

# DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA

# 3



## Cultural Shift: Developments, Biographies, (Im)materialities

edited by Piotr Cichocki, Maciej Ząbek

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## Cultural Shift in East Africa: Developments, Biographies, (Im)materialities

edited by  
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## INTRODUCTION

This collection of articles aims to bring closer the problem of current dynamic changes taking place in East Africa, something we may call cultural shifts, that actually incorporates transformations in every sphere of life from social, economic, through religious and linguistic to the rapid changes in environment and climate. A quick look at the table of contents proves that the collection is in the strict sense interdisciplinary, but the common ground for this meeting is founded by anthropological theory.

By starting to investigate the problem of a cultural shift, it is adequate to trace the constellation of academic theories referring to that question. Among concepts that are most frequently used in academic debate and outside academia are development, globalization and modernization. In the course of the book we refer to them ambiguously: at the same time we use them as analytic tools and polemicize with them, criticize them and ask them uncomfortable questions.

The good example is the concept of the development, very often used in relation to African context, but not only by Africanists or anthropologists. The development is a paradigm for thinking and acting about and through an African state, a society or even a personal life of Africans. Moreover, the concept is not only an analytical tool used to describe processes but rather it became a persuasive political tool used to redefine and reshape social and economic life of individuals, communities and regions. The example of how this concept manifests on the level of individual



biographies comes from ethnographic fieldwork. Number of Tanzanians and Malawians with whom we had opportunity to talk during our independent research projects planned or fantasized about their further lives similarly as they would write a developmental plan. Furthermore, similar observations from the fieldwork illustrate how communities or local institutions address to and organize according to the notions of development. Most of orations of traditional authorities in public or semi-public occasions were related to a development as more or less hypothetical but always desirable future. But developmental is not only, or even not mostly, discursive. It is rather an element of effective, embodied, shared imagination of powers, hierarchies and prosperities.

As above mentioned examples suggest, we propose the perspective on the cultural shifts that reflects their local diversifications and negotiations. We argue that specifically ethnographic methods, with their focus on unmediated experience play a crucial role in understanding the phenomenon as multilayered rather than universal and homogenous.

Due to ethnographic methodology, we – and most of the authors from this volume – had an opportunity to observe and understand contradictions, multifariousness and spottiness of shifts and changes, that are often seen as monolithic and leading one universal way of life in the spacious and diverse continent and region.

This book has been organized into three sections, each of which contains the set of interrelated articles. The division reflects some theoretical orientations in modern African studies, but even more, the categories of institutions and experience of everyday life in East Africa. We have proposed three points of view: throughout the already discussed concept of the development, through the perspective of biographies and narrations on the body, then through the scope of (im)materiality.

The first part presents papers that focus on what is usually discussed, within the public debate on the issues of development of states and economies. Their configuration, however, addresses the intersection of economic, political and environmental issues. We have no doubts that dynamics of these relations is essential to regional and state politics in the region, putting the environmental problems as central actor in the composition of the social<sup>1</sup>.

The second point of view – connected with eponymous biographies and narrations – is driven from methodological orientation on the individually embodied experience. By these we want to stress the importance of cultural shifts as seen from the perspective of the embodiment on individuals. One of the leading attempts of the problematization of the embodiment in today's anthropology is the gender theory. It is arguable through reading of current African studies<sup>2</sup>, that the gender theory applies to both the reinterpretation of what was and is African society from one side, and a deep change, that eventually may bring the cultural shift from postcolonial structures from the other. The perspective of the biography, especially in relation to women experience and their struggles in colonial and post-colonial social settings, questions the official historical discourse and suggests that cultural shifts we focus on, might be multidirectional. The example of this multi-directionality comes from modern history of independent Tanzania. As literature informs<sup>3</sup>, the ideological and economic reforms – establishment of Ujamaa, suahilization and generally development of African socialism – was parallel to puritanism in

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<sup>1</sup> B. Latour, *Politics of nature: how to bring the sciences into democracy*, Cambridge 2004.

<sup>2</sup> *African gender studies: theoretical questions and conceptual issues*, ed. O. Oyèwùmí, Houndmills – Basingstoke – New York 2005.

<sup>3</sup> A.M. Ivaska, *Cultured states: youth, gender, and modern style in 1960s Dar es Salaam*, Durham 2011.

spheres of attirement and behaviour of Tanzanian women. The state ideological control over women's bodies was implemented under the ideology of Africanness freed from western corrupted influences. The more present struggles of women, who aim to broaden the space of political and personal agency, prove that the previous reform supported only part of Tanzanians in their de-colonial aspirations.

The last part of the book concerns phenomena of the religious realm, understood, however, not only from the perspective of beliefs and systems, but also as networks set by people, material and immaterial elements. We decided to define it by the concept of (im)materiality, referring to the anthropological literature on religion, that highlights the importance of a material component and an embodied experience of a ritual, a faith or a morality<sup>4</sup>. To be exact, the mentioned authors stressed the ‚materiality’ of the religion (and the art). By adding ‚im’ to the ‚materiality’, we like to highlight the importance of mediated and technologic<sup>5</sup> elements in network established by religious rituals and communities. The other reason for implementation of the prefix refers to an active role of imagination and spiritual phenomena that are essential in the religious realm as defined by church attendants and ritual goers. The notion of (im)materiality ties also “human experience and technical of (im)material objects”<sup>6</sup>, which refers to wider spheres of culture outside the religious. Therefore, we aim to address religion by defining it through used elements and also through links that

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<sup>4</sup> A. Gell, *Art and agency: an anthropological theory*, Oxford – New York 1998; B. Meyer, *Materializing religion*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2, pp. 227–228; Idem, *Media and the senses in the making of religious experience: an introduction*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2, pp. 124–134, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> *Cargo/(nie)materialność. Katalog. CARGO/(im)materiality. The Catalogue/CARGO/(非)物质图录*, ed. P. Cichocki and W. Plińska, Warszawa 2016.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 44.

it is creating with seemingly other spheres of social life: economy, technology, politics or art.

### Shift or shifts?

Before we elaborate on the content of particular chapters, it is required to define more precisely the concept of ‚change‘ – or ‚shift‘. In the context of colonized regions and southern Africa more precisely, these concepts were fundamental for scholars from the so called Manchester school, in fact centered around Rhodes – Livingstone Institute in today’s Zambia. Scholars who worked in Rhodes – Livingstone Institute, led by Max Gluckman were interested mostly in the cultural shift<sup>7</sup> manifested on both material and symbolic aspects of newly formed urban communities. The example of the thematic scope was the relation between political units of „tribes” and working class. Another distinctive novelty from Max Gluckman’s group was a method of the research and the description, based mostly on case studies that are ideal lenses to observe the process of shift.

However, it is worth noting that deep dynamic and instability were a constant feature of African social landscape. At the same time, which is not contrary, the current processes create unprecedented situation of cultural, demographic, ecologic and technologic shift.

Researchers<sup>8</sup> proved by certain case studies that Africans in precolonial and colonial times manifested a great deal of attach-

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<sup>7</sup> E. Colson, *Tonga religious life in the twentieth century*, Lusaka 2006; M. Gluckman, *Order and rebellion in tribal Africa: collected essays with an autobiographical introduction*, London 2004 (1963); J.C. Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance*, Manchester 1956; R.P. Werbner, *The Manchester school in south-central Africa*, „Annual review of anthropology”, 13(1984), no. 1, pp. 157–185.

<sup>8</sup> R. Natvig, *Oromos, Slaves, and the Zar Spirits: A Contribution to the History of the Zar Cult*, „The International Journal of African Historical Studies”, 20(1987),

ment to cultural and spatial mobility. Phenomena like migrations, (sometimes very dynamic and creating new communities like mfecane), crossover of groups, religious pluralism or culture creativity were a remarkable feature of people throughout the whole continent. By far, Africans do have their own antiquity, but they also do have magnitude of history.

Another question that attracts attention of scholars<sup>9</sup> is a comparison of modern African cultural shifts to economic, political and cultural transformations from other continents. The remarkable discussions on the African working class and its similarity – or distinction – to European or American labour, again was a deal of the discussion of Manchester School. As Max Gluckman insisted ‘An African townsman is a townsman; an African miner is a miner’<sup>10</sup>, stressing the universality (or rather the process of universalization) of the capitalism.

We do not deny, however, that the changes are not a transnational phenomenon. As James Ferguson argues, Africa is a part of world order<sup>11</sup>, call it neoliberal or, if we decide to call it with the newer denotation, any global network of power, defining its certain elements by its own logic. The interesting approach that compares the African (post)modernity and (neo)liberation/liberalism comes

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no. 4, p. 669; T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa*, in: *The Invention of Tradition*, eds. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 211–262; T. Ranger, *Religious Pluralism in Zimbabwe. A Report on the Britain-Zimbabwe Society Research Day, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 23 April 1994*, „Journal of Religion in Africa”, 25(1995), no. 3, p. 226.

<sup>9</sup> *The objects of life in Central Africa: the history of consumption and social change, 1840–1980*, eds. R. Ross, M. Hinfelaar and I. Peša, Leiden 2013; L. Vail, *The Creation of tribalism in Southern Africa*, London – Berkeley 1989.

<sup>10</sup> M. Gluckman, *Anthropological problems arising from the African industrial revolution*, in: *Social change in modern Africa*, ed. A. Southall, London 1961.

<sup>11</sup> J. Ferguson, *Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order*, Durham 2006.

from theoretical writings of Immanuel Wallerstein<sup>12</sup>. Wallerstein argues that the modern interconnected world – the world system in his nomenclature – is indeed universal and overwhelming (or at least widely and aggressively expanding), but its terrain is heterogeneous and hierarchically systematized into core, semi-peripheries and peripheries, the latter two equated to post-colonial states<sup>13</sup>. The connection and the hierarchy are strengthened by the global division of labor, where the peripheral areas are sentenced to less paid, less specialized and more strenuous labour. National states are in fact subordinary in this process, only administrating the division and in case of peripheral areas weakly structured and marginally autonomous.

As far as we draw a lot from two mentioned perspectives we would like to propose a slightly different perspective that compares the global perspective and the local social and ecological environment. As most of presented papers can be described as case studies based on particular localities, we cannot underestimate the locality, the difference, the uniqueness. On the field of social studies the defiance of the local and the singular is at best a methodological limitation, and ignorance at worse. At the same time the lack of the perspective on the global processes is a lapse as well. The example from Tanzania refers to the twilight of the African socialism, when Julius Nyerere declared the end of the politics started by Arusha Agreement. It is widely known that the change of politics was an effect of pressures from International Monetary Fund and other global institutions. This decision though affected in many ways numerous localities in Tanzania. After the national change, the particular territories of Tanzanian state evolve economically in

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<sup>12</sup> I.M. Wallerstein, *Africa and the modern world*, Trenton 1986; Idem, *Africa: the politics of independence and unity*, Lincoln 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Idem, *World-systems analysis: an introduction*, Durham 2004.

different directions. A good example of the analysis of Tanzanian transformations diversified among different localities comes from ethnography of Pat Caplan, who described variously how communities of Mafia Island changed separately underway of historical changes of the state<sup>14</sup>.

Another perspective that necessitates scholars to link global and local perspective and to diversify cultural change into a bundle of transformations comes from the study of environment and climate change. As far as we understand the source of the problem – and some of its solutions – we know that particular realizations and effects of the climate change are always local.

This collection of texts, as the variety of fieldworks, themes and approaches, aims to represent a certain epistemological value. This juxtaposition, however, corresponds with the theoretical approach toward social shift, elsewhere referred to as the development or the modernisation. We understand this shift as a non-linear, non-homogenic, stratified, multi-dimensional phenomenon. It is clearly a too much distanced perspective to talk about an “African development”. Even if financial politics or technical innovations concern wider areas (or rather construct global areas e.g. ‘global south’ or ‘third world’ by the political, economic distinctions and hierarchies), they are each time shaped by local social environment, which differentiates their role, meaning and outcome. Hence, we tend to describe ‘developments’ instead of a single ‘development’, ‘modernisations’ as a contrast to the vision of homogenised modern Africa and even more broadly: ‘Africas’ instead of homogenous ‘Africa’. Moreover, we argue that not only national policies and institutions differentiate the ‘developments’. As proved by a num-

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<sup>14</sup> P. Caplan, *African voices, African lives personal narratives from a Swahili village*, London – New York 2003; Idem, *Between Socialism & Neo-Liberalism: Mafia Island, Tanzania, 1965–2004*, „Review of African Political Economy”, 34(2007), no. 114, pp. 679–694.

ber of theoreticians and researchers<sup>15</sup>, the remarkable feature of African states lies in their internal incoherency and juxtaposition. Observing countries like Tanzania and Malawi, we might see that there are numbers of factors that affect the differentiation between regions, social groups or social identities. If we take the example of relations between Northern and Southern Regions in Malawi, we consider different ethnic composition, geographical environments and landscapes, economic traditions and projects, historical backgrounds, languages used and many others factors that apart from the general condition of economy of shortage and higher administrative belonging, brings to mind more an image of contrast than a homogeneity.

## Developments

As it was mentioned, the first part of the book directs us to problems of the development, understood in the context of dynamic configurations of social and natural phenomena. We argue that to address these phenomena, the interdisciplinary approach is needed, and the chapter reflects this confidence.

The first chapter by Wakati Maliva and Gervas Kavonga concerns the link between what is understood as development, the power and the language. Authors argue that “a foreign language is not a proper tool for development”. The thesis is based on the observation, how the education of certain languages differs the faces and dynamics of African states and current developments of the region. Good enough example comes from the comparison of two neighboring countries: post-socialist Tanzania, where Kiswahili promoted – or

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<sup>15</sup> A.I. Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa's international boundaries, 1884–1984*, London 1984; A. Mbembe, *On the postcolony*, Berkeley 2001; A. Mbembe and S. Nuttall, *Public Culture*, „Public Culture”, 15(2003), no. 1, pp. 11–40.



enforced as critics may say – the cultural homogeneity despite the extreme linguistic and ethnic differentiation; and post-authoritarian Malawi, where the domination of Chewa group had not translated onto domination of Chichewa language and often English still is a lingua franca, at least among educated population. It is unauthorized to foretell political and economic future to both countries, but it clearly depends on the level of social integration of certain regions, the development of which is highly differentiated.

Authors make a clear statement, that “a foreign language is not a proper tool for development” and “imperative education [should] be delivered in the language that everyone is conversant with to enable educated people in the society to translate theories into practice”. It is remarkable, though, that the relationship between colonization, decolonization and language used by state institutions became precisely proven. Moreover, authors connect the possible wider spread of Kiswahili as the language of higher education<sup>16</sup> as the factor that contributes to the development of the region, the African Union and the EAC. By this, we can see how the language becomes somehow institutionalized and materialized as an actor in the process of the cultural shift.

The author of the next chapter, Maximilian Chuhila presents an in-depth historical analysis of rural transformations in Tanzania, more precisely maize farming in Ismani, part of the present day Iringa District. By the precise perspective of the Ismani locality, the author presents contradictions of development in the sphere of agriculture: simultaneous large size of farming as an informal sector of employment in Tanzania and its relative and limited technological means involved in it and vast land resource in rural areas contrasted with inability to adequately utilise the land. Chuhila shows the slow process of development of accessibility to market

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<sup>16</sup> For now English is still the language of higher education in Tanzania.

outlets, improving of seeds and accessibility to farm-loans parallel to political and economical changes in Tanzania.

Factors that play the most crucial role in this entanglement are the physical environment and the government interventions. Due to climate change, the agriculture finds worsening conditions and the shifting stability is secured only through the administrative support (or remittances from relatives). Through the article it is clearly visible how the local versions and practices of development varied from a number of independent factors.

The land ownership, right to use it and knowledge on it – is the subject of the paper by Napoleon Saulos Mlove and Justin K. Urassa. The specific location of the study is Handeni District in northeastern Tanzania. Authors study the legal aspect of land ownership and estimate its demographic, economic and quotidian effects. The important aspect of the control over the land in the district are Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO), which is the legal model of formalization of customary land rights. The customary rights, however, are playing a certain role within the neo-liberal economy, for example they may enable owners of the land to access bank credits and loans. The context of Mlove and Urassa research also relates to the growing demographic and social mobility, both affecting the notions of land as a commodity or a passive capital. The authors prove, however, that Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy enhance tenure security, reduce border conflicts and support ownership of land by vulnerable groups. At the same time formalised customary land rights do not affect positively household incomes and capital accumulation. The study, though, brings an interesting and based on precise data perspective on the entanglement of three systems: the so-called 'traditional', legal based on the state and neo-liberal. By these the article brings a question of how the growth of social and economic mobility interferes with earlier social structures of rural communities.

Maciej Ząbek's article also refers to the Tanzanian socialism, more specifically to rural Ujamaa communities. The author is especially interested in the role of Ujamaa in forming Tanzanian social relations and identity. The analysis of the historical context, carefully studied by the author, reveals the ideological, political and economic environment in which Ujamaa project emerged, along with reforms concerning the gender roles (regulation on the attire of women) and the educational reform supporting the spread of Kiswahili as the national language. Ujamaa was part of the wide front of reforms, which, purposely thank to Julius Nyerere's political project, had to establish the new ideological, economic structure of decolonizing state. Though, the ujamaa undoubtedly had the most tremendous effect on unevenly inhabited rural areas of Tanzania. The realization of ujamaa policy brought the relocations of whole village populations, technologization of agricultural work, but what is most interesting for Ząbek, also effects on the cultural practices, discourses and a sense of individual identity.

The paper concerns the today's look at the ujamaa past. Not surprisingly the memories about ujamaa are ambiguous and differentiated depending on which class comes from and what age group he or she represents. The vision of the past is also reshaped by today's experiences of new economic order and unequal development deepening inner diversification of Tanzanian society. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why ujamaa still takes a central role in debates on political identity of Tanzanians in media, hip-hop music or academic conferences.

Certainly the ujamaa and general Nyerere's policy shaped the modern notions of Tanzanianess, altogether with later economic reforms, which led to (neo-)liberalisation of the market. As Ząbek mentions, it is interesting to compare eastern European memories about the socialism, despite the contrasting differences between their historical contexts, realisations and effects. Perhaps among

few similarities is the fact that both of the systems were replaced by the realm of capitalism.

The next chapter written by Ambiliasia Peniel Mosha and Steven Kauzeni concerns seemingly different phenomenon, namely the issue of climate change, but observed from the local point of view. Mshiri village population, as authors argue, has the set of procedures to preserve the climate of their environment on the slopes of the Kilimanjaro elevation.

This perspective, however, concerns wide spectrum of modern life in a postcolony. The status of local, indigenous knowledge reflects the relations of power and hierarchies of certain practices toward the environment. Moreover, the shape of social cultural deeply rooted interventions that helped to preserve the climate is interrelated with moral and religious beliefs and practices. In the context of colonial and postcolonial Tanzania we can understand how the local knowledge was first neglected, administrative attitudes toward the environment modernized and only recently some projects make an effort to reconstitute and re-appreciate what is now called 'traditional knowledge'.

Without a doubt Mosha and Kauzeni fit into the engaged approach. They urge to re-construct (or construct) that environmental conversation should be "faith-based, collectively held, and engraved in peoples' hearts in the adoration of the creation which takes us back to the theories of moral realism". By this, the paper is an interesting proposition of project between African philosophically grounded social work and modern science and it brings an economic and political vision of what the development can be.

## **Biographies**

The second part of the book regards the relations between narrations, the role of body and gender in eponymous cultural shifts.

The body and gender, as authors prove, are the effect of social and historical processes. It would be a lapse, however, to easily identify gender roles for example in rural Tanzania as only effect of the so called ‚traditional African culture‘. Although we do not underestimate the historicity of African indigenous social roles, we must be suspicious for a crucial part of colonizing institutions in creating the dominant gender ideology, that justifies the masculine hegemony among most of the communities in East African states. We would rather propose to trace how gender roles were and are constructed by many different actors in the historical process.

Anna Cichecka traces the social and political entanglement of gender equality and women’s empowerment as from the perspective of representatives of the NGO sector and political circles in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. The author compares and juxtaposes the gender equality understood both as global, political project and as the social and existential struggles of local women for better and equal opportunities in their everyday life (or very often an alternative to injustice or even violent social environment they are been born into). In Cichecka’s view the non-governmental sector reflects this suspension and contradictions determining roles of Tanzanian women in current rural and urban communities around the country<sup>17</sup>. From European perspective, women’s movements ability to act autonomically and to control social, political and economic resources faces certain contradictions in Tanzania. One of the tendencies here is a ‚neopatrimoniality‘ ideologically driven from ‚African traditions‘ but at the same time its current ideology is constructed by colonial and postcolonial policies.

Describing the realization of the gender equality policy, Cichecka addresses indirectly the cultural shift, that contains also the ques-

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<sup>17</sup> It is worth mentioning that the promotion of gender equality becomes an agenda in most developing countries as a key strategy for balanced development.

tion of gender roles and gender stereotypes. Gender equality as seen through the policy makers and from bottom-up perspective may influence the dominant ideology of development in many different ways, for example support it when it comes to the strengthening of the agency, or contest it, when it tends to concentrate social and economic capital in hands of (mostly masculine) proprietors.

Anna Wieczorkiewicz asks a question about a body and a gender from a different perspective. In her paper „Black women” as a rhetorical tool of persuasion’ she is interested mostly in relation that binds various cultural subjects and social theories. By these the article links the view of researchers with the embodied perspective of certain human actors, namely two women signified within the colonial and postcolonial realm as ‘black’: Saartije Baartman and Waris Dirie. Baartman, known also under an objectifying name ‘Hottentot Venus’ in XIX had performed or rather was exhibited for white audiences in Britain and France, as phenomenon of natural world, one can interpret. Waris Dirie, on the other hand, is a Somali-born model, who escaped an arranged marriage to a much older man, moved to London and by chance was discovered by a professional photographer who started her stunning career, during which she became an activist for women’s rights, especially regarding campaigns against female genital mutilation. Wieczorkiewicz compares biographies of these two ‘black women’ and analyses how they were narrated in several juxtaposed ways by varied subjects and constructed, shaped by social and political factors. In effect these two biographies became persuasive tools for negotiating and contesting different ideologies and hierarchies.

The thematic scope of Wieczorkiewicz’s chapter crosses the boundaries of the East African region, media and discourses transmitting biographies of Baartman and Dirie as global but locally reinterpreted. These two cases give an example of a cultural shift that is processing parallel in many localities. Within this shift the

narratives deterritorialize and their meanings become multilayered. It is another premise to understand the analyzed cultural shift as ambiguous, multidimensional and juxtaposed.

### **(Im)materialities**

The third part of the book gathers four articles related to African religious life in the process of a historical shift. However, as it was noted earlier, the approach to the religion is extended by the sphere of materiality – and also immaterial objects that are conceptualized not as a sphere of belief, but as actors affecting the network of elements they belong to.

We also want to emphasize the role of the religion in the processes of cultural shifts in East Africa and beyond. It is addressed by authors within this section: Ashura Jackson and Mussa Kassimu write about the political and social consequences of Christian missions establishment, these two chapters approach religion from the historical perspective; Piotr Cichocki and Antonio Alegretti refer to the technical development and changing material infrastructures in context of a shift in the religious life.

To be more precise, Ashura Jackson compares African Independent Churches (AICs) to what she calls historical churches, initiated outside Africa. The comparison refers to the area known today as Mbeya region. Author shows skilfully how the administrative region was constructed by the establishment and the activity of missions, setting the first colonial structures of power. Moreover, the African Independent Churches, which were emerging relatively early in this area (from 1920s), were seen as not only religious communities but also as a political threat to colonial administrative hegemony. In fact the religious practices were not completely separated from political realm, by the way how they address issues of the subjectivity, the race, the power, the competence of human and non-human actors.

The rivalry between African Independent Churches and historical (colonial) churches were clearly seen in the spheres of everyday life of Mbeya inhabitants and issues like family life (monogamy or polygamy), individualism, secularism and consumerism. The conflict had not finished with the colonial period, but remains vivid in post-colonial Tanganyika (and furthermore Tanzania). As Jackson writes: “Post-colonial threats were on the economy, different doctrine, followers, and teachings, things they provide to people, freedom of praising and worshipping and the way they considered faith with culture”.

Mussa Kassimu in his paper refers to a particular group from Central-Western Tanzania, namely Wanyamwezi. The analysis also concerns the colonisation and transformation of religious life and beliefs. Same as Arusha Jackson Kassimu writes about the conflict between “African beliefs” and incoming religious systems. In case of Wanyamwezi both Christianity from white missionaries and Arab traders played a role. Kassimu generally defines their role as somehow negative in relation to identity crisis that started to undermine the consistency of community (the oneness of the group – Unyamwezi<sup>18</sup>). The precolonial group was divided into Wanyamwezi Christians and Wanyamwezi Muslims, which led to conflict and therefore weakened political meaning of the group. The social split was also the result of the forsake of “important traditional ritual practices” which were dissolved in religious practices of new denominations.

By this, the paper brings an interesting comparison of religion, politics and political identity. Kassimu argues that the change of religious life, especially when the shift undermines the homogeneity of community, may cause the political destabilisation in case of pre-colonial communities. In fact, the analysis is a model of thinking about the role of monotheisms in the process of

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<sup>18</sup> R.G. Abrahams, *The Political Organization of Unyamwezi*, Cambridge 1967.



colonisation. The case of Wanyamwezi can be compared to the process of colonisation of what is now Central African Republic, where the influences of Christianity and Islam dominated over the traditional beliefs. From this perspective it seems to be justified to evaluate the religious systems and practices as politically effective.

The effectiveness is also the subject of the next chapter, whose author is Piotr Cichocki. This time the main fieldwork concerns Northern Region of Malawi where a Christian mission in Livingstonia was established as far as in 1894. From that time on, the influence of Christianity has an indisputable influence on every sphere of life of local Tumbuka and Ngoni people. Cichocki is interested mostly in the connection between Christianity and the technological development, and traces these bonds through religious and ritual practices connected with music. He makes a comparison between pentecostal and presbyterian Christianity and local cults of spirits named *vimbuza*. The comparison reveals close phenomenological relationship between Christianity and electricity along with other modern technological facilities and connection between local ritual life with handcraft, and what is called in case of music – acoustic sound.

The case of two types of religious practices (Christianity and *Vimbuza*) reflects the relation between religion and development which is in both academic and colloquial discourse somehow oversimplified. Instead of contrasting the developed technology and the religion, it is more accurate to observe and interpret ways in which they are entangled. The juxtaposed attitudes toward the technology and its relationship with religious rituals complicate and diversify the allegedly homogenised image of global development. Moreover, the analysis of the technological aspects of rituals emphasises the material and dynamic aspects of religion in lieu of static approach focused on systems of beliefs.

The next chapter by Antonio Alegretti brings a similar perspective on the relations between religion and the development. The author comments on the very distinct group of Tanzanian society – Maasai, and questions the role of Christianity in the transformation of the social, cultural and material landscape of Maasailand. The analysis is concerned mostly with the material aspect, which again binds the issues of technological and material shift with the overall aspects of changing culture. Alegretti, as Cichocki in previous chapter, argues that there is a need to change anthropological perspective on religion from a set of internal or immaterial beliefs to practices involving networks of social relations and materialities<sup>19</sup>. Using this approach the author shows the development of Christianity among Maasai, which is a relatively current phenomenon, comparing to the role of Christianity among other groups in former Tanganika. This phenomenon however should not be discussed as external to what can be called Maasai traditional culture. Rather the religious sphere is understood as a space in which relations of power between individuals, communities and spheres of society compete. To the general idea of the book the chapter contributes also by theorising cultural shift not as much as a generational change, but rather as a construction of new spaces (both material and imaginary) like religion, which become “sites of negotiations” for hierarchies, access and generally development.

## Methods

The method shared by authors, whose papers build this volume, is worth mentioning. As it was underlined we have been tracing the

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<sup>19</sup> T.G. Kirsch, *Restaging the Will to Believe: Religious Pluralism, Anti-Syncretism, and the Problem of Belief*, „American Anthropologist”, 106(2004), no. 4, pp. 699–709; B. Meyer, *Mediation and the Genesis of presence: towards a material approach to religion*, Utrecht 2012.

local and embodied ways of changing the social realm of current East Africa. Obviously, the perspective of analysis does not stand apart from the character of the knowledge. The source is obviously based on everyday life of social actors and the local knowledge. Most of research projects presented in papers are based on the ethnographic fieldwork including the participant observation of fluctuating dailiness in certain localities and ethnographic interviews.

By conducting semi-structured ethnographic interviews authors aimed to understand local conceptualizations and emic classifications.

The method of the participant observation addresses problems of the embodiment, the materiality, the cultural practice and the imponderabilia of dailiness. Moreover, it also helps to understand ways in which technologies and media take part in mundane everyday life and the human experience.

Some authors, however, decided to research the developmental and cultural shifts through the historical archives or official documents (chapters by Maximilan Chuhila and Arusha Jackson) or through the narratives on historical past as seen and experienced by individual social actors (chapter by Maciej Ząbek and to some extent – Anna Wieczorkiewicz). Others interspersed also the quantitative methods used especially to present the economic aspect of research problems.

As final remarks we invite readers to explore these multi-accentual, multilayered perspectives and reverberations of shifting Africas. We hope that tracing the way how this mosaic or polyphonic symphony fuses into a wider composition will be epistemically and practically enriching.

*Piotr Cichocki & Maciej Ząbek*

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PART I

**DEVELOPMENTS**

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## Chapter 1.

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KAWONGA GERVAS, WAKATI MALIVA

### **EAST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: LANGUAGE AS A FORGOTTEN FACTOR**

*No country has developed on the basis  
of a foreign language, a language mastered  
by only a few elite.*

Brock-Utne, 2014

#### **ABSTRACT**

Development is a process which is anticipated to involve the whole society. In order for every individual to participate fully, it is imperative that the language used in accessing education be understood by all stakeholders involved in the development process. The argument of this paper is that appropriate language for communication and language of education is the uppermost requisite for development to be achieved. The skills of saving, investing and taking risks cannot be accessed by majority if they are provided through an education system whose language of instruction serves the interest of the few elites. The conclusion given is rooted from critical literature review and the authors experience in learning and teaching in higher education through foreign language and Kiswahili, an African language of the majority in EACs countries. This paper intended to show the extent to which a foreign language is not a proper tool for development; not only in East Africa but to any society. Language of instruction has a great role in development since the kind of education provided by the nation determines her path of development,

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the emphasis of this paper is that it is imperative education be delivered in the language that everyone is conversant with to enable educated people in the society to translate theories into practice for the development of East African region. The suggestion which is put forward is to replace a foreign language as a language of instructions with indigenous languages of wider communications such as Kiswahili. Kiswahili is being advocated for because it has two main characteristics. First is the advantage of being nobody's language throughout East Africa despite its widespread use in the region. Second, Kiswahili is linguistically related to the most indigenous languages creating necessary condition for easy acquisition. Furthermore, the language has also gained a status of an official language in the African Union and the EAC.

## Introduction

The sociolinguistic situation in East Africa is characterized by the widespread use of Kiswahili as a lingua franca, ethnic languages at local scale and foreign languages, particularly English and French among the few elites. Since the 1960s Kiswahili became an official and national language in Tanzania and Kenya<sup>1</sup> while a number of other indigenous languages are left aside. Uganda has 40 indigenous languages and English, making a total of 41 languages but only English has been given a status of both official and national language. Selection of any indigenous language to become a national and official language in Uganda would mean that other tribes are sidelined. Unfortunately, national and official language, English, is estimated to be spoken by only 21% of Uganda's population. Given that situation, only Kiswahili belongs to none of the ethnic groups. The choice of Kiswahili, being ethnically neutral and widely spoken in the country, as a national language and subsequently LoI would

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<sup>1</sup> V. Pawliková-Vilhanová, *Swahili and the dilemma of Ugandan language policy*, „Asian and African Studies”, 5(1996), no. 2, pp. 158–170.

improve the quality of education and eventually sustainable development in the country.

In Kenya the state of Kiswahili is better. Kiswahili enjoys the constitutional status of both an official and a national language. By 1996, 70% of Kenyans were estimated to speak Kiswahili along with other ethnic languages<sup>2</sup>. Although a number of ethnic languages in Kenya is not well established, they are estimated to range between 40 and 60<sup>3</sup>. Despite the variations, the fact is that the country's language which can serve as LoI and that is widely used in the East African region apart from English is Kiswahili. Provided that Kenya has accorded Kiswahili a national language status, making it LoI, may not be as difficult.

Tanzania has a unique experience with Kiswahili. Despite having 120–155 ethnic languages<sup>4</sup>, Kiswahili is spoken all over the country. The language is a LoI in primary education, certificate in teacher education and is taught as a compulsory subject in Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE). Kiswahili is also learned at university level as a discipline. However, Kiswahili is not used as LoI in secondary and higher education in Tanzania. Kiswahili was to start to be used as LoI at all levels of education in Tanzania by 1990's as recommended by the Makweta commission of 1984 but for no apparent reason it was delayed to date. It is estimated that only less than 5% of Tanzanians are fluent in English language. Although English is mastered by that small population in the country, it is used as a LoI in post primary education.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>3</sup> L. Muaka, *Language Perceptions and Identity among Kenyan Speakers*, in: *Selected Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference on African Linguistics*, ed. G.E. Bokamba [et al.], Somerville 2011.

<sup>4</sup> H.R.T. Muzale & J.M. Rugemalira, *Researching and Documenting the Languages of Tanzania*, „Language Documentation & conservation”, 2(2008), no. 1.

Rwanda has Kinyarwanda as the only ethnic language where more than 90% speak it and this has made it easier for the nation to make the language both national and official. It is also the LoI in primary school education. Rwanda had three official languages until 2008 when French was officially dropped from being an official language. This change was caused partly by the political disagreements between Rwanda and France. Prior to that change, both English and French were used as LoI in secondary education and used as a criterion for selection into university. Since Rwanda joined the East African Community in 2009, it has made Kiswahili, which is an official language of the community, its official language, too.

Burundi is as linguistically homogeneous as Rwanda where it is estimated that 98% of its population speak Kirundi, a national language. French is an official language and is used in secondary and higher education. Kiswahili is a trade language but has not been given any status by the state. Kiswahili and English are now taught in schools as subjects from as early as the first year of their primary education.

Given the sociolinguistic situation in this section, it is apparent that two issues are noted. First, languages used in post primary education in East African region are foreign and ill mastered by both teachers and students. Second, Kiswahili has received a special attention across EAC countries. With this trend of Kiswahili, communication challenges among people of the EAC can be eliminated. Moreover,, LoI issue in the region can be appropriately addressed. The solution to communication and LoI will pave the way to the majority to engage in the discussion and implementation of development plans in the region. There is a close and indispensable relationship between language and development. Arguing in line with this view Laitin and Ramachadran had the following to say:

“... we assume that increasing distance and lower exposure [to LoI] results in increasing learning costs and consequently reduces the

level of human capital in society. We see in Africa a combination of elite access to the official language and widespread popular ignorance of that language. We can infer from this combination that the failure of newly independent African states to choose local languages as official increases manifold times the costs of effective participation in political and professional roles [both factors affect development] for much of the local populations. Similarly the use of a distant language increases the cost of acquiring and processing pertinent health information, [development information in this case], and acts as a barrier to fostering desirable health behavior, as well in affecting access and quality of health care provided. These differences in physical and mental human capital in turn translate into differences in productivity and wealth”. [Squared brackets and emphasis is ours]<sup>5</sup>.

As can be noted from the quotation above, the concept of official languages does not solely exclude the LoI especially when it is associated with development. The reason behind is that education has a vital role for human development. Before any further discussion, the concept of development is introduced here with argument on the importance of appropriate LoI for development to be achieved.

The term development is oftentimes used to denote physical infrastructure such as better roads, railway lines, electricity, better houses and of course, better education. Okonkwo observes that if a nation in present age does not have education as its prime project, there must be an agenda of underdevelopment as its alternative<sup>6</sup>. Every nation tries to educate its citizens to the best of their capacities. A massive amount of money is being spent by nations on education. New curricula are being crafted to keep pace with the global development in science and technology. Despite all investment and concerns in

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<sup>5</sup> D.D. Laitin, R. Ramachandran and S.L. Walter, *Language of instruction and student learning: Evidence from an experimental program in Cameroon*, in: *15th SAET Conference on Trends in Economics*, Cambridge, UK, 2015, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> J.I. Okonkwo, *Appropriate Language in Education*, in: *Giving Space to African Voices: Rights in Local Languages and Local Curriculum*, Z. Babaci-Wilhite, Rotterdam 2014, pp. 131–146.

education, less discussion is devoted to language of instruction (LoI) in our education. The LoI is so crucial in fostering development in all areas of human wellbeing. Development in all sectors cannot be disassociated from the language that is used by the people to acquire knowledge and skills. The importance of language, particularly LoI in our schools holds a key role to development because decision about development requires right information on concepts, theories and practices through quality education.

We all agree that our children must get a good education. But what is a good education? Through which medium should our children be educated? For whose benefit are they educated? The answer to the first question is difficult even to the developed world to date. Lessow-Hurley puts it clearly how difficult it is for Americans to decide what good education is:

Everyone agrees that children are our most precious resource, that they should all have access to a good education that they should achieve. But in a multiethnic, multidenominational, multilingual society with broad geographic, socioeconomic, and value spectra, what constitutes a good education, what children should achieve, and how they should achieve it, isn't at all clear<sup>7</sup>.

East African region has a great diversity when it comes to languages as many African nations do. The diversity naturally came in place since language is made of arbitrary symbols. Colonial powers divided Africa on their own criteria, not based on the languages spoken by people of the particular area. Those who inherited the political leadership from colonialists took over diverse population groups with distinct languages and cultures alongside alien and haphazard territorial boundaries<sup>8</sup>. Since the colonial masters educated

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<sup>7</sup> J. Lessow-Hurley, *Meeting the needs of second language learners: an educator's guide*, Alexandria 2003, p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> S.Y. Hameso, *The language of education in Africa: The key issues*, „Language, culture and curriculum”, 10(1997), no. 1, pp. 1–13.

few Africans through the medium of their language, new governments inherited and continued to educate their citizens through the same. During colonialism, using colonial languages to educate Africans was aimed at obtaining few colonial assistants to facilitate their administration. Any attempt to remove this great language and cultural diversity into a single, foreign language and culture is too great undertaking. In the midst of this language diversity, there is Kiswahili, a language that is spoken by majority of East Africans. Genetically Kiswahili shares all main linguistic features with most languages found in EAC. This is to say that most languages including Kiswahili belong to the Bantu Family languages. That being the case, a child with a Bantu mother tongue will learn Kiswahili as a second language more easily than learning English which belongs to the Germanic Language Family. This assumption is consistent with Laitin and Ramachandran argument that a foreign language to be used for instruction, must be in proximity to the indigenous language<sup>9</sup>. They further insisted that there are more economic gains for using local languages as opposed to using a foreign language. According to Rubanza, most children in Tanzania acquire their mother tongue plus Kiswahili simultaneously to the extent that no clear line can be drawn when a child finishes learning mother tongue and starts to learn Kiswahili<sup>10</sup>. Astonishingly, our citizens are educated, not even through the second language (L2) but through the foreign languages (FL). The difference between the two is given by Kecskâes & Papp when he explains:

In the second language environment (SLE), language learners have full exposure to the target language (not only to the language system, but to its frame as well) because it is the dominant or the only language of the community. This is not the case in the foreign language environment

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<sup>9</sup> D.D. Laitin, R. Ramachandran, and S.L. Walter, *Language of instruction...*, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> Y.I. Rubanza, *Can a three-tier language policy model work in Tanzania? A new perspective*, „Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies”, 24(1996), no. 1.

(FLE) where students' experience and activities in the target language are almost always restricted to the time spent in the classroom<sup>11</sup>.

And the way English is used in East African states, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda secondary schools is exactly what Kecskâes and Papp refer to as FLE. The situation is also similar to the French speaking countries in EAC such as Burundi and Rwanda. Students do not use a foreign language beyond the four walls of their classrooms. This situation makes the LoI new throughout their schooling years. As a result, this deficiency in LoI is carried over to university. This is evidenced by Komba who studied communication skills among Third Year university students at the Sokoine University of Agriculture and found that most students had little skills for essay writing<sup>12</sup>. He measured several aspects and concluded that 89.1%, 88.6% and 85.1% were unable to use appropriate tenses, conclude essays and use examples or illustrate ideas respectively. This deficiency in communication skills among Third Year university students suggests that despite English being used for six years of secondary education in Tanzania as LoI, its mastery is poor. If these are university students, what about those who could not make to this level? It can be implied from the study that the LoI is not understood among students and instructors even at university level. There are many more who could not make it to the university because of a language barrier. This could also mean that those who have lower language abilities are left without education. It should be remembered that the more the people get educated, the more the development the country or region achieves. Therefore, if many citizens in East Africa are dropped from education due to the language barrier, development

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<sup>11</sup> I. Kecskés and T. Papp, *Foreign language and mother tongue*, New Jersey 2014, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> S. Komba, *The Predictive Validity of the Communication Skills Examination on Students' Overall Academic Performance at the Sokoine University of Agriculture* (unpublished PhD Thesis), University of Dar es Salaam 2012.

becomes a daydream to the region. Technological advancements in agriculture, manufacturing and other sectors cannot be developed if fewer people in the region become educated. When East Africa insists on educating its citizens through foreign languages, it is insisting on underdevelopment.

### **Language and development defined**

Scholarly works have put forward very clearly to explain why some countries have developed and others have not. Putting forward factors which facilitate or constrain development, Moyo classifies them as geographical factors, historical factors, psychological factors and cultural factors<sup>13</sup>. While these general factors hold water, the role of a language has not been given a desired attention which this paper has devoted to address in the context of EAC countries. The vital role of a language for development falls in the wider concept of communication. As it can simply be defined, communication is a process of sending and receiving information. The emphasis in this context is on effective communication which helps to create social networking for socio-economic development. People need to make informed decisions on issues regarding development. When zonal economic communities like EAC lack effective means of communication, development cannot be attained. For example, among the EAC countries, Kenya is regarded to be at the top in English fluency. However, the number of English speakers in Kenya is less than 30% of the total population<sup>14</sup>. It means that the majority are marginalized in the development agenda. Within the Community the relationship created among its people is that

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<sup>13</sup> D. Moyo and N. Ferguson, *Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*, Vancouver 2010.

<sup>14</sup> V. Pawliková-Vilhanová, *Swahili and the dilemma...*, op. cit.



of superior and inferior just because of a language and not on the bases of genuine contribution on how to eradicate social-economic challenges. According to Wanyama, the dialect of Kiswahili known as *Sheng* emerged in Nairobi in 1960s and 1970s among the youth in their efforts to find an effective means of communication<sup>15</sup>. The language employs vocabulary from African languages and English while using Kiswahili syntax. There are several sociolinguistic reasons for the emergence of that dialect but in the context of this paper, the youth sought for their communication freedom to push forward their development agenda and define their destiny in their own environment. The weak language policy of Kenya failed to address the language problem among the Kenyans not unknowingly but deliberately to exclude majority in the development agenda for the benefit of the few elites, “elites of English Language”. Based on the communication setbacks among the citizens of the same nation or across the region, development is far from achievement. Indigenous knowledge which is important for socioeconomic development of the society cannot be harvested using a language not familiar to the society. The similar observation is given by Laitin and Ramachandran that:

One institutional factor distinguishing “developed” from many “developing” nations today is their official language. The official language in developed nations is typically one which is spoken and used widely by a majority of the population. Even in developed states, when official languages/ Loi were selected, they were not universally accepted. On the other hand, in most developing states today, the official language is often one that is neither indigenous nor spoken by citizens outside of an elite minority<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> L.L. Wanyama, *Language Communication And Marketing: Contextualising the Rise of Sheng’Language in Advertising Platforms in Kenya*, „New Media and Mass Communication”, 32(2014).

<sup>16</sup> D.D. Laitin, R. Ramachandran, and S.L. Walter, *Language of instruction...*, op. cit., p. 5.

Based on that argument there is a great correlation between the nature of the language employed in seeking development and the level of development attained by a nation or a region.

### **Language of Instruction conceptualized**

This refers to the language used to implement a formal curriculum in or outside the classroom. This is the language used as an instrument of passing over knowledge, norms and beliefs of the society to its new generation<sup>17</sup>. According to UNESCO mother tongue or language of the wider communication is the most recommended as LoI<sup>18</sup>. The research by UNESCO insists that a language which is familiar to the children is wealthy for teaching and learning. Mkude has a view that it is a burden to make people struggle for their life using a foreign language because they are required to restructure their thoughts about the reality<sup>19</sup>. Several research<sup>20</sup> findings agree that teaching and learning through unfamiliar language result into poor performance and low quality in education. East African countries are still in the chain of colonial languages particularly English and French as LoI. Warning has over time been provided that there

<sup>17</sup> A. Masudi, *The need for an appropriate medium of instruction in secondary education and institutions of higher learning in Tanzania*, „Papers in Education and Development”, 2006, no. 26, pp. 32–41.

<sup>18</sup> UNESCO, *Education Position Paper*, Paris 2003.

<sup>19</sup> D.J. Mkude, *Ujenzi wa Demokrasia na Sera ya Lugha Nchini Tanzania: Kiswahili/Kiingereza Dhidi ya Lugha za Jumuiya Ndogondogo*, in: *Kiswahili katika Elimu*, Dar es Salaam 2007, p. 14–30.

<sup>20</sup> B. Brock-Utne, *Language of instruction and student performance: New insights from research in Tanzania and South Africa*, „International Review of Education”, 53(2007), no. 5–6, pp. 509–530; M.A.K. Halliday, *Explorations in the functions of language*, London 1977; Z.S.M. Mochiwa, *Utotoni hadi Ungumbaru: Matatizo ya Elimu Tanzania. Ktk. Tumbo Massabo na Chiduo*, in: *Kiswahili katika Elimu*, Dar es Salaam 2007, p. 40–53; Z. Babaci-Wilhite, *Language, Development Aid and Human Rights in Education: Curriculum Policies in Africa and Asia*, Basingstoke 2015.

is a little possibility of maintaining the objectives of education in a specific society while the language used is not familiar to the majority. In other words, at a moment you change the language of instruction to unfamiliar one, it is the time you change the objectives of education. In order to attain this aim, communication between teacher and pupil must be smooth. Most pupils in schools in East African Countries are passive participants almost in all levels of education including universities. Academic Audit report of the University of Dar es Salaam of 2008 revealed an acute language problem among the university students. The report suggested to the university management to switch to Kiswahili as a medium of instruction in order to improve the quality of education. On the contrary, the same report suggested the university to continue using English based on the international demands and trends in science and technology. The fact here is that Tanzanians learn poorly in English as their fellows do across the EAC member states. This is what is observed by Babaci-Wilhite that some African languages are well established in both scientific and technological terminologies yet they are not used as LoI in secondary education<sup>21</sup>. The similar views are put forward by Laitin and Ramachandran that “Secondary education, the key to joining the modern sector in Africa, is almost entirely conducted through the media of non indigenous languages throughout Africa, with possible exceptions of Somalia (before state collapse) and Mauritania”<sup>22</sup>. Kiswahili is the most pointed language in Africa which can afford the responsibility of being a LoI. Kiswahili being a lingua franca in East Africa could be adopted in all member states as LoI. Kiswahili is the right LoI we ought to use as EAC in education and based on what is argued by Babaci-Wilhite<sup>23</sup> on the

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<sup>21</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>22</sup> D.D. Laitin, R. Ramachandran, and S.L. Walter, *Language of instruction...*, op. cit., p. 5–6.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem.

importance of localizing instruction and curricular. Kiswahili can accommodate the linguistic diversity in East Africa because of having common linguistic features with most ethnic languages and its being sociolinguistically neutral as it is argued elsewhere in this paper.

### **Historical perspective of LoI (imperial legacy)**

Much is said in favour of foreign LoI in Africa. Many argue that global languages such as English are inevitable if Africa and the developing world throughout the world want to achieve development. The thesis is that science and technology is better accessed through the medium of English. This idea is strongly opposed by Language-Power-Pedagogy which argues that no language is inherently and permanently designed for science and technology<sup>24</sup>. And if science and technology was inherent to certain language or languages, it would not spread to other nations that speak a different language and therefore nuclear technology that began with western nations would not be present in North Korea where the West opposes their possession.

We witness many nationalities from around the globe such as the Chinese, undertaking great projects in road construction, industrialization and mining in Africa. Do they construct the roads in English? Do they manufacture industrial goods that are scattered all over Africa in English? It is time for East Africans to realize that it is the skills that matter and not language. When that is realized, education in this region will aid the development we aspire to achieve as opposed to the current practice where education acts as barrier to development due to FL being its vehicle of delivery.

There is another claim by parents on the use of English as LoI in primary school in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. They educate their

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<sup>24</sup> J.I. Okonkwo, *Appropriate Language in Education*, op. cit., pp. 131–146.

children in the medium of English because secondary education is provided in English and therefore primary education in English paves the way for smooth education at secondary level. However, there is no evidence to support this claim because even the children who learn through their L1 need to learn more grammar and new ways to communicate in academic arena. What makes a foreign language even worse to be a LoI is its limited use outside classroom walls where more free communication and language learning takes place among students. Also a foreign language cannot mold the psychological part of the human being.

### **Language and mind / thought**

The term mind is synonymously related to brain. The Webster-Dictionary defines a term mind in three different ways: (a) the element or complexity of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons. (b) the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism (c) the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism. All these definitions are in line with the fact that language has a direct link to the brain for production, processing and comprehension. According to Caplan, brain consists of a large number of regions each of which contributes to motor function, thought, emotion and other functions in special ways<sup>25</sup>. However, mind operates from actual experiences which an individual acquires from her/his environment. Mind absorbs information through various senses of organs to build a base for thoughts. Aspects of culture, norms, beliefs and traditions impose significant effects on thoughts produced by an individual. The uppermost strong mechanism which brings cultural

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<sup>25</sup> D. Caplan, *Neurolinguistics and linguistic aphasiology: An introduction*, Cambridge 1987.

aspects in the mind is language. Language is both the most effective means of communication among the human species and the means of inheriting values to the new generation. This is to suggest that a thought is produced after its conception through overtime experiences acquired from specific context through language. The proper language is the one which has arbitrarily emanated from the specific context in which individuals found themselves.

However, we are aware of the controversial debate raised by Whorf<sup>26</sup> about what is to start between language and thought. Despite the debate taking egg and chicken model, the possibility suggested in Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity cannot be ignored. According to Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity, language is not simply a reporting device for our experience, but a defining framework of it. This assumption suggests that people of different linguistic background think and understand concepts differently. In the context of this paper, the concept of development has different conception among different races of various backgrounds in linguistics, their conception must be respected. People understand concepts in their right way as they are shaped through their languages. Krashen in the theory of social interaction insisted on the importance of resources available in the speech community for language development<sup>27</sup>. Interpretations of meaning to most language expressions are culturally constructed. Taking example of idiomatic expressions, the meaning interpreted is not a result of the total words available in the expressions but rather culturally constructed, produced, interpreted and defined. Studies in second language learning have suggested that a learner cannot attain a native speaker's competence. All these suggest that con-

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<sup>26</sup> B.L. Whorf and J.B. Carroll, *Language, thought, and reality: selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*, Mansfield 2011.

<sup>27</sup> S. Krashen, *Second Language Acquisition and Second Language Learning*, Oxford 1981.

cepts like development must be rooted in the specific culture to be well understood and accepted. The superimposed definition and practices of poverty alleviation programmes in Africa and among EAC countries in particular, will never become sustainable and multiply to the grassroots. This is because thoughts and concepts are culturally constructed and understood. Arguing in line with Social semiotic theory, Kress (2007:18) had the following to say:

The sign is a social semiotic entity because the process of realization and making meaning is based on choices that are contingent action by the speakers in a social environment. Shifting modes of representation results to profound changes in our stance towards how we make sense of the world<sup>28</sup>.

Based on that view, the emphasis is that people should discuss their challenges using the signs of communication they are competent in. Using a foreign language is to change the mission of the society for the benefit of the few. This view is consistent with Ellis (2016) who argues that language and social context play an important role in conceptual processing<sup>29</sup>. This means that the context cannot fully be shared or transferred to the new context expecting to yield the same results. Using a foreign language to address poverty alleviation in EAC and elsewhere is to shift the mode of representation of reality and constrain the development process. This is because representation and communication is always a social matter which responds to social change<sup>30</sup>. Development must be conceived and addressed through language and culture of those who want development. Foreign languages especially

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<sup>28</sup> G. Kress, *Meaning, Learning and Representation in a Social Semiotic Approach to Multimodal Communication*, in: *Advances in Language and Education*, eds. A. McCabe, M. O' Donnell and R. Whittaker, London 2007, p. 18.

<sup>29</sup> C.A. Ellis, *How Language Culture and Emotions Shape the Mind*, Phd Thesis (unpublished), Bangor University 2016.

<sup>30</sup> D. Caplan, *Neurolinguistics and linguistic aphasiology*, op. cit.

English and French have caused communication difficulties over African countries including EAC. The result of such a situation, development agenda are only understood by the few elites. Borrowing from the dependency theory, discussion on development in developing countries involves the centre of the core and the centre of the peripheral while the majorities are marginalized through language<sup>31</sup>. Since discussion about development is inevitable, our concern is that in which language and for whose benefit the discussion is held. How many people are aware of several conferences being held within EAC on development every year? To what extent are the resolutions being disseminated to common people who are important for development? In whose language are the resolutions disseminated? These are questions that need to be addressed while discussing development in the EAC and elsewhere. This section has addressed the relationship between language and mind/thoughts. We have emphasized the importance of specific cultures for concept creation and understanding at a significant degree to yield the desired impact. This is to say, foreign languages cannot bring development in the foreign context. Taking example of EAC, the lingua franca is Kiswahili which is not used in education to familiarize the development theories. This is contrary to the principles of psychology, education and sociology in language and education<sup>32</sup>.

## Language and Education

Education is related to language because it is through language that education is provided. For education to be meaningful, the

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<sup>31</sup> D. Moyo and N. Ferguson, *Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> K.K. Prah, *Going native: Language of instruction for education, development and African emancipation*, in: *Language of instruction in Tanzania and South Africa (LOITASA)*, Dar es Saalam 2003, pp. 14–34.



language that is used to deliver it has to be familiar to both the teacher and the learners. Corson shows how language is related to education:

A school curriculum is a selection of knowledge from the culture: all those things in the culture (or from other cultures) considered worth passing on through schooling. Since all forms of knowledge are „filtered” through language, the chief item of knowledge in any culture is its language. The chief object of the school is to encourage the complete mastery of the language of the culture, since without this mastery children are denied power and influence over their own affairs and an opportunity for success in education<sup>33</sup>.

It is difficult to educate people of one language using other people’s language. Language performs both positive and negative roles. It can be used to unite people, strengthen relationships and the like. However, language can be used to discriminate, dominate and block people’s access to political and economic progress<sup>34</sup>. East African region needs to rethink the way languages in education are used in their respective nations; whether they are used for domination or emancipation. For if language of education is used in the same way the colonial masters used against us, the possibility of development is narrowed by the fact that very few citizens will get meaningful education necessary for development.

Learning is a demanding activity, it becomes more demanding when the learner has to learn the language and the content at the same time and hence be faced with double tasks<sup>35</sup>. This is because every language divides its world differently. This means that the current practice in East African region, where the languages of

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<sup>33</sup> D. Corson, *Language policy across the curriculum*, Clevedon 1990, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> S.Y. Hameso, *The language of education in Africa...*, op. cit., pp. 1–13.

<sup>35</sup> W. Maliva, Challenges encountered by teachers in implementing the advanced level competence based English language curriculum in Iringa municipality-Tanzania (unpublished M.A. Education dissertation), University of Dar es Salaam 2013.

education are foreign, creates a drawback to educational development which in turn leads to underdevelopment in other areas as well. The problem is that we view education only through western lens and so believe that it can only be provided in English<sup>36</sup>.

In West Africa the situation is the same and Okonkwo further notes that since education is provided in the language alien to learners<sup>37</sup>, the education attained is just surface level compartmental education and it results into poor national development. Despite English being used for 200 years and now LoI in Nigeria, less than 20% of Nigerians are able to speak and write it<sup>38</sup>.

### Research on local LoI

A significant number of researches have revealed that local languages are most appropriate for teaching and learning in schools. According to UNESCO there are three main factors which make local languages more appropriate as LoI<sup>39</sup>. These factors are psychological, sociological and educational.

Psychologically, local language like other languages is a system of signs which can be comprehended more easily and accurately in the brain of a learner. This means that a learner having acquired native competence of his/her language uses a little energy to follow what is being taught compared to using a second or a foreign language. Sociologically local languages are devices to establish relations and friendship in the society which is important for experience sharing. People in EAC are not free to interact due to

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<sup>36</sup> J.I. Okonkwo, *Appropriate Language in Education*, op. cit., pp. 131–146.

<sup>37</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>38</sup> E.M. Emenanjo, *Languages and the national policy on education policy on education: Implications and Prospects*, Retrieved June 18, 2011, from <http://fafunwafoundation.tripod.com/fafunwafoundation/id9.html> [Accessed: 02-Jan-2018].

<sup>39</sup> *Education Position Paper*, op. cit.

communication barrier. Kenyans, for example, are regarded to have high level of competence in English language. Ugandans can be regarded the second. In both countries English is the second language based on sociolinguistic analysis. Tanzania and the rest, English and French are foreign languages. These differences create unnecessary inferiority among member states just because of less or more mastering foreign language. The attitude is that knowing English or French means possessing knowledge. Using a foreign language for education alienates the elites from their society and makes them belong to the foreign culture and nation. That being the case development can be difficult to attain in the region.

Educational wise, local languages simplify learning and teaching. Reaserchers have suggested that a teacher and a student must use a language they well master<sup>40</sup>.

On the one hand, it suggested that the university switches to Kiswahili as a LoI. On the other hand, it suggested continuing using English due to global trends in Science and Technology. In our opinion the first suggestion is valid because it is absurd to think of global solutions to local challenges. Thinking in that way violates the hierarchy of needs as suggested by Maslow. According to him, a human being strives most for the basic needs towards the less basic needs. Development must adhere to that hierarchy. A critical community cannot think of external world while its own people are starving.

Language serves as a vehicle for transmission of knowledge and skills among members of the community. This function is best performed when the language is familiar to both parties involved in communication. Any deficiency in either party hampers the communication process, and worse in the education provision.

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<sup>40</sup> B. Brock-Utne, *Language of instruction and student performance: New insights from research in Tanzania and South Africa*, op. cit., pp. 509–530.

When education is provided through the language both the teacher and the learners master, the result is greater than when it is only the teacher who masters the language. The situation is worse when it is not only the students who do not master the LoI, but teachers as well. What is expected from students even when the teacher does not master the LoI?

There are several constraints of using a foreign language as LoI. One of them is exclusion of learners in teaching and learning process. Those who do not master the foreign language especially English and French for the case of EAC countries are regarded as fools, slow learners and hopeless children. The second impediment is incomprehension of content even to those few who seem to master the language. Over years researches have suggested that most language of education in Africa is a curse to the intellectual development of the young people. According to Senkoro, using a foreign language results into the intellectual “genocide” of African children<sup>41</sup>. That being the case, education provided does not help people to master their environment and thus development cannot be attained. Innovations and discoveries in foreign language have rarely been reported on earth.

## Conclusions and recommendations

The society’s language is one of its most treasured possessions. When that language is used in education, the results are great. Those who defend English for education in Africa say that the language carries with it science and technology<sup>42</sup>, and if that was the

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<sup>41</sup> F. Senkoro, *Mauaji ya Halaiki ya Watoto wa Tanzania Kupitia Lugha ya Kufundishia Sekondari na Vyuoni*, Dar es Salaam 2008.

<sup>42</sup> R.A. Foyewa, *Language attitudes in Nigeria: Implication on General English in Higher Institutions*, „Journal of Language and Applied Linguistic”, 3(2012), no. 2, pp. 28–36.

case, the Chinese would not have achieved their vast technological development just from 1949 using their own language.

Since language is used by examination agencies to determine children's educational fate<sup>43</sup>, it is important to ensure that the language that is used to assess what these learners use to display what they know is familiar to them. Our students may be unable to understand what they are taught not because it is difficult, but because the language used in the process of teaching and learning is not familiar to them. We must be able to discern when learners cannot understand what is taught because of their aptitude or that the language is the barrier.

The LoI has to change if we want East Africa to develop and it is the people who belong to the elite group that are to lead this movement. The elite has to lead the movement because it is this group that perpetuates the use of foreign languages, not because of the benefit of their country they live in, but because of their own children<sup>44</sup>. Speaking of LoI shift from foreign to native, Brock-Utne further argues that most African academics know that the majority of Africans cannot learn well if the learning is going to take place in the language they do not master.

Although the fight against the belief that the use of foreign languages in higher education is hard, we have to be bold enough and start it. Okonkwo argues that language is power and an explosive that can explode in many directions and can affect people positively or negatively<sup>45</sup>. He further sees that knowledge and education are also powers that are totally inherent and interpretable through the forms and concatenations of language. By that

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<sup>43</sup> D. Corson, *Language policy across the curriculum*, op. cit.

<sup>44</sup> B. Brock-Utne, *Language of instruction and student performance: New insights from research in Tanzania and South Africa*, op. cit.

<sup>45</sup> J.I. Okonkwo, *Appropriate Language in Education...*, op. cit.

observation, nations have to be careful in selecting LoI in order to avoid negative impact on the learners and the nations.

The reason we should select our local languages such as Kiswahili to be used as LoI is well said by Okonkwo:

Since all languages have the natural endowment to construct and deliver knowledge, the knowledge so far delivered becomes a 'Form of Life' for the producers. The fact here is that as long as you use a language that is by nature not yours, you have imported a 'Form of Life' that is not yours either. Language is the determiner of the kind of life people lead<sup>46</sup>.

It should be clear that the argument here is not a total rejection of other languages. Learning a second and even a third and fourth language is an asset. What is being advocated here is that other languages are worth learning and we should learn them to the best proficiency possible. In order for these foreign languages to be learnt well, deliberate efforts to train competent teachers in these languages is needed and the students can learn these foreign languages and become more competent than the current students are.

What is suggested here is that foreign languages should not be used as LoI. Their use implies inability of students to master these languages and thus becomes a barrier to access education.

Tanzania has an education policy of 2014 that assigns more roles to Kiswahili in education. If that move continues, a leap in education and subsequently in development can be achieved. Makweta commission of 1980s recommended the use of Kiswahili as LoI from primary school to university. It was suggested to be implemented in phases such that secondary education was to begin using Kiswahili from Form One, and therefore English medium would phase out in the same order. This recommendation was not implemented and no clear explanations were given for its rejec-

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<sup>46</sup> Ibidem, p. 137.

tion. However, logical analysis brings the conclusion that linguistic imperialism has succeeded to dominate the cultures of the world.

The starting point has to be primary education where all primary schools should educate children in the language that is better known to them than foreign languages such as English, and for East Africa, Kiswahili can serve that purpose.

East Africa and Africa have to understand that it takes knowledge and skills to develop, not language. Clinging to languages the learners and perhaps the teachers cannot master is detrimental to development.

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## Chapter 2.

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MAXMILLIAN J. CHUHILA

### COMMERCE OR FOOD? DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVES OF MAIZE FARMING IN ISMANI, CA. 1940S TO THE PRESENT

*About 60% of gross domestic product is earned  
in the agricultural sector, and so we find 80%  
of total employment and 80%  
of total export earnings originating there.*

G.K. Helleiner, 1979:188.

#### ABSTRACT

Farming is a major informal sector employer of more than 80 per cent of the active labour force in Tanzania. This has been the case since independence and will slightly change in a course of a long time. Rural transformations in Tanzania will depend on modernisation of agricultural development, improvement of accessibility to market outlets, guarantees on improved seeds and access to farm-loans. Amidst the existence of vast land resource in rural areas, the land is inadequately utilised for farming because of various challenges facing the rural sector. Most of such land is either less fertile or receives less rainfall with no possibilities for irrigation. This paper provides an overview of the development of maize farming in Ismani, part of the present day Iringa District. It argues that the development of maize farming in Ismani depended on government interventions on the one side and on the other the physical environment. When the government encouraged production, maize farming was for both food and commerce but when the physical environment hindered

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production, even that small supply for food fell short. In recent years especially from the year 2000 to the present Ismani remains unpredictable in as far as food security is concerned. Once a prosperous zone for maize farming that used to feed a large part of Tanzania, today, an area with recurrent food insecurity that depends on government relief food or remittances from relatives outside Ismani. The paper explores the dynamics of maize farming in the area to provide a detailed historical understanding of the present day situation in the area. This paper uses archival sources, fieldwork interviews and secondary sources collected between 2012 and 2013 and 2017.

**Key words:** rural modernisation, agriculture, Ismani, development, maize farming, environmental history, Ujamaa.

## Introduction

The above extract shows the importance of the rural sector in most of the third world countries. Although the statistics were specific for the year 1979 nothing substantial has reversed the situation completely up to the last decade. The contribution of the rural sector to the economy of less developed remains significant. The quotation indicates that for a successful economic planning and development to occur effort should be made to liberate the rural sector from unnecessary strings limiting its progress<sup>1</sup>. This will help to modernise the rural sector and contribute intensively to the national gross income through export of cash crops and assurance of food supplies. In Tanzania, according to the 2013 agricultural policy, the average annual growth rate of agricultural productions was 4.4% compared to population growth that was 2.6%. This trend of agricultural and population growth is

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<sup>1</sup> G.K. Helleiner, *Agricultural Export Pricing Strategy for Tanzania*, in: *Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania*, eds. K.S. Kim, R. Mabele and M.J. Schultheis, Nairobi 1979, p. 188.

not enough to reduce poverty and solve the challenges of food security in Tanzania. An average agricultural annual growth of at least six to eight per cent would sustain a healthy and more progressive rural sector. The other challenge in the statistics of the agricultural policy is the combination of food and commercial crops in the estimations of annual agricultural growth<sup>2</sup>. Commercial crops like coffee, cotton and sisal are entirely for the market while crops like maize, groundnuts, rice, beans and many others are divided between the market and the kitchens. This implies while cash crops are entirely for the market, food crops are at a risk of going to the market especially in areas without alternative cash crops. In the period between the 1980s and 1990s, there was a primary school textbook<sup>3</sup> used all over Tanzania for school children. In this book there were case studies on different crops how they were grown and the required climatic and weather conditions for optimal growth. These were sampled from different areas of rural Tanzania. One of its chapters was on maize farming in Iringa District that used Ismani as an example of the areas where modern and prosperous agriculture existed. It was during the heyday of maize farming in Ismani. Unfortunately, the conditions that brought fame to maize farming in Ismani are no longer in place. The historic maize farming in Ismani has now remained in the minds of the people of Ismani as well as the minds of many Tanzanians. Some of them still consider the pride of maize in Ismani still continues while some understand that it was a nostalgic past. Media reports have repeatedly reported what currently happens in Ismani as opposed to what was the case in the 1970s and 1980s.

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<sup>2</sup> Refer *National Agricultural Policy*, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, 2013, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Taasisi ya Elimu, *Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania: Jiografia kwa Darasa la Nne, Kitabu cha Wanafunzi*, Wizara ya Elimu ya Taifa, Dar Es Salaam 1983, pp. 26–28.

## Background

Classified agro-ecologically, Ismani falls in the Lowland and Midland climatic zones of Iringa District. Most villages of Ismani division fall in the lowland zone. The Lowland zone lies between 900m to 1200m above the sea level. It always receives low amount of rainfall between 500mm to 600mm per annum with a mean temperature of between 20°C and 30°C. It was endowed with fertile soils that had a high potential for agriculture from 1900s to 1980s, however, farming was hindered by unreliable rainfall and the fact that other areas of Iringa District were used for farming. Out of the four wards of Ismani Division, only two fall in the Midland zone. The Midland zone is comparatively more suitable for cultivation than the other zones. The zone lies within an attitude of 1200m and 1600m above the sea level. The landscape of the midland zone is characterised by scattered mountain hills, plateaus with swamps and ponds. This zone receives an annual rainfall between 600mm and 1, 000mm per annum and a mean temperature between 15°C to 20°C. The two wards of Ismani division that fall in the midland zone are Kising'a and Kihorogota<sup>4</sup>.

In Tanganyika agricultural activities that might have culminated in rapid production and environmental change were observed in the 1930s. Farming became particularly noticeable during this time when the British colonial government intensified production of crops by launching the 'grow more crops campaign'. Through this campaign, peasants were encouraged to open new fields to take advantage of price incentives provided by the colonial government<sup>5</sup>. Enough food crops were required for labourers who were in various estate and settler farms such as sisal plantations

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<sup>4</sup> *Iringa District Profile*, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> B.D. Bowles, *The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika 1939–1961*, in: *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule*, ed. M.H. Kaniki, London 1980, p. 168.

in Morogoro and Tanga. Also during the same time there were several British soldiers who camped in Kenya for the Second World War<sup>6</sup>. The intensity of production increased remarkably soon after the Second World War as a result of the modernisation campaigns of the colonial government. After the war Ismani became under intensive considerations for maize farming and more settlements were opened in the area during this period. The modernisation campaigns in Ismani resulted into major success in maize farming. Specifically after the Second World War and the two decades of independence, during the heydays of maize farming, the area was regarded as a national grain basket. Despite all this historic significance of area, in the recent decades, Ismani has been characterised by recurrent shortage of food and difficulties in farming as will be discussed later in this paper.

### **Farming during the 1940s to 1961**

Intensive farming did not start in Ismani until the 1940s. Before the 1940s Ismani was not heavily settled as peasants occupied land elsewhere in the region. Also before this period the area experienced some challenges that hindered settlement and farming in the area. The challenges included the absence of perennial crops, the introduction of Lupa Goldfields in Mbeya which attracted labourers from Iringa District to work in European firms, the predominance of livestock keeping over subsistence farming, the poor knowledge on the potentiality of the soil and fear of wild animals<sup>7</sup>. The post-Second World War period and especially the 1950s witnessed what some historians have called the period of

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<sup>6</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>7</sup> A. Awiti, *Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism*, in: *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, ed. Lionel Cliffe, Dar es Salaam 1975, p.52.

‘new colonialism’<sup>8</sup>, ‘second colonial occupation’<sup>9</sup>, or ‘the beginning of the end of the great colonial epoch’<sup>10</sup>. Generally, it was a period of struggle against environmental, political and economic constraints to realise greater hopes for recovery from the depredations of the war. It was characterised by all these names because of the new strategies and campaigns implemented in the colonies to improve the livelihood of the colonised people and compensate the loss of the war.

The post World War II period was also partly characterised by shortage of food and edible oil. This prompted the British colonial government to encourage establishment of large scale farming in the territory so as to cater for the demands of food and cash crops. This culminated into the opening up of large areas of land in different parts of the colony for production. For instance, tobacco farms were established in Urambo, cattle ranches were opened up in Dodoma, and a groundnut scheme was established in Nachingwea<sup>11</sup>. Most of these schemes failed due to poor conceptions and failure to consider environmental specifications and the availability of labour. They were conceived in 1940s and were abandoned in 1950<sup>12</sup>. During the same period new settlements were established in Ismani and heavy investment in maize farming continued. Awit, Goran Hyden and Finn Kjærby acknowledge this period as an important interlude for colonial agricultural developments in the colony. Strategic

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<sup>8</sup> J. Illife, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge 1979, pp. 436–484.

<sup>9</sup> D.A. Low and J.M. Lonsdale, 1976, as Cited in Illife 1979, p. 436.

<sup>10</sup> N.R. Fughes-Couchman, *Agricultural Change in Tanganyika: 1945–1960*, Stanford 1964, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and Uncaptured Peasantry*, Nairobi 1980, p. 63; J.S. Hogendorn and K.M. Scott, *Very Large Scale Agricultural Projects: The lessons of the East African Groundnut Scheme*, in: *Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa*, ed. R.I. Rotberg, Massachusetts – Toronto, pp. 167–192.

<sup>12</sup> J. Illiffe, *Modern History*, op. cit., pp. 436–484.

cash crops such as sisal and rubber were encouraged on large-scale farming. At the same time more emphasis was on the production of food crops to reduce dependence on imported food supplies<sup>13</sup>. Food grains were produced on large-scale farms in two zones; that is, wheat in the Northern highlands, notably West Kilimanjaro and Mbulu, and maize chiefly in Ismani<sup>14</sup>. Some scholars have seen this period as experiencing the 'peasant mode of production' where large and small-scale farmers engaged in farming activities<sup>15</sup>. Tanganyika peasants were at advantage as compared with peasants in other British colonies like Kenya and Zimbabwe. Peasants in Tanganyika were allowed to produce cash crops while they were prohibited in settler-dominated colonies like Kenya and Zimbabwe.

Most European colonial governments left economic development to private enterprise and the governments contributed indirectly through establishment of infrastructure, legal provisions and taxation systems<sup>16</sup>. The British colonial government in Tanganyika did not commit itself to too much economic intervention until after the enactment of the Colonial Development Act of 1929. After the Act the British government started to show interests in overseas development and development approach in the colonies received a new dimension<sup>17</sup>. Government intervention started with the

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<sup>13</sup> A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, Oxford 2013, pp. 78–79.

<sup>14</sup> H. Ruthenberg, *Agricultural Development in Tanganyika (Afrika-Studies, no. 2)*, Cited in G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa*, op. cit., p. 63; F. Kjørby, *The Development of Agricultural Mechanisation in Tanzania*, in: *Tanzania Crisis and Struggle for Survival*, eds. J. Boesen [et al.], Uppsala 1986, pp. 175–178.

<sup>15</sup> G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa*, op. cit., pp. 12–18.

<sup>16</sup> J. Tosh, *The Cash Crop Revolution in Tropical Africa: An Agricultural Reappraisal*, „African Affairs”, 79(1980), no. 314, pp. 79–94; J. Illiffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, Cambridge 1995, pp. 202–208.

<sup>17</sup> M. Jennings, 'A Very Real War': *Popular Participation in Development in Tanzania the 1940*, „The International Journal of African Historical Studies”, 40(2007), no.1, p. 74.



improvement of transport and communication infrastructure. Later during the 1930s the efforts were extended to cover social welfare<sup>18</sup>. The role of the government in supervising the economy continued to be significant throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The establishment of Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) in the post World War II period had a considerable impact on the role of the state in stimulating development. It was after the Second World War that the government assumed a major role in economic planning and implementation through the creation of marketing boards, institution of price controls and use of by-laws to enforce agricultural practices<sup>19</sup>.

Like many other parts of colonial Tanganyika, Ismani did not fall into an immediate target of colonial production in the early days of colonial occupation because of the dynamics and the challenges already examined. During this period other areas of Iringa District were under colonial production and they produced cash crops like tobacco. Before the introduction and the extension of colonial production, Ismani was characterised by small-scale subsistence farming. They used broadsheet-planting technique, later hand hoes, then ox ploughing<sup>20</sup>. Despite the use of these unsophisticated methods of farming, they were able to harvest 8 to 15 sacks of maize per hectare<sup>21</sup>. The transition from small scale subsistence farming based on low level technologies into large scale commercial farming of maize in Ismani was marked by increased demand for maize during and soon after the Second World War. Also the establishment of the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibidem. E.F. Twinning (Lord Twinning), *The Last Nine Years in Tanganyika*, „African Affairs”, 58(1959), no. 230, p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>20</sup> Broadsheet planting technique included spreading the maize seeds randomly without tilling the land. Interview with, Aloyce Mpagama, Nyang'oro, 17.11.2011.

<sup>21</sup> See TANU, *Siasa ni Kilimo*, Dar es Salaam 1972, Interviews with, Aloyce Mpagama (Nyang'oro) and Daniel Musa Kavindi, Ismani Tarafani, 18.11.2011.

Revenue Ordinance in 1943, which amended the War Revenue Act, encouraged peasants to produce more maize for the market in order to get money for payment of taxes<sup>22</sup>. This was the first initiative that stimulated commercial maize production by peasant producers. There were no alternatives to get cash for tax than producing maize or seeking wage labour outside Iringa District. To meet the wartime and post war demands the colonial government instituted measures that led to the production of sufficient food. One of those measures was the provision of subsidies in terms of free grants of shillings 7.5 to farmers who produced maize on land of over 25 hectares<sup>23</sup>. Peasants in Ismani were encouraged to open more arable land to benefit from free grants.

The second measure was the use of guaranteed return for farmers who would get loss as a result of intensive capital investment in food crop production. They were to be refunded by the colonial government<sup>24</sup>. This encouraged intensive investments in food crop production in one way or another as farmers were insured against any loss. Peasants with capital expanded farming activities to the limit of their capital. This increased both the acreage under maize farming and maize produces. In addition to guaranteed return upon loss in agricultural investment, the government provided acreage grants that were different from free grants. Through acreage grants, the government issued a list of names of farmers who first applied for them in each District. Selected farmers were given planting orders and conditions to sell their maize to the colonial Grain Storage Department<sup>25</sup>. After selling their produce,

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<sup>22</sup> Tanganyika Territory, *Ordinances Enacted During the Year 1943*, Dar es Salaam 1944.

<sup>23</sup> „The Tanganyika Standard”, Saturday, February 12, 1944.

<sup>24</sup> „The Tanganyika Standard”, Thursday, August 30, 1951.

<sup>25</sup> TNA, EC B. 833/III/313: Department of Grain Stores, 1949. *Guaranteed Prices of Maize Acreage Grants and Reduced Prices (1949)*.

the farmers were paid dues in the manner outlined here by the director of Grain Stores:

It is emphasized that the Director of Agriculture will only consider payment of acreage grant to planters who can produce either Grain Storage Department purchase receipts in respect of delivery to Government or Agents Stores or written permission by Provincial Produces Officers or District Commissioners' in respect of direct sales<sup>26</sup>.

In Ismani, only few farmers qualified for the grants in the period between 1947 and 1950. They included few big farmers in Nduli who were eligible beneficiaries for acreage bonus in the 1948/1949 growing season<sup>27</sup>. Under the acreage grants scheme, the maize that was to be used by producers either individually or as a producing company or institution or even a group of corporate producers, had first to be sold to Unga Limited, the only buying agent by the time and then bought back by producers. This was a condition for all farmers who received grants from the government. After harvest, producers declared the quantity of maize they harvested plus the amount that was enough for their food and the surplus to be sold to Unga Limited<sup>28</sup>. The condition to declare the amount of food enough for the producer and the surplus for sale had little significance to the producer. As regardless of the amount they required for food they had to sell all the maize to Unga Limited before they could buy them back. Interestingly, during this time producers were even allowed to sell their crops on the farm. Therefore, the incentives given to maize producers, price guarantee, guaranteed return and acreage grants stimulated maize farming for the market. Progressive farmers, as we have seen, did this, while small-scale peasant producers continued to produce for subsistence.

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<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>28</sup> TNA, 24/A3/21: African Staples, Permits to Retain.

The establishment of the Land Bank in 1947 had a significant contribution to large-scale maize farming in Ismani. On inception the Bank provided loans to large-scale cash crop farmers such as tobacco farmers in Nduli. Later, the loans were extended to maize farmers, although most of them were non-African farmers<sup>29</sup>. It was not until the 1950s when African farmers started to access the loans. African peasants obtained loans from two sources of funds that were established at the end of the 1940s. These sources included the Local Development Loan Fund (LDLF) and the African Productivity Loan Fund (APLF). These loan schemes accelerated differentiation in the rural areas. Some peasants expanded production by use of modern agricultural inputs, such as tractors obtained through loan money<sup>30</sup>. The Bank provided loans only to farmers whose farmlands were 50 acres and above. Those whose farmlands were below 50 acres were encouraged to expand their farms in order to qualify for the loans<sup>31</sup>.

Government intervention in supervising and encouraging maize production especially in the 1950s was a catalyst towards expanded commercial production of maize. The provision of acreage grants, loans, guaranteed returns and the introduction of a new taxation system accelerated extensive rather than intensive cultivation. Colonial intervention in the production process also contributed towards the replacement of the traditional food crops, such as millet and finger millet, by extensive production of maize. Prior to this period maize was produced in small scale. Therefore, by the 1950s Ismani had become one of the most important places for maize production in Iringa District. There was sufficient rainfall and the

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<sup>29</sup> L.A Msambichaka and R. Mabele, *Agricultural Credit and the Development of Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*, „ERB, Paper”, no. 74.10, 1974, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 4–7.

<sup>31</sup> TNA, 24/52/3/13: Monthly Report for May 1956.

fertility of the soil was suitable. These facts were acknowledged in a monthly report of the agricultural field officer who noted;

From reports and personal observation it is noticed that the most advanced area in the District is Ismani where rains broke early and cultivation have taken every opportunity to push forward with cultivation and planting. Their zeal and enterprise is providing itself worthwhile as excellent germination can be seen in almost every shamba<sup>32</sup>.

Ismani was a potential maize production area by this time and there were no signs of crop failure<sup>33</sup>. In the 1950s, Ismani had no alternative cash crop to depend on apart from maize. Therefore, maize served dual purposes, as a staple crop and cash crop.

Another effort by the colonial government to transform Ismani into a colonial food granary was the establishment of demonstration farms in 1956 in the area. Under this new programme farmers were given land and money. By this time there were already indications that farmers from other places of Iringa District were moving to Ismani to benefit from the advantages of demonstration farms. As a result it was stated that for one to be given a demonstration farm was to be a resident in Ismani. Many people did not meet this condition but were still given the farms because of the need to produce as much maize as possible<sup>34</sup>. Demonstration farms acted as units for teaching farmers the best practices for maize cultivation<sup>35</sup>. They were expected to have a trickle-down effect to the rural sector at large and boost productivity in the main. As a consequence of all those efforts, Ismani came to be

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<sup>32</sup> TNA, D3/4: Development: Ismani Development, Report for the Month Ending 31<sup>st</sup> December, 1951-114/IV/29/552, Report for the Month Ending June 1951-114/IV/20.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>34</sup> TNA, D3/4: Folio: Letter-P/SCH/ISM, Demonstration Farm, Ismani, 21.12.1956.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*.

under intensive colonial production in the last decade of colonial rule in Tanganyika.

It is notable that during this period the colonial approach to peasant production changed significantly. Previously, the government concentrated on peasantry production as whole that changed into a new 'focal point approach'. This change was partly a colonial response to the 1950s nationalist movements and the need to reduce production costs in the after war period. It was thought that promoting African peasantry entirely would create wealthy Africans who, in turn, would increase political consciousness and stability in rural areas<sup>36</sup>. In practice this would disadvantage the smooth functioning of the colonial enterprises. The new approach focused on the promotion of progressive farmers at the expense of the larger peasantry sector<sup>37</sup>. Through this method, the colonial government was able to get sufficient maize from few progressive farmers.

The change of approach to rural development resulted into narrowing down all colonial projects. They became small in scale, sometimes based on a clan or a village, or a group of few enterprising individuals<sup>38</sup>. Small-scale projects would benefit from the few extension services provided by a small number of extension personnel. Extension personnel were reduced to match with the budgetary constraints that faced the peasantry sector at the time<sup>39</sup>. Farmers on individual bases did not get assistance from the central government but were instead supervised by the Native Authorities<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> J. Illife, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika: An Outline*, Nairobi 1971, p. 37.

<sup>37</sup> Ibidem. Lord Twinning, *Nine Years in Tanganyika*, op. cit. p. 15.

<sup>38</sup> 'Memorandum No.10 for Provincial Commissioners', Conference, January 1957: Focal Point Approach in Agricultural Extension Work, LG 9/36/011. p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem, p. 2.

In the post World War II period, especially in the 1950s, there came what John Illife calls the ‘cash crop boom’. The boom promoted production of not only the crops earlier considered marginal cash crops but also food crops such as maize. The colonial government declared, ‘the United Kingdom will require increased quantities of maize and will be able to absorb any increases in export in this Territory’<sup>41</sup>. To get assured with high output of maize the government started to supply maize seeds for free or at much lesser subsidised prices. Also, the government continued with campaigns for increased maize production and made advertisements on newspapers, steamers, buses and railway stations<sup>42</sup>.

The boom years were characterised by the emergence of new commercial growers. These included the Maize Growers of Ismani, Wheat Growers of Mbulu, Pyrethrum Growers of the Southern Highlands and Cashew nut Growers of the southern part of Tanganyika. Also there was mushrooming of farmers associations such as the Ismani African Maize Growers Association<sup>43</sup>, which later changed into Ismani African Maize Growers Cooperative Society<sup>44</sup>. The associations later became instrumental in negotiating prices for their produced crops. Most prosperous progressive farmers benefited more from the associations as they had more to sell than ordinary peasants.

The production of maize in Ismani was very profitable in the last decade of colonial rule in Tanzania. It made producers own tractors after farming for few seasons. This profitability continued to attract more and more farmers to the area. After only six years

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<sup>41</sup> B. Bode and D. Wu, *The Legacy of Underdevelopment in Tanzania: A Case Study from Morogoro*, Research Paper, Report for Care International Tanzania, 2011, p. 16.

<sup>42</sup> Illife, *Agricultural Change*, op. cit., pp. 39–40.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>44</sup> Illife, *Modern History*, op. cit., p. 465.

(1959 to 1965), more than 16, 000 hectares were under maize cultivation in Ismani<sup>45</sup>. The number of producers reached 367 and each owned more than four hectares, and 29 farmers who each owned more than 40 hectares<sup>46</sup>. These acreages per individual producer kept on increasing as the indigenous people allocated plots to foreigners only by measuring the width of the plots and did not bother about limiting the length. This tendency led to rapid expansion of arable land in Ismani<sup>47</sup>.

### Farming During 1961–1971

The rural sector in Tanzania at independence experienced continuation of the implementation of colonial development policies for a long time. The implementation of colonial plans, as were suggested by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRBD), manifested in the entire period covering the 1960s to the 1980s. The first Five-Year Development Plan articulated clearly the need to improve and transform the rural sector<sup>48</sup>. The First Five Year Development Plan was ambitious and wished that the development of the country could be realised as soon as possible to satisfy people's expectations of independence. Through the First Five Year Plan, Tanzania encouraged, and anticipated a massive flow of foreign investments in agricultural and industrial sectors<sup>49</sup>. In the mid 1960s it became apparent that the anticipations were not materialising. As a consequence of this

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<sup>45</sup> Ibidem, p. 457.

<sup>46</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with, Benitho Masangula, Nyang'oro, 17.11.2011.

<sup>48</sup> The United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, *Tanganyika Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1964 – 30th June, 1969*, vol. 1, General Analysis 1964, pp. ix–x.

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, p. viii.



frustrating situation, the government was inclined in 1967 to resort to a new path towards development. This shift was officially enunciated in the Arusha Declaration of February 1967. The Arusha Declaration, unlike the First Five Year Development Plan, did not put much emphasis on foreign grants, loans and investments but emphasis went on using internally available resources for development. Political slogans such as '*Uhuru na Kazi: Freedom and Work*' and '*Uhuru na Maendeleo: Freedom and Development*' served as catalysts towards popular participation in development. The implementation of those slogans concentrated much on self-help projects that included construction of roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries and initiation of agricultural activities. Participation in community or self-help projects was a credit to responsible citizens<sup>50</sup>. It was held that improvement or development at the local level was a contribution to the entire national development<sup>51</sup>. Popular participation was highly encouraged during the period.

The adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 symbolized two major things for the newly independent Tanzania. In the first place it implied a change in economic planning from reliance on what Michael Jennings called the colonial development paradigm to a nationalist rural oriented development paradigm. Also the Arusha Declaration signalled the transition of the economy from one that was highly dependent upon foreign assistance to an economy based mostly on the utilization of internal resources. However, the declaration did not reject outright gifts and loans, but emphasised that these would be accepted if and only if they were being made in the interest of national development. To show the contrasts between the pre-Arusha Declaration situation in economic planning and the newly anticipated system, the declaration pointed out that;

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<sup>50</sup> M. Jennings, *Very Real War*, op. cit., pp. 86–87.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*.

Our government and different groups of our leaders, never stop thinking about methods of getting finance from abroad. And if we get some money or even if we just get a promise of it, our newspapers, our radio, and our leaders, all advertise the fact in order that every person shall know that salvation is [was] coming or is on the way. If we receive a gift we announce it, if we receive a loan we announce it, if we get a new factory we announce it-and always loudly. In the same way, when we get a promise of a gift, a loan, or a new industry, we make an announcement of the promise. Even when we have merely started discussions with a foreign government or institution for a gift, a loan or a new industry we make an announcement-even though we do not know the outcomes of the discussions<sup>52</sup>.

This shows dissatisfaction with externally oriented economic thinking. The Arusha Declaration provided principles by which the system would be changed towards self-reliance.

By this time Ismani was still under commercial farming of maize. The adoption of the Arusha Declaration in one way promoted the large-scale production of maize as it encouraged progressive farmers. On the other hand however, it gave way to restrictions on continued intensive capital investment in agriculture by individuals in favour of communal development approach. This follows from the fact that the gap between rich progressive farmers, small peasants and labourers was increasing fast. During this period rich farmers enjoyed expansion to areas formerly owned by small farmers through purchase of land. In implication, the few rich farmers owned and controlled the economy at the expense of the impoverishment of the majority of peasants; something that was not the priority of the declaration. Small peasants continued to be landless and poor while the number of labourers working for progressive farmers continued to increase. Small producers also started to be labourers as the only way available for their subsistence.

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<sup>52</sup> TANU, *The Arusha Declaration*, in: J.K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, Oxford 1968, p. 22.

## Villagization and maize farming, 1971 to 1985

State-led and externally controlled economic policies and development have in most counts resulted in several impacts in the communities and the environments where they are implemented. Such impacts originate from the failure to recognise local environmental conditions and the reality on the ground that does not necessarily reflect the expectations of state bureaucrats<sup>53</sup>. State control of rural development in Tanzania is historically rooted. It started during the colonial period and went on through the postcolonial period. State control on the economy was challenged after the collapse of the East African community in 1977 a period that went together with several other economic and political problems. There was the 1978 Tanzania – Uganda war, the global oil crisis, disturbance in the balance of trade in Tanzania and the poor weather of the 1980s that brought general crop failure. These led into an impoverished economy and poor livelihood of a majority of the population. The government failed to provide the necessary supplies such as medicine, food and other consumables<sup>54</sup>. During the same period of the 1970s political and economic crisis, the government overcommitted itself into the very expensive villagization projects that were implemented in the rural – centred development model. As a result, the government's defiance to liberal policies and the conditions of the Breton wood institutions (IMF, World Bank and WTO) was challenged. The unexpected retirement of Julius Nyerere from presidency on one side resulted from his failure to contain the pressure of change enforced by the Breton wood institutions

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<sup>53</sup> See the analysis of how several state controlled projects failed to modernize the rural sector in J.C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven – London 2008, pp. 1–8.

<sup>54</sup> K. J. Havenevik, *Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above*, Dar es Salaam 1993, pp. 29–62.

and on the other side he was not ready to accept them. The only option remaining was stepping down. In 1982 the government softened its hand on its control of the rural sector. A new agricultural policy was launched in 1982, the same year with the launching of the Structural Adjustment Programmes. The agricultural policy aimed at improving the rural sector mainly by allowing private investment in agriculture and private ownership of land. When this was happening countrywide, its impact varied from one area to another<sup>55</sup>. Commercial farmers benefited from liberal policies. Large-scale capital owners and producers in Ismani moved their capital from the area to other areas of Tanzania.

State control of the rural sector through Ujamaa in Tanzania took both courses, that is, direct and indirect coercion on one side and voluntary on the other. Compulsory resettlement included total planning and movement of people's settlement into closer proximities to each other to facilitate service delivery. Under this category, poor ecological knowledge of the environments affected the new residents. On the second count, indirect coerced resettlement included joining Ujamaa villages to receive relief food from the government especially in areas with food insecurity. When villagers faced famine they had no option than joining into an Ujamaa village<sup>56</sup>. In areas where peasants voluntarily moved, they were able to find suitable areas for agricultural activities and agriculture continued without many problems. The areas like Songea under the famous Ruvuma Development Association and Handeni – Tanga experienced both coerced and voluntary movement at the same time. In the areas with voluntary associations with Ujamaa villages, the Ujamaa projects succeeded and failed in the areas where force

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<sup>55</sup> Ibidem, pp. 56–62.

<sup>56</sup> Suleman Sumra, *Problems of Agricultural Production in Ujamaa Villages in Handeni District*, in: *Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania*, op. cit., pp. 202–206.

was used<sup>57</sup>. In Urambo, in western Tanzania, tobacco farming was both boosted on one side in terms of extensive farming – increase of acreage but on the other side it faced challenges. Large – scale tobacco farmers were confiscated of their land and machinery in favour of communal farming that resulted into extensive farming but reduced productivity<sup>58</sup>. In Ismani where forced resettlement took place and large progressive farmers ran away, Ujamaa projects did not achieve much<sup>59</sup>. In the Iraqwland, where ecological considerations were not given priority, the programmes under Ujamaa were not successful<sup>60</sup>. In general the villagization policy in Tanzania had varied impacts depending on the area where it was implemented.

We have explored the production side of the impact in various areas of Tanzania. On the environmental side, villagization had far reaching implications because there was no feasibility study done to assess the environmental impact of the programme. Yusufu Lawi, Helge Kjekshus, Esbern Friis-Hansen and Idris Kikula provided a general evaluation of the environmental impact of villagization and resettlement schemes of the 1970s<sup>61</sup>. They argued that the

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<sup>57</sup> Refer to Havenevik, Tanzania, and H. Ndomba, The Ruvuma Development Association and Ujamaa in Songea District, 1960s–1990s, Unpublished MA Dissertation: University of Dar es Salaam, 2014, pp. 54–88.

<sup>58</sup> S. Ayo, Tobacco Farming and its Influence on the Social Cultural Transformation in Urambo District, Western Tanzania, 1950s to 2010, forthcoming MA Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam.

<sup>59</sup> Details in M.J. Chuhila, Maize Farming and Environmental Change in Iringa District: The case of Ismani, 1940–2010, Unpublished MA Dissertation: University of Dar es Salaam 2013, pp. 64–79.

<sup>60</sup> Yusufu Q. Lawi, *Tanzania's Operation Vijiji and Local Ecological Consciousness: The Case of Eastern Iraqwland, 1974–1976*, „Journal of African History”, 48(2007), pp. 75–83.

<sup>61</sup> Idem, *May the Spider Web Blind Witches and Wild Animals: Local Knowledge and the Political Ecology of Natural Resources Use in the Iraqwland, Tanzania, 1900–1985*, Unpublished PhD Thesis: Boston University 2000, p. 319; Idem,

impact resulted from the concentration of people in small areas due to clearing of new areas for settlement and farming. Lawi adds that it destroyed the social ecological considerations which people regarded when choosing settlement areas in Iraqwland. On the whole, as a result, the failure to control ecological conditions of the new areas affected the communities that were relocated into other areas<sup>62</sup>.

Although the period from the 1970s experienced several socio-economic and political challenges throughout the country, the villagization programme created a new history in Ismani and it is highly remembered in the area. It is remembered not only because of the environmental impact but also the influence on the production of maize. It changed the history of maize farming in Ismani at large. The villagization programme was preceded by the implementation of the Iringa Resolution that was another big step towards improving the rural sector. To reflect its emphasis on agriculture, the Iringa Resolution of 1972 was commonly referred to as *Siasa ni Kilimo* (Agriculture is Politics). The Iringa Resolution came up with four principles to promote agriculture. *Siasa ni Kilimo* enabled the organisation of agricultural production in a way which ensured food self-sufficiency to peasants, improved quality of food through production of nutritious food, production of exportable crops and production of sufficient raw materials for industrial development<sup>63</sup>. At almost the same time, the Ismani

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*Tanzania's Operation Vijiji*, op. cit.; H. Kjekshus, *The Tanzanian Villagisation Policy: Implementation and Ecological Dimensions*, „Canadian Journal of African Studies”, 11(1977), no. 2, pp. 270–272; E. Friis-Hansen, *Changes in Land Tenure Use Since Villagisation and their Impact on Peasant Agricultural Production in Tanzania: The Case of Southern Highlands*, Copenhagen 1987, pp. 9–20; Idris Kikula *Lessons From Twenty-Five Years of Conservation and Seven Years of Research Initiatives in the Kondoa Highlands of Central Tanzania*, „Ambio”, 28(1999), no. 5, p. 445.

<sup>62</sup> Yusufu Q. Lawi, *Tanzania's Operation Vijiji*, op. cit.

<sup>63</sup> TANU, *Siasa ni Kilimo*.

Maize Credit Programme was introduced to boost maize productivity. The credit scheme had three main objectives. The first was to replace large-scale capitalist oriented (market – oriented) farmers by cooperative communal based farmers. Although the objectives for this were not articulated, communal farming involved the production of both food and commercial maize<sup>64</sup>. However, production for the market was hindered when large-scale farmers decided to reallocate from Ismani. As a result neither food nor market based maize was produced sufficiently. What followed in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s was a struggle for survival that was a transition from proud producers of maize in Tanzania.

The second objective of the Ismani maize credit was to increase productivity of maize produce in the area. This was done through the application of better crop husbandry, fertilisers and improved seeds. Unfortunately, all these attempts to increase productivity failed because the people who were forced to join in Ujamaa villages sabotaged Ujamaa production. This was done through stealing seeds and produces and at the same time working with obvious laxity in Ujamaa farms<sup>65</sup>. All these led to the decline of production in Ismani instead of encouraging and promoting its production. Also, as pointed out earlier, maize farming in Ismani depended on large-scale capital-intensive farmers who at the time of these modernisations had decided to move from Ismani. Modernisation involved the distribution of hybrid seeds and chemical fertilizers where the seeds were distributed for free in one growing season and in the subsequent seasons producers prepared their own improved seeds<sup>66</sup>. Some farmers in the 1970s did not opt for chemical fertilizers; instead they used Farm Yard Manure (FYM)

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<sup>64</sup> A.T. Mohele, *The Ismani Maize Credit Programme*, in: *Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania*, op. cit., pp. 217–218.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with, Andephice Mahali, Mikong’wi, 14.11.2011.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with, Aloyce Mpagama, Nyang’oro.

that was also a new experience for farming in Ismani<sup>67</sup>. They could not adopt chemical fertilisers while they had not even used FYM – from their livestock on farms because the soil was fertile enough to allow cultivation. The reorganization of settlements and production in Ismani during the villagisation programme was not supported by the will of the majority. The traditional land tenure was abolished through the implementation of the villagisation policy. Villagers wondered to find and occupy new land in the new areas. As a result, it went on to happen that peasants lived in Ujamaa villages but went out to work on their previous farms. This lost a considerable amount of their time walking to and from and hence reducing the working time on the farms. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 formalised the abolition of traditional land rights that implied a new struggle for land ownership<sup>68</sup>. On the whole, *ujamaa* farming in Ismani is remembered to have been a problem rather than a solution to peasant's problems. Working in *ujamaa* farms was not as productive as working on individual farms. The big farmers who owned tractors were forced to work on *ujamaa* farms before they could start working on their plots. This decision was unpopular among large-scale maize farmers.

The last objective of the Ismani maize credit scheme was to improve the incomes of the *wajamaa* through guaranteed crop prices that were regulated by cooperative societies. This was unrealistic because not all villages were given credit and even those given credit did not manage to improve the livelihood of the people because the repayment rates of the loans were high. In the early days of the scheme 1971/72 and 1972/73 growing seasons some successes were registered by maize farming. However, the sustainability of both

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<sup>67</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>68</sup> E. Friis-Hansen, *Changes in Land Tenure Use Since Villagisation and their Impact on Peasant Agricultural Production in Tanzania...*, op. cit., pp. 23–28.



food and commercial maize farming was threatened. There emerged loan-serving farming, sabotage of Ujamaa projects and continued decline in the acreages cultivated because of lack of capital and machinery equipment after the withdrawal of large-scale producers<sup>69</sup>. In the end, the villages given the credit produced a loan – serving maize while those that did not receive loan produced both maize for food and market<sup>70</sup>. To indicate the inefficiency of operation Ismani, in 1971/72 it was revealed that an average of 595 kilograms per hectare was produced on Ujamaa fields while at the same time and in the same environment, individually owned farms produced an average of 869 kilograms per hectare<sup>71</sup>. This example demonstrates that the success in maize farming in Ismani did not depend on the investment of industrial inputs. It rather depended on the knowledge of the environment, soil, locally determined growing seasons and market incentives. All these conditions existed during the colonial period and were discarded during *Ujamaa* period in favour of state directed agriculture. Closely related to the decline in productivity, another challenge was on how to distribute the produces amongst the members of a particular Ujamaa village. A number of villages failed to distribute produces to members or the income coming from selling Ujamaa produces. This situation resulted from the low harvests that were also sold to repay the loans in Ujamaa villages. In turn, this discouraged members from committing themselves in Ujamaa projects. Due to this challenge and of course, the national commitment towards agriculture, the National maize Programme was introduced in 1973. The programme aimed to increase maize acreage and reduce the import of food<sup>72</sup>.

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<sup>69</sup> Interview with, Innocent Mtakidunga Wilomo, Mangawe, 19.11.2011.

<sup>70</sup> A.T. Mohele, *The Ismani Maize Credit Programme*, op.cit.

<sup>71</sup> B.Ch. Nindi, *Agricultural Change and Rural Class Formation in Iringa District, Tanzania*, Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Hull 1978, p. 267.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 274–280.

Apart from the Ismani maize credit scheme the government also established agricultural credit schemes, which were given to middlemen to enable them to buy crops from producers, while the producers received production credits<sup>73</sup>. This was generally applied countrywide and started in 1962 through the Agricultural Credit Agency (ACA). The ACA provided loans to individual farmers, to groups of farmers or to government institutions that embarked on agriculture. The second loan scheme was through the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) that came into being in 1964. NDCA did not register achievements, as up to its dissolution it had only reached one *ujamaa* village. The establishment of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) in 1971 was the most comprehensive programme to finance agriculture in the rural areas. It covered many sectors of the rural economy by supporting *ujamaa* villages especially those engaged with the production of food crops, such as maize and wheat<sup>74</sup>. TRDB was therefore committed to modernising the rural sector. TRDB reiterated that; ‘the Tanzania Rural Development Bank was therefore instituted as a means of providing a comprehensive credit system for transforming the subsistence living into a modern cash economy with its attendant increased employment opportunities and income distribution’<sup>75</sup>.

The *villagisation* campaign of 1974 was the first transformative wave for Ismani. It propelled the area’s change from a prosperous place to an impoverished one. The 1974 *Villagisation* campaign discouraged progressive farmers in favour of communally owned

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<sup>73</sup> L.A Msambichaka and R. Mabele, *Agricultural Credit and the Development...*, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 12.

<sup>75</sup> Tanzania Rural Development Bank, *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 30<sup>th</sup> June 1971 – 30<sup>th</sup> June 1972*, Quoted in L.A Msambichaka and R. Mabele, *Agricultural Credit and the Development...*, op. cit., p. 11.

farms and cultivation that were small in scale and faced several challenges to operate the farms. Ownership of large farms was shifted to villages while some were distributed to former labourers at the rate of three hectares per head. The evidence at hand shows that it was difficult to incorporate the former progressive farmers into *ujamaa* cooperative work as we have pointed earlier<sup>76</sup>.

The most remembered incidence of *ujamaa* farming in Ismani was the murder of Dr. Wilbert Kleruu, then Regional Commissioner for Iringa. Dr. Kleruu is claimed to have been a committed socialist who wanted everybody to live on socialist principles. On Christmas day 1971, Dr. Kleruu went to Ismani to see how production was going on. Unfortunately, he found one of the large-scale farmers of maize in Ismani called Said Mwamwindi cultivating his privately owned farm. Mwamwindi had worked for most of his time on *ujamaa* plots but during the holiday he wanted to cultivate his private shamba. Nevertheless, Dr. Kleruu ordered him to stop. This action is believed to have made Mwamwindi angry, hence his decision to gun down the Regional Commissioner at Mkungugu village<sup>77</sup>. The death of the Regional Commissioner created tensions amongst all big producers of maize in Ismani and the implementation of villagization in the area<sup>78</sup>. Mwamwindi started farming in Ismani together with other progressive farmers in the

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<sup>76</sup> Interview with, Aloyce Mpagama.

<sup>77</sup> The main reasons that resulted into his death are varied in local articulations. Some point out that he was insulted in front of his wives others; claim that Mwamwindi became angry when he was told to stop working on a privately owned farm. Generally, the death of a regional Commissioner indicated the extent to which progressive farmers in Ismani were committed to realise profit out of maize farming. The regional Commissioner was seen as a threat to many of the progressive farmers. Interviews with, Henry Mkayula Likoko, Kising'a, 15.11.2011, Speditho Magidanga, Uhominyi, 14.11.2011, Omary Chunga and Bayati Mkwama at Mkungugu, 20.11.2011.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with, Omary Chunga, Mkungugu.

1950s. During this period he owned only three acres of land and worked as a lorry driver. He continued to buy land and expand his cultivated plots that by the 1970s he had over 160 acres<sup>79</sup>. This indicates that he was one of the most progressive farmers in the area that operation Ismani targeted. It also shows the type of anger that a person could have when his assets and wealth were threatened with being confiscated or nationalised. Bad enough the aftermath of the death of the Regional Commissioner brought more mess than progress in the area. It became increasingly difficult to convince people to work in Ujamaa villages. Local leaders and state technocrats feared that what happened to Kleruu could happen to them. As a result production in Ujamaa villages continued to decline.

### **Maize farming and the challenge of Environmental Change, 1985 to Present**

Environmental change in Ismani has been a gradual process and was generally unnoticed until the second half of the last century. This was partly contributed by the presence of extensive and fertile arable land, which made it easy for peasants to abandon exhausted areas in favour of new ones<sup>80</sup>. Environmental change in Ismani manifested itself in various forms, including changes in vegetation cover, soil exhaustion, unreliability of rainfall, drought and decline of crop yields. It has been argued in the preceding discussion that commercial production of maize was responsible for the change of the socio-economic relations in Ismani from the 1950s. Through commercial production of maize, Ismani gained fame and became a conceited feeder based

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<sup>79</sup> B.Ch. Nindi, *Agricultural Change*, op. cit., pp. 259–264.

<sup>80</sup> A. Awiti, *Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 53.

on the agricultural output by large producers. Smallholders were also not left behind, as they were assured of food from the small areas they cultivated.

The fame of Ismani changed in the recent years. While in the 1950s up to the 1980s it had famous names because of its capacity to feed a large part of the country with maize, from the last decade onwards things have turned upside down. The production of maize is no longer tenable and villagers live on food insecurity and abject economic poverty. This situation is evidenced by both media reports and oral articulations<sup>81</sup>. For example, the high productivity of maize in the 1970s called for the Iringa Resolution, famously known as *Siasa ni Kilimo* (Agriculture is Politics) to boost productivity<sup>82</sup>. The resolution recognised the declining trend of productivity of maize in the area from 20 to 25 sacks of maize grains per hectare in the 1950s to only 7 sacks in the 1970s<sup>83</sup>. However, the trend of production continued to decline throughout the 1970s to 1980s despite the modernization of the methods of production.

The situation worsened much starting from the 2000s. During this period peasants were unable to produce either for sale or for their food sufficiency. This can partly be evidenced by Lukelo Kihogota, a smallholder producer in Ismani, who recalled the practices of *Siasa ni Kilimo* and then added that ‘we have no alternative than to depend on relief food’<sup>84</sup>. Mr. Kihogota used to be a good producer over the years, sold surplus maize to those

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<sup>81</sup> Tumaini Msowoya, *Ukame wa Miaka Minne Wageuka Balaa Kuu la Njaa, Mawazo Malembeka, 'Njaa: Malengamakali, Wananchi Wanaishi Kwa Mboga za Majani'*, *Radio Report*, [http://radiofreeafricatv.com/2011/njaa\\_malengamakali\\_wananchi\\_waishi\\_kwa\\_mboga\\_za\\_majani](http://radiofreeafricatv.com/2011/njaa_malengamakali_wananchi_waishi_kwa_mboga_za_majani)- Accessed on 21.10.2011, at 1300hrs.

<sup>82</sup> TANU, *Siasa ni Kilimo*.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 11–12.

<sup>84</sup> Tumaini Msowoya, *Ukame wa Miaka Minne*.

who were in need, but now fails even to produce enough for his family. This is not a unique situation for him alone as it cuts across the majority of the families in Ismani. All this indicates the degree to which Ismani in recent years starting from the 2000s has become the home of food shortage. The government takes initiatives by providing regular relief food to starving villagers nearly every year. Starvation in Ismani resulted from regular crop failure as an outcome of unpredictable weather conditions, shifting in farming preferences from maize to commercial crops like sunflower and tomatoes. Tomatoes and sunflower have no ban when it comes to exporting them to foreign markets. But if surplus maize is produced, the government limits its export in favour of domestic market.

Most families in Ismani in recent years face hunger and in some cases they depend on green vegetables as their food especially during the rain season where food shortage is at its peak. The most affected areas are Malengamakali Ward and Ikengeza village in Nyang'oro Ward. Food insecurity in Ismani was at some point given emphasis in the parliament when a Member of Parliament, Ms. Pindi Chana commented, 'the District Council agricultural projects should target to increase productivity especially in those areas with hunger such as Ismani where every year there is a need to send relief food'<sup>85</sup>. Such statements demonstrate the extent to which what was formerly a national grain basket is now a place with acute food shortages. Other news headlines in recent days include: 'Four Years Drought turns A Great Hunger in Iringa'<sup>86</sup>, 'Hunger: Malengamakali,

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<sup>85</sup> Bunge la Tanzania, *Majadiriano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Ishirini, Kikao cha Kumi na Tatu Tr: 22 Juni 2010*. The MP, Pindi Chana said 'Eneo la Mufindi katika mashamba ya chai, zao la Biashara, wameomba wapewe vocha katika zao hilo la Biashara. Miradi ya Halmashauri ya Kilimo ilenge kuongeza uzalishaji hususani maeneo ya Njaa kama Ismani ambako kila mwaka hupelekwa Chakula', p. 162.

<sup>86</sup> Tumaini Msowoya.

People Live on Green Vegetable'<sup>87</sup>, '9,000 People Face Hunger in Iringa',<sup>88</sup> and 'Ikengeza to Face Severe Food Shortage'<sup>89</sup>.

## Conclusion

There is no way we can generalise the impact of state interventions in rural sector development in Tanzania. The impacts varied depending on several factors based on the production side and the environment. On the production side, it depended on the incentives that peasants received out of what they produced that in turn intrinsically motivated them to produce more. Environmentally wisely, it depended on the specific environmental conditions for a specific crop. The case presented by Ismani is an example of both positive and negative outcomes of state interventions in rural development. Colonial interventions boosted productivity as production based on individuals unlike the communal production relations advocated by the postcolonial government. However, we should not take for granted that the colonial government was keen enough to boost productivity, we must also understand the fact that Ismani was opened for intensive farming in the 1940s, thus it was still fertile enough to allow high productivity in the entire colonial period. In the postcolonial period especially from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s soil fertility deteriorated and when coupled with other problems resulting from the political economy of the time

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<sup>87</sup> Mawazo Malembeka, *Njaa: Malengamakali, Wananchi Wanaishi Kwa Mboga za Majani, Radio Report*, [http://radiofreeafricatv.com/2011/njaa\\_malengamakali\\_wananchi\\_waishi\\_kwa\\_mboga\\_za\\_majani-](http://radiofreeafricatv.com/2011/njaa_malengamakali_wananchi_waishi_kwa_mboga_za_majani-) Accessed on 21.10.2011, at 1300hrs.

<sup>88</sup> <http://www.ippmedia.com/fronted/?!=29291>, 'Watu 9, 000 Wamekumbwa na Balaa la Njaa Iringa', Accessed on 21.10.2011, at 1330hrs.

<sup>89</sup> Irene Mwakalinga, *Wakazi wa Ikengeza-Iringa Kukumbwa na Uhaba wa Chakula*, [http://www.tbc.go.tz-tbc\\_local\\_general/1501\\_wakazi\\_wa\\_likengeza\\_iringa\\_kukumbwa\\_na\\_uhaba\\_wa\\_wa-\\_chakula.html](http://www.tbc.go.tz-tbc_local_general/1501_wakazi_wa_likengeza_iringa_kukumbwa_na_uhaba_wa_wa-_chakula.html). Accessed on 22.10.2011 at 0953hrs.

and environmental change, it limited the progress of maize farming. The future of peasant farming in Ismani will depend on the control of population growth and control of the rapidly changing environment through rampant charcoal burning and opening of more fields for agriculture and settlement.

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## Chapter 3.

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NAPOLEON SAULOS MLOWE  
JUSTIN K. URASSA

# FORMALIZATION OF CUSTOMARY LAND RIGHTS ON RURAL HOUSEHOLD'S LIVELIHOOD OUTCOMES IN HANDENI DISTRICT, TANZANIA

## ABSTRACT

Access to land is central to the livelihoods of many Tanzanians. The study specifically aimed at assessing people's perception on formalization of customary land rights; determining the contribution of CCRO<sup>1</sup> in enabling owners of land to access credit and ownership of CCRO, and a household's income and asset accumulation. And to identify challenges faced by CCRO holders in accessing credit. The study adopted a cross-sectional research design whereby data were collected from four villages in Handeni District. Multi stage sampling was employed to select 184 household with and without CCRO. Findings show that, having a CCRO has enhanced tenure security, reduced border conflicts and has enhanced ownership of land by vulnerable groups. However, CCRO ownership has not significantly contributed to a household's livelihood outcomes in terms of income and asset accumulation. Major challenges facing formalization of customary land rights in the study area include existence of land conflicts, lack of capital to investing in agriculture and male dominance on land ownership. The paper recommends more research on better land ownership schemes for improvement of rural livelihoods.

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<sup>1</sup> Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO).

## Introduction

Land is of utmost importance for socio-economic development in both developed and developing countries. Land includes resources such as arable land, and surface and sub-surface resources. According to Poteete<sup>2</sup> “everyone has a relationship to land”. Literature<sup>3</sup> shows that the entire life of an average African revolves around land” and that “realistic discussions of poverty alleviation in Africa need to be addressed in the context of land”. The Tanzania National Land Policy and Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025 recognize the critical importance of land for poverty reduction. According to URT<sup>4</sup>, 70% of land in Tanzania is under customary land ownership and 80% of the population living in rural areas depends on land for their livelihoods. Property rights to land and dwellings in developing nations are, according to de Soto<sup>5</sup>, notoriously insecure, a fact that has led to impoverishment of the citizens in those nations.

Land laws in Tanzania recognize customary rights as having equal legal force and effect as rights acquired through grant or purchase from the state. In practice, customary rights are stronger because they are held and registered in perpetuity whereas statu-

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<sup>2</sup> A.R. Poteete, *Analyzing the politics of natural resources: from theories of property rights to institutional analysis and beyond*, in: *Environmental Social Sciences: Methods and Research Design*, eds. I. Vaccaro, E.A. Smith, and S. Aswani, Cambridge 2010, pp. 57–79.

<sup>3</sup> J.C. Franco, *Making land rights accessible: Social movements and political-legal innovation in the rural Philippines*, „The Journal of Development Studies”, 44(2008), no. 7, pp. 991–1022; S. Razavi, *Engendering the political economy of agrarian change*, „The Journal of Peasant Studies”, 36(2009), no. 1, pp. 197–226; R.V. Murthy, *Political economy of agrarian crisis and subsistence under neoliberalism in India*, „The Nehu Journal”, 11(2013), no. 1.

<sup>4</sup> URT (United Republic of Tanzania), *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty: Poverty and Human Development Report*, URT 2011.

<sup>5</sup> H. de Soto, *The mystery of capital*, New York 2010.

tory rights have a limited term. Nearly 70% of the land area is “village land” and to which the Village Land Act applies. Each village as a legal entity has rights to define its village land area, and the village government is the lawful controller and manager of those lands<sup>6</sup> (URT, 1999). This includes the right to set up its own Village Land Register, register collectively owned areas, and issue titles of Customary Rights of Occupancy over house and farm plots.

In Tanzania when it comes to village land registration, the government recognizes both formalized customary land rights and informal indigenous land ownership rights<sup>7</sup>. In 2006, Tanzania initiated a program called Property and Business Formalization Program (PBF), popularly known in Kiswahili as MKURABITA (*Mkakati wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania*). PBF Programme carried out a pilot customary land right titling project in Handeni District in 2006 by providing certificates of customary right of occupancy (CCRO) through implementation of the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999. One of the objectives of introducing land reforms in Tanzania was to improve customary tenure system for the rural poor communities.

The existing customary system basically operates more effectively when land is relatively abundant and population is low such that people involved in the transactions have regular and direct contact<sup>8</sup>. High population growth in Sub Saharan Africa, land markets expand and transactions increase between individuals who are not closely related therefore, certainty over the entitlement of

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<sup>6</sup> URT, *National Land Policy* (1997). 2nd (ed.). The Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development (MLHSD), 1999.

<sup>7</sup> URT, *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty: Poverty and Human Development Report* 2011.

<sup>8</sup> C.B. Kerekes and C.R. Williamson, *Propertyless in Peru, even with a government land title*, „American Journal of Economics and Sociology”, 69(2010), no. 3, pp. 1011–1033.

the owner to transfer land rights becomes increasingly relevant<sup>9</sup>. The government relies on the expectation that documentation of land rights will increase tenure security, access to formal financial institutions for credit, and finally promote investment. Since the introduction of rural land registration under the Village Land Act (VLA) of 1999, there has been a vast mobilization on land registration taking place at a promising rate (for instance in Handeni from 500 CCROs in 2006 to 1 007 CCROs in 2016), land holders together with other land users are expecting to use CCRO as collateral to access credit. Therefore, the current study aimed at exploring the influence of formalizing customary land rights on rural household livelihood outcomes.

Rural households generally face a number of hindrances when it comes to accessing credit from formal financial institutions, the major one being the lack secure property rights. Therefore, formalizing land rights has been promoted as a way to enhance credit access, encourage investment, stimulate land markets, and improve livelihoods<sup>10</sup>. However, there has been little improvement in those aspects; for example, Handeni District council has reported that access to credit through formal financial institutions in rural settings is still low at about 3%<sup>11</sup>.

Formalization of customary land rights (CCRO) and access to credit do not give consistent outcomes; researches carried out in Tanzania, Kenya Ghana and Rwanda showed that, CCRO ownership had no clear impact in improving livelihoods<sup>12</sup>; On

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<sup>9</sup> E.C. Fairley, *Upholding Customary Land Rights through Formalization? Evidence from Tanzania's Program of Land Reform*, Minneapolis 2013.

<sup>10</sup> F.N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration and Land Policy*, „The Guardian Series”, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> URT, *Handeni District Profile*, 2013.

<sup>12</sup> E.C. Fairley, *Upholding Customary Land Rights through Formalization?...*, op. cit.; F. Place and S.E. Migot-Adholla, *The economic effects of land registration*

the contrary, a study conducted in Latin America, Honduras, Paraguay, and Brazil showed positive impacts on access to credit and improvement of household's livelihoods<sup>13</sup>. So it is debatable as to whether formalization of customary land rights can really lead to improved rural livelihood outcomes, through access to credit from the formal financial institutions available in the study area. Hernando de Soto hypothesizes that, government land titling establishes secure property rights and leads to the associated positive benefits. However, literature<sup>14</sup> on the effects of land titling finds mixed results. Moreover, the Tanzanian government piloted the PBF program in the District in 2006, but since then, no study has been done in the area to empirically determine the impact of the CCRO's on livelihood outcomes of the rural households in the District.

The study on which the manuscript is based aimed at gathering some empirical evidence on the impact of CCRO on rural household's livelihood outcomes in Handeni District. Previous researches<sup>15</sup> in the District have dealt with issues of land and rural livelihoods in isolation. Hence, there is so much emphasis

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*on smallholder farms in Kenya: evidence from Nyeri and Kakamega districts*, „Land Economics”, 74(1998), no. 3, pp. 360–373; M. Lyons, *Pro-poor business law? On MKURABITA and the legal empowerment of Tanzania's street vendors*, „Hague Journal on the Rule of Law”, 5(2013), no. 1, pp. 74–95.

<sup>13</sup> C.B. Kerekes and C.R. Williamson, *Propertyless in Peru, even with a government land title*, „American Journal of Economics and Sociology”, 69(2010), no. 3, pp. 1011–1033.

<sup>14</sup> F.N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration...*, op. cit.; *Baseline survey of female entrepreneurs in Temeke, Kinondoni and Ilala districts of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam 2009; M. Lyons, *Pro-poor business law?...*, op. cit., pp. 74–95.

<sup>15</sup> *PBF And The implementation of The Village Land Law – Act No 5 Of 1999, A participation Report of The MKURABITA Pilot Project in Handeni District*, TAPHGO (Tanzania Pastoralists, Hunters and Gatherers Organization), 2007; F.N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration and Land Policy*, op. cit..



of some issues at the expense of others or overlooking of some topics (e.g. more weight on land at the expense of livelihoods). Generally, findings from such kind of works might mislead policy makers leading to erroneous policies and programs. Therefore, the need for a more specific study on formalized customary land rights and rural livelihood outcomes, which needs to be analysed simultaneously. The importance of the study was also based on the fact that land and livelihoods issues remain major concerns of development policy both at the national and international levels. Thus, the manuscript represents a crucial body of reference which will assist the decision makers on appropriate steps to be taken in Handeni District in poverty reduction and land administration and management. Moreover, the study is in line with the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) and the former Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); goal number one which was to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger with a target linked to reduce poverty and reduce income inequality<sup>16</sup> and also the study is linked to the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) especially 1–3 which emphasize poverty eradication<sup>17</sup>. Results from the study could therefore benefit rural communities, policy makers, development practitioners, researchers, and planners in their endeavor to alleviate rural poverty. Generally, the study aimed at exploring the influence of formalizing customary land rights on rural household livelihood outcomes. Specifically, it determined people's perception on formalization of customary land rights; assessed the influence of CCRO in enabling owners of land to access credit in formal

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<sup>16</sup> URT, *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty: Poverty and Human Development Report*, 2011.

<sup>17</sup> URT, *Press release; The United Nations in conjunction with the Government of Tanzania officially launched 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also known as Global Goals*, 2015.

financial institutions; determined how ownership of CCRO has influenced household income and asset accumulation and identified challenges facing land owners in using land as a tool to improve rural livelihood outcomes.

## Conceptualization of Key Terms

### What is land?

There are controversial statements about the definition of land, as some people confine the term only to the soil, thus separating other components attached to it. This has led to misconceptions about the term. However, Sumberg<sup>18</sup> argues that land includes much more than just the physical soil or substance. Studies by Sumberg, Njogu and Dietz<sup>19</sup> have pointed out that land encompasses a range of resources the scope and influence of which transcends private property. These lines of thinking correspond to that by UN-HABITAT<sup>20</sup> which states that 'land involves a wide range of rights and responsibilities'. Hence, unlike other resources, land consists of a diversity of resources such that to entrust all land rights exclusively to a single individual is difficult. This is particularly true in Africa where different people tend to have different rights over the same piece of land and over different land resources<sup>21</sup>. In the

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<sup>18</sup> J. Sumberg [et al.], *Young people, agriculture, and employment in rural Africa*, 2014.

<sup>19</sup> J.G. Njogu and T. Dietz, *Land use and tenure: entitlement rights for community-based wildlife and forest conservation in Taita Taveta*, Nairobi 2006.

<sup>20</sup> D. Antonio, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, and International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, Eds., *Handling land: innovative tools for land governance and secure tenure*. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), 2012.

<sup>21</sup> A.R. Poteete, *Analyzing the politics of natural resources: from theories of property rights to institutional analysis and beyond*, in: *Environmental Social Sci-*

current study the term ‘land’ is defined as: “a physical resource that consists of many attributes of the biosphere that support life, ranging from arable land, landforms, surface and sub-surface hydrology, forest, minerals, pasture, and both human and animal populations”.

### Land tenure system

Like the land concept, also the term land tenure is perceived differently by different authors. According to Maxwell and Wiebe<sup>22</sup>, land tenure is defined as a system of rights and institutions that govern access to and use of land and other resources. On the other hand, FAO<sup>23</sup> defines land tenure on legal grounds, to refer to the bundle of both rights and obligations – the right to own, hold, manage, transfer, or exploit resources and land, but also the obligation not to use these in a way that harms others. Moreover, Münkner<sup>24</sup> has argued that, the term land tenure has a very broad meaning and cautions that one should be careful to avoid misconception. To him it includes the social, economic, legal and technical relationships of persons (individuals or groups) to land and to other individuals or groups. It also covers relations concerning family, kinship, labour and access to resources, and is influenced by natural/physical factors as well as man-made rules regarding the man/land relationship. Perhaps, these are kinds of arguments that make Poteete<sup>25</sup> and

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*ences: Methods and Research Design*, eds. I. Vaccaro, E.A. Smith, and S. Aswani, Cambridge 2010, pp. 57–79.

<sup>22</sup> D. Maxwell and K. Wiebe, *Land tenure and food security: Exploring dynamic linkages*, „Development and Change”, 30(1999), no. 4, pp. 825–849.

<sup>23</sup> FAO, *Land tenure and rural development*, Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization, 2002.

<sup>24</sup> H.H. Münkner, *Synthesis of Current State and Trends in Land Tenure, Land Policy and Land Law in Africa*, Eschborn 1995.

<sup>25</sup> A.R. Poteete, *Analyzing the politics of natural resources...*, op. cit.

FAO<sup>26</sup> consider land tenure as an institution. As it includes roles invented by the society to regulate behaviours on how to utilize land resources.

Based on the above definitions, land tenure can generally be defined to include terms and conditions under which land resources are governed and regulated. It constitutes legal or customarily defined bundles of rights and the obligations entrusted to an individual or groups as a whole regarding access to and use of land and other resources. These bundles of rights are defined based on existing social, legal, economic and environmental conditions. Hence, it should be clear from the outset that the rights on land resources may be derived through customary or statutory laws, marriage and inheritance and through power and control. The land tenure system can therefore be classified into three main categories as detailed below.

### **Statutory or formal tenure system**

Statutory land tenure system is a system whereby the rights to ownership or occupancy of land are defined according to formalized national legal or constitutional process. They are most effective when land values are high and transactions among strangers are frequent<sup>27</sup>.

### **Informal land tenure**

This type of land holding is where means of access is vested through unsanctioned occupation, allocation by local leaders, inheritance and purchase from those who own the land<sup>28</sup>. Here people own land without having acquired it through the custom-

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<sup>26</sup> FAO, *Land tenure and rural development...*, op. cit.

<sup>27</sup> F.N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration...*, op.cit.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem.

ary or statutory channels; a common situation in developing countries.

### **Customary land tenure**

Customary land tenure is the mode of holding land rights which exists through historical agreement among people within the community without written laws. These unwritten laws are often based on the experience of the elders and are aimed at defending the interest of the group/clan/tribe/family<sup>29</sup>. In this system land belongs to the whole community or clan and not to an individual. The clan head is the custodian of the land rights on behalf of the community. Once the rights are granted to an individual they are held in perpetuity as long as the grantee conducts are in a manner satisfactory to the grantor<sup>30</sup>. Community leaders play a major role when determining allocation, use, transfer and other activities related to land and they do this on behalf of the entire community, the determinant being the need rather through payment for acquisition of land. The distinction often made between statutory and customary land rights is now becoming blurred in a number of countries, particularly in Africa where provision of formal legal customary land right (CCRO) is practised<sup>31</sup>.

### **Rural livelihood**

The term livelihood comprises people, their capabilities and means of living, including food, income and assets<sup>32</sup>. Thus, rural

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<sup>29</sup> M. Wanyama, L.O. Mose, M. Odendo, J.O. Okuro, G. Owuor, and L. Mohamed, *Determinants of income diversification strategies amongst rural households in maize based farming systems of Kenya*, „African Journal of Food Science”, 4(2010), no. 12, pp. 754–763.

<sup>30</sup> D.A. Atwood, *Land registration in Africa: The impact on agricultural production*, „World development”, 18(1990), no. 5, pp. 659–671.

<sup>31</sup> FAO, *Land tenure and rural development...*, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> R. Chambers and G. Conway, *Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century*, Institute of Development Studies (UK), 1992.

livelihoods include different means of gaining a living in rural areas which to a large extent are connected to their capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living.

### **Livelihood outcomes**

Livelihood outcomes are the results or outcomes of livelihood strategies. Livelihood outcomes include: increased household food security through improved and productive livestock and crop production, increased household income, increased employment opportunities, enhanced social and human capital, reduced livelihood vulnerability, ensured social inclusion, ensured good governance, increased equal access to information, communication, education and all forms of empowerment in general. Batterbury<sup>33</sup> defines livelihood outcomes as the achievement or outputs of livelihood strategies, such as more income, increased well-being, reduced vulnerability, improved food security, and more sustainable use of natural resources. Therefore, the study's operational definition of livelihood outcomes focuses on household income improvement and accumulation of assets through the use of land as natural resources available under the new scheme of land ownership in the customary land rights.

### **The study's Conceptual Framework**

The study's conceptual framework is a modification of Batterbury<sup>34</sup> diagnosis on sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) which assumes that the livelihood of any community comprises capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> S. Batterbury, *Sustainable livelihoods: still being sought, ten years on*, 2007.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> R. Chambers and G. Conway, *Sustainable rural livelihoods...*, op. cit.

The Sustainable livelihoods framework therefore examines the different elements that contribute to people's livelihood strategies. It analyses how forces outside the household or community in 'the external environment' affect them. The framework looks at the interaction between individuals, their capabilities and the different types of assets or resources they have access to the activities through which they gain their livelihoods<sup>36</sup>. This study has borrowed some ideas from the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) to uncover the influence of CCRO on rural livelihood outcomes. Therefore, customary land rights (CCRO) are considered as one of the assets in natural assets of the DFID model. Elements of the DFID were adopted under the following assumptions.

Household vulnerability context; households with CCRO as a legal and formal customary land rights document are less vulnerable than households without a CCRO. This is because it is expected that such households are likely to have better livelihood outcomes reflected from their income compared to the households without CCRO. Households with CCRO are expected to access credit in the formal financial institutions, engage more into livelihood activities and ultimately improve their incomes.

Improved social, financial and natural capital; households with a CCRO are likely to have more assets as compared to the households without a CCRO. This implies that households with a CCRO have received training on various issues concerning land benefits (improved human capital) including access to credit in financial institutions (financial capital), Land tenure security enhanced through CCRO (improved natural capital) as compared to household without CCRO.

The role of PBFP project to issue CCRO is assumed to be the transforming structures and processes. This is because the general

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<sup>36</sup> R. Smyth, *Exploring the usefulness of a conceptual framework as a research tool: a researcher's reflections*, „Issues in educational research”, 14(2004), no. 2, p. 167.

objective of PBFP pilot project is to secure rural land as a livelihood resource to improve the concerned household livelihood activities and ultimately improve their livelihood outcomes.

## METHODOLOGY

### Description of the Study Area

#### Description of Handeni District

The study was conducted in Handeni District where the customary land titling pilot programme was implemented in 2006. Seven (7) villages of Mzeri, Sindeni, Kweisasu, Bongi, Nkale, Mbuyuni, and Kwamkono were involved with a total population of 19 737<sup>37</sup>. Handeni District Council covers an area of 7,080 km<sup>2</sup> and occupies the south-western part of Tanga Region. The district is administratively divided into 7 divisions, 19 ward and 112 registered villages and it lies between 4.9° – 6.0°S and 36.8° – 38.5°E and an altitude of between 600 and 1000 metres above sea level, the district has an average temperature of 28.8°C. The district experiences two rainy seasons per year (bimodal). Short rains fall between October – December and the long rains between March and May. Average annual rainfall is between 500–1000mm<sup>38</sup>.

The reason for selecting Handeni Districts for the study rests on the fact that it was among the two pioneer districts (Mbozi and Handeni) to be involved in the pilot project of the National Property and Business Formalization Programme (popularly known as MKURABITA (*Mkakati wa Kurasimisha Rasimali na Biashara za*

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<sup>37</sup> PBFP And The implementation of The Village Land Law – Act No 5 Of 1999, A participation Report of The MKURABITA Pilot Project in Handeni District, TAPHGO (Tanzania Pastoralists, Hunters and Gatherers Organization), 2007.

<sup>38</sup> URT, *Handeni District Profile*, 2013.



wanyonge Tanzania) in Swahili. The above is not true for the other districts of Tanzania, though some districts have started to practice formalization of customary land rights by providing Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy. Likewise, even other districts that are endowed with land in customary land tenure system do not have such a great number of CCRO as those provided in Handeni District 1 007, Mbozi has about 300, Mbarali 250 CCROs and the rest of districts has less than 100 CCROs issued so far<sup>39</sup>. These conditions motivated a study which looks at the interdependence of formalization of customary land rights and rural livelihoods outcomes.

### Research Design

The study adopted a cross-sectional research design whereby data were collected at one point in time. According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech<sup>40</sup>, the cross-sectional research design is also cost effective. Therefore, the choice of this design was based on the ability to allow data collection that meets the study's objectives within the duration of the study and available financial resources. In addition, a mixed-methods approach was chosen for gathering, analysing, interpreting and validating results. A mixed method research refers to a type of research, which combines elements of quantitative and qualitative research approaches for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and triangulation of information. Thus, instead of relying on just one method such as quantitative or qualitative methods, both approaches were employed to gather, cross-check, analyse and interpret data. By

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<sup>39</sup> A. Hart [et al.], *Participatory Land Use Planning to Support Tanzanian Farmer and Pastoralist Investment: Experiences from Mbarali District, Mbeya Region*, Dar es Salaam 2014.

<sup>40</sup> A.J. Onwuegbuzie and N.L. Leech, *On becoming a pragmatic researcher: The importance of combining quantitative and qualitative research methodologies*, „International journal of social research methodology”, 8(2005), no. 5, pp. 375–387.

combining the strength of each method the research and its subsequent results are generally improved.

### **Study Population**

The target population of this study was all households with CCRO granted through the PBFP pilot project in Handeni District and individuals without CCRO in the study villages. The strategy of having respondents with and without CCRO was adopted to capture the impact of CCRO on rural livelihood outcomes. Sindeni WEO, VEOs in the four villages, District land Officer, village land committee members (8; 2 from each village) and Extension Officers (8:2 from each village) were included in the study as key informants during In-depth Interviews to enrich information collected through household survey questionnaires. Moreover, representatives from formal financial institutions (FINCA, BRAC, Vision Fund, CRDB, PSPF and NMB) were also included as key informants in the study population, making a total of 32 key informants interviewed in the study area. The study's unit of analysis is the household.

### **Sample Size and Sampling Technique**

The sampling unit was a household since the benefits and ownership of CCRO are shared within the household. The study employed a multi-stage sampling technique. From the main sampling frame of 19 737 households the sample size of 188 households has been obtained (details in Appendix 4). Then sampling fraction was computed and sub-samples compiled per village. Among seven villages involved in the project, four villages were randomly selected as the community is relatively homogeneous, followed by stratified proportional random sampling across household with and without CCRO sub-samples.

Based on the formula as pointed above 188 respondents were to be surveyed and interviewed for the study but only 184 re-

spondents were interviewed because it was difficult to meet all the respondents as it was farming time for most of the household members. According to Baker<sup>41</sup>, the sample size should range from 30 to 60 respondents with 30 respondents being the minimum number of respondents. Nevertheless, the sample size of 184 respondents is satisfactory to run rigorous statistical analysis. Stratified random sampling was used to select participants for the focus group discussions (FGDs) across socio-demographic groups. Then participants were organized in groups of eight to twelve participants, however these respondents were not included in the individual interviews; and a sum total of four (4) FGDs one from each village were conducted.

## **Data Collection Methods and Tools**

### **Nature and type of data**

Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) by DFID (1999) was useful in determining the nature and types of data to be collected. Different livelihood resources which are found in rural settings together with livelihood strategies were identified. These are natural resources, physical capital, economic capital and social capital. However, more weight was given to livelihood strategies that mostly depend on land as many people (66%) still rely on agriculture<sup>42</sup>. Thus, data on crop cultivation and livestock keeping activities were gathered. Attention was also given to finan-

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<sup>41</sup> S.E. Baker, R. Edwards and M. Doidge, *How many qualitative interviews is enough?: Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research*, 2012.

<sup>42</sup> URT, *2012 Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*. National Bureau of Statistics, Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2012.

cial capital, physical capital and human capital components of livelihood resources. In respect to financial capital, data related to income, savings and credit cooperation societies, village community banks, financial institutions, remittance and pensions were gathered. Data on household annual income and asset value were collected as estimated figures from the respondents. However, social capital information was not collected due to limited time. Likewise, off-farm income generating activities such as petty trading, handcraft activities and the like were included. Regarding natural capital, weight was given to land ownership and its associated tenure security.

### **Data collection methods**

Primary data were collected using a household survey questionnaire (Appendix I) with open and close-ended questions in order to collect a wide range of information. The primary data focused on households' ownership of land with or without CCRO and rural community livelihood outcomes. In addition, FGDs and In-depth Interviews with key Informants were used to compliment information on rural livelihood outcomes in terms of challenges facing CCRO owners in improving their livelihood. The FGDs and In-depth Interviews were guided by an FGD guide (Appendix II) and In-depth interview guide Appendix III. Four FGDs were conducted, one for each village in the study area.

### **Data Analysis**

Data analysis was mainly done using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Program. After data cleaning the data was analysed. Multiple linear regression analysis model and Independent sample t-test were employed to capture information on objective three of the study about the influence of CCRO on livelihood outcomes (household income) against the selected predictor

variables between household with and without CCRO (Table 1). Multiple linear regression was used in the study because the dependent variable household income is a continuous variable and it was regressed against eight independent variables. Therefore, based on the  $R^2$  of 0.410, this means that the independent variables entered in the model explained 41% of the variance in the dependent variable. Descriptive statistical analysis was employed to determine means, frequencies, and percentages on selected household's characteristics. Reliability of the results obtained from the qualitative data was checked by triangulation methods; whereby, the same issue is checked or supplemented through different ways to ensure authenticity. In addition to the above model, Independent-sample t-test was used to compare estimated value of assets based on the current prices owned between the two groups (household with and without CCRO) independently. For objective one data were analysed using Likert Scale while objective (ii) data were analysed using descriptive statistics by establishing percentages and frequencies.

### **Ethical Considerations**

Respondents were entitled to privacy and confidentiality both on ethical consideration and protection of their personal data. In addition, respondent's participation in the study was voluntary. The research details were properly and clearly communicated to each respondent before the interviews. Participants were informed of their rights, assured of confidentiality and that their identity would be kept anonymous throughout the interview and study results unless well communicated and agreed upon between the researcher and the respondent. Researcher entry to the District followed administrative procedure set forth by the government and by Sokoine University of Agriculture. Pre-arrangement was made through the District Administrative Secretary's (DAS) office,

District Executive Director, Ward Executive Officer (WEOs), Village Executive Offices (VEOs) in the respective study areas. Hence, the risk associated with improper entry and safety matters to the researcher and respondents were adhered to.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents and Land Ownership

#### Household head's age and land ownership

Study findings as presented in Table 1 show that the majority (86%) and (84%) of the household heads with and without CCRO group belong to the age group of 18–60 years respectively and a few (14%) and (16%) in both groups were above 60 years of age and the overall mean age of 44.6. The results suggest that the majority of the household heads were in the active and productive age group. According to URT<sup>43</sup>, about half (49%) of the Tanzania population in the economically productive age range (15–64), a substantial burden is placed on these people to support older and younger members of the population.

Cross tabulation results of household head's age groups with average land size show that more than a half (51%) and (62%) of land belongs to those above 60 years for both household heads with and without CCRO respectively. This is because customary land acquisition is mainly based on inheritance and therefore the active age inherits land from their parents who are fewer generally but yet they still own big chunks of land as compared to the younger ones (i.e. those below 60 years). Moreover, results suggest that since the aged own big chunks of land, this could be among the

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<sup>43</sup> Ibidem.

other reasons why most of the land in the rural areas of Handeni are not developed or are underutilized resulting into poor improvement of the rural livelihood outcomes. Similar observations were reported by ILC<sup>44</sup> in Mbozi Tanzania that the majority of land owned by those aged 60 years and above were underdeveloped. This observation was supported during the FGDs whereby a concern was raised about elders owning large pieces of land which is also not fully utilized as quoted below;

“These elders own big chunks of land; however, they don’t use it as whole and they don’t allow us to use their land for crop production instead they want to sell it to people outside the village or from town”  
(A 32 years old male FGDs participant Kweisasu village, 08/03/2016).

**Table 1:** Household head’s socio-demographic characteristics and land ownership

Households heads owning land with CCRO (n=92)					
Characteristic	Categories	Frequency	Average land size owned (acres)	Frequency	Average land size owned(acres)
Household head’s age (years)	18–35	12(13)	14.9	9(10)	12.4
	36–60	67(73)	10.4	68(74)	11.2
	>60	13(14)	69.5	15(16)	60.3
Household head’s sex	Male	74 (80)	18	71(77)	23
	Female	18(20)	18	21(23)	3.7
Household head’s marital status	Married	57(62)	21.8	68(74)	22
	Divorced	8(8.6)	5.2	4(4.3)	4.6
	Single	12(13)	33.4	12(13)	20.1
	Widow	15(16.4)	6.1	8(8.7)	3.5
Household size	1–4	22(23.9)	19.1	22(23.9)	25.5
	5–8	44(47.8)	13.9	49(53.3)	14
	>8	26(28.3)	28.4	21(22.8)	25.6
Household head’s education level	No formal	18(19.6)	26.8	20(21.7)	18.8
	Primary	70(76.1)	18.3	58(63)	21.4
	Secondary	3(3.3)	3.5	14(15.3)	8.5
	College	1(1.1)	4	—	—

**NB:** Numbers in the brackets indicate percentage

<sup>44</sup> A. Hart [et al.], *Participatory Land Use Planning to Support Tanzanian Farmer and Pastoralist Investment: Experiences from Mbarali District, Mbeya Region*, op. cit.

## Household head's sex and land ownership status

The study findings show that male headed households (MHH) were the majority (87%) and (77%) with and without CCRO respectively as compared to females headed households (FHH) (20%) and (23%) as shown in Table 1. According to URT<sup>45</sup>, in the year 2011/12 FHH in Tanzania represented 22% of all households. Generally, women who head households tend to be widowed, divorced or separated. A similar observation was made by Songoro<sup>46</sup> in a study on west Usambara about land, forests and livelihood in Tanzania whereby a total 254 household heads were randomly sampled for investigation whereby about 80 % households were headed by men, and 20% by women. In addition, Paaga<sup>47</sup> in the study about customary land rights in Ghana observed that more than two third (68%) of the household heads owning land were males.

Results from cross tabulation of a household head's sex and land ownership status in terms of CCRO ownership show that most (96%) and (78%) of land in households with and without CCRO respectively was owned by MHHs as compared to FHHs (14%) and (22%) respectively. Results further show that generally over three quarters (80%) of land was owned by MHHs while only 20% of land is owned by FHHs. Similar results were observed by EFG<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> URT, *2012 Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*. National Bureau of Statistics, Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2012.

<sup>46</sup> A.E. Songoro, *Land scarcity, rural livelihoods and forest management in West Usambara*, Dissertation: Giessen University 2014.

<sup>47</sup> D.T. Paaga and G. Dandeebo, *Customary land tenure and its implications for land disputes in Ghana: Cases from Wa, Wechau and Lambussie*, „International Journal of Humanities and Social Science”, 3(2014), no. 18, pp. 263–270.

<sup>48</sup> *Baseline survey of female entrepreneurs in Temeke, Kinondoni and Ilala districts of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 2009.



that land ownership by women in households was a problem, of all female respondents only 9.2% of respondents owned land individually and 10% owned land jointly with their spouses and or other household members. It was clear that ownership of land by women, either individually or jointly, was low<sup>49</sup>. The above results suggest that FHHs were adversely affected in terms of control to land, hence, most of them continue to remain in the poverty vicious cycle trap with poor livelihood outcomes. On the other hand, women in the households headed by males may not necessarily be poor but their face a similar challenge with FHHs when it comes to control over land<sup>50</sup>.

Results from the study suggest that although formalization of customary land rights promotes land ownership to vulnerable groups, the challenge of control over land still holds. Generally, males inherit land from their parents based on the patriarchal system practiced in most African countries, including Tanzania. Land is simply divided between male heirs who enjoy full rights on such lands and who may then dispose of it to any one at any time. Land in most of the households is said to be owned by members of the household or jointly owned by married couples based on verbal terms and in case of marriage break up or divorce most women lose access and control over the land, this observation coincides with what had been observed by Nawrotzki<sup>51</sup> in the a study about rural livelihood and access to natural capital in Madagascar. During the FGDs a concern was raised about male dominance in land ownership as shown below;

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<sup>49</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>50</sup> D.T. Paaga and G. Dandeebo, *Customary land tenure and its implications...*, op. cit.

<sup>51</sup> R.J. Nawrotzki, L.M. Hunter, and T.W. Dickinson, *Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital: Differences between migrants and non-migrants in Madagascar*, „Demographic research”, 26(2012).

“Generally land is owned and shared between husband and wife when love is sweet, but when love turns bitter and the woman gets divorced, land remains in the hands of the greedy men. I am now happy after my name was included on the land certificate (referring to the CCRO). I hope that whatever happens I will still own the land together with my ex-husband”.

(A 54 years old female FGDs participant at Mbuyuni village 05/03/2016).

CCRO provides a formal and legal binding agreement between household members in terms of land ownership. The PBF pilot project through CCRO has promoted gender mainstreaming on matters pertaining to land ownership across gender categories in the study villages. Table 2 shows a picture of participatory mapping of gendered rural livelihood resources ownership and decision making regarding use of such resources at Kweisasu village only in Handeni District<sup>52</sup>. Table 2 analysis for one village only (Kweisasu) shows that men own and decide on the use of houses, farms, radio, bicycle, cattle and the farm harvest while women own only chickens. Again, men decide on the use of all such livelihood assets they own, only labour seems to be shared equally across gender categories<sup>53</sup>. Land ownership under CCRO scheme provides an avenue for women to formally own land and ultimately own what is upon that land; house, crops and animal grazing areas. This implies that most of the household socio-economic resources are controlled by males. Therefore, use of such resources depends on males priorities of which in most cases marginalize the needs of the women and other vulnerable groups in the household thus adversely affecting women’s well-being.

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<sup>52</sup> URT, *Handeni District Profile*, 2013.

<sup>53</sup> URT, *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty: Poverty and Human Development Report*, 2011.

**Table 2:** A gendered analysis of livelihood assets ownership and power for decision making to use such assets

Livelihood asset	Who Owns		Who decides on use			
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
House		V		V	V	V
Land		V		V	V	V
Farm		V		V	V	V
Cows		V		V	V	V
Goats		V		V	V	V
Chicken	V		V	V	V	V
Bicycle		V		V	V	V
Radio		V		V	V	V
<b>Total scores</b>	1(12.5)	7(87.5)	1(12)	8(88)	8(50)	8(50)

**NB:** Numbers in the brackets indicate percent

Source: Data from village file (Opportunities and Obstacles to development Programme (O&OD) at Kweisasu village, 2012.

## Household head's marital status and land ownership

The study findings in Table 1 show that more than a half (62%) and (74%) households' heads with and without CCRO respectively were married couples while only (38%) and (26%) were not married (divorced, single, widows, widower). According to URT<sup>54</sup>, in Tanzania Mainland, the percentage of adults who are married or living together has declined from about 60% in 2007 to about 57% in 2011/12. Results of the study indicate a low number of separations which suggest that the majority of families are intact across all the four villages in the study area. Findings on the comparison of land ownership reveal that married couples own the largest part of

<sup>54</sup> URT, 2012 *Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*. National Bureau of Statistics, Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2012.

the land (70%) and (84%) of households with and without CCRO. These findings suggest that the majority of the respondents were married couples and they are at the productive age, hence the need to inherit land from the grandparents. Since all the households had an equal chance in the pilot project to acquire CCRO then, study results suggest that the majority of the village population consists of married couples as compared to other marital status groups. Similar results were observed by Foukona<sup>55</sup> in the legal aspects of customary land Administration in Solomon Islands, whereby 71% of respondents were married couples among which 64% and 45% of the households had CCRO and without CCRO respectively. Again literature<sup>56</sup> found that during marriage separation or death of a husband, land that is jointly owned by both married couples using CCRO provides legal opportunity for women to have access and control over the land for their well-being. The results of this study together with other authors observation emphasize the importance of CCRO towards women and other vulnerable groups well-being with regard to access and control over land.

### **Household head's education level and land ownership**

Results in Table 1 show that majority (80.4%) and (78.3%) of all household heads with and without a CCRO had formal education (primary, secondary and college) while a few (19.6%) and (21.7%) respectively had no formal education. Moreover, results show that a large part of land (72%) and (63%) was owned by the household's heads with primary education for both categories. This result suggests that literacy level in the study area is higher as compared to the National literacy level of 65.9 in rural

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<sup>55</sup> J.D. Foukona, *Legal aspects of customary land administration in Solomon Islands*, „Journal of South Pacific Law”, 11(2007), no. 1, pp. 64–72.

<sup>56</sup> Ibidem; F.N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration...*, op. cit.; D.T. Paaga and G. Dandeebo, *Customary land tenure and its implications...*, op. cit.

areas in 2010<sup>57</sup>. Generally, literacy is believed to be an important aspect in livelihood strategies, activities and its associated outcomes. Knowledge associated with primary education level has been observed to promote wise use of natural resources and its associated property rights of which land is of utmost importance livelihood resource.

The results further suggest that the majority of the population in the study area have accessed formal education. The slight difference in ownership of CCRO among formal education household heads is due to PBFP pilot project procedure in provision of CCRO which provided an equal chance to all household's heads to acquire CCRO. According to Jeannette et al.<sup>58</sup>, a household head's education level is one of the important demographic characteristics which influences the choice and good performance of a livelihood activity. Literate households are expected to easily access financial capital in the form of rural credit. Again literate households are expected to easily adopt new innovations and therefore, increasing probability of improving their livelihood outcomes as compared to their non-formal educated household heads.

### **Household size and land ownership**

Results presented in Table 1 show that about half (48.8%) and (53.3%) of all the household heads with and without CCRO interviewed had 5-8 household members (medium household size) while the rest 52.2% and 46.7% had 1 to 4 and more than 8 household members. The results also revealed that population in the study area had an average household size of 6 members per

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<sup>57</sup> URT, *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty: Poverty and Human Development Report*, 2011.

<sup>58</sup> V. Jeannette, A. Notenbaert, S. Moyo, and M. Herrero, *Household livelihood strategies and livestock benefits dependence in Gaza province of Mozambique*, „African Journal of Agricultural Research”, 6(2011), no. 3, pp. 560–572.

household. Similar results have been observed by Songoro<sup>59</sup> in a study about Usambara forest and livelihood outcomes whereby out of 254 study respondents (67%) had average household size of 6 and above with average household size being 7. The study results suggest that households in the study area had higher household size as compared to average household size of 5 members of the Tanga Region and 5.3 household members of the rural Tanzania<sup>60</sup>. These results imply land ownership is not directly related to household size but household size is an important household economic characteristic. This is based on the fact that the larger the household size the higher the need for more resources especially land and possibly improved technologies to allow intensification of agriculture production as an important livelihood resource.

In addition to the above, results show that there is a slight difference in the number of respondents owning land with CCRO across household size categories; low (1-4), medium (5-8) and high (9 and above) own land around one third to each category, i.e. 24%, 34%, 42% with CCRO respectively. A similar observation was revealed in the household heads without CCRO that household size categories: low (1-4), medium (5-8), high (9 and above) own land about one third to each category (31%), (39%) and (30%) respectively. The study result suggests that household size has little influence on land ownership but it is an important demographic characteristic for assessment of household livelihood strategies, activities and outcomes<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> A.E. Songoro, Land scarcity, rural livelihoods and forest management in West Usambara, op. cit.

<sup>60</sup> URT, *2012 Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*. National Bureau of Statistics, Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2012.

<sup>61</sup> S. Batterbury, *Sustainable livelihoods...*, op. cit.

## Household Socio-economic Characteristics and Land Ownership

### Household occupation and land ownership

In the study villages main occupations observed were crop production, livestock keeping, businesses, government employment, bodaboda operators as shown in the Table 3. The majority (73% and 67.9%) of the household heads with and without CCRO respectively engaged in crop production. Considering livestock keeping and crop production together as agriculture, this made the majority's main occupation to be agriculture in the households with and without CCRO. The rest of the respondents engage in business and other types of occupation such as formal employment and petty businesses as their source of income. According to URT<sup>62</sup>, more than two thirds (66%) of the rural Tanzanians depend on agriculture as the main employer and source of income. The study result indicates that agriculture is the main rural employer for the majority of the population in the study area and source of income for their livelihood. Moreover, the relationship between household head's occupation and land ownership are as shown in Table 4, the majority of household heads with (70.1%) and without (65.5%) CCRO respectively own land under crop production and livestock keeping.

The results suggest that a large part of land is owned by households engaging in agricultural related activities. In addition, the PBF pilot project mainly aimed at providing CCRO to farms rather than land for other uses such as settlement. A similar observation was made by Mwangi<sup>63</sup> in the study about

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<sup>62</sup> URT, 2012 *Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*. National Bureau of Statistics, Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2012.

<sup>63</sup> L.H. Mwangi, *Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition by Investors: Case Studies from sub-Saharan Africa*, Sussex 2011.

process of land acquisition by large scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereby it was revealed that over three quarter (76%) of land in Sub-Saharan Africa is owned by households engaging in agricultural activities.

**Table 3:** CCRO ownership and socio-economic characteristics of respondents (n=184)

Characteristic		Access to credit			
		Land ownership	No (n=92)	Yes (n=92)	
Occupations of HH	Business and other occupations	Without CCRO	5(5.4)	2 (2.2)	7(3.9)
		With CCRO	2(2.2)	0 (0)	2(1.2)
	Livestock keeping	Without CCRO	3(3.2)	—	3(2)
		With CCRO	3(3.2)	—	3(2)
Crop production and livestock keeping	Without CCRO	16(17.4)	4 (4.4)	20(10.9)	
	With CCRO	16(17.4)	3 (3.2)	19(10.9)	
Crop production	Without CCRO	60(65.2)	2(2.2)	62(67.9)	
	With CCRO	65(70.7)	3 (3.2)	68(73)	
Sex of HH	Female	Without CCRO	18(19.5)	3(3.2)	21(22.8)
		With CCRO	12(13)	—	12(13)
	Male	With CCRO	84(91.3)	3(3.2)	87(94)
		Without CCRO	56(60.8)	8 (8.6)	64(69)

NB: Numbers in the brackets indicate percentage

### Respondent’s Perception on CCRO and Community Livelihood Outcomes

Respondent’s perception on land ownership and CCRO issues were determined by computing mean and percentages of respondent’s perception on selected characteristics shown in Table 4 using a five summative Likert scale analysis. Overall results show that both groups (household heads with and without CCRO) recognize the importance of CCRO in their livelihood. Specifically, more than a half (61%) had a positive perception on the role of CCRO in improving tenure security, decreasing land conflicts, enhancing vulnerable groups, land ownership, promoting awareness on



land administration and enhancing community's participation in decision making regarding land. A minority (15%) had a negative perception on CCRO; they thought that CCRO could enable them to access credit, an aspect which was not realized since inception of CCRO in the study area.

In addition, the other 24% of the respondents had a neutral perception on CCRO which suggests that other community members with and without CCRO lack awareness on the potential values of CCRO on their livelihood. These results suggest that formalization of customary land rights does not always result into positive economic benefits in the modern market as postulated by de Soto but it depends on the environment and the actors involved. Again, literature<sup>64</sup> studies done in Tanzania, Peru, Kenya and Ghana respectively show mixed results on the de Soto argumentation. These imply that environment and actors involved differ and ultimately outcomes of such land formalization differ and therefore the need for creating enabling environment for de Soto's argumentation to work in the study area.

### **Households' perception on CCRO and access to financial services**

The majority (93.5%) and (83%) of household heads with and without CCRO respectively, strongly disagree that CCRO promote economic investment through more access to financial services. In addition, the existing land conflicts deter financial institutions to offer loans in rural areas using land as collateral. The slight dif-

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<sup>64</sup> O.M.L. Kosyando, *Mkurabita and the Implementation of the Village Land Law-Act No 5 of 1999*, TAPHGO, Arusha, Tanzania, [http://www.tnrf.org/files/einfo\\_taphgo\\_report\\_on\\_mkurabita\\_Handeni\\_land\\_registration\\_0.Pdf](http://www.tnrf.org/files/einfo_taphgo_report_on_mkurabita_Handeni_land_registration_0.Pdf), 2007; C.B. Kerekes and C.R. Williamson, *Propertyless in Peru, even with a government land title*, op. cit., pp. 1011–1033, 2010; D.T. Paaga and G. Dandeebo, *Customary land tenure and its implications for land disputes in Ghana...*, op. cit., pp. 263–270.

ference between the two groups was based on the fact that both groups had not accessed financial services using land as collateral despite other households having CCRO.

On the other hand, a minority (6.5%) and (17.4%) of those with and without a CCRO agreed that ownership of CCRO promoted economic investment since they accessed credit from the formal financial institutions. This observation is contrary to what was expected from the PBF program which believed that formalization of customary land rights could enable land owners to access credit and promote economic investment. According to a study done in Ghana by Paaga<sup>65</sup>, it was shown that ownership of a CCRO promoted access to credit whereby more than a third (38%) of the households with a CCRO accessed credit in formal financial institutions.

**Table 4:** Surveyed household’s perception on CCRO impact to rural livelihood outcomes (n=92)

Statement	HH owning land with a CCRO	SD	D	N	A	SA
CCRO promoted access to financial services	Yes	76(83)	4(4)	0(0)	12(13)	0(0)
	No	86(93.5)	0(0)	6(6.5)	0(0)	0(0)
CCRO decreased land conflicts	Yes	0(0)	13(14)	15(16)	56 (61)	8(9)
	No	3(3)	6(6.5)	10(10.9)	70(76.6)	3(3)
CCRO maintained traditional land tenure	Yes	5(5.4)	76(82.6)	9(10)	2(2)	0(0)
	No	0(0)	75(81.5)	12(13)	4(4.3)	1(1.2)
CCRO ownership promoted land tenure security	Yes	0(0)	10(11)	2(2)	76 (83)	4(4)
	No	0(0)	11(22)	0(0)	81 (88)	0(0)
CCRO enabled vulnerable groups to own land	Yes	6(6.5)	4(4)	8(9)	62(67.5)	12(13)
	No	0(0)	0(0)	12(13)	80 (87)	0(0)
CCRO enhanced community awareness on land	Yes	0(0)	5(5.4)	0(0)	66(71.7)	0(0)
	No	0(0)	26(28.3)	6(6.5)	81 (88)	0(0)

*NB:* Number in brackets indicate percent.

*SD*-strongly disagree, *D*-disagree, *N*-neutral, *A*-agree, *SA*-strongly agree.

<sup>65</sup> Ibidem.

## Community perception on CCRO and land conflicts

Results of this study as indicated in Table 6. show that the majority (76.6%) and (61%) of respondents with and without CCRO thought issuing of CCRO could decrease land conflicts in the study area. However, a few (14%) and (6.5%) from the above groups respectively argued that land conflicts still exist in the study area despite issuing of the same. The study result suggests that in general terms CCRO has positively contributed to minimizing land conflicts but not their eradication. The low percentage of respondents reporting existence of land conflicts despite introduction of CCRO pinpointed that among other reasons which cause land conflicts in the villages is the government's failure to properly administer land laws and bylaws. This was emphasized by one of the male pastoralist participant during one of the FGDs as pointed in the quote below;

“Village Land Use Plan (VLUP) and CCRO are good for our livelihoods. However, effectiveness will depend on whether VLUP bylaws and CCRO will be respected by all stakeholders; village leaders, district leaders, regional, national and all village dwellers; both farmers and livestock keepers”.

A male FGDs participant at Bongvi village, 10/03/2016).

The observation from the study suggests that land conflicts exist in Handeni and Tanzania in particular. Conflicts over land in many parts of Tanzania are to a large extent not related to land scarcity or even ethnicity and political pressures as commonly reported in other countries such as Kenya, Somalia and Rwanda<sup>66</sup>. Instead, land conflicts in Tanzania arise from what is

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<sup>66</sup> J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and a new world economic order*, op. cit.; R.R. Simiyu, *Militianisation of resource conflicts: the case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of western Kenya*, Pretoria 2008, p. 80 (*Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, no. 152); C. Médard, *'Indigenous' land claims in Kenya: A case-study of Chebyuk, Mount Elgon district*, Kenya 2010; M. Mghanga, *Usipoziba ufa utajenga ukuta: land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya's Coast Province*, Nairobi 2010.

called by FAO<sup>67</sup> overriding interest; failure by government and developing investors to take into account the needs of local people (i.e. ignoring collective and customary rights over land of local people); lack of adhering to procedures as stipulated in land laws; corruptive behaviours and mismanagement by the government. These factors are compounded by ineffective land use planning that fails to accommodate different land users, inefficiency in land administration as manifested in inadequate capacity to plan, compensate, map and issuance of land to different users.

Also increase in human activities due to population increase that outstrip the government's capacity to render land services a situation contributing into land conflicts. Similar challenges are facing the community in the study area with regard to land conflicts, a situation which adversely affects rural livelihood outcomes, since households will incur costs in terms of time and finances in conflict resolutions. PBFP was formulated to curb this problem in rural community to empower them with CCRO as a tool to minimize such problems.

### **Households' perception on CCRO and traditional land tenure**

The study findings (Table 4) show that the majority (88%) and (83%) of respondents with and without CCRO thought that CCRO land tenure system does not maintain traditional land tenure system. The respondents pinpointed one main reason for the above argument that traditional land tenure maintains land to the clan lineage but CCRO promotes individualization on land ownership. On the other side, a few (11%) and (22%) of the above respondents respectively thought that CCRO could maintain traditional land tenure system by protecting land ownership under clanship rather

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<sup>67</sup> FAO, *Land tenure and rural development*, Rome 2002.

than individualization. These results suggest that formalization of customary land rights promotes individualized ownership of land rather than by the clan as in the case of traditional land system. The same perception was observed by other scholars and experts in Tanzania who challenge formalization of customary land rights for example<sup>68</sup>.

The above have challenged the government's formalization of customary land rights, despite the argument that such changes are in favour of the interests of rural poor Tanzanians. The duo maintain that amendments in the land laws will compromise the welfare of many citizens in the near future by leaving many landless<sup>69</sup>. Similarly, although the formalization program (PBFP) sounds good in terms of poverty reduction, a close examination leaves a lot of doubt as to whether it would bear benefits to the poor. Some scholars<sup>70</sup> have also argued that "amendments, especially those made in the land acts, were largely backed by the World Bank which to a large extent favours liberalization policies on land and a class of commercial farmers"<sup>71</sup>. The IMF/World Bank's agenda on land since 1980s has been to replace customary systems with private land tenure system<sup>72</sup>. According

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<sup>68</sup> W. Olenasha, *Reforming land tenure in Tanzania: for whose benefit*, A study prepared for Hakiardhi, Dar es Salaam, www.hakiardhi.or.tz, 2005; P.K. Olenгурumwa, *1990's Tanzania Land Laws Reforms and its Impact on the Pastoral Land Tenure*, presented at the Pastoral Week, Arusha, 2010.

<sup>69</sup> W. Olenasha, *Reforming land tenure in Tanzania...*, op. cit.

<sup>70</sup> R.R. Simiyu, *Militianisation of resource conflicts: the case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of western Kenya*, op. cit., p. 80; M. Mghanga, *Usipoziba ufa utajenga ukuta: land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya's Coast Province*, op. cit.; L.H. Mwangi, *Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition by Investors...*, op. cit.

<sup>71</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>72</sup> P.K. Olenгурumwa, *1990's Tanzania Land Laws Reforms and its Impact on the Pastoral Land Tenure*, presented at the Pastoral Week, op. cit.; P. Peters, *Challenges in land tenure and land reform in Africa: An anthropological perspective*, Cambridge: Harvard University 2007.

to the study results, people's perception on the CCRO land tenure system is that it destroys traditional land tenure. This concern was also raised during key informant interviews as shown in the quote below that;

“Formalization of customary land rights promotes more individualization of land rights and makes it easier to sell land rights to other individuals as compared to the former traditional land tenure system. CCRO has now promoted many individuals from outside the villages and even districts to acquire large tracts of village land. This may lead into some poor rural households to lose their land and remain poor of the poorest landless people” (a female Key informant (land officer) Handeni District Office, 16/03/2016).

### **Surveyed households' perception towards the socio-economic role of CCRO**

Apart from understanding the general perception of people on land issues it was also necessary to understand their perception towards the role of CCRO economically in terms of impact on their livelihood. In this regard, mixed results (Table 5) were observed. A considerable number of respondents (85.3%) saw the indirect role of CCRO economically through enhancement of tenure security which supports investment in agricultural activities. Study findings in Table 6 show that the majority (71.7%) and (88%) of households who own land with and without CCRO respectively agree that CCRO promotes land tenure security. On the other hand, a few respondents (5.4%) and (28.3%) with and without CCRO respectively do not see the importance of CCRO in tenure security.

The above findings suggest that the CCRO tenure security is important, however, it is not enough to convince everyone to see the importance of CCRO on rural livelihood outcomes. Hence, both tenure security benefits and the direct CCRO use value should go hand-in-hand. Similar observation has been made by

other authors<sup>73</sup> studies done in Tanzania; and Migot-Adhola<sup>74</sup>, 2012 in Kenya have revealed that households with CCRO who accessed financial services using land as collateral have positively influenced others to inquire CCRO for their land. This indicates that households owning land without CCRO have been positively motivated to obtain CCRO because of its use value.

**Table 5:** Likert scale analysis summary on overall surveyed household's perception on CCRO and rural livelihood outcomes (n=184)

Perception	Range	Percentage
Positive	21–30	61
Neutral	11–20	24
Negative	0–10	15

### Contribution of CCRO to the Surveyed Households' Livelihood Outcomes

This section examines in detail the surveyed households' livelihood outcomes using a multiple regression model and independent sample t-test. The models are based on the hypothesis that some household characteristics such as: sex, age, marital status, occupation, land size owned, ownership of CCRO, household size and household head's education level may have influenced household livelihood outcomes. A sum total of eight independent variables were used which are: sex, age, marital status, occupation, farm size owned, ownership of a CCRO, household size and household head's education. All the above mentioned independent variables were included in the models to determine their contribution to

<sup>73</sup> F.N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration...*, op. cit; W. Ole-nasha, *Reforming land tenure in Tanzania...*, op. cit.

<sup>74</sup> F. Place and S.E. Migot-Adholla, *The economic effects of land registration on smallholder farms...*, op. cit.

the household livelihood outcomes especially household income and accumulation of assets.

In addressing the above, a multiple linear regression model was used. Before running the model, the dependent variable (household income) and independent variables recorded at the ratio level (farm size cultivated, household size, and age of the household head in years) were checked for normality by computing their distribution curves and checking the curves visually to find whether they were skewed or not. The variables: household income, farm size cultivated were found to be skewed; hence they were transformed using base-10 Logarithm to normal distributions. The transformed variables were used in the regression model together with the other variables which were not transformed because they already had normal distributions. Multi-collinearity was checked by computing variance inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerances of the explanatory variables. Multi-collinearity is an undesirable situation which exists when some pairs of variables are so closely related that if both such variables are included in the regression equation, the resultant regression coefficients will be unstable<sup>75</sup>. Tolerances below 0.1 imply multicollinearity and VIFs values that are greater than 10 denote the presence of multicollinearity<sup>76</sup>.

Multiple linear regression results for average household income are shown in Table 6. Therefore, based on the  $R^2$  of 0.410, this means that the independent variables entered in the model explained 41% of the variance in the dependent variable. Among the eight independent variables (household head's sex, age, marital status, education level, household size, land ownership status, farm size and occupation) regressed against household income

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<sup>75</sup> A. Bryman, *Social research methods*. Place of publication not identified: Oxford Univ Pr Canada, 2013.

<sup>76</sup> S. Landau and B.S. Everitt, *A Handbook of Statistical Analyses using SPSS*, 2004.



only three variables; household head's age, marital status and farm size for both household heads' with and without CCRO were positively significant at  $P \leq 0.05$  and  $p \leq 0.1$ .

Generally, the above observation seems to suggest that households with CCRO and those without CCRO had no significant differences in terms of average annual household income, since having a CCRO had no significant contribution on the household income. This is because most of the household as indicated in the earlier sections had not accessed credit and still financial literacy is very low in rural areas. These findings are similar to what was observed by Lugoe<sup>77</sup> in a study conducted in Uganda, Kenya and Zambia; whereby it was reported that formalization of customary land rights had no significant contribution on the rural livelihood outcomes where the conditions for effective use of CCRO face a number of bottlenecks.

**Table 6:** Multiple linear regression analysis results for predictor variable influence on household income

Predictor variable	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients			Tolerance	VIF
	(B)	S.E	(B)	T	Sig.		
Sex of household head	2.98	2.213	0.836	0.665	2.151	0.736	1.532
Age of household head	0.004	0.012	0.001	0.657	0.075*	0.686	1.847
Education of household head	-0.978	1.078	0.867	0.443	0.851	0.363	1.568
Marital status of household head	0.664	1.335	0.231	0.354	0.004**	0.791	1.345
Household size	0.155	0.075	0.352	0.664	0.008**	0.868	1.349
Household occupation	-0.425	0.342	0.256	0.376	0.257	0.686	1.954
Land ownership status with or without CCRO	-0.161	0.154	3.234	0.762	0.531	0.774	1.232
Farm size owned	0.586	0.222	2.111	0.123	0.001**	0.989	1.168

NB: B=Coefficient, S.E=Standard Error, Sig.=degree of significance (p value), \*=significance at  $p=0.1$ , \*\*= significance at  $p=0.05$ .  $R^2=386$ , Adjusted  $R^2=0.410$ , Standard Error of estimates=0.3405.

<sup>77</sup> F. N. Lugoe, *Tanzania's Experience in Land Administration...*, op. cit.

According to the multiple linear regression results (Table 6), a household head's age was positively associated with an increase in household income. An additional increase in one's age meant also more income. The main reasons could be the fact that 18 to 60 years of age comprises youth and mature productive adults.

Similar observations were made by Jayne et al<sup>78</sup>. These scholars narrated that 'poverty reduction in countries where 70–80% of the rural population draws their income from agriculture will depend on the distribution of assets 'in particular land' across age categories since households income are associated with the age of the household head's age. This observation was made after conducting a study on smallholder income and land distribution in Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia. The study revealed existence of strong correlations between landholding size, household head's age, education levels and household income.

Further to the above, study results show that farm size has a positive and significant contribution to household income and that households with small farm size in acres had lower incomes as compared to households with larger farm size. The same kind of argument is given by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) that certainly most households who own small size farms have limited potential to break out of poverty and that 'an attempt to address poverty in Africa should be centred on reinforcing the rights of the poor people on land'<sup>79</sup>.

Marital status was also considered as an important household head's characteristic that influences household livelihood outcomes.

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<sup>78</sup> T.S. Jayne [et al.], *Smallholder income and land distribution in Africa: implications for poverty reduction strategies*, „Food Policy”, 28(2003), no. 3, pp. 253–275.

<sup>79</sup> *Land Tenure Systems and their Impacts on Food Security and Sustainable Development in Africa*, Addis Ababa, 2004.

Results as shown in Table 8 show that marital status was positively and significantly (0.05) associated with a household's income for both household with and without CCRO. Similar observation has been reported by URT<sup>80</sup> in 2011/12 Household Budget Surveys (HBS) that income poverty rate was higher for those who were separated or divorced than in other categories of marital status; in 2007 HBS a similar picture was seen for widows. Moreover, a study conducted in Ethiopia by the African Union<sup>81</sup> reported similar results that married couples had better household incomes as compared to other marital status categories because of stable families and networking among married couples as they complement each other.

### **Ownership of a CCRO and Household Assets**

Estimated value of assets owned by households with and without CCRO was compared. From the results of Levene's test for equality of the variance as shown in the Table 9 below the first line was selected because the probability shown in Levene's test was 0.140 which was not statistically significant and therefore obeyed the assumption of equal variance. Moreover, the results from the second line (t-test equality of means) show that the probability at t-value 0.578 with 182 degrees of freedom and probability ( $p=0.578$ ) which was also not statistically significant. These results suggest that there was no statistical difference between estimated values of assets owned by household head's with and without CCRO in the study area. The population in the study area mostly depend on agriculture for their livelihood and they have never accessed credit which could probably improve agricultural productivity

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<sup>80</sup> URT, *2012 Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*. National Bureau of Statistics, Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2012.

<sup>81</sup> *Land policy in Africa: a framework to strengthen land rights, enhance productivity and secure livelihoods*, Addis Ababa, 2009.

and ultimately asset accumulation. This could possibly explain why both households with and without CCRO had no significant difference in terms of asset accumulation.

**Table 7:** Independent sample t-test for the surveyed households assets values based on ownership of a CCRO (n=184)

Asset value	Levene's Test for equality of variance		t-test for equality of means					Lower	Upper
	F	Sig.	T	df	Sig. (2tad)	Mean Difference	Std Error difference		
Equal variances assumed	2.199	0.140	-0.578	182	0.564	-279663	483945	-1234528	675202
Equal variances not assumed			-0.578	177	0.564	-279663	483945	-1234682	675356

Household head's assets owned were again cross tabulated between households with and without CCRO as shown in Table 8. It was revealed that there were no significant differences between the household head's with and without a CCRO in all assets listed. More than half (59%) and (52%) of the household head's with and without CCRO respectively had houses roofed with grasses. Again, Table 10 shows that the majority (90%) and (88%) of the household heads with and without CCRO respectively own furniture. While less than a quarter (12%) and (8%) household heads with and without CCRO own a motorbike respectively. Moreover, more than half (78% and 82%) of the household heads had a bicycle for transport respectively.

Further to the above, the study findings also show that only a few, 10% and 11% of the household heads with and without CCRO respectively, had solar system for electricity at least for household lights and phone charging. In addition, only (2%) and

(3%) of the household with and without CCRO respectively owned a television set. These results (Table 8) show that there is no statistical significant difference between assets owned by household heads with and without CCRO and therefore, ownership of a CCRO did not make a significant difference in terms of household livelihood outcomes, especially asset accumulation. These results suggest that both households mentioned above face similar opportunities and challenges with regard to accumulation of assets types despite existence of CCRO. Households having a CCRO were expected to use a CCRO to fetch some socio-economic benefits to enable them to have better assets as compared to their counterparts, a reality not realized.

**Table 8:** Surveyed household's list of assets owned (n=184)

Asset	Household heads with CCRO (%)	Household heads without CCRO (%)
Bicycle	78	82
House with grass roof	59	52
Furniture	90	88
Cattle	33	45
Poultry	67	54
Radio	98	95
Motorcycle	12	8
Solar system	10	11
Television set	2	3

## Factors Hindering the Surveyed Household's Use of Land for Improving Livelihood

### Outcomes

The respondents to the study, both those with and without a CCRO, identified six (6) factors hindering land owners in using

land as a tool for improving livelihood outcomes as presented in the Table 9. Factors identified are: existence of land conflicts, household male dominance on land ownership, lack of awareness on micro-credit facilities available, poor knowledge on credit use and management, lack of capital for better investment and poor performance of the agricultural activities, in particular crop production. The majority (75%) and (68%) of households with and without CCRO respectively, claimed lack of capital to initiate or invest in agriculture as the main factor hindering improvement of the livelihood outcomes. Study findings further show that more than half (71%) of the respondents in the households without CCRO claimed the existence of land conflicts as the second major factor that affects their livelihood as compared to only a few (22%) of respondents in the household with CCRO.

Findings from the current study are similar to a study conducted in Namibia by Paaga<sup>82</sup> where it was reported that land owners who are also smallholder farmers in rural areas of Namibia are mostly affected by lack of capital to invest and access credit in formal financial institutions despite such lands being formalized or not. According to URT<sup>83</sup> (2012), about 36.2% of businesses' main source of start-up capital were obtained from own savings. One percent (1%) of the household members involved in business in Tanzania Mainland secured loans from financial institutions for starting their business.

In addition to the above, results in Table 9 show that about a half (48%) of the respondents in households without CCRO argued that male dominance on land ownership is a stumbling block to households break out of poverty, as compared to under a third (28%) of

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<sup>82</sup> D.T. Paaga and G. Dandeebo, *Customary land tenure and its implications...*, op. cit.

<sup>83</sup> URT, *2012 Population and Housing Census...*, op. cit.

the respondents in the households with CCRO who pointed out that male dominance in land ownership is still a problem towards households livelihood improvement. This result implies that in both groups male dominance hinders household economic activities and hence blocks efforts to achieve better household livelihood outcomes. Widows and orphans are being dispossessed of their lands after the death of the male head of household. Under customary practice, a widow rarely inherits land upon her husband's death, as the land (and oftentimes the family's livestock, furniture, and all productive assets) is reclaimed by her husband's family, goes directly to her adult sons, or is held in trusteeship by the widow or by uncles and other male relatives until her sons are of age. In the past, widows were usually allowed to continue to live on the land of their husband's family for the rest of their lives, or until they remarried. This also emerged during key informant interviews as shown in the quote below;

“I own land together with my husband about 20 acres. Last year I wanted to use CCRO to access credit from NMB to start poultry project for our household, but my husband refused without giving any reason and he said he doesn't want to hear about it again. Or else he is going to remove my name from our CCRO”.

(A 40 years female participant, Sindeni village, 16/03/2016).

In addition, some literature, a study on “Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital in Madagascar and the Poverty Institute<sup>84</sup>, have reported that male dominance over resources especially land is currently declining due to increase in literacy level and women involvement in socio-economic activities. This has enabled women to acquire assets or resources of their own and in case of joint ownership, they inquire a formal and legal ownership as exemplified by land rights ownership through a CCRO.

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<sup>84</sup> R.J. Nawrotzki, L.M. Hunter and T.W. Dickinson, *Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital*, op. cit.

**Table 9:** Factors affecting land owners in Handeni District (n=184)

Factor	Household head's with CCRO (%)	Household head's without CCRO (%)
Lack of capital to invest	75	68
Existence of land conflicts	22	71
Male dominance on land ownership	28	48
Low financial management education	86	88
Lack of awareness on micro-credit available	23	25
Poor performance of agriculture	69	58

Table 9. in addition shows that more than three quarter (86%) and (88%) of the respondents in the households with and without CCRO respectively correspond with the claim that low access to financial services in rural areas hinders household improvement of livelihood outcomes. The increasing microfinance services provided by SACCOS, micro-credit organizations (VICOBA, SEDA, BRAC) and mobile phone banking provide a window for rural communities to access financial services but yet not enough to access higher loans for bigger investment especially in the agricultural sector. For example, according to URT<sup>85</sup> SACCOS provided about 0.5% of loans in rural areas. A similar observation made by Songoro<sup>86</sup> shows that the number of credit facilities operating in Handeni is low and many villagers are not aware of their existence. For instance, only (23%) and (25%) of households with and without CCRO respectively were aware of the existence of local credit facilities such as Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) and the Village Community Bank (VICOBA). Also, the financial capacities of these facilities in terms of providing loans are thin. Thus, they have not managed to assist a large section of the com-

<sup>85</sup> URT, *2012 Population and Housing Census...*, op. cit.

<sup>86</sup> A.E. Songoro, *Land scarcity, rural livelihoods...*, op. cit.



munity. The situation is compounded by lack of bank facilities in this area, currently the whole Handeni District is served by one bank – the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) which has a branch operating in Handeni town.

The current study also aimed at understanding the willingness of the community to borrow from credit facilities if such opportunities are introduced. More than three quarters (86%) and (88%) respondents in households with and without CCRO respectively showed interest to borrow money. However, they were suggesting proper education to be given to them first before being given such credit. These results suggest that lack of financial management education is a major factor that hinders household's access to financial services using land as collateral. A similar observation was made by Sumberg<sup>87</sup>, whereby it was reported that majority 68% respondents did not only have low financial literacy, lack of entrepreneurial spirit but also the fear to lose their possessions were found to be among other factors that hinder youth from accessing credit in formal financial institutions. On the other hand, CLKnet<sup>88</sup> in the study about "Access to finance by majority of Tanzanians: a dream or reality?" whereby it was reported that there was an increase in women access to financial services in the VICOBA schemes. The findings from the study show that women revive their entrepreneurial spirit when they are together in a group and the training received before given credit equips them with financial literacy.

Finally, study findings in Table 9 show that over half (69%) and (58%) of the respondents for both households with and without CCRO respectively claimed that the low agricultural productivity was among the major factors that result into poor livelihood out-

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<sup>87</sup> J. Sumberg [et al.], *Young people...*, op. cit.

<sup>88</sup> *Access to Finance by Majority of Tanzanians: A Dream or a Reality?*, CLK.net, Audience Forum Report Number 8.

comes. The low productivity and unreliability of agricultural activities (90% of rural agriculture is rain fed and rainfall is unreliable) were claimed to be among the many factors deterring financial institutions to offer credit in agricultural investments. According to CLKnet<sup>89</sup>, other factors that hinder financial institutions to offer credit for agricultural investment include: challenges of market for agricultural produce, low prices of agricultural produce, poor infrastructures for transport and communication networks from the farms to the market and poor technologies on agricultural produce processing and storage. On the other hand, Sumberg<sup>90</sup> reported that higher interest rates provided by the financial institutions deter farmers to access credit for agricultural investment. These studies above suggest that there is a gap between farmers, government, other development partners and financial institutions that needs to be filled for rural livelihood improvement.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusions

The general objective of the study was to explore formalization of customary land rights and rural livelihood outcomes in Handeni District. Based on the findings of the study it is concluded that people's perception on formalization of customary land rights has been proved to improve land security of tenure as land rights are being formally registered, decrease land conflicts, enable vulnerable groups to some extent own and access land as a livelihood resource, and enhanced community awareness on matters pertaining to land administration and management. On the other hand, it is further

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<sup>89</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>90</sup> J. Sumberg [et al.], *Young people...*, op. cit.

concluded that formalization of land rights did not promote economic investment, access to financial services and traditional land tenure system. It can also be concluded that males (men) still dominate land ownership in the study area. Women and other vulnerable groups face a chronic problem of deprivation from access to land which is a major livelihood resource. This is because in customary land system land ownership is through inheritance and it is the male children who inherit land from their parents. Therefore, formalization of customary land rights simply formalizes male dominance on land ownership and women continue to suffer from gender specific poverty and remain in the poverty viscous cycle trap due to lack of control of the most important means of production (land).

The study further concludes that formalization of customary land rights had no statistically significant influence on household's income and asset accumulation. Despite ownership of CCRO the majority of the household heads had low access to financial services and hence low economic investment and ultimately poor livelihood outcomes. Lastly, it is concluded that despite its benefits mentioned in the earlier chapters, formalization of customary land rights and rural livelihood outcomes in the study area faces a number of challenges which include: existence of land conflicts among land users, lack of capital for investing in agriculture, male dominance on land ownership, low financial management education, lack of awareness on microcredit available and poor productivity of agriculture.

## **Recommendations**

Based on the study's findings and discussions, the following are recommended in order to improve the influence of formalization of customary land rights on rural livelihoods in Handeni District.

- 1) As observed from the current study, lack of capital for agricultural investment was identified as the most serious constraint to

land owners in both households with and those without CCRO in achieving livelihood outcomes. Therefore, it is recommended that the government and other development partners need to conduct research and come up with suitable and affordable capital support schemes in Handeni District such as VICOBA and other related schemes.

- 2) The study results revealed that existence of land conflicts hinder improvement of rural livelihood outcomes since households incur costs in terms of time and finances in land conflicts resolutions. Moreover, land conflicts hinder intensive and extensive agricultural investments. Therefore, it is recommended that the village government, district authorities, central government, other land stakeholders and the community at large, work together to minimize land conflicts in Handeni District.
- 3) Observation from the current study shows that male dominance on land ownership and access is among the stumbling block towards household livelihood outcomes improvement. To ensure that the government at all levels will advance individual interests and promote equal opportunity for all members of society, vulnerable groups should be encouraged to be granted the right of occupancy on land in separate certificates (CCRO) from other household/clan members.
- 4) Lastly, it is further recommended that formalisation of customary land rights should be encouraged as it pointed out earlier that CCRO promotes land tenure security and still holds the potential for accessing the modern market capital.

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## Chapter 4.

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MACIEJ ZĄBEK

### UJAMMA. CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE ABOUT JULIUS NYERERE SOCIALISM

#### ABSTRACT

This article is devoted to the history and specific character of Tanzanian socialism and the opinions of the contemporary Tanzanians on the rural Ujamma communities which were to constitute the basis for the future development of their society. The paper was written based on short ethnographic research of the selected group from among Iringa University students and inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. The cited accounts from the interviews illustrate ambiguous opinions of the interlocutors on the topic in question. Despite the consensus on the negative economic impact of the very project, the interlocutors defend its social advantages. The main reason of such a standpoint seems to be the dissatisfaction with the current socio-political situation, unemployment, extremely high prices and primarily the increasing social anomie, family dissolution and decay of traditional values.

#### Introduction

The word *ujamaa* stemming from the Swahili<sup>1</sup> language is a term defining the Tanzanian model of socialism formed in the 1960s by

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<sup>1</sup> *Ujamaa*, from Swahili *u-* ‚condition, quality’; *jamaa* ‚family’, from Arabic.; the term introduced by the President Julius K. Nyerere in his book *Uhuru na Ujamaa* ‚Freedom and socialism’, Nairobi, 1968.



the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere<sup>2</sup> and based mainly on agricultural cooperatives. During my last visit to Tanzania in 2015<sup>3</sup> I had the opportunity to convince myself that memory about that regime called „the system of social justice” was still alive both among the older and younger generations of Tanzanians and was the core subject of their discussions. The system, which was to lead to modernisation and guarantee justice, safety and political independence of the country, despite common awareness of its shortcomings, still evokes a great deal of genuine sentiment among people regardless of their education, age and ethnic identity. Thus, I would like to dedicate this paper to recollecting the history and the specific character of Tanzanian socialism by referring to relevant accounts of contemporary inhabitants of this country in this regard. Their accounts may be also interesting for the Polish readers who have their own recollections from the socialist period.

How is it possible that people still miss and recollect with sentiment the times of socialism or communism which have always meant the systems of *Economics of Shortage*<sup>4</sup> while for many years

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<sup>2</sup> Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999), the founder of the Tanzanian country and its president between 1964–1985, an ideologist of the concept of the African socialism, a Servant of God in the Catholic Church.

<sup>3</sup> In February, 2015 I participated in the Polish-Tanzanian conference devoted to the idea of sustainable development at the University of Iringa. The conference was accompanied by research on the socialist project executed in the Tanzanian villages during the Nyerere’s rule and the contemporary capitalistic transformations. There were two stages. In the first stage the Iringa University students were asked to write essays on villagization and collectivisation of the Tanzanian villages in the 60s and 70s of the previous century. The second stage embraced quality research in the form of group discussions conducted in two selected villages (one of them underwent collectivisation) in the district of Kिलولو. Apart from the guests from Poland, the Iringa University employees also participated in the research as the translators of the Swahili and commentators.

<sup>4</sup> The term “Economics of shortage” was coined by the Hungarian economist János Kornai in 1980 as the centrally controlled communist economics. He stated

now contemporary Tanzania has been considered a quite stable and relatively fast developing country? By answering this question it should be stated that the model of the so called free-market capitalism which has brought relative material well-being to some people is unfortunately at the same time the system which causes growing cultural changes the effects of which are not generally positively perceived. The negative consequences include among others the dissolution of African strong and conservative extended families, further stratification of egalitarian societies and emergence of unknown until then ecological problems affecting the natural environment. Repercussions embrace the Tanzanians' sense of lack of security which is the primary need for majority of people, sometimes even more important than their personal freedom. Unfavourable situation is further hindered by worries about the increasing control of the Western powers over domestic natural resources and internal economy as well as a growing penetration of politics, economy and ideology.

### **Juliusa Nyerere's model of socialism**

In the post-colonial Tanzania, contrary to the Marxist theoreticians, socialism did not have socio-economic background, neither did it gain social support from young elites of the country. In Eastern Africa there were no prominent groups of proletariat or even rebellious peasants. Social classes<sup>5</sup>, so characteristic of Asia and Europe, have not been developed there except Ethiopia and Great Lakes Region. Moreover, Marxist philosophy, strongly based on materialism, was to a great extent incomprehensible

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that shortage is its inherent feature. See.: J. Kornai: *Niedobór w gospodarce*, Warszawa 1985.

<sup>5</sup> P. Osafo-Kwaako, *Long-run Effects of Villagization in Tanzania*, Draft 2011, [www.econ.yale.edu/conference](http://www.econ.yale.edu/conference) [Accessed: June 2015].

even to the well-educated and deeply religious Africans. Moreover, according to the British historian Martin Meredith, people in Tanzania did not share common expectations towards such radical changes and there were no organisations or influential groups (it also regarded the very governing party) in favour of that idea<sup>6</sup>. If it had not been for one man – Julius Kambarage Nyerere – a future Tanzanian President<sup>7</sup>, who was very determined in following his dreams, socialism in Tanzania might have not developed at all.

Nyerere, compared with other African leaders known for their extravagance or even cruelty, seemed to be exceptionally righteous, modest and religious<sup>8</sup>. Leading a one-party state he did not possess authoritarian manners and his speeches resembled sermons of a priest rather than political speeches of a country's head. Defending himself against allegations of violating human rights he kept on saying: „Until we win our battle against poverty, ignorance and diseases, we will not allow any foreign powers to destroy our unity!”. Both Margery Freda Perham, a historian of, and writer on, African affairs, and Ryszard Kapuściński, a Polish reporter

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<sup>6</sup> M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, London 2005, pp. 228–237.

<sup>7</sup> Theoretical (according to the assumptions of Marxism) lack of favourable conditions for the development of socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa did not hinder its development on this continent, especially after the conference of the newly independent countries in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. Nyerere was one of its first theorists and pioneers along with Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana and Ahmed Sekou Toure from Guinea; see: W.H. Friedland, C.G. Rosberg, *African Socialism*, Redwood City 1964.

<sup>8</sup> Nyerere was baptised only at the age of 20 in the Roman Catholic Church after graduating from Makerere College in Uganda. First, he became a teacher in the missionary school and then he went to study history and economics in Great Britain. Since the beginning of his adult life he actively participated in social life forming the future ruling party TANU (*Tanganyika African National Union*); see: J. i K. Chałasiński, *Bliżej Afryki*, Warszawa 1965, pp. 271–273.

and writer, regarded Nyerere as a role model and an example to follow, and described him as a perfectly balanced and warm man, the most reliable of all African leaders<sup>9</sup>. In fact, he pacified the political opposition but he managed to achieve this by bloodless methods<sup>10</sup>. Fascinated by Maoist revolution and Israeli kibbutz he decided to combine those ideas with the African tradition of community<sup>11</sup>. He held the firm conviction that power should result from the achieved *consensus* like in traditional Africa where the elders discussed current affairs „in the shade of a big tree” trying to reach unanimity<sup>12</sup>, rather than from confrontation and outvoting minority. He pursued his objective with an admirable missionary passion persuading his „nation” to his idea for five years before finally implementing it. It should be noted, however, that in his understanding „socialism” meant a universal idea of brotherhood among people and in Africa, where the concept of private ownership was unknown, socialism existed long before Marx in the institution of a tribe. According to Nyerere, socialism was a natural African system which had only been affected by colonialism but after gaining independence it should be reinstated there not by adopting strange to Africans Marxist philosophy, but by reviving the tribal institution as a socialist unit of a society. He associated socialism mainly with the countryside where collective settlements (familyhood) in the form of *ujamaa* villages were created to con-

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<sup>9</sup> M. Meredith, *The State of Africa*, op. cit., p. 229; see also: M. Perham, *The Colonial Reckoning: The End of Imperial Rule in Africa in The Light of British Experience*, New York 1962; R. Kapuściński, *Gdyby cała Afryka...*, Warszawa: Agora, 1969.

<sup>10</sup> Nyerere, after dissolving the army which made an attempt to overthrow him in 1964, formed a “party army”, the so called Tanzania People’s Defence Force from among members of Tanu League of Youth on which he based his power; P. Johnson, *History of the world – from 1917 to 1990s*, London 1991, p. 704.

<sup>11</sup> See: A. Leszczyński, *Skok w nowoczesność. Polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 1943–1980*, Warszawa 2013.

<sup>12</sup> R. Oliver, A. Atmore, *Dzieje Afryki po roku 1800*, Warszawa 2007, p. 347.

stitute the basis for the future development of a country and thus they were also called „development villages”:

Development villages are villages to which people moved so as to work together for their own sake and for the good of the community. Ujamaa settlements were created for people to enable the agricultural progress and infrastructure growth thanks to the support of the state. In contrast to other villages, they differentiated themselves by the communal character of management....

Villages formed the modern network of settlements and gave new possibilities providing the individual unit growth.

Development villages aimed at the strategic advancement of the country and particularly the agricultural economy. Thanks to the communal work supported by the state communities were formed on the basis of which locals could develop themselves without external aid.... This led to the unification of both the citizens and the nation [based on the interviews with students from the University of Iringa].

In his famous book „Freedom and Unity” (*Uhuru na Umoja*), Nyerere wrote: „*Ujamaa*, in other words *Familyhood*, constitutes the basis of our socialism and the objection to capitalism, constructing a happy society free from the exploitation of man by man. However, it also means the opposition to dogmatic socialism based on the philosophy of constant fight of man against man”<sup>13</sup>. Besides, the choice of this political system was for Nyerere equivalent to opting for national autonomy and independence from foreign development assistance and the status of a customer of Western powers<sup>14</sup>. Nyerere himself, because of his popularity (sometimes

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<sup>13</sup> J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity – Uhuru na Umoja*, Nairobi – Lusaka – Addis Ababa 1996, p. 170. The essence of the “African socialism”, in contrast to the “classical socialism” was the rejection of class struggle and ideological materialism, and concentration on the development of public sector, preventing the creation of social classes and promoting a traditional African identity; see: W.H. Friedland, C.G. Rosberg, *African Socialism*, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> He spread the idea of *self-reliance* relating it with the principle of „freedom and work” (*Uhuru na Kazi*) and the policy of non-involvement pursued by

even called tanzaphilia) was the favourite of many Western providers of development aid (especially from the European left-wing circles), gaining from them much more aid measures per capita than any other African countries had ever received. However, he was perfectly aware that it meant subordination and limited possibilities to undertake independent decisions and actions. He claimed, fully justified, that: „Independence means reliance upon oneself. Independence is not complete when it is dependent upon donations and loans from other nations on its development path”<sup>15</sup>.

Ujamaa meant working together. The government ordered people to collectively join ujamaa. All the villagers were asked to work together for the good of all. In practice, some plots of land were designated for communal farming. The concept of ujamaa assumed that there should be an equal division between families. Every family had its share and altogether all the people formed a community and shared everything equally supporting each other. Once it had finished, a lot of problems occurred. Nowadays, it is a great challenge to restore the same community spirit, which is our greatest loss. I want to pinpoint, however, that from the economic point of view it was pointless [based on the interview with members of the non-governmental organisation in Kilolo].

Nyerere published his development blueprint in the so called Arusha Declaration on 7 February, 1967 in which he called for the national independence stressing that external assistance would not suffice to develop economy. He underlined the need of fundamental work from basis, i.e. the development of village communities and the right of a given country to control all major means of production and exchange. By this last statement, without plans, discussions and preparations, he implemented a large-scale process of nationalisation of banks, insurance companies, food handling industries,

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Tanzania. In practice, he could not, however, do without external aid; H. Zins, *Historia Afryki Wschodniej*, Wrocław – Warszawa 1986, p. 339.

<sup>15</sup> Cit.: M. Meredith, *The State of Africa*, op. cit., p. 230.

export companies, cement plants, tobacco plants, footwear plants, breweries and other types of real estate including valuable houses, rental houses and apartments.

However, the basis of the village development was to be formed by the above mentioned *ujamma* – self-sufficient, developmental socialist collective villages. By supporting the concept of *ujamaa* he listed the following arguments: „Our agricultural organisation will be mainly based upon communal life and work to the benefit of all the people concerned. [People] will live together in villages; will collectively cultivate land; will collectively trade in the marketplace and satisfy minor, essential needs...”<sup>16</sup>. *Ujamaa* villages were to have access to water and road connections, be provided with schools, health centres and basic services whereas people were to be accommodated in spacious, modern, brick houses.

In order to understand the meaning of the changes put forward by Nyerere it should be explained that settlement in East Africa was highly dispersed and basically there were no big villages with service infrastructure and facilities such as schools or health centres<sup>17</sup>. Small-sized, self-sufficient family communities did not maintain any contacts either with towns or with the country’s authorities<sup>18</sup>. Thus, since the very beginning the political goal was as important as economy. By „villagization” of the country, which meant the concentration of dispersed people from various ethnic groups in big villages being local centres of agricultural production and various services, Nyerere expected not only an increase in agricultural output and improvement of farmers’ conditions,

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<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, p. 232.

<sup>17</sup> It was the result of the centuries-long domination of Maasai pastoral tribes in Eastern Africa.

<sup>18</sup> J. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control*, Princeton 2000; A.V. Chayanov, *The Theory of the Peasant Economy*, Homewood 1966.

but also „creation of the Tanzanian nation”, high above ethnic and tribal divisions, which was and still is the ambitious objective of numerous African politicians. He wanted to achieve his goal by unifying the patriotic state education, implementing Swahili as the obligatory national language and developing tight bonds between the province inhabitants and the central authorities. „Nationalisation” also entailed an obligation of physical work and a two-year stay of secondary schools graduates in para-military labour corps known as National Service with an aim to teach the youth the socialist attitude to work<sup>19</sup>.

### **Failure of socialist villagization**

*Ujamaa* villages, contrary to the compulsory collectivisation in the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe, basically were to be formed on a voluntary basis. Nyerere believed that people would trust him and attracted by modern facilities would settle new villages in large numbers. Socialism should stem from the villagers’ willingness to accept it. Moreover, socialism was against forcing people to establish such communities. In reality, much to his astonishment, people did not respond the way he had expected. Neither farmers nor peasants listened to him and supported him. Until the end of 1968 no more than 180 villages were formed under that project.

First *ujamaa* was established in 1968. Our leader was a woman. Her name was Lamuna Niemba. She had a daughter, Joisi, and thus she was called Mama Joisi. She persuaded people to, in line with the government’s will, start collectively cultivate land. So, we started to grow wheat. In the beginning, we collected seven sacks per one acre. Everything was initiated by women who nagged people and only later they were supported as a community by the government. That women’s movement was called „Nation’s call for *ujamaa*”.

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<sup>19</sup> H. Zins, *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 339.



When we started to work together the government started to assist us. First, we were given a tractor. Only then men joined us although they were initially against that concept. It may be said that ujamaa was created by women who triggered the whole process. Firstly, they won one acre of communal farmland and after receiving a tractor they could take eight acres [based on the interview with the community from Luanzi].

It meant a great change for people although the crops were not as high as expected. Nevertheless, it was certain that ujamma would sell part of its output. If the yields were satisfactory, part of the crops were sold and everybody got the equivalent of the number of days he had worked. Afterwards they built houses and lived happily. Trade took place between ujamma villages. One ujamma produced rice whereas another ujamaa grew grain and they exchanged the crops. They received a machine park from the government.

The state delivered aid in the form of machines or land. The assistance was dependent upon the amount sold abroad. The amount was conditional upon the volume of production in a given ujamaa. If we were given a tractor we had to pay it back through the sale of grain. Then, cows and chickens were brought to villages, which enabled us to become less dependent upon other ujamaa villages.

There were five hundred families and we had to acquire five thousand sacks of rice, not individually but from another ujamaa or directly from the government. There was a list of people registered in a given ujamaa. Those, who were not registered, did not receive anything.

Service infrastructure in *ujamaa* villages was further developed, to the detriment of individual producers. Many farmers who could not sell their crops on the market and buy necessary goods agreed to join *ujamaa* in the hope to gain access to water, new schools and houses.

The government encouraged people to build brick houses. Yet, to erect them you had to have bricks. Authorities gave instructions how to produce bricks and ujamaa villages were to create them from local clay. Engineering works including constructing roofs were provided by the government. All the houses were built in the same way. We treated those buildings as some kind of presents. We would never have built them if it had not been for ujamaa.

Until mid-1973 the number of villages which underwent collectivisation in Tanzania rose to five thousand embracing 15% of the country's population<sup>20</sup>. Majority of those villagers still preferred, however, to administer ujamaa in a traditional way. Thus, in November 1973, Nyerere disappointed with the situation made a decision about the compulsory resettlement into the development villages. He realised that it was impossible to forcefully transform people into socialists but his government could make everyone live in a village. "To live in a village is a command", he declared<sup>21</sup>.

At first people were encouraged but later on they were forced to move there. It was especially difficult to persuade men to join ujamaa. In order to reduce their reluctance they were given new houses and flats. Then, all the people together sang Ujamaa...

Joining ujamaa was not voluntary in 100%. Some people were seduced with brick houses because they had only small huts but it was not sufficient to persuade everybody so the government had to take further steps to force them. Finally, people had a choice either to move into ujamaa or end up in a prison. Thus, people started to pretend that they were really working together. It was organised in such a way that people were given something to start from and then they could work on their own to sell grain and develop themselves but it was necessary for the government that all the houses were exactly the same. All of us had to work in the same way and the houses were to be identical. You could join that system or you had to face the consequences...

Coercion to live together was closely linked to the possibility to attend schools. Nobody was allowed to stay alone in a field as all the people had to be together in ujamaa in order to collectivise. If people continued to work on their own they stood no chance of assistance. The government supported ujamaa but never individual farmers. If you wanted to have a new house or a flat you had to join ujamaa and eventually people acquiesced to it.

Those staying outside the system were not supported by the government. You were allowed to live wherever you wanted but you needed

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<sup>20</sup> M. Meredith, *The State of Africa*, op. cit., p. 233.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 234.

the permit to build your house and if you did not belong to ujamaa you were not granted the permission. And in ujamaa you could get a new house [based on interviews with the community from Luanzi].

That way, within three years until 1976 the governing party managed to collectivise almost half of the village population, sometimes resorting to the use of force. It facilitated the construction of new schools and health centres but on the other hand, the collectively cultivated fields occurred to be a failure as they yielded much less crops than they had before the collectivisation process. At the same time transport continued to decline, inflation advanced and the strategy based on villagization paradoxically led to enormous waves of villagers fleeing to urban areas. The country which was to base its economy mainly on the village development policy, paradoxically became an example of one of the fastest growing urbanisation phenomenon in the whole world (above 10% annually)<sup>22</sup>.

It was not taken into consideration that goods in deficit such as land, sources of water and forests are always usurped as otherwise they become exhausted or dilapidated. Secondly, whenever a man does some work he becomes individually responsible for it which means he acquires a type of ownership. In fact, in Eastern Africa, unlike in Europe, there was no individual land ownership with succession rights but it obviously did not mean that land or water could belong to anybody. First of all, it was owned by ancestors of a particular tribe, a particular community so it could be used only by their descendants whom a given community represented by local heads gave for temporary use designated plots of land which could be farmed individually. Even „strangers” could sometimes enjoy that form of “lease” but there was a clear distinction between primary and secondary users, the latter being given less rights to

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<sup>22</sup> J. Ilife, *Africans: the history of a continent*, Cambridge 1995, p. 317.

joint ownership. People often benefited from their neighbours' help but such help was always to be compensated for in various ways. In reality, there was no communal work under joint ownership with identical gains. In *ujamma* those general rules were not respected so eventually *ujamaa* villages were doomed to failure, followed by state shops, industrial plants or banks, etc. *Ujamma* concept was likely to fail in all spheres administered by state service officials devoid of individual responsibility for the entrusted assets. The situation was exacerbated by other factors such as lack of managerial skills or improper use of entrusted modern farm machinery.

We could not effectively use the equipment, which was a great problem. Although we continually enlarged the cultivated area we only managed to harvest 25 sacks per 8 acres against 56 sacks predicted, like today when we gathered 3 bags per acre. When we had only one acre we were able to cultivate it better than when we had more acres. Moreover, the land efficiency declined but nobody cared. The main problem was that nobody monitored that area. Nobody took responsibility for it and nobody took care of it.

Reduced agricultural productivity resulted in the intervention of authorities but eventually blame was put on the local management represented by Mama Joisi. She was called to appear before the District Council and she had to explain herself. I remember her say she was an average person... Her position of a leader was assumed by her brother who seized power from her [based on the interview with the community from Luanzi].

Nyerere bitterly complained about laziness, total ineptitude and indifference of his fellow-citizens, but to no avail. His threats, requests and calls for greater discipline occurred to be ineffective. State economy, despite immeasurable international support, estimated in the 70s at three billion, still generated losses. For instance, the Chrysanthemums cultivation cost more than the value of flowers sold to Europe.

At the end of the 70s, with the increase in oil prices and decline in the value of coffee and istle, income from export in Tanzania

covered only 40% of its import whereas its external debt rose astronomically and the average living standard dropped by almost 50%. Nyerere was compelled to admit: „Now we are poorer than in 1972”. Yet, he still rejected all the suggestions implying that the choice of his favourite system might have been a mistake. He defended the system even at the beginning of the 80s comparing it to the vaccination immunising against inequality and excesses of capitalism<sup>23</sup>. In reality, Tanzania increasingly needed assistance. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund agreed to help Tanzania but in return they required painful structural reforms. Finally, in 1985 Nyerere voluntarily retired and apologised the nation for his final failure to implement his ideas. International community was totally surprised, not being used to peaceful transfer of power on this continent or to the leader admitting his mistakes. Nyerere died in 1990 and was declared, without objection, as „The Father of the Nation” and the Servant of God’s Catholic Church<sup>24</sup>. The party that he formed is still in power although it has already abandoned the concept of *ujamaa* in favour of the so called neo-liberal solutions which are to bring that country to modernity. No sooner had Tanzania embarked on a path of Americanisation and global capitalism than Tanzanians started to miss socialism.

### **Contemporary discourse on *ujamaa* communities**

Memory about *ujamaa* in Tanzania, as I could personally notice, is still alive being the centre of numerous discussions especially in the context of contemporary politics and morality. Moreover, it became the source of inspiration for young reporters and hip-

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<sup>23</sup> M. Meredith, *The State of Africa*, op. cit., p. 235–237.

<sup>24</sup> Definition used to the deceased person the Beatification process of whom has already started.

hop artists in the streets of Tanzanian cities<sup>25</sup>. To a certain extent it was a reaction to the disappointment people experienced in Tanzania after Nyerere's death. Memory about *ujamaa* became a form of opposition to rapidly increasing prices and growing unemployment rate also affecting the well-educated citizens. It was a manifestation of a great shock at scandals, nepotism and corruption of an old and the same a new political class trying to enfranchise the state assets. Hip hop, which came to Tanzania along with globalisation, became an artistic form of opposition to those changes and recollection of Nyerere's Times during which, according to many interviewed people, honesty, modesty, equality and family values were in force. Lyrics written by hip-hop artists are inspired by Afro-American celebration of Kwanzaa<sup>26</sup> and promote the cooperative movement, family business, fair trade and sustainable development. They adopted its seven core principles: 1. Unity (*umoja*) of family, nation and race; 2. Self-determination (*kujikhagulia*); 3. Collective work and responsibility (*ujima*) in the process of building our community; 4. Cooperative economics (*ujamaa*) in building and maintaining our own shops and companies; 5. Creativity (*kuumba*); 6. Purpose: (*nia*) restoration of our race; 7. Faith (*imani*) in our people, our parents and teachers, our leaders, in justice and victory of our struggle.

General perception of socialism in Tanzania seems to be completely different from that in Poland mainly because it was a native and anti-colonial project. As a matter of fact, interlocutors generally confirm that in economic terms the great project of *Mwalim*

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<sup>25</sup> L. Sidney, *Ni Wapi Tunakwenda (Kultura Hip Hopu i dzieci Arushy)*, in: *The Vinyl Ain't Final. Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture*, eds. D. Basu, S.J. Lemelle, London 2006, pp. 230–254.

<sup>26</sup> A week-long holiday and movement of the African diaspora in the USA formed in the 60s by a black nationalist Maulane Karenga (born as Ronald McKinley Everett).

(i.e. their teacher, as they commonly called Nyerere) failed but it does not mean that it was bad. They admit that currently their standard of living is a bit higher and that they may enjoy greater freedom in many areas, especially in business. When asked to compare their present situation with that from the 70s they claim:

In economic terms, it must be stated that nowadays we lead better lives. Everybody can work on their own, can act in a group or individually. Productivity is higher now. Smaller groups are more effective than *ujamaa* villages [the interlocutor refers to work within non-governmental organisation]. Now you do not have to do what they ask you to do but you can choose what is profitable and in line with your business. We like the idea that greater responsibility lies with us and that everybody can fully exploit their own opportunities. Thanks to it you can see the results of your activities. You realise that you did something and succeeded in earning some money. In *ujamaa* you could not see that. Nobody knew who was responsible for what and anyway greatest profits were acquired by the government. Work in *ujamaa* was certainly of collective nature but I did not like the fact that I did not know what I had done and what my neighbour had. People stood no chance of self-development and could do nothing about that. Nowadays, it is up to me to choose whether to take up carpentry or start growing fruit and vegetables or keeping pigs and I can see that I am responsible for my activities, my final success or failure. I also feel better when I do not have to be subordinate to somebody and listen to their orders [based on the interview with people from Kilolo].

Nowadays, people are also satisfied, contrary to the times of Nyerere, that they can buy in shops whatever they want. There is a greater variety of goods than in the past and they are no longer limited. That is one of the most noticeable changes positively rated in contrast to the past:

In the past all the services were centralised in *ujamaa*. Sale of goods could be held only there. For example, *Ujamaa* decided to purchase sugar and the day it arrived a shop was opened in a village so that everybody could buy sugar. Yet, there was a list of people entitled to buy that sugar. People who did not belong to *ujamaa* or did not

work in ujamaa could not buy anything [based on the interview with community people from Luanzi].

Some students from Iringa regret nowadays that:

as a result of this programme... respect for private ownership was violated,... poverty spread over Tanzanian province and the spirit of private entrepreneurship, which was banned then, was eradicated, although [they add after a while] the unity was strengthened which positively influenced the process of creating our nation [based on interviews with students from Iringa].

All in all, contemporary interlocutors do not deny obvious shortcomings of the programme forming development villages, yet they do not condemn socialism as they can notice its numerous advantages when compared with the current system. It should be added that the number of people with whom we conducted the interviews on that topic and who positively evaluated *ujamaa* was significantly higher than those who focused on negative aspects. A surprising fact for us, Poles, may be that Africans from Tanzania distinctly stressed the non-economic aspects of life they suffer from. Their basic problems were not salaries, still much lower in comparison with the developed countries (like in the case of Poles), but the fact that they experienced the imbalance or even decline of traditional system of social control, binding in every African village for centuries. Additionally, they noticed a growing and expanding social anomy which let people live for their own and realised that capitalistic system further encouraged people to lead such lives, incur loans in banks and have as few children as possible. That is the most radical change which Africans do not eagerly accept though they themselves let capitalism seduce them.

From our perspective, the greatest tragedy was the violation of natural social balance. We lacked that balance which could help us face ujamaa and could give us hope to fight that challenge together. Your child was part of ujamaa. That challenge starts with small things. If your child misbehaved and I could see that then everybody from



ujamaa could come to a child and reproach them as that child belonged to ujamaa and all the people formed ujamaa and the nation. Ujamaa meant creating the nation.

Look at us. We were raised in ujamaa and we know how to respect the elders. If we go to other ujamaa villages we can see that they also show respect to old people as these are natural rules of upbringing. Nowadays, nobody pays attention to what an old man says. Everyone wants to follow their own paths and you are not allowed to reproach their children because parents will say that these children are theirs and you should not interfere in their affairs. The worst of all is the fact that everybody goes their own way and children choose their own way of life and do not care what is good for the community.

The truth is that it was more difficult to earn money but people respected it more. When you earned some money you had to share it with your relatives, grandfathers and ujamaa. You had one thousand shillings to live on and buy clothes. It was to suffice. Today, you can even earn ten thousand but it means nothing as the time spent on earning that money is priceless.

At present there are hundreds of various schools and everybody goes to a different one so it is not possible to compare the knowledge gained. The same applies to the question of safety. In the past we were together and ujamaa monitored the area. Now, in case of an accident the police may come but a lot of time will pass and we do not even know that policeman as he does not belong to ujamaa. He is an anonymous representative of unknown authorities.

Look at how divided we are nowadays. Everybody represents different values and follows their own paths. But after all, if it had not been for ujamaa we would be still living in small huts. Thanks to our communal work and power all of that development took place. Nowadays, nobody stands a chance to buy a big house because they will not be able to earn for that on their own. Thus, because of the community breakdown we think that the times of ujamaa were despite everything better.

Sentiment towards ujamaa is so great among old people because they knew that everybody had the same salaries and they followed the same rules. A drift away from ujamaa broke social ties and young people migrate to cities as they do not feel attached to their villages...

Earlier ujamaa meant a family but youth today do not like their families and do not want to be limited by their families...

The young do not perceive agriculture as a source of business. They think that the only business they can do is in the cities [based on the interview with the community from Luanzi].

Opinions on the causes of the failure of the *ujamaa* programme and the general breakdown of socialism in Tanzania may also attract our attention. It occurs that Tanzanians, mainly young and quite well-educated last year students, do not think that the idea was bad. In their opinion the failure was caused by weak planning and poor execution. They can easily list its numerous advantages and achievements:

People were more interested in one another than today. The state provided social services, which strengthened unity of the nation. Tribalism declined. People living in ujamaa showed more solidarity and were more sensitive to others' needs. The programme could not achieve success as it was badly planned.

They often underline that the reason of failure existed not only inside the system, but also outside it. The ujamaa experiment was finished in 1982 because the villages, on one hand, were formed on the inappropriate legal basis and on the other hand the International Monetary Fund demanded structural liberalisation in return for assistance: *Ujamaa ceased to exist as a result of growth of the global capitalism which came to power...* Additionally, activities of the World Bank and United Nations added to its collapse. *Domestic economy had to undergo changes and become compatible with the global economic system.*

Some of the statements resemble the then existing propaganda:

Ujamaa ceased to exist because Tanzania was attacked by Western capitalism and individualism. Those ideologies spread all over the world by the imperialists took control of the Tanzanian authorities and forced them to complete the ujamaa project. Foreigners compelled the state to transform its system, which was facilitated by

lack of national unity, selfishness and egoism of some state members who wanted to grow rich to the detriment of others. The idea of capitalism was spread in Tanzania [based on the interviews with Iringa University students].

Only those pragmatic ones admit that:

the system could not defend itself because of its low economic efficiency along with continuous population growth and conflicts between the developing global market and inefficient economic system of Tanzania.

Yet, almost everybody regrets the collapse of the system claiming that the moment it collapsed they lost a considerable lot:

We achieved the economic unity, we enjoyed equal access to education and medical care as well as other social services. We gained national identity. And now people have stopped working together and living in communities. The government does not care about people, which affects social inequality [based on the interviews with Iringa University students].

Many representatives of intellectual and political elites are sceptical about their prior criticism of the villagization programme. In their opinion, although the programme collapsed it greatly contributed to the process of establishing ties of villagers with the state. They think that the programme should be considered not only in economic terms but also from social and cultural point of view as in these areas it evoked significantly greater changes than in economy.

Thanks to the *ujamma* programme a dense network of local administrative offices was established, health care and effective tax systems were implemented and new modern law became applicable. In villages where *ujamaa* programme was implemented the level of trust grew and the cooperation between authorities and citizens who know their local leaders better and are more attached to their region and country strengthened. It is also noticeable that in the villagized areas people more eagerly

participate in parliamentary elections and greatly support the governing party (currently CCM previously TANU<sup>27</sup>) with only slight support for the anti-government opposition. People living in development villages remember that they owe access to health centres and possibility to educate their children to socialism. In their opinion, the general level of development grew due to the increase in per capita income and cereal production, with a visible decrease in illiteracy. As a result of dissemination of education (100% of 13-year-old teenagers and 95% of 17-year olds learn at schools) average age of people getting married has become on average higher (20 years for women and 25 for men), with a slight fertility decline. Most importantly, however, a country, which was previously devoid of villages, gave rise to the development of huge rural settlements equipped with basic service infrastructure<sup>28</sup>. Experience from the 70s and 80s connected with the name of Nyerere and the *ujamaa* programme transformed Tanzanian villages. According to the socialism enthusiasts, despite the failure of the programme it led to the considerable changes in a country with long-lasting effects vital for that country's development.

## Conclusions

Tanzania (known as Tanganyika before it unified with Zanzibar) has been a formally independent country since 1961<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> TANU, *Tanganyika African National Union*, the main political party in Tanzania formed by Julius Nyerere in 1954, at present *Revolutionary State Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi – CCM)*.

<sup>28</sup> P. Osafo-Kwaako, *Long-run Effects*, op. cit.

<sup>29</sup> The United Republic of Tanzania was formed only in 1964 as a result of union of Tanganyika and People's Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba (earlier the Sultanate of Zanzibar).

Nyerere was in power for 24 years. The historical experiment of combining African traditional community values with socialism in the form of the *ujamaa* project of villages reorganisation lasted just 10 years as it developed on a full scale in 1973 and ended in 1982. The changes brought about by the project are still visible not only in the architecture and landscape of today's Tanzanian villages but most of all it left a long-lasting mark upon mentality and culture of the country's inhabitants. The experiment's consequences are highly inconclusive and opinions about it are indeed ambiguous. Tanzanians share the same opinion only on one point stating that in economic terms the project was completely unsuccessful. It remains an open question to the majority of Tanzanians whether the project stood no chance of success because it did not focus on human nature or due to its poor planning and having been deliberately led to collapse by hostile external forces. Distinctive weakness of the current political system alternative along with the futile social effects caused by neoliberal globalisation make many people defend the previous regime and search for its positive sides. Objectively speaking, it is hard to achieve as the common knowledge has it that all positive changes introduced in Tanzania under Nyerere's rule in infrastructure, education and building construction cannot be attributed to Tanzanians only but mainly to the international aid. However, the fact remains that today's Tanzanians are much better educated, united and prone to solidarity with their country than the ethnically diversified tribal societies in the neighbouring countries. Tanzania has been up till now a peaceful, safe and relatively well-organised country. Up to the present day it has not been affected by civil wars and ethnic or religious tensions being a real nuisance for most of the African countries. In Tanzania they do not constitute a problem. Can it be, therefore, concluded that Tanzanian national identity may be attributed to *ujamaa* at least

to a certain extent? I leave this question to the potential readers and researchers of this problem. Similarly, the question remains why for majority of people safety (socialism) is more important than freedom (liberal capitalism)? Maybe because there is no real freedom without safety?

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## Chapter 5.

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AMBILIASIA PENIEL MOSHA  
STEVEN KAUZENI

### **SOCIAL CULTURAL HABITS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF CLIMATE PRESERVATION FROM KILIMANJARO**

#### **ABSTRACT**

Climate change has been one of the indispensable topics to international conferences and local ones, academics and streets, old and young, male and female and the stratification may go on, simply because its effects engulf all facets of man's life regardless of heterogeneity. Most academic endeavors so far focused on the scientific preservation measures of climate change forgetting the other untapped and invisible side of traditional knowledge that helped to preserve the climate that recent generation wasn't lucky to find. This paper goes deeper and explores the traditional untold measures used for environmental conservation and poses it as a challenge to modern generation. Using Qualitative approach the researchers conduct an in-depth interview to the purposeful selected elders of Mshiri Village and bring out the worked truths on how the villagers once imbibed interesting environmental conservation mechanisms which preserved the world they lived in. The key findings reveal that the question of environmental conservation and climate change is or should be faith-based, collectively held, and engraved in peoples' hearts in the adoration of the creation which takes us back to the theories of moral realism. Having observed that most academic endeavors so far focused on the scientific measures to control climate change while neglecting the

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other untapped and invisible side of social cultural deeply rooted interventions that helped preserve the climate; this paper focuses attention on Traditional Knowledge as was used previously by Mshiri village natives and suggest how this can be used complementarily with modern scientific measures to conserve the environment and boost economic development as a result. The paper recommends that there should be deliberate efforts to inculcate ethical obligation to Tanzanians which will bring back the once felt connection between man and nature which as a consequence will arouse conscious environment conservation spirit that will be backed up by the fusion of belief and reality of what is societal good.

## **Introduction**

Once upon a time climate change was a foreign topic in academia and students struggled hard to understand concepts like weather, temperature, draught, floods and many others. Nowadays, these concepts are easily understood as what was only to be known theoretically is now practical and easily observed. Environmental degradation is vivid and harnessed by man. Population growth resulting in overconsumption and technological advancements, resulted in degradation of biophysical environment and ultimately change in climate with vivid global effects like melting glaciers and rising sea levels resulting in floods, extreme weather, shifting rainfall patterns, extreme draught, human health defects, wildlife catastrophes and costs for society and economy. According to WWF<sup>1</sup> for instance, the average temperature in arctic region has increased by 5 degrees C over the last 100 years and they suggest the disappearance of ice cover in few decades to come. This has disastrous effects on polar species and the world climate in general.

In Tanzania consequences of climate change are also vivid. As reported by Patric Lameck (n.d.), climate change has several

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<sup>1</sup> WWF, *Soil Erosion and Degradation*, 2016.

impacts like invasion of salt water to freshwater bodies in Bagamoyo, submergence of Maziwe Island in Pangani and Tanga, land slidding in Same District and loss of soil fertility. Yussuf I.<sup>2</sup> further reports effects like water salinity and scarcity, increase in rainfall intensity in different places, declining fish stock, beach erosion, rising temperature and changing wind.

Governments all over the world are trying hard to control the rapid pace of climate change and dealing with resultant consequence. Several counteracting measures provided include scientific approaches like beach nourishment, agro forest, climate proofing of critical infrastructure, desalination and developing sustainable ground water management policies.

However, it is evident that traditional African societies had own unique ways of conserving the environment and hence built conducive ecosystem that enabled them to survive for many years, having enough to eat and store, and have consistent weather patterns which were predictable and beneficial for their daily lives. Despite presence of this treasure, its documentation is scarce<sup>3</sup>. This paper uses qualitative approach and conducts a purposeful in-depth interview to Mshiri natives and brings out the worked – truths on how the Kilimanjaro traditional societies imbibed interesting environmental conservation mechanisms which preserved the world they lived in.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Despite the fact that traditional knowledge played a great role in conserving the environment, it is currently minimally utilized. This is the knowledge that was revealed in social cultural practices interconnected with people's belief in supernatural God and gods who

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<sup>2</sup> I. Yussuf, *Tanzania: Assessing Impact of Climate Change On Environment, Human Health, Food Security*, 2016.

<sup>3</sup> L. Sati, *Traditional Practices Key to Environmental Conservation*, Available at [www.av.at.nwsofthesouth.com](http://www.av.at.nwsofthesouth.com). Accessed on 21<sup>st</sup> July, 2017.

were the providers and enforcers of the rules of nurturing nature. It was voluntary, cheap and collective hence simplified enforcement of mutually agreed measures and created belongingness and ownership of efforts. Its documentation is also scarcely available and its practice is about to disappear in the long run. Presence of extreme climate change indicators in rural Tanzania which was once well conserved raises questions as to what might have gone wrong.

This has escalated to urban areas as well. For instance, the 2005/2006 draughts reduced economic growth by 1% GDP and affected livelihood enormously; change in crop yields and labor productivity is estimated to affect the economy causing losses to annual global GDP in 2060 by 0.8% and by 0.9% to more vulnerable regions according to OECD (2010); deterioration of aquatic systems; land degradation; lack of accessible, good quality water for rural and urban inhabitants, environmental pollution, food shortage, eruption of diseases and loss of wildlife habitats and biodiversity are all indicators that modern scientific environmental conservation knowledge is not sufficient to control climate change (Tanzania environmental policy).

So far lots of money has been invested in scientific interventions to conserve the environment and deal with climate change (UKaid). Tanzania has joined global initiatives and signed protocols like Kyoto protocol and various donors such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden are also supporting the initiative. The government also has established institutions and policies to deal with environmental conservation, launching various campaigns like alternative energy campaigns and others despite the piecemeal results.

However, there is the untapped traditional knowledge secreted in social culturally deeply-rooted interventions that helped to preserve climate in African natives. This is scarcely researched upon and documented, neither its usage is sufficiently employed. If well tapped, the researchers believe that it can complement the modern scientific

knowledge and robust environmental conservation and control climate change and its consequences as it used to be previously. The research investigated the significance of traditional knowledge in conserving the environment in Mshiri village in Kilimanjaro region.

So, it is the standpoint of this paper that the use of traditional knowledge would significantly complement the present scientific methods of which some have been proved to accelerate further problems to environment.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study was to assess the contribution of traditional knowledge in environmental conservation using a case study of Mshiri Village at Kilimanjaro region.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The study was based on the following objectives:

- To determine traditional knowledge practices which were used to preserve the environment in the study area.
- To find out the significance of traditional knowledge in conserving the environment in the study area.
- To identify indicators of climate change at Mshiri Village in Kilimanjaro.
- To analyze factors influencing climate change in the study area.
- To assess people's awareness on day-to-day implication of climate change.

### **Significance of the Study**

There is a need for complementary measure of conserving the environment in Tanzania, especially on the re-adoption of social cultural habits or practices that once worked. This information is currently scarce on literature and neither are there formalized efforts directed to such measures in Tanzania's conservation undertak-

ings. This knowledge will be useful three-fold. One, to the people of Tanzania and elsewhere, it will impart them with complementary home-made measures of conserving climate and hence appreciate its consequences; two, for environmental and climate change activists it will provide a challenging countermeasure that they can incorporate in their interventions and three, it offers a unique opportunity for government to rethink and formally acknowledge the role of traditional knowledge in conserving the climate.

## **Literature Review**

### **Introduction**

The need for traditional knowledge in preserving climate cannot be overemphasized. Gleb Raygorodetsky<sup>4</sup> emphasizes the indispensability of traditional knowledge in environmental conservation. This traditional knowledge is embodied in traditional ways of life which contribute little to climate change; moreover it is the base for “community based adaptation and mitigation actions that sustain resilience of socio-ecological systems at the interconnected local, regional and global scales” according to Raygorodetsky<sup>5</sup>.

### **Definition of Traditional Knowledge/ Indigenous Knowledge as used in climate change**

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conceptualizes traditional knowledge/ Indigenous knowledge or local knowledge as adaptation strategies held by indigenous people

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<sup>4</sup> G. Raygorodetsky, *Why Traditional Knowledge Holds the Key to Climate Change*, United Nations University. Abruflbar unter: <http://unu.edu/articles/global-change-sustainable-development/why-traditional-knowledge-holds-the-key-to-climate-change> (Zugriff am 19), 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem.

worldwide which are cost-effective, participatory and sustainable. This is to say that indigenous societies have own 'know how' which is adopted, instituted and transferred from one generation to another through the informal education mechanism such as experiential learning and storytelling. This definition will be used in this paper to represent traditional methods and techniques that were used previously by the indigenous forefathers around Mount Kilimanjaro in Mshiri village and whose traces still remain but suffocated by contemporary adverse anthropological activities which are hazardous to the environment and modern scientific control measures.

### **Theoretical framework: Moral Realism Theory**

The questions of ontology (theory of being/existence) and epistemology (theory of knowing/ methods of knowing what exists) split when it comes to science and religion as they both have different assumptions. Religious ontology from Realist perspective for example confers the existence/ truth to Moral realism, i.e. truth exists beyond what we think of it while scientific ontology ascribes the truth to experiments and facts which lay proof for what exists. This paper focuses on realism. Assumptions of realism as pointed out by Ron White (n. d.) are as follows:

There are at least some timeless universal facts or timeless universal values that serve as the foundation for our true beliefs.

- 1) *Moral realism* argues that 'there at least some prescriptive beliefs that are similarly true, that correspond to values that are universally good, and independent of what individuals or communities think about those values' (ibid).
- 2) The timeless and universal moral truths, are founded on timeless and universal foundation that is rooted in a theory of Truth 'Value based on a one-to-one correspondence between belief and reality'.

- 3) True beliefs correspond to the dictates of foundational reality and false beliefs contradict that reality.
- 4) The role of supernaturalism especially *divine command theory* which demands that universal moral truth is based on the word of God whose main presupposition is that all humans belong to same God who is unstoppable, all powerful and all pervading (i.e. omnipotent/unstoppable/all powerful, omnipresent/all pervading/universal and omniscient).
- 5) The unquestioned authority of God is usually supported by the inability to escape God's timeless and universal vigilance to detect non-compliance with universal rules, and the inability to resist God's timeless and universal enforcement of those rules'.

The correspondence between belief and reality has been nurtured by the African traditional societies as regard to environmental conservation<sup>6</sup>. Environmental conservation practices were a positive externality of mixed rituals and beliefs that was held dear to peoples' hearts and passed from one generation to the next. Being constructed by communities they then became venerated as traditions (White *ibid*). This theoretical stance elaborates clearly the foundation of the beliefs that existed in Kilimanjaro and which consequently provided the ecosystem that was favorable to the dwellers. The fact that indigenous people of Kilimanjaro held true beliefs that was found on the reality that the environment provided their physical needs which were connected to their religion and the fear of the supernatural God's punishment and gods; they automatically abode to the collec-

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<sup>6</sup> L. Sati, *Traditional Practices Key to Environmental Conservation*, op. cit.; S. Asimire, *The Unwritten Law: Traditional Ways Of Conserving Environment*. [Online], 2014. Available: [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1316940/unwritten-law-traditional-conserving-environment](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1316940/unwritten-law-traditional-conserving-environment). [Accessed: 02-Jan-2018].

tively agreed norms which were traditionally instituted as will be envisaged in the coming sections.

### **Environmental Destruction in Tanzania**

The multitudinal impacts of climate change are vividly felt worldwide and Tanzania is not exceptional. The extent of environmental destruction has escalated the qualitative and quantitative short term and long term effects to living and non living things on earth. Stiftung Konrad's (2016) for instance has provided a chain-effect of prolonged draughts in Tanzania which has reduced the mean annual temperature resulting in fall of cash crop production which has led to lower agricultural yields resulting in a whole set of social, political and economic difficulties to the country.

Anthropological environmental destruction activity has resulted in consequences like reduced precipitation and underground water; dried wells, reduced springs and lakes like Victoria, Manyara and Rukwa; reduced dams like Nyumba ya Mungu in Kilimanjaro. This has led to food insecurity resulting in famine, desertification and the prolonged conflict between farmers and pastoralists.

Land degrading encounters have facilitated soil erosion, desertification and salinization. This is due to activities like overgrazing, wild fires, deforestation and inappropriate agriculture practices.

Forests and wetlands are suffering from deforestation caused by increasing need for timber and energy. According to Tanzania Environment and Climate Change Policy Brief (2010) as quoted, 'The wetlands are threatened by increasing population, land clearance and deforestation of swamp forest and surrounding woodlands, poaching, pollution and eutrophication, and modification of natural flow regimes. The ecosystem services are impaired by infestation of alien species, declining fish populations, habitat destruction and loss of biodiversity'.



Biodiversity which plays a great role in supporting life on earth has been affected in numerous ways. For instance, aquatic life has been vulnerable to manned – harmful activities like destructive fishing, unregulated costal tourism and over-exploitation of aquatic resources.

Deforestation is said to disturb forests potentials like purification and regulation of water, climate regulation, and carbon sequestration. It is also accused of being responsible for global climate change mainly facilitating erosion, siltation and loss of ecosystem services<sup>7</sup>.

### **Impacts of Environmental Destruction in Tanzania**

Environmental destruction has a lot of impacts. Some of these include but not limited to overheated temperature from global warming which has led to melting icecaps like that of Mount Kilimanjaro with long-term threatening effects of total diminishing. It is estimated that the snow at the top of Mount Kilimanjaro will disappear in 10 years time to come. Consequent to this are economic impacts like lack of tourists who bring foreign currency that is directed to development interventions in the country. This impact trickles down to enhance family poverty especially to dependants of tourist activities of Mount Kilimanjaro.

There has also been an outbreak of pests and diseases which have affected coffee production by 20% in areas which will experience heavy rainfall and maize production has declined by 33% on the national level leading to consequential effects of prize escalation impacting the poor who cannot afford the prize.

The Tanzania Environment and Climate Change Policy (2010) has reported that Tanzania's water resources' flowing is being

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<sup>7</sup> J. Andersson and D. Slunge, *Tanzania – Environmental Policy Brief*, Gothenburg 2005.

reduced and hence affects lives of the users in many ways; for instance domestic usages and hydroelectric power production. Rivers like Pangani River which supports life in Kilimanjaro and Moshi, the Ruvu River which supports Dar es Salaam are also affected. It is estimated that “the reduced flows of the Pangani will impact the 17.4% of the country’s hydropower generated in that basin, while the increased flows in the Rufiji basin may cause damage to the Mtera and Kidatu hydropower installations, which generate 50.3% of the country’s hydropower”<sup>8</sup>.

### **Different Remedies Given**

In fighting environmental degradation and preserving climate Tanzania has joined forces with global initiatives like signing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and ratified it in 1996; signed the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and established a National Adaptation Program of Action in January 2007. Deliberate efforts have also been put by institutionalizing environmental conservation by establishing various sectors like ministry to deal with environment in Vice President’s Office Division of Environment, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives and Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, National Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC), Tanzania Meteorological Agency and others.

Moreover, the establishment of several policies like National Environmental Policy (NEP, 1997), the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP, 1997), the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA, 2007);, the Environmental Management Act (EMA,

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<sup>8</sup> S. Mkhandi and J. Ngana, *Trends analysis and spatial variability of annual rainfall*, in: *Water Resources Management in the Pangani River Basin: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. J. Ngana, Dar es Salaam 2001, pp. 21–29.

2004), a legislation providing for legal and institutional framework for sustainable management of environment, prevention and control of pollution, environmental compliance and enforcement, etc., the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) have been accomplished.

Tanzania has also instituted measures like use of alternative sources of energy like improved sources such as biodiesel charcoal and stoves and donors likewise have been invited and they play a great role in saving the climate. The Government of Norway for instance has pledged US\$100 million for work related to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD); Denmark through DANIDA is conducting a lot of projects in various areas in the country, Finland supports forest and environment, and Bioenergy, and European Union also plays a key role.

## **Traditional Knowledge for Environmental preservation**

### **General Overview**

Traditional social cultural habits of preserving climate and environment have been carried and demonstrated in traditional/indigenous or local knowledge. In 1992 the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) positioned this knowledge in the centre of attaining sustainable development though protecting earth's biological diversity. Moreover, many international development agencies are recommending the integration of scientific and traditional knowledge which entails linking culture, environment and development in management of natural resources and conservation of biological diversity.

This knowledge is said to be community based, collectively held and useful on complementing scientific interventions in climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

insists on the indispensability of indigenous knowledge in developing adaptation and resource management strategies and that it is cost-effective, participatory and sustainable. Furthermore, the United Nations, Traditional Knowledge Initiative (UN-TKI) in Partnership with IPCC recognizes the importance of involving indigenous people in climate change debates. Other global organizations like UNDP, UNESCO, and CBD in recognizing the importance of local or traditional knowledge are campaigning to involve local people in developing local, regional and global policies in addressing climate change. Lastly, the 2011 Mexico City workshop has recognized the importance of local knowledge in agro forest, traditional medicine, biodiversity conservation, customary resource management, impact assessment and natural disaster preparedness and response<sup>9</sup>.

It has to be noted that as mentioned in the background information and in the theoretical framework this traditional knowledge is backed up by existence of traditional beliefs that manifest themselves through fear of supernatural God or gods/goddesses whose abode lied in rocks, streams, trees, rivers and others and that these gods can protect them from harm, famine, draught, epidemics and war, and that it happens that these gods avenge their anger on however disobey them. Moreover, these beliefs have been merged with legal institutions of the community which in turn make people obedient<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> G. Raygorodetsky, *Why traditional knowledge...*, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> R.J. Chacon, 'Conservation or Resource Maximization? Analyzing Subsistence Hunting Among the Achuar (Shiwiar) of Ecuador', in: *The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian Research: Reporting on Environmental Degradation and Warfare*, eds. R. Chacon and R. Mandoza, New York 2012, pp. 311–360; S. Krech, *Reflections on conservation, sustainability, and environmentalism in indigenous North America*, „American anthropologist”, 107(2005), no. 1, pp. 78–86; P.A. Cox, *Will tribal knowledge survive the millennium?*, „Science”, 287(2000), no. 5450, pp. 44–45.

## **Traditional Knowledge Practice in Africa**

African traditional knowledge on environmental conservation is interconnected with religious practices as it was widely believed that ‘everything which belongs to ecosystem and environment had strong spiritual meaning for humans’<sup>11</sup>.

It is widely believed that African communities have incredible knowledge on conserving climate and that Africans are excellent observers and interpreters of change in the environment<sup>12</sup>.

African traditional knowledge has proved useful in conserving climate and providing subsistence for the dwellers over years as demonstrated in different ventures. Humans have relied on plants for multipurpose aspects such as food, clothing, construction materials, cosmetics and medicines, and this has sustained for years because ‘traditional value systems have guided the sustainable use of wild plants in Africa over the years’ (conserveafrica.org n. d).

Also some African rituals set forests as ‘no go’ areas as they were regarded as Gods and gods’ residences as hence cannot be contaminated by community members who were not religious leaders. Moreover, unnecessary tree cut was forbidden and one has to acquire special permit to do so. Sati (2013) for instance posits that forests were made part of the community who had feelings for them. This cultural practice lets forests robust and as a result regulates climate by attracting rainfall, wind barring and cool the areas.

In tribal communities of Urhobos in Delta Central in Ghana and even in Nigeria for instance there exist certain taboos on killing or eating an animal totem which has played a key practice of in-

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<sup>11</sup> S. Asiimire, *The Unwritten Law...*, op. cit.

<sup>12</sup> G. Raygorodetsky, *Why traditional knowledge...*, op. cit.; L. Sati, *Traditional Practices Key...*, op. cit.

indigenous knowledge for conserving biodiversity. This is practiced in the belief that there is supernatural connection between people and environment.

In his own words Asimiire S. posits that ‘natural phenomena were seen as possessing spiritual powers, and the natural force that supplies food seen as superior and accorded respect and veneration; and therefore sacred and endowed with healing powers’<sup>13</sup>. Certain trees, for instance, could not be felled because they were considered as (God’s trees) and this shows the strength of traditional habits intrinsically connected with religion in environmental conservation. Land in African societies was also seen as a goddess. On Sunday or even when the community member has died, one could not farm the land; this regulated man’s impact on the land and thus secured its fertility. Land in these traditional societies belongs to clans and not to the individuals, and because the clan consisted of the living, the dead and even the unborn, it enhanced the idea of sharing and caring for nature.

Generally, rivers and seas were also seen as abodes of the gods and as divinities, certain human activities that marred their beauty were considered abominations; therefore, pollutants and human waste could not be discharged into these water bodies lest the culprits were punished by gods.

### **Traditional Knowledge Practices outside Africa**

Not only in Africa but also all over the globe traditional or local knowledge has way back been beneficial and used by indigenous people for survival and conserving the climate. The following case of Philippines, as demonstrated by UNESCO (2013), shows how traditional knowledge was used by the Philippines to enable them survive;

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<sup>13</sup> S. Asimiire, *The Unwritten Law...*, op. cit.

The Philippines used traditional knowledge in building social cohesion and cooperation networks using traditional supporting systems involving reciprocal exchanges of valuables with stories associated with them. These took place as rituals and provided the forum for the whole community to agree and transfer worked knowledge of resource management and environmental conservation.

In *Ranau Sabah* traditional knowledge on environmental conservation has been manifested through agriculture and traditional healing activities. In agriculture, for instance, hilly areas were protected from erosion by planting and avoiding cutting down trees and mixed farming and shifting cultivation methods were employed to retain fertility. Also, there were certain prohibitions like observing dreams and listening omens from birds. If, for instance, one had a bad dream when he/she is about to open a new piece of land it signaled bad luck unsuitability of place for farming; likewise certain birds' sounds signaled good or bad omen and one had to strictly follow it hence limit land use.

Vitality of certain food crops used for medicinal practices allowed plenty of trees to be found around native homesteads and hence regulated climate. Red rice water, for instance, was a medicine for women who have just given birth and its leaves were believed to increase blood content.

In *India* several practices accompanied by religious practices have taken place whereby for instance certain forests are named as sacred and protected by customary laws. Such forests are potential for herbs and other medicinal plants.

All these evidences of presence of traditional knowledge prove that it is not to be neglected. In *Tanzania*, however, there is scarce literature on this knowledge despite the fact that the remnants of its existence are still evident to indigenous societies to date. Moreover, no research has been conducted to study its existence in

Mshiri village and pose it as complementary measure to preserve environment to modern generation. This is the gap that this paper has attempted to fill.

## **Research Methodology**

### **Introduction**

Methodology denotes a systematical way of solving Research problems. It contained various steps that have been generally adopted by research in studying this research problem along with logic behind them. This paper was set to find out whether traditional environmental conservation methods can be helpful to complement the modern and scientific methods of which its effectiveness is proving ineffective and adding further problem to the planet Earth.

The process of achieving this involved investigation and exposed various methods of traditional environmental conservation that can be utilized to help the large mass of Tanzanian population to conserve environment in more distressful conditions of environment destruction that is in persistence today.

### **Research design**

The study employed Case study research design with the view that it would provide an opportunity to study the aspect of the problem in some depth within some limited time scale, the research maximized qualitative approaches and quantitative approaches to ensure quality.

### **Study Area**

The study was based on Kilimanjaro region; the focus was to assess the contribution of traditional knowledge in environmental conservation using a case study of Mshiri Village which in recent



years has lost its virginal condition of coldness and instead high level of temperature is being experienced. Study population has focused on the elder people of Mshiri village in Kilimanjaro region as well as some few middle aged people to air out their views on how properly traditional knowledge can be utilized to help and complement the current methods to achieve the promising environmentally friendly conditions to man's life. This population is chosen because they have the treasure of the knowledge from experience and they are eye witnesses to climate change in the village and so reliable information was obtained from them.

### **Sample size and sampling**

The study optimized purposive/judgmental sampling because researchers believed that it would provide the necessary and rich information relevant to the study problem. Random sampling was used to complement purposive sampling whereby the sample size included 10 respondents who were the elders that in distant time utilized traditional methods in course of environmental preservation; 5 individuals of middle age, 2 of them being forest specialists aimed to provide technical experience on environmental conservation.

### **Data collection methods and Analysis**

The study was optimally designed to use both primary and secondary data, however utilization of secondary data method found it difficult given that sources on traditional methods of environmental conservation were limited especially in Tanzanian context, however documents from other African countries were utilized. However, the study used n-depth interview method which involved face to face conversation between interviewer and respondents with the purpose of eliciting information from the respondents. This helped researchers to follow up ideas, probe responses and investigate motives

and feelings in relation to environmental conservation methods. Secondary data were obtained from books, journals, institutions statistics and reports for theoretical analysis. Data obtained from the field were recorded, summarized, operationalized and data from documents were subjected to content analysis. Presentation of Data was in the form of text and elaborations and qualitative elements were presented in the form of percentages and tables.

### **Data quality control (Reliability and Validity)**

Reliability of data is the extent to which a test or procedures produce similar results under constant conditions on all occasion, on the other hand, validity tells us whether an item measures what is supposed to measure or describe. To ensure these a careful operationalization of research instrument was employed including employing multi methods in data collection.

### **Data Presentation and Findings Discussion**

This section presents and discusses the findings of the study. They are presented following the sequence of research objectives. A number of questions were posed regarding environmental preservation and climate change in Mshiri village. Questions included asking the respondents to mention practices and significance of traditional knowledge used to conserve the environment, to mention practices of climate change in their village, to point out factors influencing climate change in their area, and to show their awareness on the implication of climate change in their day to day lives. Results are presented and discussed below.

### **Practices and Significance of Traditional Knowledge in Environmental Conservation in Mshiri Village**

In answering the question on practices and significance of traditional knowledge on conserving the environment, it was found

out that traditionally local knowledge was paramount in preserving climate change for Mshiri village residents. This was facilitated by their homogeneity in race, language, religion and even leadership style whereby people were under patronage of their political and religious leaders. The fear of gods and God (*Ruwa*) for enforcing and punishing the law breakers of what was communally agreed has been one of the strongest reason for preserving the environment in the village. This is summarized in the table below, presented and discussed thereafter.

**Table 1:** Key Practices of Traditional Knowledge in Preserving the Environment

Element	Number	%
Religion	15	100
Solidarity works ( <i>Jumatatu</i> )	13	86
Respect to Leaders and Sanctions	5	15
Traditional Healing	14	93
Homogenous Leadership	2	13
Others Practices	15	100

Source: Field Data 2017.

## Religion

From the table above it was revealed that Religion was the basic element that serves as the foundation of environmental conservation at Mshiri village supported by all 15 participants, i.e 100%. It reflects the traditional cultural heritage where by customs were ascribed to worship of gods and one God for Chagga people (*Ruwa*) who was the enforcer of truth. This God spoke to people vividly on the dos and don'ts in the society. He punished the law breakers by killing them, bringing famine of diseases to their clan/ homesteads and to this end everything was looked from religious perspective (Mbiti *ibid*). God provided nature and human realized this and so

was in good relationship with it<sup>14</sup>. There were several avenues that connected environmental conservation and religion as follows:

All 15 respondents (100%) discussed about the existed belief that God and gods resided in specific major avenues like big trees or mountains. For instance, some trees were not supposed to be cut or touched. They grew in various places in the village and it was an abomination for anybody, to approach the tree zones except the elders. Trees like 'Mkuu' and 'Mfuranje' were considered sacred and every homestead had them. As a result the trees grew big attracting shades, preserving ecology, and acted as wind breakers making the area well-conserved. This traditional knowledge and belief are synonymous with Mkenda (n.d) findings that African society big trees like fig and baobab were a manifestation of the powers of Supreme Being and used as shrines.

Not only in Africa but even outside Africa big trees have been considered sacred and kept for veneration. For instance, the Bothi tree is considered as a sacred fig tree by Buddhist, Hinduism and Jainism. This is according to Mkenda that "indigenous people knew that they had religious and moral responsibility towards the environment and that if they destroy environment it would imply destroying themselves"

Moreover, big rivers were also preserved and adored as they were perceived to have supernatural powers. Big rives had 'basin – like' places traditionally known as 'Nduwa' which were considered to be the gods residence and so were inaccessible to ordinary villagers except for religious leaders who were authorized by gods to enter. These were used for rituals and intercession between people and gods in cases where for instance there were calamities caused

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<sup>14</sup> C.V.O. Eneji [et al.], *Traditional African Religion in Natural Resource Conservation and Management in Cross River State, Nigeria*, „Environment and Natural Resource Research”, 2(2012), no. 4, p. 45.

by man disobedience. These places were approached to remove bad omen and by pleading to the 'mizimus' i.e. ancestral spirits. These places were normally surrounded by big trees, grasses and tree bushes. As the place was well conserved it was never dry and it maintained rivers that flew to the village throughout the year.

### **Solidarity works (*Jumatatu*)**

Another traditional practice which reflected people's traditional knowledge in environmental conservation was existence of solidarity works. This was mentioned by 13 respondents equivalent to 86 %. Frequent meetings on how to conserve the environment were facilitated with religious leaders and political leaders. It was a tradition for village leaders to have a session after every Sunday service to give announcements and allocate '*Jumatatu*' tasks (community solidarity works) and religious leaders would wind up by adding emphasis insisting Gods enforcements on top of legal ones. This practice still happens but to lesser extent and also these solidarity works are greatly affected with rural-urban migration whereby most of youth have shifted to urban areas in Moshi, Arusha and even Dar es Salaam leaving elderly people who are not as energetic to tender these works.

Moreover, solidarity works were demonstrated in the act of guarding forests in turn against the stubborn and law breakers. As it was noticed that law breakers were always trying to enter forests for reasons like fuel searching, felling trees, honey harvest and others, and by noticing that these harmful activities will endanger their environment, they agreed to guard the forests in turn. The village leaders knew all members of the community and they were each assigned a day to guard the forests, failure to do so would attract sanctions like fines. For those who were caught destroying the forests punishment included beating in public, fines or confiscating personal property like baskets, cattle and anything available.

This was associated with the belief that forests were provided by God for caring his people, so it was collectively agreed to respect that by preserving what He has given them.

Among the interviewees, 3 respondents (20%) mentioned demonstration of traditional knowledge in keeping tree nurseries. Leaders, both political and religious were champions in ensuring that trees were planted in every homestead and open places. It was even agreed that every Monday to be a community working day and one of the activities was planting trees all around the places that were identified by the leaders. This made the village to be so full of trees and fruits that served for shades, food and good climate.

As pointed out by moral realists that true beliefs correspond to the dictates of foundational reality and false beliefs contradict that reality; it was easy for community members to place their belief in what they knew was true and this was reciprocated by having a good climate which supplied them with everything they needed.

There was also unique knowledge on keeping water sources. One of them included guarding seriously ways that lead to Mount Kilimanjaro to prevent bypassers and those who would try to enter without permission as these were main sources of bush fires that frequently attacked the area and destroyed the natural forests for about 41 km<sup>2</sup> between 1952 and 1982<sup>15</sup>.

It was also reported by almost 98% of the participants that all village men would on every Monday attend all water sources like springs, wells and rivers to make sure that they are not blocked and are clean and anyone who missed that activity was fined. Another activity was digging, directing and frequent cleaning of

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<sup>15</sup> P.Z. Yanda and E.K. Shishira, *Forestry conservation and resource utilization on southern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro: trends, conflicts and resolutions*, in: *Water resources management in the Pangani River Basin: challenges and opportunities*, ed. J.O. Ngana, Dar es Salaam 2001, pp. 104–117.

canneries (*mifereji asilia*) that were made from the water sources directly to homesteads in the village for purposes of irrigation, domestic uses like washing, cooking and bathing and for taming harmful animals like wild rabbits (*panya buku*) locally known as *'fuko'* that destroyed banana trees and other crops. It was collectively agreed and enforced that no one has to do any private activity that dirty the water or prevent these waters from entering other people's homesteads. This means that it was shared by all villagers equally. These made the water sources last for years and there was enough water for everybody's use.

### **Respect to Leaders and Sanctions**

Traditional knowledge was also manifested by existing sanctions like prohibiting animal grazing from water sources, in the forests and in private properties. Areas which were believed to be gods residence were no entry zones and fairy tales had it that when animals entered these areas they vanished. Also, if any community member, who was not even a leader, witnessed a law breaking act, he/she went to report it to the leaders and appropriate measures were taken like public beating, fines or total confiscation of the cattle.

Explaining keenly one old woman of about 70 years narrated that cattle rearing, being one of the major activities for every homestead, it was women's major task to find fodder for cattle. Sanctions were the same that these no go areas like water sources and *'Nduwas'* were no go areas and if caught same sanctions mentioned above would apply. It was very common to find women being slashed publicly in front of everybody including their children. As this was a humiliating and shaming activity women had to ask for permission and followed instruction to only enter the permitted zones. She narrated a case where she and her friend spent the whole night in the forest just to avoid being apprehended by the

villagers who noticed them entering the forbidden zone. They had to come out the other day afternoon and still face the humiliation and according to the woman, they never dared to repeat the act and it became a lesson to the rest, and this was so because leaders were highly respected.

This practice has to be reintroduced. People have to be involved in formulating strict rules to conserve the environment in which they will feel ownership and hence implement as their own as it has been proved that people must have voice on deciding their fate, being listened, respected and empowered to implement what they collectively agree so as to bring ownership and sustainability<sup>16</sup>.

### **Traditional healing**

Fourteen (93%) of respondents reported traditional healing practices as an area which demonstrated high knowledge in conserving the environment. This refers to knowledge that existence in varieties of trees and other plantations that were identified to have healing powers. These existed in planted trees' seeds, leaves and roots of vegetations. It was learnt that some trees were not fell for traditional medicinal purposes both for humans and animals.

Homesteads were also full of human medicine plantations like: 'mpasi', 'kitolo' and 'mareremu' for treating coughing', 'mamboko' for curing broken bones or injured nerves, 'ratune'/aloevera for wounds and 'mapfuna' for cuts. Leaves of a tree known as 'Ringiri' were also special for feeding domestic animals such as goats when they give birth; and it was found in every homestead.

Other researches done elsewhere in Africa found the same kind of belief that there were supernatural powers behind vegetations

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<sup>16</sup> R. Chambers, *Rural development: putting the last first*, London – Lagos – New York 1983.



which originated from the link between religion and natural phenomena Asimiire<sup>17</sup>.

These practices still remain in some societies to a lesser extent like Maasai Tanzania and Kenya. Researcher's observation in Mshiri Village witnessed people walking a long distance deep in Kinapa forest to search for these herbs and some have disappeared altogether. Provided that this traditional practice served the multipurpose and its benefits are indispensable, still there is a need to recapture this knowledge and exercise it in modern generation.

### **Homogenous Leadership**

Two, i.e. (13%) of respondents complained about presence of multi-partism which has brought division to the villagers. Presence of one common political affiliation has facilitated discipline and commitment to the agreed customs and traditions. This was ascribed to the sense of belongingness between the leader and the led whereby leaders were considered to share the same feeling and understanding with the led. Moreover, having respected clan heads, who were taken as God's representatives and who gave direction to the community, facilitated togetherness and hence common understanding. This has been proved to be so; that division in party affiliation brings disagreements, prolonged meetings and even creation of opposing camps opposing each other hence delaying agreement and implementation of decisions.

### **Other Domestic Activities**

Respondents also mentioned a number of other domestic practices where traditional knowledge was demonstrated. One of them was fuel uses. Most rural households live on fuel from trees, and this has been one of the major causes of deforestation and deser-

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<sup>17</sup> S. Asiimire, *The Unwritten Law...*, op. cit.

tification in Tanzania recently. It is intriguing how Mshiri, being one of these villages in rural areas, maintained sustainable use of trees for fuel purposes. Traditional knowledge played a great role in ensuring this. First, this was a custom to have all trees a family will need inside its Kihamba. This included trees traditionally known as '*meresi*', '*msonobari*' and '*mtarako*'. Despite the fact that these trees were used for timber and leaves for livestock beddings, what is interesting is the way they were used for fuel.

A tree like '*msonobari*' for instance could be lit for a week continuously without quenching. This was because after every use at night thick wet pieces of firewood were kept inside the fireplace and this was found still burning the next morning. Moreover, dry pieces of firewood were mixed with wet ones and these made the fire consistent and slow hence minimizing the need for a more firewood pieces.

It was also revealed that traditional knowledge was useful in identifying signs from birds and surroundings for different activities of the year. Respondents described association of certain bird's sounds with events. For instance, certain birds' sound symbolizes planting or harvesting season, death, and drought or rain season. It was also a common knowledge which was passed from elders to children to read the clouds in the sky; for instance, when the clouds were so dark and in certain location like eastern side, western or overhead side it would rain on that day. Also, each particular clouds pattern had interpretation like God's/ gods' anger or happiness.

All these indicators were of much significance to Mshiri people as they enabled them to conserve the environment and survive under good climatic condition of which they were responsible to create and nurture. This is in tandem with moral realism philosophy which states that true beliefs correspond to the dictates of foundational reality and further it was possible as all villagers

were aware that they will not escape God's punishment for non compliance with caring nature.

### **Indicators of Climate Change in Mshiri Village**

When asked about the indicators of climate change in the village, all 15 participants were not hesitant to mention changes in weather patterns. As all participants were 40 years and above, over four decades they lived they have been eye witnesses of changes in weather patterns from systematic weather condition of 1970s, to present unpredictable patterns. Prolonged and unpredictable hot/summer seasons were reported as the most troubling condition which has twisted people lives in this once cool and wetland. All 15 respondents elaborated with deep feelings the way prolonged hot climate has affected their lives from economic activities to agricultural ones.

Mshiri population which once lived on banana and coffee, which is robust in humid climate, is now unable to depend on this because hot climate will not allow them to grow as they used to. It was normal to have cloudy and very cold mornings accompanied with fog to about 10:00 a.m. in the morning. This is no longer there. According to the study conducted by the University of Witwatersrand Coffee production for instance has dropped and will drop to 200kg per hectare by 2030 and to 145kg per hectare in 2060 because it has been established that for every 1 degree night temperature rise, 137kgs are lost and since 1961 night temperature has risen by 1.4 degrees<sup>18</sup>.

Glacier retreat and reduction of ice cap on Mount Kilimanjaro was also a matter of concern to all villagers as presented by the

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<sup>18</sup> K. Makoye, *Coffee production slipping in Tanzania as temperatures rise*. [Online]. Available: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-coffee/coffee-production-slipping-in-tanzania-as-temperatures-rise-idUSKBN0N1OD520150427>. [Accessed: 02-Jan-2018].

respondents. One can have a direct view of the mountain when standing on any hilly area of the village. In the company of one respondent the researcher could see vividly Mount Kilimanjaro and the respondent was pointing his finger showing the way he used to see the amount of ice covering the rocks of the mountain to the bottom of the mountain but now it is like a naked man wearing an undersized hat.

Another indicator mentioned was presence of reduced, drying or dried water sources and rivers like river '*Kiruwi*' which was once full throughout the year and now is a dried area. A lot of springs have also dried up and this has reduced the supply of water in the village. Reason to these is multifaceted.

Reduction of ice cap on Mount Kilimanjaro is the major reason as the ice has been drizzling and forms streams. It forms pure fresh water which supported ecosystem around the mountain. Other anthropological activities also have contributed like deforestation, bush fires and others.

Also famine was mentioned as another indicator of climate change in Mshiri Village. As pointed out earlier, changes in weather patterns and reduction of water sources have direct impact on agriculture. Mshiri village has previously depended on producing their own food for 100% and this was possible due to support of conducive climate but only 5% have food throughout the year.

Their population increases at an estimated rate of 3 per cent each year and the population density for the upper belt was around 650 people per km<sup>2</sup> in the year 2000, according to the Moshi Rural District Council. Consequently, the land devoted to agriculture, which the Chagga call *shamba*, is shrinking. Yet, the old Chagga agro forestry system has been one of the most productive areas of agriculture in Tanzania. Its multicultural combination of trees, rice, vegetables, beans and groundnuts

combines well with naturally good soil to achieve sustainable resource management<sup>19</sup>.

People described lack of 'ghalas' (locally made food store) and presence of empty 'kais' (traditional storage space in the roof) as an indicator of lack of food. It was learnt that years back when climate was good it was common for homesteads to have places they store food. For instance, extra harvested maize was processed and kept in a *ghala* for a very long time for future uses. Moreover, Mshiri houses were built with kais specially for storing surplus crops like coffee.

Fertile black soils in *shambas* were also reported as indicator of plenty food. Subsistence farming supported by climate allowed mixed farming whereby homesteads grew their own food enough to consume throughout the year. People would grow maize, coffee, potatoes and various types of vegetables, yams, many fruits, sugarcanes, and many others. It was normal to have ripened bananas rotting on *shambas* from lack of people to consume. Also relatives from urban areas returned with big sacks of varieties of food when they went to visit back home in the village. All these have changed. Presence of empty kais, lack of *ghalas*, lack of coffee to harvest and store, visible *shambas* with only one type of food crop and few fruits and relatives from urban areas returning empty handed has been an order of the day and indicator of food shortage in the area. One of the respondents pointed out that this is happening because God and gods are angry with the people. In her research Mwangi<sup>20</sup> found out that when weather was good and food was plenty it symbolized God's and gods' happiness towards his people and vice versa.

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<sup>19</sup> A. Hemp, *The banana forests of Kilimanjaro: biodiversity and conservation of the Chagga homegardens*, „Biodiversity and Conservation”, 15(2006), no. 4, pp. 1193–1217.

<sup>20</sup> E. Mwangi, *Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Conservation in East Africa*, Bloomington 1998.

### Factors influencing climate change in the area?

The researcher was interested to know whether villagers were aware of factors influencing climate change in their village. The following factors were mentioned:

**Table 2:** Factors influencing Climate Change at Mshiri Village

Factor	Frequency	%
Harvest of natural forests	15	100
Toothless laws	3	20
Unsustainable pastoralist's activities	15	100
Destroying water sources	15	100
Lack of environmental conservation education	5	33
Laziness	2	13
Neglecting traditional practices of replanting trees	11	73
Lack of discipline to leaders and elders	12	80
Life hardship/ low income/ poverty	15	100
Poor leadership	4	27
Drinking habits	3	20
Population growth	9	65

Source: Field Data 2017.

The table above shows prominent factors mentioned to be destructive to environment: tremendous increases of harvesting of natural forests for fuel, farming and housing purposes. This was mentioned by 100% of respondents. Being a rural area where other sources of energy like electricity were unavailable or unaffordable, prime source remained to be firewood and charcoal which involved tree cutting. This was escalated by lack of reforestation (73%), population growth (65%), life hardship whereby people engaged in firewood and timber harvesting and selling to earn income (100%) and lack of environmental conservation education (33%). Other factors mentioned were unsustainable pastoralist activities

(100%) like grazing in water sources such as springs and wells, and cutting fodder for zero grazed cattle.

Other factors were: presence of toothless laws which are not able to punish the culprits (80%), laziness 13%, lack of discipline to leaders and elders (80%), poor leadership (27%) and drinking habits (20%). Also destroying water sources was mentioned as the major factor that influences climate change. This was done through grazing in the sources, cutting trees around water sources, leaving them unattended, performing other domestic activities in the rivers like washing and bathing.

Global warming has also affected Mt. Kilimanjaro which is the major source of water at Mshiri Village. Frequent bush fires, smokes from industries in towns and vehicles have resulted in overheated temperature leading to melting ice top of Mount Kilimanjaro with long-term threatening effects of total diminishing. As presented in previous sections this has an impact on economy and society at large.

### **People's awareness on day to day implication of climate change**

The research also intended to know whether people were aware of the implication of climate change. This was important so as to be able to establish the fact that people knew the consequences of their actions. Table number 3 shows the results:

**Table3:** Respondent's awareness on Day to Day Implications of Climate Change

Sex	Yes	%	No	0%
M	6 out of 6	100%	0	0%
F	9 out of 9	100%	0	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	15	100%	0	0%

Source: Field Data 2017.

All respondents (100%) demonstrated awareness of the impacts of climate change in the study area. They mentioned indicators

like disappearance of traditional food crops like 'sowe' (traditional yams), banana, potatoes and yams; cash crops like coffee; and lack of affordability of three meals per day, lack of rain, low tourism activities, lack of timber, diminished biological diversity resulting in drought, poor health status – eruption of diseases, poverty, deaths from hunger, lack of pure air, diseases to humans and animals and lack of biodiversity.

## Conclusion

This section draws conclusion from the research findings and makes a number of recommendations. The principal objective of this study was to assess the contribution of traditional knowledge in environmental preservation using a case study of Mshiri Village at Kilimanjaro region in Tanzania.

Traditional knowledge has come out in this research as a complementary mechanism that can be used hand in hand with scientific methods in controlling climate change by conserving the environment. Different traditional aspects of Kilimanjaro natives like religion, leadership, traditional healing and lifestyle accompanied with participatory mechanisms come out as major factors that contributed to conserving the environment in previous years. Moreover, ownership and institutionalization of collectively agreed methods has been the centre piece in effecting the efforts. This knowledge has also proved to be useful in many African countries like Zimbabwe, Mali and Nigeria<sup>21</sup>.

However, there are little remnants of evidence that show existence of traditional knowledge in conserving the environment at

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<sup>21</sup> A. Lalonde, *African indigenous knowledge and its relevance to sustainable development*, in: *Traditional ecological knowledge: concepts and cases*, ed. J.T. Inghish, Ottawa 1993, pp. 55–62.



Mshiri village. Stories from elder people, existence of dry valleys once filled with water, traces of once existed water canaries in front of villagers' households and empty and dilapidated food storage spaces prove the vanishing of traditional knowledge in conserving the environment. Increased famine, prolonged hot climate, water scarcity, lack of vegetations like trees surrounding homesteads and low tourists activities together with loss of biodiversity have been found as consequences of neglecting traditional knowledge in conserving the environment at Mshiri.

### **Recommendations**

Guided by the findings of the study, the researchers recommend the following:

There should be revival of traditional knowledge in conserving the environment in rural Tanzania which can also be duplicated in urban areas. This can be achieved through making deliberate efforts to visit and conduct more research in taping the traditional knowledge in rural areas so as to come out with context – specific measures which will be relevant to the dwellers.

Also, the paper recommends that there should be deliberate efforts to inculcate ethical obligation to Tanzanians which will bring back the once felt connection between man and nature which as a consequence will arouse conscious environmental conservation spirit that will be backed up by the fusion of belief and reality of what is societal good.

Moreover, policy makers should incorporate indigenous knowledge in planning environmental conservation interventions countrywide and especially in rural areas because these areas play a key role in regulating climate in cities and supplying them with food. This should go hand in hand with empowering local people in implementing the agreed efforts.

However, the incorporation of indigenous knowledge as a complement to scientific one has to be done keenly as it has been observed to be of great challenge to adopt a technological mix of indigenous knowledge and modern scientific one. Ahmed<sup>22</sup> recognizes the power of modern science in revolutionizing life on earth, and identifies as a challenge the ability to adopt a technological mix of indigenous knowledge and modern science in order to meet the social, spiritual, cultural and humanitarian goals of people to maximize their internal well-being.

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<sup>22</sup> *The Concept of Indigenous Knowledge and its Relevance to Sustainable Development*, in: *Indigenous Knowledge for Sustainable Development in Sudan*, ed. M. Ahmed, Chartum 1994, pp. 1–41.

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Diminishing River Kuruwi in Mshiri Village





Diminishing River Una



Diminishing Morning Fog as viewed in Mshiri Village

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PART II  
**BIOGRAPHIES**

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## Chapter 6.

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ANNA CICHECKA

# GENDER AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

### ABSTRACT

The promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment are indicated as essential elements of development. Put simply, it is pointed out that development without "half of the population" – what means without women – is impossible. Following this gender agenda one may observe that the elimination of gender disparity and the strengthening of the organizations working for women's rights are present in most developmental strategies for developing countries. This situation is also reflected in Tanzania. At the same time, it is assumed that neopatrimonial political culture in Tanzania has strongly affected the activities of the non-governmental sector and has limited women's movements ability to act independently and with full access to autonomy, because the state authorities react violently and with indignation to signs of oppositional voices. On the other hand, it is visible that the Tanzanian women's movements have used these obstacles to strengthen their position in society, as well as in the public sphere. Thus, it is worth examining the role of gender agenda with regard to the issue of development and with local NGOs in Tanzania. The paper is based on an analysis of the subject literature as well as field research and interviews that the author has conducted with representatives of the NGO sector and political circles in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. The field research was funded by a grant from the National Science Centre – PRELUDIUM 9 Number: 2015/17/N/HS5/00408 while the rest of the research was funded by a grant from the University of Wroclaw Number 0401/2467/17.

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**Key words:** development, women's rights, gender agenda, Tanzania.

## Introduction

Interest in official developmental strategies increased after the Second World War. However, an intensive debate on development has started at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, becoming one of the most dominant discussions in international relations. This situation was related to several historic cases, such as: the appearance of the phenomenon called “fatigue aid,” the summary of the decolonization decade as the “Lost Decade,” and the political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, in response to the growing economic and political problems in the global South, international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have presented proposals for solutions. They initiated the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), whose general aims were economic liberalization and political transformation towards democracy. These countries which implemented SAP regulations could receive various forms of financial assistance, including debt relief<sup>1</sup>.

As a consequence, two opposite trends emerged at the turn of 1980s. and 1990s. On the one hand, the indicators of global economic growth have increased. On the other, the gap between poor and wealthy states has grown at an alarming rate, and millions of people in developing countries adjusted to live on the verge of poverty. In relation to this situation the discourse on development has been complemented by issues related to hunger and indigence – which have been defined as major developmental problems<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign aid and development: lessons learnt and directions for the future*, eds. F. Tarp and P. Hjertholm, London – New York 2000, pp. 80–83.

<sup>2</sup> M.S. Grindle, *Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries*, „Governance”, 17(2004), no. 4, pp. 525–548.

Simultaneously, it has been noted that one of the most vulnerable groups for these problems were women. This became an impulse for the United Nations (UN) to start a debate on the role of gender in development and to propose varied strategies dedicated to women's rights and empowerment, which have started to be called the "gender agenda". The UN assumed that development without "half of the population" – what means without women – is impossible<sup>3</sup>.

Following this gender agenda one may observe that the elimination of gender disparity and strengthening the organizations working for women's rights are present in most developmental strategies for developing countries. This situation is also reflected in Tanzania. At the same time, it is assumed that neopatrimonial political culture in Tanzania has strongly affected the activities of the non-governmental sector and has limited women's movements' ability to act independently and with full access to autonomy, because the state authorities react violently and with indignation to signs of oppositional voices<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, it is visible that Tanzanian women's movements have used these obstacles to strengthen their position in society, as well as in the public sphere. Thus, it is worth examining the role of gender agenda with regard to the issue of development and with local NGOs in Tanzania.

### Hypothesis and research questions

Preliminary research has led to opposite assumptions. On the one hand, it can be observed that gender agenda is extremely popular in Tanzania due to the great influence of the UN and because of its unquestionable value for development. On the other hand, it

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<sup>3</sup> *Millennium Development Goals*, Available: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml>, [Accessed: 29-Dec-2017].

<sup>4</sup> *African Women's Movements. Changing Political Landscapes*, ed. A.M. Tripp [et al.], Cambridge – New York 2009, pp. 81–89.

is stated that obviously the role of gender strategies is indispensable for economic growth but their implementation could not be so successful without the engagement of local NGOs advocating women's rights.

Therefore, the author proposes a balanced hypothesis that the gender agenda in Tanzania is considered as significant and needed not only because of the rhetoric of international institutions – such as the UN, but also because of the powerful forms of advocacy of local NGOs – which guaranteed success and which have created an impact as well. The author does not examine the role of gender agenda in terms of the economy but investigates the narratives about how these strategies have become popular.

## Methodology

The paper refers to social constructivism theory<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, the ideational and normative structures will be defined by the actors such as: international institutions, the UN, NGOs, women's movements, the state, the authorities, etc. The author undertakes a comprehensive explanation of the relationship between the actors, as well as considering and understanding this phenomenon.

The research has been conducted by qualitative methods. The first method is the analysis of the source materials and an analysis of the subject literature. The author has also used an in-depth interview method during the field research conducted in Tanzania, in 2015 and 2016. The groups of respondents have included: representatives of women's NGOs; representatives of public administration; representatives of academics and representatives of business circles – a total of 29 interviews. All of these groups received a set of questions adapted to the social role they play.

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<sup>5</sup> A. Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, Cambridge – New York 1999.

The way of asking the questions has allowed for free responses. All of the respondents have been questioned about the meanings, interests and objectives of gender agenda and the NGOs activities in general. The field research was funded by a grant from the National Science Centre – PRELUDIUM 9 Number: 2015/17/N/HS5/00408 while the rest of the research was funded by a grant from the University of Wroclaw Number 0401/2467/17.

In order to test the hypothesis, the author has used the following research methods: a critical survey of the literature and a critical analysis. The aim of the first part of this paper is to characterize narratives about the effectiveness and popularity of gender agenda in developmental strategies on the basis of the literature sources, whereas the aim of the second part is to investigate the perception of respondents, who have been interviewed by the author, and to present their beliefs about the omnipresence of gender strategies in developmental programs in Tanzania. The last part includes a brief comparison of these two attitudes and gives a summary as well.

### **The explanation of gender agenda popularity in Tanzania proposed in the literature**

Among the most important authors, whose publications are linked to the issue of gender agenda and development, are: A.M. Tripp, A. Kiondo, C. Mercer, C.G. Ishengoma, A. Ellis, M. Blackden, J. Cutura, F. MacCulloh, H. Seebens, and R. Pinkney and S. Feinstein and N.C. D ,errico. It is worth to note that this list is obviously much longer, yet the analysis of the positions published by the authors indicated above may serve as a basic point for further examination. A.M. Tripp describes the women's movements in East Africa and examines their impact on socio-political changes in the state<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> *African Women's Movements. Changing Political Landscapes*, op. cit.

A. Kiondo discusses varied issues linked to the NGO sector in Tanzania, paying special attention to the historical background and the factors that have shaped this sector<sup>7</sup> – similarly to C. Mercer<sup>8</sup>. C.G. Ishengoma analyzes the activity of NGOs at local level, emphasizing the influence of external actors, authorities, the Church and donors<sup>9</sup>. A. Ellis, M. Blackden, J. Cutura, F. MacCulloch and H. Seebens analyze the relationship between the rising of women's movements in Tanzania and the process of economic development, as well as social and political transformation<sup>10</sup>. R. Pinkney characterizes the NGO sector in sub-Saharan Africa in general<sup>11</sup>. S. Feinstein and N.C. D'errico describe the socio-political situation of women in Tanzania, taking into account historical and cultural dependencies, as well as analyzing the basic legal provisions relating to the issue of discrimination<sup>12</sup>.

Despite differences between the research areas favored by these authors, all of them assume that when it comes to the establishment of gender agenda, the UN deserves special attention. Firstly, they emphasize the significance of four world conferences on women organized by the UN in Mexico City, in 1975; in Copenhagen in 1980; in Nairobi; in 1985; and in Beijing, in 1995 and perceive this

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<sup>7</sup> A. Kiondo, F. Mtafikolo, *Developing and Sustaining NGOs in Tanzania. Challenges and Opportunities in the New Millennium*, Dar es Salaam 1999.

<sup>8</sup> C. Mercer, *Reconceptualizing state-society relations in Tanzania: are NGOs "making a difference"?*, „Area”, 31(1999), no. 3, pp. 247–258.

<sup>9</sup> C.G. Ishengoma, *Accessibility of Resources by Gender: The Case of Morogoro Region in Tanzania*, in: *Gender, Economics and Entitlements in Africa*, ed. E. Annan-Yao [et al.], Dakar 2004.

<sup>10</sup> *Gender and economic growth in Tanzania: creating opportunities for women*, ed. A. Ellis, Washington 2007.

<sup>11</sup> R. Pinkney, 'NGOs, Africa and the global order', *NGOs, Africa and The Global Order*, Basingstoke 2009.

<sup>12</sup> S. Feinstein and N.C. D'Errico, *Tanzanian women in their own words: stories of disability and illness*, Lanham 2010.

set of events as the basic incentive for women's movements worldwide to start the battle against discrimination<sup>13</sup>. They also agree that when it comes to Tanzania and other sub-Saharan countries the most important was the conference in Nairobi. Secondly, they notice that the UN has contributed to the implementation of gender agenda to the developmental debate, announcing that there would be "no development without empowerment". According to this statement, development without gender equality is impossible as discrimination against women has a negative influence on society in general as women's work and intellectual capacities (the same as men's) are essential factors in the process of economic growth and strengthening development<sup>14</sup>.

A.M. Tripp, A. Kiondo, C. Mercer and C.G. Ishengoma have emphasized that the establishment of gender agenda may be treated as a merit of the UN but at the same time, one should be aware of the mobilization of Tanzanian women's movements at that time and their influence on popularizing of gender strategies in the state. In general, however, it may be assumed that the main discourse in the literature seems to favor the UN part, neglecting the role of local initiatives.

The next point is that all of the authors consider the breaking point as the turn of 1980s and 1990s. They find that the implementation of gender agenda in developmental strategies in Tanzania as well as its popularization in the state was possible due to the

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<sup>13</sup> A.M. Tripp, *Political reform in Tanzania: The struggle for associational autonomy*, „Comparative Politics”, 32(2000), no. 2, pp. 191–214.

<sup>14</sup> One of the documents that underlined this issue is the Alternative Declaration, prepared by the Non-Governmental Organizations Forum in Copenhagen. The Declaration mentions the necessity of revising existing development policies and turning to greater social, political and economic participation of women. C. Thomas, *Ubóstwo, rozwój i głód*, in: *Globalizacja polityki światowej. Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*, red. J. Baylis, S. Smith, Kraków 2008.

transformation initiated by the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, the accent falls again on the influence of external pressure – coming from international institutions (such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the Commonwealth), which has mobilized regional organizations (such as the African Union, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, SADC, ECOWAS) and eventually have encouraged local initiatives to take action<sup>15</sup>. The above-mentioned institutions have been focusing their attention on democratization, human rights, development and developmental aid at that time<sup>16</sup>. The pressure to implement specific strategies in these areas has been spreading and influencing the status of gender agenda twofold. On the one hand, developmental strategies simply included provisions dedicated to gender equality and very often have made developmental funds conditional on the observance of women's rights. On the other hand, even if developmental programs have not prioritized the gender agenda directly they have emphasized the necessity of economic liberalization and democratization. Subsequently, these processes have been creating the space for women's movements advocating the strength of gender agenda in institutional structures in the state<sup>17</sup>. The SAPs may serve as a good example.

Moreover, the literature sources highlighted the great influence of international institutions on legislative changes. It is assumed that external organizations have forced the ratification of international commitments dedicated to strengthening women's rights. It is also assumed that they have been encouraging regional and local actors to fight for legal system transformation<sup>18</sup>. At the same time

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<sup>15</sup> *African Women's Movements. Changing Political Landscapes*, op. cit., p. 62–68.

<sup>16</sup> C. Thomas, *Ubóstwo, rozwój i głód*, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> P. Norris, C. Welzel, and R. Inglehart, *Gender Equality and Democracy*, „Comparative Sociology”, 1(2002), no. 3, pp. 321–345.

<sup>18</sup> C. Mercer, *Reconceptualizing state-society relations in Tanzania...*, op. cit., pp. 247–258.

one should be aware that signing of international agreements has rarely meant the fast implementation of provisions. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the proposed contracts is perceived as unequivocal<sup>19</sup> with the acceptance of gender strategies<sup>20</sup>.

The last dominant narrative on gender agenda emphasized the role of external donors. It is pointed out that the growth of the developmental aid sector has enabled NGOs advocating gender agenda in Tanzania to become independent from the authorities and the ruling party's funds<sup>21</sup>. A.M. Tripp dedicates much attention to this issue. Although the number of grants for women's activity

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<sup>19</sup> *African Women's Movements. Changing Political Landscapes*, op. cit., p. 217–229.

<sup>20</sup> Among the most important international agreements are indicated: the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women – CEDAW, 1979; Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, 1985; Beijing Declaration and the Beijing Platform for Action; Cairo Declaration on Population and Development – ICPD, 1994; Universal Declaration on Democracy, 1997; Millennium Declaration and Development Goals – MDGs, 2000; Resolution 1325, 2000; Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women, 2003; Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa – SDGEA, 2004; Resolution 1820, 2006; Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking In Human Beings, Especially Women and Children, 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Among the most important sources of funds are indicated: 1. Public Foundations: ActionAid, the Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), the Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (HIVOS), Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO), Oxfam; 2. Bilateral donors: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), USAID; 3. Multilateral institutions: the European Development Fund, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO); 4. Special funds for women: African Women's Development Fund, Global Fund for Women; 5. Private funds; 6. Foundations: McKnight Foundation, Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation; 7. Local government; 8. The business sector.



has decreased since 2000, previous years had significantly changed the behavior patterns of local NGOs. Firstly, external funds have contributed to the quantitative and qualitative increase of NGOs advocating women's rights. Secondly, as donors have preferred cooperation with NGOs to national governments and have been favoring relations with NGOs, then as a consequence many NGOs have been adapting the donor's agendas. On the one hand, it simply maximized the chance of receiving the funds. On the other hand, it has strengthened the gender agenda at local level<sup>22</sup>.

To conclude this part of the paper, one may observe that the dominant narratives about gender agenda in literature sources put emphasis on the importance of external influence. It seems that international institutions have had a great impact on the actor's behavior patterns on a local level and have shaped the dynamic of changes. The role of Tanzanian organizations has been not omitted but definitely less attention has been paid to them in comparison with the global entities.

### **The gender agenda in local narratives in Tanzania**

It has been assumed above that the dominant narratives about gender agenda in the literature refer in particular to several points and events, which according to these narratives, may be perceived as significant for strengthening gender strategies. Among them are indicated: a set of conferences on women organized by the UN; the UN declaration that gender equality is an essential part of development; political and economic transformation set down by the SAPs; international institutions' commitment to the legislature changes on a local level; and the role of external donors in financial support for local NGOs advocating women's rights. This section

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<sup>22</sup> *African Women's Movements. Changing Political Landscapes*, op. cit., p. 101–106.

is dedicated to examining how the above-mentioned rhetoric – if it does – correlates with the perception of representatives of the NGO sector in Tanzania.

According to the first point – the importance of conferences organized by the UN – all respondents declared the same, that they have perceived this set of events as significant, emphasizing the special status of the conference in Nairobi. For a number of reasons meeting in Nairobi turned out to be ground-breaking for Tanzania. Firstly, the location on the African continent had a symbolic and practical meaning. On the one hand, the urgency of the situation of African women has been underlined. On the other hand, these measures enabled women's associations, which due to financial reasons could not afford to participate in conferences outside of the continent, to send their representatives to neighboring Nairobi. Secondly, the meeting ended with the adoption of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women – an important document that provided directions for the implementation of gender strategies at national levels<sup>23</sup>.

At the same time, however, respondents have accented that although the influence coming from the UN could not be overestimated, it was not the only one important factor in the process of strengthening gender agenda in the state. The conference in Nairobi triggered the atmosphere of mobilization and became an incentive for women's associations but the need for changes had existed before and merely appeared at this culmination moment (Interviews with Dr Rose Shayo, 2015; Rehema Msami, 2015, Professor Severine M. Rugumamu, 2015; Anna Kikwa, 2016; Ngunga Tepani, 2016; and Mary Rusimbi, 2016). As an example may serve

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<sup>23</sup> *Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace, Nairobi, 15–16 July 1985*, New York 1986.

the case of the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA). This organization was established after the conference in Nairobi, in 1987 but one should be aware that TAMWA's founders<sup>24</sup> had been advocating women's rights before that meeting. In a similar way to other representatives of women's associations in Tanzania at that time (TAMWA). Moreover, one of the first initiatives dedicated to gender equality was launched much earlier, in 1978. It was The Women's Research and Documentation Project, initially operating as an informal feminist student's group and eventually an important center for data collecting and analyzing<sup>25</sup>. Therefore, it may be assumed that the main narrative at this point emphasizes the role of local initiatives in popularizing gender strategies on a national level.

Yet, the UN merits for the implementation of gender agenda to developmental rhetoric in general seem to be almost uncontested. Respondents agree that nothing could happen without the engagement of local associations but at the same time they recognize the importance of external pressure (Interview with Dr Rose Shayo, 2015). Due to their well-developed structures international institutions were what had the power to initiate debate and create the discourse on current global issues. Obviously, this discourse may be treated as some kind of response to problems and needs but simultaneously, it has been a driving force for shaping the behavior patterns at regional and local levels.

Similarly to the narrative in the subject literature, the respondents find out the breaking point as the turn of 1980s and 1990s and link it with economic and political transformation as well. It is

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<sup>24</sup> The founders of TAWMA were: Fatma Alloo, Edda Sanga, Leila Sheikh, Rose Hajia and Ananile Nkya.

<sup>25</sup> R. Meena and M. Mbilinyi, *Women's Research and Documentation Project (Tanzania)*, „Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society”, 16(1991), no. 4, pp. 852–859.

assumed that the reforms initiated by SAPs have transformed not only the economic and political sphere but have also strengthened social activity. It should be noted however that the formal change of a one-party state system to a multi-party has not been equal to the removal of previous political behavior patterns. It meant, among others, the consistent dominance of centralized power and limited space for opposition and the non-governmental activity<sup>26</sup>. Thus, it is worth asking the question how gender agenda has become important in such a difficult political realm. While the literature sources suggest that it was possible due to the influence of external institutions, the dominant narrative of interviewed respondents underlines the importance of local organizations advocating women's rights and their forms of advocacy, such as: the watchdog method, creating coalitions and cooperation with the media (Interview with Sabetha Mwambenja, 2016). Accordingly, the emergence of gender agenda may be perceived as the process which has become apparent in international relations because of the pressure coming from international institutions – what simultaneously has been a response to current affairs at the global, regional and local levels; but ultimately has been grounded in the state because of great engagement of local non-governmental initiatives whose knowledge about domestic obstacles has enabled them to lobby for changes effectively.

When it comes to the legislative changes, research has acknowledged the influence of international institutions. It is assumed that international commitments have contributed to more intensive debates on the gender issue in Tanzania. Subsequently, this discussion about women's rights is perceived as ground-breaking as firstly, it has confronted authority with previously neglecting

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<sup>26</sup> C. Mercer, *Reconceptualizing state-society relations in Tanzania...*, op. cit., pp. 247–258.

social needs. And secondly, it has questioned the legitimacy of the patriarchal model of the family that has been deeply ingrained in tradition and beliefs (Interview with Dr Rose Shayo).

Most respondents confirm the great role of external donors in the process of emphasizing gender agenda in the state. They underline that both the programs of financial support for NGOs and developmental strategies for the government simply included the provisions about gender equality and in this way they have determined the possibility of receiving the funds, making these funds conditional on the acceptance of provisions dedicated to women's rights. At the same time, however, it is worth to mention that respondents rarely perceive this relation with donors as based on partnership and accent that the priorities of donors very often differ from local needs (Interview with Mary Rusimbi, 2016).

In summary, it may be noted that the dominant narrative about gender agenda among respondents emphasizes the importance of local initiatives. It is also worth noting that during these interviews additional issues also emerged, such as: weak cooperation between NGOs advocating women's rights and the business sector.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, it may be assumed that the results of the above analysis have proved the hypothesis proposed in this paper. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that the recognition of the role of gender agenda among respondents differs from the perception presented in the literature sources. While the literature emphasizes the influence of external actors, then the respondents underline the significance of local initiatives and accent their contribution to the adopting of gender strategies in the state. Secondly, respondents state that powerful forms of advocacy of local NGOs guaranteed success.

Simultaneously, it may be stated that as gender agenda was a part of many developmental strategies, thus NGOs advocating these gender provisions have played also an important role in the process of development. Therefore, it seems that the dynamic of changes have been affected not only by the ideas coming from international structures but also from regional and national levels.

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ANNA WIECZORKIEWICZ

**“BLACK WOMEN”  
AS A RHETORICAL TOOL OF PERSUASION**

**ABSTRACT**

How can theories support, obstruct and determine understanding and developing of various cultural subjects? I am going to approach this question by analyzing the biographies of two women who are called black: Saartjie Baartman and Waris Dirie. These biographies have been told in many ways, for various reasons and for different purposes; they have been involved in ideological, political, scientific, and also popular culture discourses. In the perspective proposed by this article, *biography* is not conceived as the sequence of successive objective facts but as a cultural construct defined by many factors (social, political, etc.). This construct is variable and may occur in many variants, however, a specific horizon of cultural imagination, established in the particular time and place, stimulates creating certain types of biographical narratives. The juxtaposition of these cases may disclose more meanings than a single analysis of an isolated biography.

I will discuss how biographies become effective persuasive tools for negotiating and contesting different opinions and convictions. However, my intention is also to present a reverse of this interaction: certain theoretical orders (e.g. postcolonial theory, feminism) can ideologize and influence the biographies, providing both



a language and a rhetorical frame for expressing experiences and emotions. In this way, theories can colonize biographies.

My point of departure may seem trivial: I will start from the landscape of popular culture which may be defined as Western and global. I have chosen them because they exemplify the effects of processing, combining and using values and opinions of various origin. My examples come from feature films which claim biographical and historical accuracy; in each case, though, the reliability is established on a different basis. (In the first case, the basis is a careful reproduction of the historical period and even incorporating quotation from authentic scientific text to the movie; in the second case, the script is based on the autobiographical book of the female protagonist and it was adapted to the movie with her approval)

Let's juxtapose two scenes from two different movies:

A well-endowed woman is turning around to the rhythm of the music that seems as wild as she herself is savage. Her red costume is tightly wrapped around her body, her legs are bent, she stuck her bottom in the air, her head is lowered. She is jumping; just a moment ago, she was tamed by a whip of a trainer who had led her – thrashing about and grinning her teeth – into the salon. She has showed, however, that she was not an animal. She has imitated playing the instruments, she could even produce a melody. And now she is dancing – wildly and passionately. Everybody in the salon is captured by the spirit of the dance.

We are in Paris at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

After the performance, elegant ladies in beautiful dresses offer some champagne to the savage girl and try to start a conversation with her. None of them would like to be like her. Watching her helps the viewers to feel in their own skin better than usual.

A black woman is walking on the catwalk – she is so beautiful and self-confident that you cannot take your eyes off her. Just a moment ago, she was wearing a niqab and only her eyes

were flashing through the narrow opening in the fabric. She has dropped it, and she was immediately transformed into a bride in a white dress. This is only the beginning of her metamorphoses: one garment immediately changes into another; each of them offers a new version of the woman. But there is something solid in the core of all these changes – a firm core that seems to be fully controlled by the woman.

This event takes place at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century in the Western culture area.

Both pictures show one black woman performing in front of the Western public; the first one comes from the movie “Venus Noire” (2010), the second one from “Desert Flower” (2009). Their juxtaposition may suggest the optimistic message about an oppressed individual (symbolized by the black woman) who is able to gain freedom and to take control of both her own life and the way in which it is told. This rhetorical procedure would be just a simplistic application of the feminist and the postcolonial studies discourses.

However, it can be also treated as a tool for focusing certain predicaments of culture; it helps to analyze the complex mechanism of contesting meanings and values.

When talking about development, we should not skip this issue, because it shows determinants of the discourse that aspires to be inter-cultural. I have started with the examples of the popular culture, because on this ground, we can easily observe the effect of processing, combining and using values and opinions of various origins. However, this is a part of a much broader issue and other examples can be found also in academic, political and artistic discourses.

The protagonist of “Venus Noire” is known under the name Saartjie Baartman or Sarah Bartman. A name which was given to her in her native language remains unknown. She was Khoikhoi (who were called by European colonizers Hottentots). She was brought from the Cape of Good Hope to London in 1810 by Doc-

tor Alexander Dunlop. That man started displaying her in public shows under her scenic name „Hottentot Venus”. The role which she was forced to play inevitably evoked the senses of wildness, sexuality, excess. These associations worked not only in entertainment enterprises in which she was engaged, but also in scientific ones, as she has become a handy example for academics who were considering races, human origins, or more general – the order of nature. She was also used as an example in abolitionist struggle against slavery; the fact that she was on display could serve as a spectacular argument against colonial exploitation.

In 1814, the show was moved to Paris; at the end of 1815, Sartjie died. Then, the autopsy was carried out on her corpse. The scientific reports from this event, which were prepared by Georges Cuvier and Henry de Blainville, were considered very useful sources by many academics, although they used them in various ways and for various purposes.

Her skeleton and plaster cast from her body were placed in the Museum of Natural History in Paris, alongside two other human skeletons and many specimens of comparative anatomy. Later, they were moved to the *Musée de l'Homme* which was opened in Paris in 1937. A visitor could see the plaster cast figure from the profile (this arrangement exposed the steatopygic shape); next to her, a skeleton was also exposed and a photograph of African men and women above<sup>1</sup>. In the 1970s, Saartjie Bartmaan's exhibition was moved to museum storerooms as a result of growing feminist criticism<sup>2</sup>. (However, it was exhibited in 1994 at a temporary exhibition devoted to the nineteenth-century ethnographic sculpture which was organized by the Orsay Museum.)

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<sup>1</sup> Sadiya Qureshi, *Displaying Sara Baartman, the 'Hottentot Venus'*, „History of Science”, 42(2004), p. 246.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 245 et seq.

In fact, the posthumous life of Saartjie Baartman was as spectacular and dramatic as her biography as a living person. Her career as a museum specimen was parallel to her career as a key case in various scientific theories. Sometimes, these two lines of life were intertwined. For example, in his famous essay “The Hottentot Venus”, Stephen Gould (paleontologist, evolutionary biologist and historian of science) described the moment when he found “the brain of Paull Broca floating in Formalin in a bell jar” in the *Musée de l’Homme* storage<sup>3</sup> and then, he continues the story: “I saw the dissected genitalia of three Third-World women, I found no brains of women, and neither Broca’s penis nor any male genitalia grace the collection.

Three jars are labeled *une négresse, une péruvienne, and la Vénus Hottentotte, or the Hottentot Venus*”<sup>4</sup>. After this finding, Gould wrote an article about Cuvier and Cuvier’s study which was published in “*Mémoires du Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle*”. Gould interpreted that study as an example of the nineteenth-century mentality: observations were fitted into frameworks of a presumed theory, but also beliefs and fantasies<sup>5</sup>.

Gould’s essay stimulated Baartham’s posthumous career as a crucial example in many theoretical studies. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century,

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<sup>3</sup> S.J. Gould, *The Hottentot Venus*, in: *The Flamingo’s Smile*, London – New York – Victoria – Toronto – Auckland 1991, p. 291.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 292.

<sup>5</sup> Gould points out that this practice is not extraordinary: ‘If earlier scientists cast the Khoi-San people as approximations to the lower primates, they now rank among the heroes of modern social movements. Their languages, with complex click, were once dismissed as a guttural farrago of beastly sounds. They are now widely admired for their complexity and subtle expression. Cuvier had stigmatized the hunter-gatherer life styles of the traditional San (Bushmen) as the ultimate degradation of a people too stupid and indolent to farm or raise cattle. The same people have become models of righteousness to modern ecoactivists for their understanding, nonexploitive, and balanced approach to natural resources.’ (*Ibidem*, p. 300).

Saartjie became the iconic example of a “black woman” in the feminist discourse. That time, she was discursively blackened. Previously, Hottentots were not considered Negros (who were perceived black by Western people). Cuvier (in his reports she was actually called “Bushman”, not a Hottentot) – described her as yellow-brown (*La couleur générale de peau étoit d’un brun-jaunâtre, presque foncée que celle de son visage*<sup>6</sup>).

Her biography was also useful for postcolonial studies, and, last but not least, for the South African political discourse. In 2002, her remains were returned to South Africa, as a result of negotiations at the government level. Her remains were buried ceremonially and she was called the mother of the nation. Thus, the identity of a “museum object” was replaced by the status of the “ancestor of the nation”.

The idea that “Saartjie Baartman is the most famous and most respected South African icon of the colonial era”<sup>7</sup> was expressed in many ways in various articles and books. It is worth mentioning that she was not the only African subjected to posthumous anatomical investigation in the nineteenth century, nor was she the only exhibition of an exotic person as a curiosity.

Her biographers expressed the regret that her voice can never be heard, and that she can be known only from messages produced by other people. In the second example, the woman seems to surpass this restriction – the narratives about her (which are often created by herself) expose her agency. The protagonist of the second movie mentioned at the beginning, Waries Dirie seems to surpass this restriction.

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<sup>6</sup> G. Cuvier, *Faites sur le cadaver; d’une femme cunnie à Paris et à Londres sous le nom de Vénus Hottentotte*, „Mémoires du Musée nationale d’histoire naturelle”, 3(1817), p. 265.

<sup>7</sup> R. Holmes R., *African Queen. The Real Life of the Hottentot Venus*, New York 2007, p. XIV.

The Somali woman, top-model, author, actress and human rights activist struggling against female genital mutilation – tells about her life herself. She speaks publicly, she publishes books about her life and about her social activities. She presents her own biography in such a way that it seems to embody vital narrative patterns, but she also suggests that she controls the meaning which are conveyed by the narratives. The narratives about her (which are often created by herself or consulted with her) expose her agency.

For example, in one of her books “Letter to my Mother”, the epistolary form is used as a specific tool of therapy and the therapy is understood in the framework of the Western therapeutic culture. In this letter, Waris says that everything that happened to her may seem like a fairy tale. For the sake of the tale, the world of her childhood is exoticized. However, just at the point where the tale should end, the ultimate sense of the story is reversed. The narrator proposes a new story: she says that the “Happy End” is the false ending. In fact, the scene of her spectacular success is only an artificial world of illusory and deceptive values. In this way, she seizes the power over her biographical narrative.

However, her narrative is open to various other meanings. The movie “Desert Flower” (which was consulted with Waris) reverses the biographical sequence which was told in the book. The story begins in London. It is true that the opening shots present the picturesque Africa and some equally picturesque childhood scenes, but then, the viewer is redirected to the luxury department store in London and the young Waris, dressed in African way, who feels completely lost among the abundance of Western women’s clothes.

The change in the narrative order points to the place where the story begins and also suggests that it is where the conceptual perspective is constructed. It is in London where this Waris, who would be able to express her life, is born and who turns her life story into a manifesto in defense of all the girls and women who

are being harmed. It influences the interpretation of the source of moral categories.

Many articles and interviews referred to the figure of Cinderella to interpret Waris' biography, and at the same time, they employed the language of therapeutic culture to tell about overcoming the childhood's trauma and emancipation. However, it should be mentioned that in her latest book "Safa", Waris explicitly says that the Cinderella story is not the proper point of reference. She wants her biographical narrative, and especially the movie "Desert Flower," to be the weapon in the fight against FGM.

Waris describes herself as the embodied message which circulates between two worlds. The two motifs which are crucial for the persuasive power of the message are: the visible beauty of the body and the hidden scar in an intimate part of her body. The meanings associated with these motives are subjected to changes, depending on the discursive area in which they occur. From the rhetorical point of view, we can ask: who is the agent of these changes? Is it so that only by obtaining the (Western) tools of self-understanding the African woman can get access to her intimate experience and also to express it? Or, is it so that by entering a new culture she also lets new meanings to be inscribed into her body according to this culture's order?

These questions can't be answered unambiguously because the answer depends on the perspective in which the question is posed. (The psychological perspective is directed towards the individual's experiences, whereas the anthropological one focuses on the predicament of cultural processes, or the inter-cultural relationship.)

In the following passage, I will use another juxtaposition to present the problematic status of the notions which are used in biographical narratives.

The episode of the movie "Desert Flower" when Waris is posing for photos for Pirelli calendar is very meaningful: she is extremely

uncomfortable when she is asked to undress herself and to expose her body in front of the photographic lens, but the photographer is so patient and delicate that she overcomes her embarrassment and starts posing; and soon she starts doing it with joy. Her nakedness transforms in nude presented in black and white photography. This scene can be interpreted as the image of the liberation of a woman who regains her body (even if she is instructed by others on how to use specific gestures.)

The counterpart to this episode is the scene from “Venus Noire”: In 1815, a few French scientists forced Saartjie to pose naked in order to examine her body and to prepare the visual documentation of the research. (In fact, the project was not fully successful because they could not see famous *sinus pudoris* – Saartjie did not want to get rid of the handkerchief, which she managed to use for covering her most intimate parts.) Though in both cases there is the issue of presenting a nude female “object” in front of a white male spectator, the meanings of these episodes are opposing each other. Saartjie does not overcome her reluctance; she is forced and suppressed. In her case, nakedness is humiliating in all its versions, even if it was “only” designed as a stage costume. (During some performances, Saartjie wore tight-fitting skin color costume that suggested that she was rather naked than dressed). In this case, nakedness is the motif that supports discourse about oppression.

The movie “Venus Noire” adds one more episode to strengthen the nakedness-humiliation association: a rape during the private performance in Paris. Saartjie lies on her back, her legs are spread and the trainer encourages the public to touch the intimate parts of her body. She starts to cry. The boundary between staged and off-stage humiliation is broken. Then, she has only prostitution and lonely death coming. The movie indicates that she was raped many times and in many meanings – physically and symbolically.



On the contrary, the 'Desert Flower' episode of undressing a woman to nudity works for the discourse of liberation (though in both cases the female body is exposed to the male viewer and then presented in images that has exotic and erotic flavor.) This can be interpreted in the perspective of issues of control over expressing various contents, notions, values. The space for expression is created by the tension between various concepts of femininity, exoticism, otherness which are held by various social actors like scientists, politicians, doctors, artists, fashion designers.

The 'calendar girl' does not want to be trapped within the boundaries established by the therapeutic culture society. She changes the persuasive direction of the manifesto of being sexy, and replaces the narrative of individual happiness and pleasure by another one – about the hidden suffering. The fact that she arrives from the non-western world (which means: from the world of other values) makes the meanings associated with this event even broader. With no clothes, dressed in art only, she seems to be more emancipated and freer than Western women. Paradoxically, these associations confirm the western strategies of individual self-determination that are crucial to the Western culture of narcissism. In this perspective, the liberation gesture is employed in the order of Western rites de passage.

Over time, she changes the meaning of this rite by adding another dimension to it. This happens when, after revealing her secret of circumcision, she begins to work for other girls and women who do not have her power. She manages to find the discursive space where the matter of sexuality is a political and legal issue. However, she is successful because the personal and intimate dimension of her story is maintained.

The act of converting the private into the public allows Waris to speak about sexuality in the high style, but it also changes the meaning of her intimate experience. Her past individual suffering is used to build a better world for the others. This may be inter-

preted as regaining the right to what was taken of Saartjie – to her body, her sexuality, her intimate story.

However, the episode of Waris’ posing may be interpreted in one more way. The photo is black and white. Artistic asceticism stresses what – as one might think – is inscribed in nature: the black female body is beautifully drawn on the white background. However, Waris is black in so far as we decide her to be black. When she is presented in pictures, her skin may have various shades, mostly it is brownish or olive. She is posed in the way which allows to expose the narrow nose, slender silhouette. Unlike in the case of Hotentock Venus, her pictured beauty does not damage Western aesthetic canons. Spectacular attractiveness of Saartjie consisted in her non-western body shape, whereas Waris is arranged as a black woman framed by occidental beauty canons. In fact, the movie episode of posing may serve as the illustration to Dean MacCannell’s article “White Culture”: the black woman is presented on the white culture background<sup>8</sup>. As much as the shape of Saartjie’s body determined its spectacularness, the monstrosity of the black model’s biography was not immediately apparent – whether and when it would be explored and in what light – it would be decided by Waris herself. For the time being, however, her body is arranged by the photographer, captured by a convention, to be occidentalized. This scene could be an illustration of Dean MacCannell’s text “White Culture”: “Black Woman” appears on the white culture background.

“We can never see her except through the eyes of the white men who described her”<sup>9</sup> – Anne Fausto-Sterling stated about

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<sup>8</sup> D. MacCannell, *White Culture*, in: *Empty Meeting Grounds. The Tourist Papers*, London 1992.

<sup>9</sup> A. Fausto-Sterling, *Gender, Race, and Nation: The Comparative Anatomy of “Hottentot” Woman in Europe, 1815–1817*, in: *Deviant Bodies. Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture*, eds. J. Terry, J. Urla, Bloomington – Indianapolis 1995, p. 31.

“Hottentott Venus”. This argument is very clear in the feminist discourse about Bartmann.

Actually, the same statement could be made about Waris Dirie, the model who is created by the camera of a white man. Her body is given proper poses and gestures, and then she can be exposed to the public. But on the other hand, this statement cannot be referred to Waris in unconditional way, since she herself seems to decide about the selection of facts which compose her biography: she publishes books, she addresses in UN meetings in defense of all the women who were or could be subjected to FGM. She speaks as the one who managed to escape from the paternalistic authority thanks to her own courage, strong will, resistance, and then started to feel and act in a new way as a free individual.

However: if she had not met the photographer. Or rather: if he had not discovered her...

In fact, there are two contesting streams of interpretation which are equally well grounded. And it is not just the matter of glamor pictures, of wearing western clothes etc. The core question is: what triggers the process of reorganization of perceiving and sensing woman's own body and interpreting her experiences? It seems (it is the suggestion which results from all versions of her life story) that if she had not joined the fashion world, if she had not become an icon of success, she would not be able to express her feelings and opinions on the official agenda. She would not be able to make such a spectacular and persuasive self-expression, if a conceptual language had not existed that involved values recognized as global and superior to other languages.

When Fausto-Sterling writes that we can only see Saartjie through the eyes of others (that is of the white men), she means that we do not really know what her own feelings and thoughts were. We can only get the access to the second-hand reports of scientists or journalists. It is not the case of Waris who strives to

control narratives about herself. What is seen "through the eyes of men" is the body of a beautiful model presented in carefully posed photographic images (which, of course, may be interpreted as reflections of male desire). What she considers to be the essential truth about herself is expressed in the narratives signed by her own name (even if her books are written in a cooperation with co-authors). Yet, the discourse about the oppression is generated by the mechanism which is much more complex than the viewer/viewed person opposition.

As a matter of fact, the essential questions are more general: how are the conditions for constructing expressible experiences and feeling constructed on the multicultural ground? How to define a situation when one culture offers conceptual and institutional tools for naming their specific experiences to other cultures and how to associate them with specific values? It is not only the matter of expressing ideas, but also of instructing people how to experience their own biographies, how to interpret and evaluate past and present experiences and how to project future and endow it with meanings.

It may be tempting to present the juxtaposition of these biographies as the optimistic *exemplum* of the process of emancipation of marginalized subjects: the surgery which Waris undergoes, restores to black woman the organs which were taken from Saartjie's body. Public "confession" of Waris may be interpreted as reclaiming the ability to speak with one's own voice which was suppressed in Saartjie's case. Even nudity may be employed in this rhetoric: at the photographic image, Waris is nude, not naked.

Saartjie's biography can be told as a process of creating an object subjected to investigation and control, but, in a way, still not defined completely. As the work on the meaning of her body progresses, she becomes more and more disembodied: she provides matter for formulating clear judgments and persuasive opinions.

Her body depicted in the illustrations from this age suggests sexual excess, and is associated with transgression of the conventions (both in terms of social customs and artistic). It also suggests that order of some fundamental categories (such as the male/female) are not definite.

Waris's biography is a story about a woman who struggles to survive being aware of her marginal position in the society. In Europe, she learns the performative gestures of Western women, but she should not lose the exotic flavor of her body in order to be successful as a model. Once she became successful (in the western sense of the word), she was able to address in the international institutional forum on behalf of other marginalized women. Her biography and her body should be treated as the incontrovertible evidence of the right of what she demands.

The story which Waris writes with her life defines concepts of oppression and excesses in the way different from Saarthije's biography. In the days of Saarthije, the language adequate to formulate this kind of criticism was *in statu nascendi*. Its rules were negotiated in courts, academic institutions, press articles and in other places of various character. This process was interrelated to the other one: redefinition of the Other.

Saartjie's biography reveals the fluency and negotiability of the rules to define racial and gender difference.

Various narratives about Saarthie which were created over the years rhetorically reversed the concept of barbarism and obviously of those people who designed and exploited "Hottentot Venus" during her life and who were called barbarians after her death, and it seems impossible to re-read this story otherwise than as the story of how Western culture has destroyed a woman who was considered "Other".

Waris takes over the role of a storyteller; moreover, she is aware that from the western perspective she should play a specific role,

or, in other words, to be a definite type of character. However, she decides which roles she accepts and which rejects. The accepted roles composed with elements which she considered her roots, co-created her new occidentalized identity.

By presenting this story in the way outlined above, we follow a trail which was designed by Waris Dirie herself. She speaks and writes in many different ways about liberation, salvation, getting free; it is getting free from personal trauma, but it also is the liberation of African women from the destructive customs, and also saving Africa from self-destructive processes.

However, in comparison with each other, these biographies can also reveal the reverse of the optimistic story about liberation and they question opinions which are claimed to be obvious. Each of these two biographies can create a revealing perspective for interpreting the other one, and suggests concepts that are useful tools for revealing the hidden or the shameful elements of the other one. The alleged similarities in the structure of stories indicate structural differences of the cultural contexts. Let's pay attention to the fact that the process of defining womanhood and femininity of both Saartjie and Waris did not take place just in one discursive area. Saartjie's womanhood and femininity was analyzed in the framework of freak shows and academic procedures; in the Waris' case, it was catwalk and the UN forum. In other words, the identity of the two women was articulated by the dynamic relationship of two socio-cultural areas associated with distinct values.

Freak shows and a fashion show are the areas that are considered ambiguous in terms of the values that they evoke.

Freak shows were flourishing at the time when the process of medicalization and anthropologization of curiosities was in progress. The "curiosities" were more and more likely to be explained as pathological cases or as ethnic specimens and this explanations entailed specific procedures and attitudes: diseases should be cured

by a medical treatment; people from exotic areas should be placed in the taxonomic order of nature. Freak shows were eliminated towards keeping audience's attention by referring to science, but in fact they were mixing various orders and were considered less and less appropriate for sophisticated audience, more and more shameful.

Nowadays, fashion shows are also considered suspected in some way. Common criticism uses the argument that the beauty promoted by them is morally impure. They work towards establishing wrong and harmful beauty patterns and watching models makes each "normal girl" feeling bad. One of its effects should be anorexia among girls and women. This opinion is expressed also by Waris herself. She often manifests her critical attitude towards fashion and its dictatorship. She treats her model career as just one of the steps in her life that was necessary to pass towards issues that really matter. However, at any time, the accents can be changed – just as it was in the movie version of "Desert Flower".

It should be mentioned, however, that fashion as well as FGM and plastic surgery can be analyzed in terms of the interrelated categories of subjectivity/reifications of people who undertake/undergo them. They are cultural practices that hew women's bodies to adjust them to certain standards that suggest that they fit for certain social roles and, for example, they can be married, they can bear children, or they can look good enough to go out with them.

Nevertheless, a simple feminizing explanation of these phenomena with the male domination can be satisfying in the short run only. Even Waris Dirie, in her writing about the operations, both in Africa and in the West, points out that in every culture, women and men, adults and children are involved in a complex network of interrelations and dependencies and the person who, at first glance, seems to be the oppressor, may be seen as a victim if we consider him or her in the broader contexts. In this multifaceted

system, what seems to be a mean of oppression can easily be transformed into a tool of emancipation and vice versa.

The scientific discourse (in the case of Saartjie) and the political discourse (in the case of Waris Dirie) relativize the ambiguities of a freak show and a fashion show. They propose an authoritative, totalizing perspective that is strictly connected with certain axiology and with defined hierarchy of problems which should be resolved for the sake of the better world. In this perspective, issues of minor importance and associated with popular tastes can be tolerated if it can be assumed that somehow they are used for higher purposes.

They mediate the colonization of bodies and biographies within the framework of dominant culture and their authoritative discourses.

The freak show was a place where researchers were hunting for interesting material for their studies as abnormalities could explain the general rules adopted.

As far as a fashion show is concerned, such relativization is achieved not only by introducing standards of minimum models' weight, but also by spreading various types of expertise; in the framework offered by them, the appearance may be just a sign of other aspects of life (for example health, or a moral profile).

In the Western culture, there is a widespread suggestion that by controlling the body, we control our lives. Various body regimes – diets, exercises, beauty treatments – are presented as tools for wellness; they also work towards colonizing the body in consumer culture area.

I am referring to the notion of “colonization” because, in fact, it is very useful for analyzing Saartjie's and Waris' biographies as two parts of one diptych. As we know, this notion inevitably entails two assumptions (which not necessarily are expressed *expressis verbis*): the premise of structural dominance relation and the premise of discursive or political suppression of the heterogeneity of the colonized object.



Colonial institutions change both the social relations and the order of thinking; the effect of these changes can last even when the visible political oppression is over. The example of this endurance is the last act of the “Hotentock Venus” biography. During the funeral of the remains of Saartjie Baartman, the President of South Africa made an address to the nation in which he referred to the democratic values of his country in the post-apartheid era. He spoke in terms established within the framework of the French Revolution and European Enlightenment: *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. These values are not questioned, and, at the same time, new freedom is described by referring to the former enslavement.

It is not difficult to discern the fact of colonization of Saartjie’s body and biography. Her biography, taken over by poststructuralist and feminist critique, perfectly fitted theories and could help to clarify abstract elements of the theoretical construction. On the other hand, the theory processed the biography: specific facts were chosen to compose the plot. Certain views were expressed through the figure of “Hotentock Venus”, but this figure was also used as a proof of the theoretical truth. The physical body of Saartjie was also reinterpreted.

The problem is more complicated when we ask about the colonization of Waris’ biography. This Waris which is available through discourses about her does not have a double identity; she has one multifaceted identity. She speaks as a mature African woman who still lives as a little girl subjected to the cruel operation; but to be able to discern the cruelty of this act and to express her experience, she must also be the Western woman and the citizen of the global world. Moreover, a social and a political area where this kind of narrative can be told, as well as a conceptual and moral language of alleged total expression should also be established. This language is claimed to be able and suitable to express the experiences of subjects from all over the world.

Waris Dirie biography can be interpreted as a story about the internalization and totalization of western norms and values and also about the moral power of these procedures. This biography can be used as an argument for both supporters and opponents of liberal choices. She presents herself both as a person who is liberated from the oppressive mechanism of the native culture, and as a subject who is colonized by the western culture. If we rename the process of internalization of western norms and values to colonization by western norms and values, then the axiological perspective of this story will change.

The persuasive power of biographic narratives is strong: the biographies refer to the individual lives that are embedded in particular realities and, at the same time, they show the embodiment of social relationships, cultural codes, etc. Both biographies can be used as strong arguments in feminist or postcolonial discourses; however, considered as conceptual diptych, they manifest the problematic nature of the key concepts of these discourses – such as *oppression* or *colonization*.

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PART III  
**(IM)MATERIALITIES**

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## Chapter 8.

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ASHURA JACKSON NGOYA

# **AFRICAN INDEPENDENT CHURCHES AS A THREAT TO THE SURVIVAL OF HISTORICAL CHURCHES IN MBEYA**

### **ABSTRACT**

During the 1920s, Mbeya region witnessed the emergence of African Independent Churches (AICs) that survived up to the present. These churches emerged due to the dissatisfactions created by Western initiated churches. Both churches believed in God, and the Bible is used in teaching but differed somehow in doctrine. This paper draws on oral interviews, archival documents and secondary sources to examine how AICs remained as a threat to the survival of historical churches in Mbeya region during the post-colonial period. Since the formation of AICs, the state opposed the evolving AICs because these churches were a threat to authority and had different interests apart from religious issues. Hence, AICs were opposed to avoid contradiction in the nation controlled by the British. Similarly, historical churches opposed AICs because they resisted missionary institutions brought from Europe and their associated values, such as monogamy, individualism, secularism, consumerism and the exclusive privileges of white missionaries. However, with the challenges experienced by AICs in the colonial period, still, AICs survived and remained as a threat to the survival of historical churches in the post-colonial period. Post-colonial threats were on the economy, different doctrine, followers and teachings, things they provide to people, freedom of praising and worshipping, and the way they considered faith with culture.

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**Key words:** African Independent Churches, Threat, Survival and Historical Churches.

## Introduction

Mbeya region is one of the areas in Tanzania mentioned as having many denominations. In 2016, Mbeya was cited as the second region having highest number of denominations in Africa after Lagos in Nigeria<sup>1</sup>. People of Mbeya had and were good followers of their religion before the penetration of Christianity. The penetration of Christianity was accepted with two hands as leaders were after material benefit first than spiritual demand. Hence, by 1920s, Christianity expanded into different areas of the region. Some Christians after being aware of the religion introduced by Western people incorporated some African cultures into Christianity. From such desire, some Africans succeeded to form their own African Independent Churches (AICs). AICs have since their emergence, remained as a threat to the historical churches economically, spiritually and culturally.

## Christianity in Mbeya

The Berlin Mission Society arrived in Mbeya in the 1890s from Central Africa through Lake Nyasa<sup>2</sup>. They did not arrive in Mbeya region from the Coast of the Indian Ocean. Their coming through Lake Nyasa was mainly due to the proximity

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<sup>1</sup> See: <http://www.mpekuzihuru.com/2016/11/jiji-la-Mbeya-ni-la-pili-kwa-wingi-wa.html>: 29 November, 2016.

<sup>2</sup> B. Sundkler & C. Steed, *A History of the Church in Africa*, Cambridge: UK 2000, p. 535; A. Hastings, *A History of African Christianity 1950–1975*, Cambridge 1979, p. 45; *World Christianities c1914 – c. 2000*, ed. H. McLeod, Cambridge 2006, p. 80 (*The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 9).

of Mbeya to the Central African region where Christianity had been established earlier. The Free Church of Scotland, under the leadership of Dr Kerr Cross, was the first mission group of historical churches to arrive and settle in Mbeya region. This church was part of the Livingstonia Mission which operated in Central Africa. Dr Cross bought a place and built a house at an area called Kapugi-Tukuyu in 1888<sup>3</sup>. In the 1890s, when the Helgoland Treaty set a clear boundary between the German and British, the Free Church of Scotland-Presbyterian Church left an area to the Moravian and Lutheran given that the church was operating in Malawi where the area was under the British, and Tanganyika was under the German.

The Moravian was another old church missionary which penetrated and worked in Mbeya region. Dr Kerr Cross of the Free Church of Scotland was of great help in finding the settlement areas for the Moravians. Dr Cross suggested to the Moravians to start their permanent centre at Rungwe area<sup>4</sup>. Dr Cross' suggestion came after he was told that Moravians were interested in working in the area. The Free Church of Scotland welcomed the Moravians and allowed them to set a mission<sup>5</sup>. The Moravian missionaries under Theodor Meyer landed in Rungwe on July 7, 1891, and in October 1891 established their first mission station at the bottom of Mount Rungwe (the headquarters of the Moravian Church of Tanzania today) Rungwe Mission. The first missionaries including Theodor Meyer and Theophil Richard arrived at the place we now call Rungwe in Chief Mwakapalila's territory. Later on, another group of missionaries came to Rungwe including John Kretschmer

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<sup>3</sup> A.Y. Musomba, *The Moravian Church in Tanzania Southern Province: A Short History*, Nairobi 2005, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem.



and Traugott Bachman. At the end of 1894, they inaugurated the first worship building<sup>6</sup>.

In the same vein, the Lutheran Missionaries arrived in Mbeya region on August 21<sup>st</sup>, 1891<sup>7</sup>, constituting the third historical church to penetrate in Mbeya region. Under the leadership of A. Merensky, they established the first Berlin Lutheran Mission at *Wangemanshohe* near the Lufilyo River in October 1891. He was accompanied by three young missionaries; Nauhaus, Schumann and Bunk and by two helpers. These ministers were granted land by the chief Mwakabungila. Owing to the heat, the station was moved in 1899 to new Wangemanshohe, now known as Itete. Two more missionaries arrived in 1892, and three others came the following year (Hauer, Schuler and Wolff). Further stations were established at Manow by Reverend Schumann on the 4<sup>th</sup> June 1892 and Mwakaleli by the Reverend Bunk on the 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1895. Ikombe on the Lake Shore was founded on the 24<sup>th</sup> of August, 1893 by the Reverend Hubner and Grieguszies, and in 1910 Matema was built by two missionaries, Dost and Lyike. In August 1915, the missionary Doctor Ochne arrived and established a small medical station at Itumba<sup>8</sup>.

To avoid religious conflicts among missionaries belonging to different denominations, the Moravians established their Christian congregations adjacent to the Berliner Lutherans. These missions demanded land for their faith and production, and people as their followers and labourers. In this case, they agreed upon a boundary between their respective mission fields following the 34 degree<sup>9</sup> of

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<sup>6</sup> Rungwe Mission Archive (RMA), File Moravian General; File Origin and Growth of the UNITASFRARUM; see also A.Y. Musomba, *Historia Fupi ya Kanisa la Moravian Kusini Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam 1990, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> B. Sundkler & C. Steed, *A History of the Church in Africa*, op. cit., p. 535.

<sup>8</sup> Mbeya Southern Highland Zonal Archive (MSHZA), Part of Vicariate of Tanganyika, 1899–1932.

<sup>9</sup> A.Y. Musomba, *The Moravian Church...*, op. cit., p. 6.

longitude from the North end of the Lake Nyasa and clear demarcation was Mbaka River. Moravian mission operated in the part of the district to the West of the Mbaka River, a boundary fixed under German administration. The Berlin Lutheran Mission conducted to the East of the Mbaka River. Mbaka River is near Mbambo village from Mount Livingstone, in that place the agreement for expansion was agreed in the whole Tanzania<sup>10</sup>. Following this division between Moravian and Lutheran, the former expanded mostly in Mbeya and the later in Njombe and Iringa.

The historical churches which penetrated later on in Mbeya were given separate areas. For instance, White Fathers – Roman Catholic was given Tukuyu protectorate in the centre of the district<sup>11</sup>. Others included Pentecostal Holiness Mission and Assemblies of God which operated at Igale-Mbeya district. The Seventh-Day Adventists were given Mwakaleli as the centre of evangelization. Early during the colonial period, the division according to denomination was done to avoid religious conflicts which had torn Europe leading to long wars<sup>12</sup>. But, after the WWI denominations were somehow free to expand. League of Nations entrusted Tanganyika Territory to the British, they stipulated that there should be freedom of religion everywhere. Mbeya which was formerly closed to the Moravian and Lutheran was now open to different denominations<sup>13</sup>. These denominations never thought of religious unification for the expansion of Christianity. Their preference to the development relied much on their national interest.

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<sup>10</sup> Meshack E. Njinga, Interview at Tukuyu, November 5, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Tanzania National Archive (TNA) File: 25/9/33 Mission General Tukuyu.

<sup>12</sup> K.I. Tambila, & J. Sivalon, *Intra-denominational Conflict in Tanzania Christian Churches*, in: *Justice, Rights and Worship: Religion and Politics in Tanzania*, eds. R. Mukandala [et al.], New Delhi 2006, p. 226.

<sup>13</sup> MSHZA, *History of Diocese of Mbeya, Part III: Apostolic Prefecture of Tukuyu, 1932–1947*.

Missionaries who converted Africans themselves have been regarded and remembered with the great ambiguity. For instance, in turning people, in some areas they involved in land alienation, given African knowledge, supported colonialism and preached Evangel. Such ambiguity laid the ground for later counter-cultural movements by Africans. Hasting reported that in early West African days, one or two missionaries became slave traders. Much more, in South and Central Africa, quietly turned into settlers, large landed proprietors or colonial officials<sup>14</sup>. In a nation like South Africa, Christian evangelists were intimately involved in the colonial process<sup>15</sup>. A.J. Njoh added that the missions of colonialism and Christianity in Africa often overlapped and appeared almost indistinguishable<sup>16</sup>. Thus, missionaries apart from religious activities were involved in other activities for their interest. For example, in Mbeya, early colonial production was firstly introduced by missionaries, for instance, production of coffee<sup>17</sup>.

### **African Independent Churches in Mbeya Region**

Three decades since the formation of Christianity in Mbeya, Africans who were converted to Christianity, arouse consciousness against political, economic, social and cultural dissatisfactions through religion. In fact, it was during the British period when the historical churches were challenged by the AICs<sup>18</sup>. In Mbeya,

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<sup>14</sup> A. Hastings, *The Church in Africa 1450–1950*, Oxford 1994, p. 263.

<sup>15</sup> J. Camaroff and J. Camaroff, *Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa*, „American Ethnography”, 13(1986), no. 1, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> A.J. Njoh, *Tradition, Culture and Development in Africa: Historical Lessons for Modern Development Planning*, Farnham 2006, pp. 31–32.

<sup>17</sup> B. Brock, *The Nyiha of Mbozi*, „Tanzania Notes and Records”, 1966, no. 65.

<sup>18</sup> T.O. Ranger, *The African Churches of Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam 1972, pp.11–12 (*The Historical Association of Tanzania*, no. 5); *Africa under the Colonial Domina-*

AICs emerged in the 1920s and continued to develop with time<sup>19</sup>. Examples of the early AICs in Mbeya region include the Watch Tower under Hanoc Sindano, the African National Church under Paddy Nyasulu and the Last Church of God and His Christ under Ben Ngemela. There was also the Little Flock Church under Sem Mboma<sup>20</sup>.

Those emerged AICs in Mbeya operation were not positively supported. The opposition to AICs ranged from historic churches to the colonial government. Jimmy Nkwamu argued that Africans who were close to AICs leaders started earlier to oppose AICs<sup>21</sup>. It is important to note that AICs were opposed ever since their formation. AICs were known from South, Central and East Africa that they were against colonialism. Hence, allowing the growth of AICs in Mbeya meant the creation of contradiction with the colonial state and finally decolonisation<sup>22</sup>.

AICs in Mbeya were criticised by the black and whites as being politically motivated, judged as bridges back to paganism, and looked as uneducated and sophisticated as primitive. Hence, some AICs followers especially leaders were removed from positions they held in the colonial government. For example, Paddy Nyasulu, who had been educated and became a leader of the African National Church (ANC), was employed as mission store-keeper

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*tion 1885–1935*, ed. A.A. Boahen, Portsmouth 1990, p. 282 (*General History of Africa*, vol. 7).

<sup>19</sup> In this paper, AICs are Christian churches independently established and administered by Africans. AICs broke off from the mission/mainline/historical churches such as Roman Catholic, Moravian, Evangelical Lutheran, Pentecostal and Anglican churches. For this study, historical churches these are Christian churches initiated by Western people in Africa.

<sup>20</sup> A. Makunde, *Yafahamu Makanisa Yaliyoko Tanzania*, op. cit., pp. 13, 93, 107, 122, 129, 136, 144.

<sup>21</sup> Jimmy Nkwamu, Interview at Itende, December 7, 2014.

<sup>22</sup> TNA File No. 25/8: Rungwe.

later as a government clerk in Malawi and Tukuyu in Tanzania. He was dismissed from his position in 1923. Nyasulu was rejected due to his interest in the African National Church<sup>23</sup>. The colonial administration acted promptly to the Watch Tower Church which prohibited followers to work for the colonial government. In this process, top leaders of the church were arrested and charged with uttering words with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of others and were sentenced to 12 months each<sup>24</sup>. Moreover, some AICs faced problems to get land for religious activities and were not even allowed to own some books which they thought made people conscious. In the 1930s, the colonial government demanded all the African chiefs to take note of Kolineri Kibonde and Jonah Mwaiteleke who sold books related to religious knowledge. The books such as Deliverance, World Recovery, Prophecy, The Kingdom, Jehovah, Preparation, The end of the World, and Who Shall rule the world were prohibited in Mbeya region<sup>25</sup>.

Thus, the colonial government and historical churches believed that AICs would decline for a short period in Mbeya as it happened on the Malakite Church in Mwanza which emerged in 1924 and collapsed in 1934. Also, in 1953, the Church of Holy Spirit was formed amongst the Haya by the secession from the Evangelical Lutheran Church; in 1962, half of its members had been won back by the Lutheran church. In 1956, the Tanganyika African was formed among the Gogo by secession from the Church Mission Society; a majority of its members were won back to the Anglican Church in the early 1960s. In 1958, there was secession from the Moravian Church amongst the Nyamwezi,

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<sup>23</sup> Angolwisye Malambuigi, Interview at TEKU, September 12, November 20, 2014. See also T.O. Ranger, *The African Churches of Tanzania*, op. cit. p. 17.

<sup>24</sup> Idem, *Christian Independence in Tanzania*, in: *African Initiatives in Religion*, ed. D.B. Barrett, Nairobi 1971, p. 126.

<sup>25</sup> TNA 25/9/13: Tukuyu.

and in 1960, the majority returned to the historical church, and Shambala members of the Usambara-Digo Lutheran Church in early 1960 had been averted<sup>26</sup>. In Mbeya, AICs survived in the colonial period up to the post-colonial era, and new AIC was emerging year after year.

Contrary to other AICs formed in Mbeya, the Watch Tower Church proved a failure. At the end of the colonial period, the church was not considered anti-colonial government but turned as safety-valves of the colonial government. The Watch Tower changed the name to Jehovah Witness, and their church policy was also rectified examples of those policies that were amended. The change of a name happened when they developed a close relationship with Jehovah Witness in America. In the age of independence, these churches refused to salute the flag or consider the politics as anything but the agency of Satan. The church was seen as incompatible with the maintenance of peace, order and good governance. So, the Watch Tower declined, and Jehovah Witness developed<sup>27</sup>. The leader faced the challenge of mastering the church efficiently. Hanoc Sindano was not groomed into the church like other leaders of AICs; rather he was just a follower of the Watch Tower Bible Society which provided people books and pamphlets in South Africa without a church. From such base, he established the Watch Tower Church where he was not able to balance the relationship with the colonial government, historical churches in Mbeya, and the church was not even registered. But, this church was remembered how it was a threat to the British colonial government. The church refused his people to pay tax and work for the colonial production.

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<sup>26</sup> T.O. Ranger, *Christian Independence in Tanzania*, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>27</sup> *Christianity in Tropical Africa: Studies Presented and Discussed at the Seventh International African Seminar, University of Ghana, April 1965*, ed. C.G. Baëta, Oxford 1968, p. 356.

## AICs as a Threat to the Mission Churches in the Post-colonial Period

In the post-colonial period, AICs in Mbeya had established themselves so firmly that they were no longer mere Protestant movers, but theologically genuine expressed Christian faith in the African perspective or the extension of African traditions on Christian faith. AICs provided theological reflections centred on African religious beliefs, practices, values, morals, songs, sermons, teachings, prayers, sculptures, dances, rituals, and symbols. Some of AICs beliefs were modified compared to the way it happened during the colonial period. For example, AICs which allowed polygamy during colonialism in the postcolonial period changes were implemented. Meshack Njinga reported that in the post-colonial period there were some changes to AICs, they modified their constitution to fit the time. A person with many wives, when joined the church and being baptised, was not allowed to add another wife<sup>28</sup>. AICs which emerged in the post-colonial period based much on their doctrine, African and Western culture was interwoven. For example, AICs that appeared in the post-colonial period include Last Church of Tanzania under 1968 by Daniel Mwamuya – Airport; The Church of Holy Spirit Anosisye Mwabungulu 1968 – Ghana-Mbeya, African Church Mission of Tanzania by Festo Mbeyale 1969 – Iyunga; African International Church A. Mwalyambile, 1969 – Kyela; United African Church Yohana Kabuje, 1969 – Mbalizi. The Last Church of Tanzania; Epharaim Sichone, 1973 Vwawa-Mbozi; *Uamsho la Roho Mtakatifu Nise Mwasomola*; 1978; Simike-Mbeya; Shalom Church of God, Stephano Mwamengo 1979, Isangu-Mbozi<sup>29</sup>; The Foundation Church of Apostle and Prophets, Gibson Tuya, 1982 – Ilengo

<sup>28</sup> Meshack E. Njinga, Interview at Tukuyu, November 5, 2014; May 20, 2015, May 21, 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Mbeya District Office, October 2014: *List of Churches in Mbeya*.

Mbozi; Church of Gospel International, Timotheo Mwanyengo, 1985 – Uyole and the Tanzania Forward in Faith Church Pfumo Kahwema 1987 – Simike. Others were Gospel Revival Centre, Akimu Mtafya, 1988 – Simike; Tanzania Gospel Church, Alfred Kaputula, 1989 – Ilomba and Restoration Bible Church, Emmanuel Tumwidike, 1992 Esso, African Brotherhood Church, P. Mwamlima, 1994 Mbeya City centre, just to mention few<sup>30</sup>.

Since the formation of the historical churches, economic interest has been among their preferences. Njinga noted that early production of cash crops in Mbeya was firstly introduced in the mission centre<sup>31</sup>. Early converts were also labourers in the introduced farms around the mission. Many people in the church meant financial gain. Judged regarding labourers and offerings. The emergence of a new denomination in an area where there was a historic church led to disturbance. The disturbance was firstly assessed economically of what the church gained from followers. With the growth of AICs, this affected historical churches automatically. AICs expanded in the region geographically, ethnically and with the number of members, this had a direct impact on the ancient churches. Similarly, AICs had a different technique to gain economically from followers. Members were encouraged to pay for miracles, other means of prayers required things which supporters were forced to buy at the church, and other leaders urged adherents to plant their seed. Hence, AICs remained as a threat to the historical churches given that followers were cycling or turned to AICs<sup>32</sup>.

In Mbeya, AICs ranged from the small to the large AICs. Large AICs threatened historical churches given that these churches were growing compared to the period they emerged and the level of the

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<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> Meshack E. Njinga, Interview at Tukuyu, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> Lusekelo Cheyo, Interview at Iwambi, September 21, 2014, November 5, 2014; Emmanuel Mwasile interview at Iwambi, September 24, 2014.



economy they had. Some leaders of AICs were economically stable compared to those in the historical churches given that the latter had many years of experience. Thus, some of the leaders from ancient churches were following AICs and negatively criticised their existence and operation. The critic was not based on the word of God, but it was on the level of the economy which the leader of AICs had. Thus, the degree of economy of the leaders in AICs also was a threat to historic churches. Why such wealth within a short period of existence<sup>33</sup>?

People who introduced AICs were previously members of the historic churches. They gathered into one group, understood and respected each other. They were aware of strategies which historical churches adopted to maintain followers, to expand and to develop. Then, when individuals from the historical churches introduced AIC, experienced criticism, suspicion, lack of trust, lack of communication, unfriendliness, destruction of family unity all these were done by the historical churches to AICs. Nsaligwa Kimanga narrated that Nise Mwasomola, founder of *Kanisa la Uamsho*, was a member of Pentecostal Assemblies of God; she was given power by God to deliver the sick and preach. Her service was not accepted in the historical churches, and she chased away. In 1978, she decided to form her church<sup>34</sup>. Instead of being supported her services turned as a threat to the former church. It was revealed that Mwasomola's church taped followers who were in need with services she was providing.

AICs turned as a threat to historical churches given that some of the leaders of AICs were having unique talents while they were in the former churches. These people were not recognised and some

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<sup>33</sup> Kolineri Mwampule, Interview at Jacaranda, September 13, 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Nsaligwa Kimanga, Interview at Simike, September 13, 2014. Rabi Mwanani, interview at Sokomatola, September 28, 2014.

were seen as stubborn/ too crucial to the church. These people with their unique talents decided to establish their own AIC. These leaders exercised their talents in their next church, instead of being recognised for what they were doing, leaders turned to be a threat to the churches that they worshipped before. For example, the founder of Restoration Bible Church Emmanuel Tumwidike was a member of Anglican Church before forming his church and taped different followers from various historical churches in Mbeya town even from Anglican Church<sup>35</sup>.

Most of those who established AICs were members of mission churches hence automatically they became their competitors. Leaders of AICs were aware of the weakness of the former church. Hence they adopted strategies to survive. While leaders in the historical churches sacrificed time to follow the preaching campaigns of AICs that led a certain amount of biases or antagonism against the AICs<sup>36</sup>. AICs reflected rebellion against Christianity that had continued with European culture. The mode of worship and other areas of ministry of the historical-related churches were not psychologically and sociologically satisfying to the Africans. With the emergence of AICs, the liturgy was made more African, where African drums, dresses, singing and dancing reflected the African culture. In this sense, the gospel was made relevant and contextualised to the thought patterns of the converts. Juma added this threatened historical churches as their followers were attracted with inclusiveness which was added in Christianity which was not there before. Medrick Mbuba revealed that AICs threatened historical churches because they in AICs traditional and modern were welded<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with Angolwisye Malabugi, op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> Juma Jacob, Interview at Nzovwe, September 18, 2014.

<sup>37</sup> Medrick Mbuba, Interview at Nzovwe, September 18, 2014.

Interpretation of the Bible, the issue of polygamy, taking alcohol, the way of singing in the church, not considering long preparatory period before baptism, just to mention a few, was contrary to the historical churches. The Last Church of God and His Christ and African National Church supported polygamy which was not allowed by the historical churches<sup>38</sup>. Mary Kategile emphasised that polygamy added members to AICs in Mbeya such as the Last Church of God and His Christ and the African National Church<sup>39</sup>. The Last Church of Tanzania, which emerged in 1973 by Sichone with registration number SO. 5712, also believed in polygamy<sup>40</sup>. In 1990, the church had about 850 followers in Tanzania, 215 in Zambia and 120 in Malawi with headquarters in Vwawa-Mbozi<sup>41</sup>. David Sichone Reverend that Archbishop Samweli Mwabughi was appointed in 2007 up to 2015, then the church had 260,000 followers both in Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia<sup>42</sup>. The historical churches and AICs were all Christians but had different beliefs which remained as a threat to the survival of historical churches. AICs were seen as an enemy to the historical churches<sup>43</sup>. The doctrine of polygamy threatened the old church even though they prevented it to the larger extent. The teachings threatened the church given that it was African culture from the beginning, many

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<sup>38</sup> Pastor Mbao, Interview at Sabasaba, September 15, 2014. See also J. Baur, *2000 Years of Christianity Africa: An African History*, Nairobi 1994, p. 479.

<sup>39</sup> Mary Kategile, Interview at TEKU, September 8; September 9; September 11, 2014.

<sup>40</sup> Mary Kategile, Interview at TEKU, op. cit.

<sup>41</sup> SHMZA, File, M.60.15: *The Last Church of Tanzania*. See also W.H. Turner, *The Church of the Lord: the Expansion of a Nigerian Independent Church in Sierra Leone and Ghana*, „Journal of African History”, 3(1962), no. 1, pp. 91–92, Intention of AICs was not to expand within their own localities only, but into different areas.

<sup>42</sup> David Ephraim Sichone, Interview at Vwawa, November 4, 2014.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Emmanuel Mwasile, op. cit.

people joined the church and accepted only a single wife, but in reality were having many wives<sup>44</sup>. With the church which gave an opportunity to many wives, this gave room to the development of African culture which was prevented by the historical church.

The growth of AICs went parallel to the changes occurred in the society. AIC exemplifies the intimate link between problems and the solutions. For example, economic and social hardship in the 1970s and 1980s fuelled people to AICs. Different informants agreed that people joined AICs when they heard that people's problems were tackled by the church<sup>45</sup>. Juliana Mbilinyi reported that early members of the church of *Uamsho were Roho Mtakatifu* in the 1970s were those whose diseases were cured by Nise Mwasomola, the founder of the Church. AICs in Mbeya gained followers as this experience was shared experience to the traditional religion when an individual had a problem related to diseases a traditional healer was a solution. Traditional African communities were to a large extent health-orientated communities, and in African traditional religions, rituals for healing and protection were the most prominent ones. So, AICs, with a similar function of healing diseases, made people join them. Also, Nathaniel Ndabila proclaimed that the same God who saves the soul heals the body, delivers from evil forces, and provides answers to human needs<sup>46</sup>. Indeed, sickness was by far the most common reason given by people attending AICs.

Moreover, preaching the prosperity gospel, in these churches the pastor occupied a prominent place in the life of the followers, what the pastor was speaking, people were able to listen and follow. This trend expanded through the 1990s after the failure of Structural Adjustment Policies imposed by the Bretton Woods

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<sup>44</sup> Daudi Sichinga, Interview at Mbeya City Centre, September 12, 2014.

<sup>45</sup> Juliana Mbilinyi, Interview at Simike, September 13, 2014. April 20, 2015.

<sup>46</sup> Nathaniel Ndabila, Interview at Uyole, September 19, 2014.

institutions. People lost confidence in economic mechanisms, social recovery plans and the ability of governments to bail them out, and turned to the AICs for survival. Preaching the gospel of prosperity and miracles dominated, these churches, with their human founders called apostles, prophets or archbishop promised earthly happiness. These churches offered utopian hopes through the gospel of prosperity and miracles. The prosperity gospel found fertile ground in Africa because of the real sufferings facing these Christians burdened who needed immediate relief and thought, could find happiness trusting in anyone making such promises.

Healing services, indeed, sickness is by far the most common reason which people give for attending AICs. Testimonies of healing, soundness and miracles are heard from many about their answered prayers. In quite some cases those concerned claim that they first went to the hospitals, and or consulted traditional healers. They then resorted to an AIC when the foreign physicians and herbalists failed them. In several AICs, a special day was set aside for healing purposes. Sometimes, a sick person would be expected to stay in the Church for healing service. David Nicholous put evident that prayer and healing is a significant role in these churches in Mbeya. Some AICs announced that they were curing specific diseases such as HIV which was a serious problem from the 1980s, cancer and diabetes through prayers<sup>47</sup>. Involvement of AICs on HIV, which was a problem facing different people in Mbeya, was compatible. Mbeya region in Tanzania encompasses two major highways and is adjacent to two international borders. In the late 1980s, HIV epidemic rapidly expanded in the Mbeya region, fuelled by these unique geographic features and exacerbated by a lack of trained health staff, shortage of medicine and a weak health care infrastructure.

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<sup>47</sup> Interview with David Nicholous, op. cit: see also. Patric Mbaou, Interview at Sabasaba, September 15, 2014.

To respond to the rapidly growing HIV epidemic in the region, in 1988 the Tanzania government (through the Mbeya Regional Medical Officer's Office and the Mbeya Referral Hospital), in collaboration with the German Agency for Technical Cooperation and the University of Munich in Germany, established an intervention programme on HIV/AIDS called the "Mbeya Regional AIDS Control Programme". The program aimed to fight against the rapidly expanding HIV epidemic in the region. The Programme collaborated with other partners including the US Military HIV Research Program (MHRP) in the late 1990's and the Tanzanian National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) under the vigorous and committed leadership of Dr. Leonard Maboko and Prof Michael Hoelscher<sup>48</sup>. The effort to prevent the spread of HIV somehow proved a failure in Mbeya. Instead of the decline in a number of the people affected by HIV, the toll increased year after year. Mbeya Regional AIDS Control Programme (MRACP) continued the fight against HIV/AIDS since the 1980s. The Regional Medical Officers (RMO) directly supervised the MRACP. MRACP adopted a participatory approach in all of its functions, involving all interested partners and the civil society organisation. But, Mbeya remained among the region where HIV/AIDS toll is high within the nation. Mbeya region is the second hard-hit region in the country after Dar es Salaam as far as AIDS infections are concerned<sup>49</sup>. Many followers in Mbeya were taped to AICs to get healing services.

One of the distinctive features of these churches is the elevated position accorded to women. In spite of the fact that the historical

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<sup>48</sup> See: <http://www.hvtn.org/en/team/international-clinical-trial-sites/Mbeya-ClinicalResearchSite.html> 22/9/2016.

<sup>49</sup> F.R. Mbogella, Factors Associated with the Spread of HIV/AIDS among the Female Youth in Tanzania: A case of Mbeya Municipality, Dissertation (Unpublished), University of Dar es Salaam 2002, p. 45.

churches preached the principle of equality of sexes, men usually hold the principal positions of authority. The Archbishops, Reverend Ministers, Pastors, Priests, Choir Leaders and so on are typically all men. AICs, on the other hand, have been exceptional in encouraging women to participate in the ministry of the Church. They provide opportunities for leadership and the exercise of authority for women who usually far outnumber the men who attend these churches. Some of these Churches were and are being established or co-founded by women, for example, Nise Mwasomola in Mbeya. Omoyajowo has an extensive list of such founders in Nigeria. Asare Opoku also observed that there are women first-class prophetesses and deaconesses in the Musama Disco Christo Church in Ghana. Alice Lakwena of Uganda was another woman-founder of a Holy Spirit movement. Other positions of leadership for women, as Barrett showed, include Reverend-Mothers, Lady Leaders, Mothers-in-Israel, Superior-Mothers, Praying-Mothers, Lady-Evangelists, women Church Planters and so on<sup>50</sup>. It may also be added that in these Churches women get more possessed, they are prone to give more testimonies, they are more operative in initiating songs, dancing, jumping and clapping than men. From the preceding, it is not surprising to note that there are usually far more women societies, prayer groups, hospitality associations and welfare unions than men's in the AICs.

Survival strategies adopted by AICs remained a threat to the historical churches. For example, the fight against poverty among church members through economic empowerment was among the strategies taken to survive. It was argued that the church saw poverty as spiritually characterised, meagre family income, powerlessness, physical weariness, isolation and vulnerability.

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<sup>50</sup> D. Ayegboyin & S.A. Ishola, *African Indigenous: A Historical Perspectives*, op. cit., p. 30.

They believed that poverty was a social and economic justice which must be addressed by Christian as one of their primary responsibilities<sup>51</sup>. The church had exerted efforts to organise formal and informal entrepreneurship training among church members. Professional in areas related to business and entrepreneurship was invited by the church leaders to run training on entrepreneurship. From such practice, the church managed to form micro credit scheme among church members<sup>52</sup>. Enterprising training among church members catered in areas such as bookkeeping, marketing and rules of good business practices. Through this strategy, the church had seen to be emancipating its church members not only through spiritual bareness but also on economic well-being. Even though it was a slow growth, AICs were moving. People were able to construct their church through this strategy<sup>53</sup>. Some AICs established church departments to develop their church. These include evangelization, economic, health and press and information office<sup>54</sup>.

AICs threatened historical churches in their mode of worship which is typically African. Drumming, clapping and dancing typify the community as different from other Christian denominations of European origin and the basic concept of religion. Thus, when one considers the doctrinal foundations of AICs and their closeness to the socio-cultural background of Africans, one can safely predict that these churches will maintain their leading role, and

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<sup>51</sup> A. Mpesha, *The Role of the Church in Microcredit Financing for Business Development in Tanzania*, Grand Rapids 2004, p. 5.

<sup>52</sup> Oyi Masambili, interview at Mbeya city centre, September 12, 2014.; David Nicholas, Interview at Simike, September 14, 2014; Interview with Abiud Simkoko, Interview at Simike, September 09, 2014; Medrick Mbuba, Interview at Nzovwe, September 18, 2014.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with David Nicholous, op. cit.

<sup>54</sup> Dastan Hapelwa, Interview at Veta, September 20, 2014.



AICs were projected to become more familiar because of their offer of assistance to the spiritual problems of people in the complex world of today. It is necessary, however, to ensure that church growth by the membership was accompanied by growth in spiritual power<sup>55</sup>.

Africans naturally enjoy a more expressive form of worship. Consequently, in contrast to the supposedly dull liturgy of the historical churches, the AICs have given a home to a more fascinating and exciting form of worship with singing, clapping, dancing and stamping of the feet. Most of the songs sung are songs in traditional lyrics. Usually, they are evocations and sometimes spontaneous composition accompanied by ringing of bells, drumming and the use of other native musical instruments as well as Western equipment<sup>56</sup>. Everybody participates in clapping, dancing and singing. Prayer is also spontaneous and everyone is inspired to pray and deliver a message or give testimony. Thus, they practice lively church worship.

Dedication to Evangelism and Revival; AICs have an extraordinary zeal and enthusiasm for evangelistic ministry and revivals. They organise and conduct regular crusades, revivals and prayer sessions at several nooks and corners of towns and villages. Most of the AICs leaders were itinerant preachers and evangelists who held revival meetings wherever they went. The practice is very right of Moses Orimolade, Babalola, Ositelu, Samson Oppong, and Simon Kimbangu, to name just a few. One of the usual prophetic utterances in these churches is the urge on the leadership and follower-ship to rise early in the morning, walk around a neighbourhood with the ringing of the bell, while proclaiming the message of the Gospel.

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<sup>55</sup> <https://www.gospelandculture.com/2017/07/30/gospel-and-culture-from-perspective-of-african-instituted-churches/>, 30/7/2017; 4:54pm.

<sup>56</sup> Lusekelo Cheyo, Interview at Iwambi, September 21, 2014, November 5, 2014; Kastory Erasto Msigwa, Interview at Tunduma, September 25, 2014.

The individuals concerned must also hold or lead between seven to twenty-day revival meetings in or outside the church or to conduct open-air crusades for a specific number of days.

Different AICs were running their activities in the areas not set/designed for religious institutions as churches failed to acquire land legally. Very few succeeded to get the land lease earlier. So, it was not easy for AICs to get a proper area for church construction. AICs leaders ended up buying a house or using their own houses for the service. Many of AICs in Mbeya were located in slum areas such as Simike, Nzovwe, Iyunga, Mama John and Ilomba<sup>57</sup>. These areas are well populated and hence easy to get followers, while most historical churches were located in the designated religious areas<sup>58</sup>.

Cheyo acknowledged teachings of the word of God in AICs to its followers. Instruction of the word of God was the clear foundation of the church's existence; it enabled AICs to cross over all storms for the decades of its existence. They taught realities to their followers according to the Bible and relevant to the society, especially which touches people at the time<sup>59</sup>. In prioritising Bible teaching, the church had several scriptures teaching a session in the church as well as at home of the followers<sup>60</sup>. Teaching attracted church members and non-church members thus making the church permanently fill its people's hearts and hence its survival. Different from the historical churches, some Africans had the culture of going to the church without the Bible just listening when leaders were reading. The practice was contrary to AICs people who were having the Bible and leaders sometimes pointed anyone to read the word of God. The new method meant that the sheep will al-

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<sup>57</sup> Frank E.P. Mwaitebele, interview at Tunduma, September 25, 2014.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Lusekelo Cheyo, *op. cit.*

<sup>60</sup> Nathaniel Ndabila, interview at Uyole, September 19, 2014.

ways stray to where they might find good pasture, and they were getting it in AICs<sup>61</sup>.

The historical churches in Mbeya had been affected by AICs. Christopher Mwanisongole noted that AICs had something to teach the historical churches and vice versa<sup>62</sup>. Since the formation of AICs, even though it remained small in comparison to the historical churches, AIC has continued to be the main threat to the historical churches. AICs Gospel was rooted in African style compared to historical churches. Nicholous supported that one of the AICs most precious assets was its experience of being rooted in African cultures. Leaders who formed AICs wanted Christians to fit African culture. Even though the result was not the same, it was the matter of challenge<sup>63</sup>.

Also, even though AICs are complained negatively by the historical churches, still different modification in these churches was due to the services provided by AICs to the followers. As a result, in Mbeya, some people are getting services to both churches. Thus, they are dual worshipers; as a result, it was difficult to assess definite expansion of these churches. Followers were cycling members both in historical churches and AICs.

Through AICs in Mbeya, the historical churches had adopted different things done in the AICs which were not standard to their denominations, mainly Protestant denominations. AICs practised well things like praising and worshipping, prayers, services like healing, and counselling. Without adopting these, AICs will remain a threat to the historical churches<sup>64</sup>. The his-

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<sup>61</sup> J.A. Gyadu, *United over Meals Divided at the Lord's Table: Christianity and the Unity of the Church in Africa*, „Transformation”, 27(2010), no. 1, pp. 16–17.

<sup>62</sup> Christopher Mwanisongole, Interview at Nzovwe, November 10, 2014.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with David Nicholous, op. cit.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with K. Mwaishumo, op. cit. Interview with Emmanuel Mwasile, op. cit.

torical churches leaders should also learn from AICs that even Africans were able to stand on their own and develop their church without asking support from outside<sup>65</sup>. Leonard Maboko, one of the leaders of the historical church, showed the desire on that “we feel that we must be in touch with independent churches to understand the influence and practice of self-reliance”<sup>66</sup>. Osi-telu adds that most of their practices have been adopted by the so-called the historical churches and the American style new generation churches<sup>67</sup>.

Maboko added that as long as the AICs speak the language which the ordinary person on the street, the masons, carpenters and illiterates understand, they will survive. As long as they continue to fulfil the claims that they were able to help those who faced unique difficulties in life, they will thrive. Provided they heal sicknesses, serve as a haven of rest to those in distress, and give relief to those with psychosomatic troubles, they will continue to survive in the face of all odds which were likely to befall them<sup>68</sup>.

## Conclusion

AICs will remain a threat to the historical churches if they fail to recognise the meaning of Christianity and how Christianity had been expanding. It is true that in Mbeya Christianity is growing through AICs. By the 1960s, the religious picture in Mbeya region was somehow clear. The 1967 census shows that

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<sup>65</sup> Interview with Abiud Simkoko, op. cit.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Leonard Maboko, op. cit.

<sup>67</sup> R.O.O. Osi-telu, *African Instituted Churches: Diversities, Growth, Gifts, Spirituality and Ecumenical Understanding of African Initiated Churches*, Hamburg 2002, p. 38.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Leonard Maboko, op. cit.

Mbeya had about 43% Christians, 2% Muslims, 53% African Religion, and 2% others<sup>69</sup>. Ndaluka argues that there were over 90 churches in Zanzibar and there were over 300 denominations in Mbeya Regions in the 1990s. The new denominations seem to compete with the historical ones<sup>70</sup>. In 2016, Mbeya was mentioned as the second region having many denominations in Africa and the first being Lagos in Nigeria<sup>71</sup>. In the information declared by district commissioner Paul Ntinika, Mbeya had about 450 denominations. David Mwashilindi added that many churches were not a problem given that order was followed<sup>72</sup>. If at the beginning there were only two denominations with their doctrine and target, so it is clear that with AICs which are more than hundred denominations in Mbeya, the former churches were not happy with it. Also, Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and Pentecostal Council Tanzania (PCT), religious organisations in Mbeya, do not accept AICs. Historical churches and AICs all are Christians but they preferred division.

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<sup>69</sup> URT, 1967 *Population Census*, vol. 3.

<sup>70</sup> T.J. Ndaluka, *Social Cohesion and Religious Intolerance in Tanzania*, in: *The Political Economy of Change in Tanzania: Contestations Over Identity, the Constitution and Resources*, ed. R.S. Mukandala, Dar es Salaam 2015, p. 49.

<sup>71</sup> See: <http://www.mpekuzihuru.com/2016/11/jiji-la-Mbeya-ni-la-pili-kwa-wingi-wa.html>: 29 November, 2016.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*.

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## Chapter 9.

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MUSSA KASSIMU

### **FOREIGN RELIGIONS AND WANYAMWEZI TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS RITUALS Influences and Absorption of African traditionalists' Mind in the Third Millennium**

#### **ABSTRACT**

Whether one's religion is more or less worth is an attitude of mind. From the 19<sup>th</sup> century to date, foreign religions have profound effects on African beliefs. Foreign religions surpassed traditional African religions in the way African perceive them better at the expense of theirs. Wanyamwezi practices have been influenced in terms of identity, worship, religious ceremony, gratitude to Supreme Being and other institutions of religion; which are more based on foreign religions. The work deals with Wanyamwezi, a community of Central-Western Tanzania, which has been in contact with Arabs as porters and their areas stationed by European missionaries all of which acted as levers for foreign religions spread. This work, therefore, has shown some important traditional ritual practices strongly valued by Wanyamwezi before the influence of foreign religions and how the latter resulted into identity crisis, which if left unchecked may result into chaos accompanied by strives as it has been experienced at Buselesele and Zanzibar in Tanzania, as well as in the Central African Republic only few to mention. It is not conflict-based but impact-based paper in which there is an identity crisis accompanied by blustering of who are right in the eyes of God as an ideological weapon in winning more supports and gaining many followers. Islam and Christianity have

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numerous numbers of faith adherents, among them are Wanyamwezi with few not convinced by either of the sides. Data were collected from Tabora Municipality and former Urambo District (Kaliua and Urambo) through interview, questionnaire, focus group discussion and observation. The target was not to find the number of followers of each religion but to find out how the Nyamwezi as a case were absorbed by foreigners religiously. Understanding African traditional beliefs and merging with what religion is, one will be in a good position to understand the current role of African religions.

**Key words:** religions, tradition, rituals.

## Introduction

A human being is a social being who, from the first time of his existence, began a social life, lived and organized themselves in groups that later developed into the early societies. They engaged in different economic activities including agriculture during stone ages, and developed a system of beliefs to solve some complicated issues<sup>1</sup>. Africans had a sense of religion millions of year ago, from the time Africans were attempting to manipulate the unseen world that controls natural object and phenomena by means of magic<sup>2</sup>. Drought and little harvests are some of the issues that forced man to have such kind of belief. Shillington<sup>3</sup> explains that with '*Homo erectus*' of the 'acheulian' period men have had some form of ritual or early religion with the beginnings of the deliberate burial of the dead. Men probably sought remedies for evil in inherited beliefs and institutions. They consulted the diviners, made offerings for ancestral spirits, countered witches and employed medicines<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, New York 1979.

<sup>2</sup> J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions & Philosophy*, Dar-es-Salaam 1969.

<sup>3</sup> K. Shillington, *History of African Revised*, New York 2005.

<sup>4</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, op. cit.

For that sense, people had a belief in supernatural power and as a result they created imaginary Supreme Beings referred to as gods in their daily activities. The Supreme Beings are the origin and sustenance of all things<sup>5</sup>. The essence of religious practices is the struggle of human kind to control the unseen events. Religion became an institutional aspect of societies, which was the result of men's struggle to control and understand the material world as Rodney<sup>6</sup> asserts that religion was an aspect of the superstructure of a Society, deriving ultimately from the degree of control and understanding of the material world. Therefore, religion is very important among other institutions of society which maintains the bond between and among members and assures continuation as well as its existence.

However, societies have been interacting overtime from the ancient period to the present. Such interactions resulted into social influences in not only religious aspects but also other structures of society<sup>7</sup>. '*In God we trust*', is being used by most of Americans. The saying had its origin in African theological doctrine developed during the height of the infamous slave trade to reinforce the slaves<sup>8</sup>. When two societies of different sorts come into prolonged and effective contact, the rate and character of change taking place in both is seriously affected to the extent that entirely new patterns are created, and the weaker of the two societies is bound to be affected<sup>9</sup>. Most of African traditional religions were perceived weak in the Foreigners' eyes, including that of the Nyamwezi; hence, were absorbed. Rodney<sup>10</sup> stated that African ancestral religions

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<sup>5</sup> J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions & Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Dar es Salaam 1972.

<sup>7</sup> J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions & Philosophy*, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> D.A. Mungazi, *The Mind of Black African*, Westport 1996.

<sup>9</sup> W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem.

were no better or worse than other religions as such. It implies that whatever happened in other world religions also could happen in African traditional religions. African societies were open-ended allowing integration of other new culture<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, African societies provided room for the new culture, religion as part of that culture. It evidently proves that African religions provided chance for the imported foreign religious aspects.

T. Shibangu and colleague<sup>12</sup> stated that African society is not the ancient Society but a Society with Euro-Christian and Islamic influences. Therefore, much of what was practised was influenced by Christianity and Islam. Accepting either of the two influential religions meant innovation in the existing culture. Africans, by the time outsiders came with what they called religious civilization, were recognizing and praising their own gods. Rodney<sup>13</sup> disclosed that:

“As are well known, traditional African religious practices exist in a variety, and it should also be remembered that both Islam and Christianity found homes on the African continent almost from their very inception. The features of the traditional African religions help to set African cultures apart from those in other continents”.

Evidence shows that African religions have existed from ancient Africa, during the stone-age dominated by Homo erectus. Although Africans of a certain geographical area practiced cultures which slightly differed from that of others, they shared some common characteristics such as sacrifice to the ancestral spirits, the sacral role of the chief as a cult-personnel as well as tribal festival dur-

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<sup>11</sup> A.A. Mazrui, *Africa and other Civilization; conquest and Counter Conquest*, in: *Africa in World Politics; The African State System in Flux*, eds. J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, Boulder 2000, pp. 110–135.

<sup>12</sup> T. Shibangu, *Essential of Research Methodology in Human and Social Sciences*, Kampala 2007.

<sup>13</sup> W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, op. cit.

ing tribal and personal crises as well as healing exercise in society. Rodney<sup>14</sup> asserted that religion pervaded African life in the period before the coming of whites, just as it pervaded life in other pre-feudal societies. Therefore, Africans had established their own belief system by the time foreigners landed on the continent.

The nineteenth-twentieth century was the period of the considerable Arab and European influences on the African ways of life as the two were competing to de-Africanize the continent. Nineteenth century was the period of Europeans coming into Africa as Ranger explained that the 1870s – 1890s were the time of great flowering of European invented tradition. Europeans were rushing into Africa. Therefore, nineteenth century seems to be the time of competition between Asians and Europeans, respectively. Iliffe<sup>15</sup> stated that missionaries in East Africa were competing with an expanding Islam as well as competing with each other.

Kimambo<sup>16</sup> (1969) reported that nineteenth century was the period of Tanzanian history which had been much oversimplified. For it was easy either to work in the nineteenth century as the period of change and the pre-1800 period as one during which many Tanzanian societies were static, or to recognize changes and, perhaps ‘improvements’ in both social and political organization, but consider that changes to be initiated by some ‘superior’ groups of people with a special kind of ‘know-how,’ while the stimulus to many of the changes which took place in that period could be traced to the arrival of new groups of people into regions already inhabited. The word ‘inhabited’ here may refer also to cultural achievements including development of religion. Neither Europeans nor Arabs only can be condemned for the changes on

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<sup>14</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>15</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> I.N. Kimambo, *The Interior Before 1800*, in: *A History of Tanzania*, eds. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, Nairobi 1969.

Africans, but one can have a look over these influences from the multi-dimensions as Kimambo<sup>17</sup> asserts that:

“There was no single group responsible for transmitting the ideas of change and ‘improvements’ to all parts of Tanzania. Secondly, even when ideas defused from one area to another, local initiatives transformed these ideas and adopted them to the needs of that particular society”.

Their influences resulted from Africans’ interaction with external world like what was happening to the rest of the world such as in China and Roman. Rodney<sup>18</sup> noted that, “By the end of feudalism, Europeans began to narrow the area of human life in which religion and the church played a part”. Talking about Europeans and Christianity is the narration of inseparable aspects. Iliffe<sup>19</sup> states that, “Three innovations in indigenous religions appear to have taken place in German times. One was the continued vulgarization of religious activities hitherto to specialists, much as kubandwa had been vulgarized into ‘buswezi’ in Unyamwezi”. Therefore, Christianity exerted its influence on popular cult.

## Methodology

### Approach and Research Design

The study on the Foreign Religious Influence upon Wanyamwezi Traditional Rituals was organised qualitatively as an approach which includes designs, techniques and measures that do not produce discrete numerical data, and in which data are often in form of words rather than numbers, and these words are grouped into categories as it was done by the researcher<sup>20</sup>. Case study was

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, p. 18.

<sup>18</sup> W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, op. cit., p. 206.

<sup>20</sup> O.M. Mugenda and A.G. Mugenda, *Research Methods; Quantitative & Qualitative research Approach*, Nairobi 1999.

employed to find an in-depth, real time or retrospective analysis of case<sup>21</sup> (Edmond and colleague, 2013). Therefore, case study was admitted purposefully to find in-depth and retrospective influence of the monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam upon Wanyamwezi traditional religious rituals.

### Study area

The study was carried at former Urambo District (Urambo and Kaliua) and Tabora Municipality (Unyanyembe) in Tabora, Tanzania (shown in figure 1) and Tabora Municipal (shown in figure 2) and former Urambo District (current Urambo and Kaliua). The region is populated by different groups including the Wanyamwezi: the dominant group, their cousin Basukuma. Significant minorities include: Waha, Wanyiramba in Igunga, Wafipa, Wachaga, and refugees from Burundi that have added varieties to that region ethnic's make up<sup>22</sup>.

The two areas (Tabora municipality and former Urambo district) have a total population of approximately four hundred thousand out of population of two million and three hundred thousand of the whole Tabora region: However, the researcher did not manage to get the number of Wanyamwezi<sup>23</sup>. Tabora municipal has twenty five wards out of which six were visited namely: Kanyenye, Gongoni, Chemchem, Kitete, Ng,ambo and Itetemia (Figure 2). Urambo has sixteen wards out of which four were reached and worked upon; Itundu, Imalamakoye, Kapilula and Urambo (Figure 3). However, the researcher also visited Ushokola ward of the new Kaliua District which was part of former Urambo because he intended to carry out the study in former Urambo district and Tabora Municipal.

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<sup>21</sup> W.A. Edmonds, and T.D. Kennedy, *An Applied Reference Guide to Research. Designs; Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods*, New Delhi 2013.

<sup>22</sup> The President's Office, *Planning and Privatisation*, January, 2005, p. 208.

<sup>23</sup> *Population and Housing Census*, vol. 2, 2012.

Figure 1. Map of Tanzania showing Tabora Region



Source: Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (2012).

Figure 2. A map showing Tabora municipality



Source: Tabora Municipal Administrative office.





### Sample size, sampling procedures and data analysis

The study involved twenty five Nyamwezi adult people aged fifty to sixty years and twelve elders of sixty one years old and above, with knowledge of the traditional religious rituals who were the key-informants. These were obtained through snowball sampling; eighteen religious officials, nine Muslim leaders, such as *sheikhs* and *maalim*, as well as nine Christian religious leaders including pastors, nuns and clergymen, religious leaders who would analyse the principles to which the converts should adhere to in order to become a true Christian or Muslim all of whom were purposively sampled. Four traditional healers were consulted as traditional ritual experts and two grandchildren of Nyamwezi chiefs, Mirambo and Fundikira who were also purposively selected Grandchildren would somehow disclose the sacred rituals practised by their grandparents as according to most African tradition grandchildren are given names and other ritual inheritance. Schonenberg<sup>24</sup> supports that, "In giving a name to a child, Wanyamwezi parents remember their own parents in gratitude and reverence by calling their children by the names of their own parents and of brothers and sisters of their own parents". Names were given sequentially with the responsibilities vested to the grandparents. Generally, the study involved a total of sixty one respondents.

The researcher employed purposive sampling technique to get religious leaders and chiefs' grandchildren by virtue of their position. The selected cases were judged as the most appropriate ones for this study. Religious leaders would provide the principle to which the new converts should adhere.

The report contains data from both primary sources and secondary sources through interview, Focus group discussion, Question-

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<sup>24</sup> P. Schonenberg, *Nyamwezi Names of Persons*, „Anthropos”, 90(1995), Heft. 1-3, pp. 109-132.

naire and Documentary Review; therefore, the project preserved its validity due to the use of multiple data collection methods involved in the study in relation to the objectives. The stability of this study is based on the assumption that consistent results would be provided if investigation were repeated in the same context. Data have been analysed qualitatively.

## Findings

### Wanyamwezi traditional religious ritual practices

Prior to foreign influences, there were varieties of Nyamwezi traditional religious rituals, according to the interviews held in 2014 in the areas under the study, one of the respondent explained ritual practice as '*Kwisenga*' which means the prayer and any other related activities. Varieties of these ritual practices according to the respondents were determined by event in advance. These include: deaths of a family or community member, installation of chiefs to the office, preventive rituals against the occurrence of natural disasters, misunderstandings between or among family members, and that aimed at seeking blessing before a person left from his, her or their home for seeking better life were among the determinants. Kendall<sup>25</sup> supports that religious beliefs are linked to practices that bind people together and to rites of passage such as birth, marriage and death. These events are associated with religious rituals. The following are varieties of religious rituals identified during data collection.

1. Religious rituals practised in mourning days of death of members of the community.

This was regarded as part of community rites; therefore, religious ritual practices would be held and were of two types. Those

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<sup>25</sup> D.E. Kendall, *Sociology in Our Times*, Ware 2000.

practised following deaths of chiefs and other respected, and that was held after the commoner's death. At the interview, the member of the Nyamwezi community said:

“During the burial ceremony of the chief, the elder people would organize the special prayer. We believed that a dead chief would become the ancestral spirit who would keep on helping us whenever we needed a help. A chief's body had to be well chiefly dressed”.

Burial of such kind revealed respect to the chief. It also signified the status of the chief in religious affairs. Iliffe<sup>26</sup> explains, “Most commonly ancestors' propitiation was extended to make a chief's ancestors influential over the welfare of the territory they ruled. Regular sacrifices might be made at their graves, or they might be propitiated in communal misfortune”.

Shillington<sup>27</sup> in supporting this explains that African political and religious authority was generally very closely allied. Even in the smallest-scale society the chief was usually the guardian of religious shrines or protector of the ancestral spirits. Therefore, in respect to the chief, a special religious ritual practice following his death was necessary. Chiefs in almost all African ethnic groups had special respect. For example, Shillington<sup>28</sup> stated that Mansa's central religious role within the empire was crucial to people's survival and he was thus treated with exaggerated respect. The Nyamwezi chiefs were honoured for the virtue of their status in the community; therefore, what was practised for them had no or slight difference from the other African community, whether of the Western, Southern, Eastern or Central Africa.

Another type of traditional religious ritual practice in honour to death was that practised during the death of a common person. The

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<sup>26</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, op. cit.

<sup>27</sup> K. Shillington, *History of African Revised*, op. cit.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 94.

prayer would be carried out during the mourning days, differently from that in honour of the chief '*mtemi*' or sub-chief '*mwanangwa*'.

One of the interviewees said:

"The commoners' burial ceremonies were respected, but were never held like those of chiefs'. Commoners were buried alone followed by normal ritual practices. People also could stay at the funeral in the days of mourning. If he or she was an elder person, the elders would carry the corpse and were responsible for sacred requirement during burial ceremonies".

However, among the commoners, also the organisation of burial ceremonies differed from one another. The interviewee proceeded and the response was, "If any of the two twins died, he or she had to be buried while covered with the barks of trees, in lower land area or near the well or dams". When the interviewee was asked if there was any gender consideration to these burial ceremonies she replied that gender could play part only for the twins. The male twin could only be buried by males and if it was a female, only females; in black clothes with soaked flour smeared on their foreheads, were responsible to bury her but all people attended the funeral.

2. There were also religious practices held during the installation of a new chief to the reign

A chief having both political and religious authority was given respect during the ceremony. He was regarded as new to maintain good relationship among his subjects and between the communities and the sacred. One of the interviewees said that the installed chief was showered with water from the soaked leaves of tree called '*Mvuta mvula*' meaning rain attractor". Rain was valued so much as a source of life. Whichever worth thing was regarded as brought by rainfall. Therefore, washing him to attract rain was not only to attract rainfall but also attracting anything good for the betterment of the society.

Most of ritual practices involved the use of traditional medicine made of different types of trees and dead animals. The interview held at Chemchem in Tabora disclosed what was really done when the authority was entrusted to the chief. Another interviewee said their elders had the authority to declare the new chief and they told him that he was washed with '*Mvuta Mvula*' purposively to attract good things to their community and throw away bad omen for the prosperity of the Nyamwezi society. Then, traditional prayer would be held for wishing success to the chief and the whole society throughout the period overseen by the installed chief. There were also medicines used by chiefs such as '*mzimilwa*' to end conflict between the chief and his enemies. Another medical tree was '*mtwaligana*' used to make him popular to the people. '*Mkungamila*' also was used, while soaked in water, to call people from different world directions. It was spread towards West, East, South and North while articulating some words. All medicines used depended on the ritual practices, that is why certain words would be spoken to show intension for the practice.

The interview held at Gongoni in Tabora, one of the grandsons of chief Mirambo said that '*mkungamilwa*', '*Mvuta Mvula*' and '*mzimilwa*' were important materials that could not be let finish out". That means, it would be better to let other things finish out than those medicines. Therefore, the role of a chief was associated with traditional medicine as part of their religious practice. The chiefs were considered the ritual experts as well as the only people who could communicate with the ancestral spirits. Most of the things which were done for the respect of any African chief were not different from other African leaders of prior to innovation. As African traditions had no much difference from one another as Kimambo<sup>29</sup> supports, "Generally speaking the '*ntemi*' was no

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<sup>29</sup> I.N. Kimambo, *The Interior Before 1800*, op. cit., p. 22.

different from the king or chief of west lake region. He had to possess certain sacred symbols; he had to lead in certain rituals, above all, his own well-being was identified". Shillington<sup>30</sup> supported that the village head or chief; the '*Mansa*' in Malinke was the person most directly linked with the spirit of the land upon whom continued and depended the production of their crops. The *Mansa*, as a guardian of the ancestors, was thus both religious and secular leader of his people.

3. There were also religious rituals practised for ending misunderstandings and conflicts among community or family members.

It is normal for people living together, sometimes, to have conflicts, misunderstanding and even quarrels for different reasons. For Wanyamwezi, prolonged misunderstandings among family members were considered as the curse from God; therefore, immediate attention was required. Special religious ritual practices would be held for ending such problem. The interviewee at Ushokola explained that if any kind of prolonged misunderstanding or conflict arose, the family elders would make an urgent call, gathering all available members in the locality. During the occasion a fire was lit. Words signifying to stop the conflict would be spoken to beg God, then fire had to be extinguished showing the ending of such conflict.

4. Other rituals aimed to protect the family or community against epidemic diseases.

Smallpox (*ndui*) was among those diseases. In protecting such kind of diseases, the interviewee at Itundu said, they were ordered to extinguish fire in their households on the day prior to occasion against '*ndui*' and were required to take fire only from the chief's

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<sup>30</sup> K. Shillington, *History of African Revised*, op. cit.

residence that could be spread to all other households. Extinguishing fires in other people's settlement signified stopping the spread of disease. Taking fire from the chief's house was regarded as taking new fire free from such kind of disaster which was believed to heal people. That fire was regarded to be strong enough to fight the disease because it was from the guardian of religious shrine.

5. There were religious practices done for the purpose of seeking blessing from traditional god '*Likubhe Linyagasa*'.

According to the interview held, the respondent elucidated that religious ritual practice would be carried and headed by the family elder, grandfather or father assisted by mother or grandmother within the household. The prayer aimed at achieving blessing from the ancestral spirit for the prosperity of clans' or individuals' goals. When he was asked if someone left without any ritual practice he replied that one would hardly succeed and he or she would be likely to get bad omen. For that sense, religious ritual practice was inevitable. The same was done for the person who was almost to marriage, and those who wanted to leave for trade. One of the discussion through focus group revealed that ritual practices would enable the married people to have good life, healthier children and be free from any magic trick or illusion. The prayer would lead them in good luck. Hence, for economic gain and the betterment of social affairs, ritual practice would be the best.

6. Religious rituals to avoid natural disasters such as flood, drought and others

In regard to the occurrences of the natural disasters such as famine, draught and floods there were religious ritual practices as a means of protecting the community against them. For example, for the heavy rainfall accompanied with thunderstorms, one of the



interviewees explained about special prayer that had to be held under twins' supervision. Twins had to stand at the door while holding a winnowing basket 'ungo' containing maize flour. They had to beg for stopping the rainfall, and their prayer would soon end the rainfall. The prayers for the other disaster were also carried in accordance to the formality. The respondent added that draught was normally considered to be a result of people being against the norms so maybe god was annoyed; therefore, it was a curse from God (*limurungu*). Begging for forgiveness required elders to make an assembly on hills and sometimes to the specified area called '*kwa itambalale*'. Women were participating in accordance with norms of the society as it was explained by one of nyamwezi elders at Kitete that only women who were not in menstrual circle participated in the prayer. She added that the prayer involved sacrificing animals such as goats, sheep and cows with black colour.

Shillington<sup>31</sup> supports that:

“Nyamwezi held Europeans responsible for drought, while Sukuma conservatives blamed religious innovation: ‘we see clouds but they move away. God hides the water lets us die...what our crime, oh God? Men arrived who taught us lies, not to make the right sacrifices”.

7. There are traditional religious rituals practiced in gratitude to God due to normal delivery of Children.

Schonenbeger<sup>32</sup> presents the feeling of Wanyamwezi on getting children and expressed that Wanyamwezi are fond of children and see children as the most marvelous gift of the creator. Therefore, they had to thank god '*Likubhe Linyangasa*' in gratitude for the safe birth. It was explained by respondent that a pregnant woman always would pray for good health and normal delivery because only '*liimulungu*' is the one that determines mother and child's

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem, p. 342.

<sup>32</sup> P. Schonenbeger, *Nyamwezi Names of Persons*, op. cit., p. 109.

health. Parrinder<sup>33</sup> supported that when a woman announced to husband or mother that she was pregnant, there was rejoicing and precautions were taken to ensure normal gestation and delivery. A sacrifice of thanks was made to the supreme God, or the family gods' representatives or ancestors who were naturally relevant in the reproduction of their family and provision of a channel of rebirth. Prayers were made for the health of the mother and her baby.

### **Organization of traditional religious practices**

Traditional religious rituals were organized in two levels. The lowest level was that of the family where religious rituals could be carried for the betterment of the family. Whether for happiness or sadness, the event brought members of the family together to hold traditional religious rituals. One of the interviewees said they used to congregate at their elder's house when they wanted to thank their God, '*Likubhe linyangasa*' for success or asking for forgiveness when things were going so badly. Eruption of diseases, misunderstandings among the family members, poor agricultural harvests and bad omen in the day to day activities were among the issues requiring ritual practice to be held upon".

The highest traditional religious organizational practice was of the community level. The chief, *mtemi*, or sub-chief, *mwanangwa*, was the ritual supervisor. It was coordinated in response to the problems directly affecting the whole community. The respondent interviewed at Mwinyi reported that drums were beaten to call people from different places. Then, it was announced the day and time when the gathering would be held, although time was not distinct as time was determined by the direction of the sun and crow of the cock among other signs. The matter would either be for political reasons, like the installation of a new chief, social rea-

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<sup>33</sup> E.G. Parrinder, *African Traditional Religion*, London 1974.

sons like solving the problem existing in the society”. There were special areas arranged by either a chief with his council of elders at community level or by the head of the family at family level.

1. Requirements during religious ritual practices.

The organization of religious practices required preparation. This includes clothing and other things in extra (clobber) as well as sacrifice.

2. Clobbers and sacrifices.

There was special clothing alongside with other materials in accordance with the specified occasion. the clobbers usually were the permanently prepared things that could be used in more than one occasion, provided that they were appropriate and kept well to maintain natural appearance. According to the interview held at Itundu, the respondent elucidated that the ritual supervisor had to be in clothes made of barks of trees with a goat’s tail on hand. Beads made of either pumpkin seeds, or other identified materials would be worn on arms. Leather belt tightened on waist and a special hat with ostrich feathers on the head.

A chief, due to his status, used to be in a special clobber different from that of other people. For the other people as respondent said, men would be in black, red or white clothes styled in man’s open-sided cloak (*rubega*) with beads on their heads and arms. Women also had to be in black, red or white clothes but worn tightened above their breast. They wore beads around their heads, arms, waists, and slightly above their ankles. Black and red were worn during the mourning occasion; the white clothes were worn during the happiness.

All other participants had to be in a uniform-like clothes which depended upon the occasion on the spot. It was hard to find people in different dress during religious occasion because it was a custom.

However big the occasion was, it would be nothing without sacrifice to the ancestral spirit. The sacrifice included animals with specific colours and type, grain food and traditional beer. People had to prepare a black Billy-goat 'beberu' or a bull to be slaughtered during the occasion. Then, after the chief or head of the family would lead the crowd's prayer by telling the ancestral spirits the reason for gathering at that place. The sacrifice was part and parcel of traditional religious practices. People had to sacrifice to their ancestral spirits showing a real concern.

### **Influences by the foreign religions**

Religion is a belief intrinsically arisen which results into observable actions in an effort to either satisfying a person or being part of self-identity. Religious practices require identified areas on which the practice is held under respective leaders, time framework for religious activities and respective clothing. All these affected traditional religion of Wanyamwezi.

#### **1. Seeking new identity**

The traditional Supreme Being known as "*Likubhe Linyanyasa*" was replaced by either Christian God or Muslim Allah. One is not considered as a true Muslim or true Christian unless admits in his mind the concept of Almighty God or Allah with other religious principles.

One religious leader of Moravian sect annotated that it was an obligation for one to be a true Christian to accept that God is one. To believe in the Jesus Christ as a savior and his death was for the sins committed by human beings. The Holly Bible, new testament the gospel (John 1:26–29)<sup>34</sup> states that "The next day he saw Jesus coming toward him, and told them to behold, the

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<sup>34</sup> The British and Foreign Bible Society, *Holy Bible, revised Standard Version*, New York 2008.

Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of World,” It is supported by the Holly Bible, the first letter of John1 (5:10)” he who believes in the son of God has the testimony in himself. He who does not believe God has made him a liar, because he has not believed in the testimony that God has born to his son”.

The response from ustadh, a teacher of among Islamic school, in Urambo district told the researcher that one is obliged to adhere to the five Islamic principles if needs to be truly Muslim. This was supported by Johnson who explains the five Islamic pillars<sup>35</sup> that:

“The five pillars, primary duties, of the Islam: are witness; confessing the oneness of God and Mohammad, his prophet; prayer to be performed five times a day; alms giving to the poor and the mosque; fastening during daylight hours in the month of Ramadan; and pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in the Moslem’s lifetime”.

Iliffe<sup>36</sup> noted that the third religious innovation was reformulation of beliefs perhaps by emphasizing Gods intervention in human affairs as against the activities of subordinate spirits, for subordinated spirits were less relevant than God to the larger World. He added that in Unyamwezi, the missionaries’ identification of Katavi with Satan may have aided the growth of his cult. It is also through the invention of these new religions, the traditional prophets were replaced by Christian and Muslim prophets, Jesus Christ and Prophet Muhammad, respectively.

Iliffe presented that indigenus religious resources could help men to comprehend their new situation but that work was believed to be truly done by the foreign religious prophets. Iliffe explained about the prophet who had foretold the coming of the Europeans. These were among other African prophets who used to tell about the future; among them were the rain makers who were part of

<sup>35</sup> The Islamic Foundation, *Qurani Takatifu; Chapa ya kwanza*, Nairobi 2005.

<sup>36</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, op. cit.

ritual experts. Later in the era of Islamization and Christianization emerged new prophets with much prominence. Their birthdays are much more valued than traditional prophets'. "*Maulid*" and "*Christmass*" have been celebrated every year to mark the days when Prophets Muhammad and Jesus Christ were born respectively. Then, the roles of Muhammad and Jesus replaced that of the traditional prophets. John, as many people called him, the baptizer is one of the new prophets who gained popularity.

The Holy Bible, The New Testament the gospel (John 1:26–29) explains that when John was answering the question asked by the priests and Laxities who were sent by the Jews, he said "I baptized with water but among you stands one whom you do not know, even he who comes after me, the thong of whose sandal I am not worthy to untie...". John, according to that version, had foretold the coming of Jesus Christ that was proved to be true later. Therefore, the traditional prophets who did the similar work to what John and other foreign prophets did, was replaced by the foreign religious prophets.

## 2. Regular time for holding religious events

Time framework on religious events was another religious innovation. Traditional religious events were irregularly held. They had no particular time identified, instead they depended on the event in advance. The Islamic religion, for example, needs recitation of a prayer five times a day, each is recited on a particular time. The respondent said that they attend the five session prayers namely; the Morning Prayer '*Alfajiri*', the afternoon prayer '*adhuhuri*', the evening prayer '*Alasiri*' followed by another in two to three hours after '*Magharib*' then the night prayer '*Al-isha*'. She added that Muslims also celebrate events namely Iddil-el-fitr after the fastening of the holy month of Ramadhan, and Iddi-el-Hajj. For the Christian, religious practice and events also are regularly done.

One of the respondents told the researcher that they normally celebrate Christmas on 25<sup>th</sup> December every year, commemorating the birth of Jesus Christ, and Easter which starts on Wednesday to Ester Monday of the identified weeks in that particular year. It is done after ‘*kwa resma*’ a forty-day-fast. However, other Christian denominations such as the seventh day Adventists (SDA) celebrate neither Christmas nor Easter. Generally, foreign religious events are regularly prepared and held.

3. The role of chiefs in leading religious affairs was replaced by pastors, sheikh, bishops and other clergymen

Another religious reformulation was the emphasis on the pastors, priests, sheikh, ‘*ustadh*’ at the expense of chiefs as religious leader. Because the chiefs lost their political power, so they did the religious’. Shillington<sup>37</sup> supports, “As the power of the Mansa increased, so did the religious significance”. Mansa was the Malinke chief who is purposefully cited as an example in representing other African chiefs whose responsibilities look alike across the African continent. Generally speaking the “*Ntemi*” was no different from the king or chief of the West Lake Region. He had to possess certain sacred symbols; he had to lead in certain rituals above<sup>38</sup>.

By the time the invented religions took way and Christianity valued pastors, priests, pop and other recognized people in Christian faith, the Muslim community put its emphasis on *sheikh* and *ustadh* who are very much respected. Traditional chiefs were devalued in the eyes of the Christian believers and Muslim followers. Traditional ritual experts like rain makers, chiefs and others are not as important as they used to be.

<sup>37</sup> K. Shillington, *History of African Revised*, op. cit., p. 94.

<sup>38</sup> I.N. Kimambo, *The Interior Before 1800*, op. cit., p. 22.

4. Specified places were introduced replacing the traditionally recognized areas in which religious rituals were practiced.

The foreign religions, Christianity and Islam, brought a new concept of religiously specified area for prayer namely churches and mosques. The researcher portrayed in the preceding versions of this work that the Nyamwezi community held their prayer at home, at chiefs' palaces, on hills and near dams in accordance with the event in advance.

In the new era, Uyanembe experienced the mushrooming of Mosques and churches as the Arabs introduced Islam at first, then Germans followed with Christianity, that also was supported by the British who came later, who did not deform Christianity instead they made it prosper. Churches were the buildings for European and Jewish Christian worship which used from the time immemorial. In ancient times, according to the Holy Bible, the revelation to John (1:10) when John stated that:

“I was in the spirit on lord’s day, and I heard behind me a loud voice...telling me to write what I saw in the book, then I was ordered to send it to seven churches; to Ephesus, and to Smyrna and to Per’gamum and to Thyati’ra and to Sardis and to Philadelphia and to La-odice’a”.

However, in the ancient time, the Holy Bible (Matthew: 16:18) shows the promise of building a church on the rock and the powers of death would not prevail against it. Therefore, it was a promise to build the church that its roles continue to influence other parts of the world. The churches spread to different parts of the world including Africa. Currently there are many churches and mosques in Unyamwezi. According to the interview, one of the respondents said that people were willing to provide contributions for building places for worship, churches and Mosques were built in every corner. They supported morally or materially as in the Qur an suratul swaf (Qur an 61:10) which reminds believers of how they can emancipate themselves from the everlasting fire, ‘*Jehan-*



*nam'* through believing Allah and to fight for the way of God; by providing moral and material support.

There are almost more than nine Mosques in town as well as more than fifteen churches of different denominations, but only one place for traditional religion '*Kwaitambare*', the place where traditional religious rituals were practised. That illustrates people's emphasis on churches and Mosques at the expense of their traditional religious areas.

5. Traditional clobber was replaced by robes '*kanzu/joho*', mantle '*juba*' *jellaba* for the islams and modern clothes in other religions

Religious influence also appears in the way people put on during prayers. Clobber for traditional ritual practices was replaced by modern clothes. Wearing black or red bed sheet-like clothes is no longer considered. The Christians attend their mass wearing the most modernized clothes like suits, modern gowns and skirts with rosary in some denominations. The Muslims wear modern trousers, robes of different colours with prayer beads '*tasbihi*'. Members of foreign denominations told the researcher that they are not bound to the dressing code but priests are obliged to be in robes with colour according to 'Liturgy'.

6. Self-identity of the Nyamwezi based on their adherence to the new principles of the Islam and Christianity

The foreign religions, Islam and Christianity, introduced the system of Islamization and Baptism as ways through which a member is legally accepted in these foreign religions against the old system in which a member was naturally born. A new-born adhered to traditional religion naturally as in other African communities<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions & Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 4.

The indigenous Nyamwezi identify themselves with either Christian or Moslem names. Being baptized declared a person a Christian although the process has slight differences from one denomination to another. It is supported in the Holy Bible, the gospel according to John 1 (pp. 30–35) States, “This is he of whom I said, After me comes a man who ranks before me, fore he was before me... I came baptizing with water...but he who sent me to baptize with water said to me, this is who baptizes with the Holy spirit”. The Holy Bible chaptered the Gospel according to John 1 (3:3–5) when Jesus was asked by Nicole, a ruler of Jews on how man would be born again he responded “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born a new, he cannot see the kingdom of God... Unless one is born of water and the spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God”. Baptism is one of the conditions for entering the Kingdom of God.

In the Islamic religion, also, one had to be Islamized to become a member of the Islamic word. The same, it was encouraged to accept the new names of Islamic culture, women to accept a new wearing style like covering all parts of the body with exception of the face and the hands. This had been done to Nyamwezi converts. According to the Holy Qur-an, (suratul Zumar:3} reveals that, “the only supreme being deserves to be adored is “*Allah*” and warns those who worship other creatures will be punished. Allah is never with those who do not accept him and his way. It is among the effective versions used to bring followers to accept and adhere to Islam. According to the interview with some converts, they explained one would have to confess that there is no one who deserves the worship upon him unless Allah and doubtlessly, Muhammad is Allah’s messenger. Following confession, the person has to adhere and practically follow the remaining pillars of Islam.

Generally, almost Wanyamwezi community has been divided to the so called world religions namely Islam and Christianity. These

religions have been in competition between them and among the varieties of the same religions trying to influence more people to join. Tshibangu<sup>40</sup> et al states that the traditional African religion became identified in mind of many Africans that had failed and had been subjugated that many people began to proclaim adherence to Christianity and Islam. Iliffe<sup>41</sup> supports, "In 1930s in Tabora, the African Muslims were said to be divided into two factions, the left hand and the right hand; the left hand standing for drumming in the mosque, more participation by women and in general for a more Africanist Islam". Therefore, the division could be within or between religions.

Iliffe<sup>42</sup> wrote that it was reckoned by the Governor in 1912 in Tanganyika that the place contained 300,000 – 500,000 Muslims. It shows how far the Islamic influence had reached. Germans wanted to push Christianity: therefore, it seems they were in competition with Muslims.

Among the effects of foreign religions to traditional Wanyamwezi religious ritual was also the spread of literacy which almost changed the way religious leaders supervised the prayers. People had to read Quran or Bible for Muslims and Christians respectively. All of what should be said was recited from those two Holly books. Shillington<sup>43</sup> revealed one of the consequences of Islam was the spread of literacy usually in Arabic through the teaching of Qur-an. While the Missionaries opened mission stations in which people were taught bibles among other subject. Kiparapara mission station was one of the most influential centers.

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<sup>40</sup> T. Tshibangu, J.F. Agayi and L. Sanneh, *Religion and Social Evolution*, in: *A History of East Africa*, eds. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, Nairobi 1999, p. 501.

<sup>41</sup> J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, op. cit., p. 183.

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem, p. 215.

<sup>43</sup> K. Shillington, *History of African Revised*, op. cit., p. 90.

## Conclusion

Wanyamwezi community has varieties of ritual practices, only very few people practise them openly as the only way of solving problem but not their daily practice. The majority feel ashamed or betray their new faith. Traditional religious prayers are still practiced secretly among the converts. African traditional religions were open-ended and were receptive, able to accept changes and did not limit Africans to practice and join the new religions provided that one avoids taboo in accordance to Wanyamwezi customs.

In real sense, techniques employed by influential groups, the European and Arabs used such as education, trade and evangelization among others aimed at attaining their goals. For the Africans, Wanyamwezi in particular, positive effects came as effects rather than motives. They used religions to soften the Wanyamwezi and African minds in general so as to accept their foreign faith and be the base for colonization.

There are many aspects of the traditional religions that play roles similar to the invented aspects, for example, Wanyamwezi believed in a single deity, '*Likubhe linyangasa*', a supreme being characterized by having over all control of the universe, the omnipotent. Also, God is the eternal, omniscient and invisible. Mbiti<sup>44</sup> supported that conversion involves a mingling of traditional religion with a biblical religion, since nobody enters into the Christian faith with a religious vacuum and nobody can sweep out every trace of former religious background. The Christian faith with a biblical background, in effect finds a certain number of common or similar religious elements in the African converts<sup>45</sup>.

Religion is the social institution in the society which includes beliefs about the sacred or supernatural rituals in which believ-

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<sup>44</sup> J.S. Mbiti, *Bible and Theology in African Christianity*, Nairobi 1986, p. 128.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 128.

ers are drawn together by the common religious tradition<sup>46</sup>. The traditional religion united Wanyamwezi community, guided their behaviors on evils and goods.

Generally, since faith is unquestionable belief that does not require proof or scientific evidence, what was presented by the foreign religions about traditional religions that are of the uncivilized people is not correct<sup>47</sup>. The African religions could seek to answer important questions such as why we exist, why people suffer and die and what happens when we die. Neither Wanyamwezi traditional religions nor foreign religions are against life after death<sup>48</sup>. Religious practices in all religions discussed are of great importance provided that each fulfills the need of that society. Religions are socially defined and the rituals mean the obedience towards the Supreme Being.

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<sup>46</sup> D.E. Kendall, *Sociology in Our Times*, op. cit., p. 530.

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem, p. 531.

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**AFRICAN ELECTRONIC MUSIC  
IN CHURCH AND BEYOND**  
**Dialectic relation of religion and development**

**Introduction**

Since the sociocultural evolutionism died away, the technical development and the religion have been not discussed together.

However, these two in western philosophies and social contexts have intermingled long before and ever after the evolutionist approach. Some remarks about these relations in a rough version can be grouped as follows:

1. The philosophy of enlightenment and social politics started by the French Revolution replaced the earlier, religion-centered approach with the glorification of the pure reason<sup>1</sup>. The pure reason in this case guarantees the progress, excluding the religion as outer or contested sphere. The effect of such an approach can be seen in the modern science, lacking the religious paradigm, including the anthropology of religion, founded on the lay, neutral assumption on a social provenance of a religion. These types of discourses are also visible in an organization of modern

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<sup>1</sup> B. Meyer, *Mediation and the Genesis of presence: towards a material approach to religion*, Utrecht 2012.



states, especially in Europe (vide France, Scandinavia, Benelux countries or Germany), clearly separated from religious institutions or even dominating them. However, if we derive from Max Weber's interpretation of the capitalism as an effect of Protestant values and ethics<sup>2</sup>, we can see that the distinction between these spheres are not absolute, but rather visible as a realization of a different model. I believe that closer observation of this model, combined with non-western imaginaries of bonds between the sacred, power and technical can shed a light on the unfamiliar terrain of social practices between above mentioned ideal types of 'technology' and 'religion'.

2. The second perspective is derived from the perspective of religious institutions, sometimes questioning the authority of a modern state. It can be observed in conservative and religious social movements, like the Polish Catholic Church or many religious organizations in the United States. The approach to the technological development ranges from a contestation (defined as a fight with the so called "the culture of death", supposedly transmitted by modern electronic media), to capitalize it only as a highly controlled means of a social communication. Only last few years bring the gradual dynamic implementation of the newest technologies to political campaigns of conservatists or evangelization in Europe and North America. The most remarkable example is Polish (and international) Radio *Maryja* and Television *Józef*. Both broadcasters using sophisticated and expensive technologies transmit an extremely conservative political message, questioning non-Christian media, technologies and economic model. Altogether it makes a good example of how western conservatism just from its foundation – if we date it again in the French Revolution times

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<sup>2</sup> R.R. Wilk and L. Cliggett, *Ekonomie i kultury: podstawy antropologii ekonomicznej*, Kraków 2011.

– accepts new forms and meanings only when they became an integrated element of a social life.

This short paper, however, regards not European or global relations between the religion and the technical development, but rather traces it in certain locations in East Africa. I believe, though, that the view from a different perspective can unveil some less understandable aspects of the critical bond.

### **What religion and technical development have in common?**

The aim of the ongoing research, which I relate to within this short paper, is to understand how electronic technologies were integrated onto religious practices and imaginaries of East African religious men. I conduct research in Northern Region of Malawi and for the comparative purpose in Iringa Region of Tanzania. The growth of the technologic infrastructure – one of pillars of the development – is global and national project but it is also perceived, contextualized and sometimes contested in certain localities, and the latter is a subject of the study.

The technical development, when it is becoming to materialize from being a project, a plan and a symbol, to materialized part of everyday life, is re-worked and incorporated by local ontologies. Hence, the technology affects and is affected by local discourses and practice, that are essential to constitution of the local life.

From the other hand, as many anthropologists argue and as is confirmed by literally every and each interlocutor during the research, the religion plays an essential role in functioning of African communities and individuals. The classic of the anthropological theory of religion, E. Evans-Pritchard, observed that the understanding of notions of God – or spirit – gives “the key to [...]

philosophy” of African communities<sup>3</sup>. The religion understood as a ritual practice, a cosmology, a moral constitution, a way of communication – incorporates and redefines discourses and materialities of the technical development, as well as is reshaped and recontextualized by them<sup>4</sup>.

To properly understand the dynamic relation of religious life and the technical development in Eastern Africa it is required to identify the ambiguous role of religious institutions<sup>5</sup>. The religion – Christianity in this case – has a tremendous impact on the ‚colonization of minds’, but gives also an effective identity scripts and resources for the resistance against hegemonies<sup>6</sup>.

The other key issue is an understanding of the current role of native religions and rituals that play a crucial but undefined part in the political and social life of Malawi and other countries from the region. In a consequence the main problem is in questioning the dichotomy of the seemingly rational technological development

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<sup>3</sup> E.E. Evans-Pritchard and E. Gillies, *Witchcraft, oracles, and magic among the Azande*, Abridged with an introd. by Eva Gillies, Oxford 1976.

<sup>4</sup> T.G. Kirsch, *Ways of Reading as Religious Power in Print Globalization*, „American Ethnologist”, 34(2007), no. 3, pp. 509–520; Idem, *Restaging the Will to Believe: Religious Pluralism, Anti-Syncretism, and the Problem of Belief*, „American Anthropologist”, 106(2004), no. 4, pp. 699–709.

<sup>5</sup> Due to various determinants and the need of precise scope, I limited my research to Christian congregations of continental Tanzania and northern Malawi and by institutionalized religious institutions I address Catholic, Protestant and African churches. Similarly, the theorization of religious practice bases on the historical context of Christianity in Africa, with absolutely key role of colonization. However, I am aware of different angle of Islamic history and hence different definitions of development and technology in its context, also because both countries have significant Muslim population especially in respectively – Swahili coast and southern Malawi.

<sup>6</sup> J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff, *Of revelation and revolution*, Chicago 1991; B. Sundkler and C. Steed, *A history of the church in Africa*, Cambridge – New York 2000.

and the allegedly irrational sphere of ritual or at least to show the movement in between these spheres.

Let me pause this theoretical, abstract exploration and start to elaborate the character of relations between the religion, the technology and the development on three examples observed in Malawi and Tanzania in 2016 and 2017.

During the research I focus on the technology, specifically technology of sound and music<sup>7</sup>, I ask, how the technologic innovation influences the practice of believing and the religious and social ontology.

The three cases concern respectively:

- Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) Malawi, more specifically in Mzuzu, Rumphi and Lilongwe;
- *Vimbuza* possession cult practiced by Tumbuka and Ngoni people from Northern Region of Malawi;
- varied Christian congregations and gospel music production studios in Iringa region.

In 2016 I experienced first meetings and discussions with the diviners from Malawian cities: Malawi and Rumphi. I conducted parallel observations in Christian congregations of number of parishes in Mzuzu and Rumphi, including St. Augustine, Christ Congregation in Malawi in Chiputula, CCAP Luwingu, CCAP Rumphi and others. I have talked with members of congregations and with frequent patients of the diviners, who are involved in *vimbuza* cult as well as possessed persons including *vimbuza* diviners. During the first stage of the research I applied mainly participant observations and interviews along with the detailed study on performative principles and practices. The research objective was to trace the categorizations and entanglements of technologies and practices in context of the (so-called) traditional ritual performance.

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<sup>7</sup> As 'technology of sound and music' I understand.

I have conducted around 80 ethnographic interviews, based on reference scenarios. The knowledge from my interviewees gives an opportunity to understand religious and technologic conceptualizations, interpretations of genealogies and the connections to wider cultural universe<sup>8</sup> Conversations with people associated with religious rituals shed a light on *emic* classifications, individual practices and subjectively used materialities related to prayers. The interview is recognized as one of the most innovative yet well established method of social sciences<sup>9</sup>, which gives an inside to inner cultural and individual worlds<sup>10</sup>. In case of religious practices the method may be essential to glimpse emotions and affects of interlocutors.

The participant observation addressed problems of the materiality and the body in the fieldwork. Observations within the project comprehend spaces emerging from and through rituals<sup>11</sup>, imponderables of everyday life. They also allow to trace and understand bonds of the language and the practice and acts of embodiment. For example, the distinction between imported products of western technology (like electronic keyboards) and the local handicraft (like wooden drums) marked by a diverse symbolic can be observed by the ways how certain technological objects are treated, touched, stored, preserved and used (e.g. carefully cleansed, proudly presented, kept hidden or exposed<sup>12</sup>).

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<sup>8</sup> A. Seeger, *Why Suyá sing: a musical anthropology of an Amazonian people*, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] – New York 1987.

<sup>9</sup> M.V. Angrosino, *Doing Ethnographic and Observational Research*, London 2007.

<sup>10</sup> M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, *Ethnography: principles in practice*, London – New York 1983.

<sup>11</sup> G. Born, *Music, Sound and Space Transformations of Public and Private Experience*, Cambridge 2013.

<sup>12</sup> G. Rose, *Visual methodologies: an introduction to the interpretation of visual materials*, London – Thousand Oaks 2001.

The research is based on *emic* approach, which requires that rather than the perspective of theories or global institutions represented by documents like catechism, national development strategies or prognosis of the World Bank, I study the perspective and experience of local social institutions and individuals. This optic allows to understand what is the religion and the technologic development in practice, in action, first of all embodied and enacted, only then verbalized.

### Electric Christianity

Church of Central Africa Presbyterian is dominant denomination in the region. During the several months stay in Malawi I have observed mostly urban churches belonging to Livingstonia synod in Northern Malawi. Livingstonia has a special role in the history of Nyasaland and afterwards – Malawi. It was established in 1894 by Scottish missionaries, who in search of non malarial climate<sup>13</sup> moved from lake-shore locations of Cape Maclear and Bandawe to higher grounds. Parallel to the activity of zealous Europeans, the British Central Africa Protectorate started to flag its military presence in the area, justifying it with the fight with slave trade, concentrated in nearby Karonga at the stronghold of warlord named Mlozi, soon after beaten by British troops.

Soon the colonial administration prompted the restructuralization of local people into 'tribal groups' with hierarchies, allowing the colonists to rule through the mediation of tribal chiefs. This process also affected the relationship between earlier inhabitants and Ngonis<sup>14</sup>, by forming administration structure of Tumbuka tribe from

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<sup>13</sup> By that time the knowledge of mosquito-borne cause of malaria was not popularized.

<sup>14</sup> Ngoni people were a group composed by fugitives from today's KwaZulu Natal and their captives migrated during mfecane movements. They had politi-

the former<sup>15</sup>. The mission was both the centre of this administrative reforms and education addressed also for members of the established Tumbuka tribe. Only several dozens later the well-educated graduates of Livingstonia took crucial part in the independence movement. This was followed by economic marginalization of the region during dictatorship of decades-long presidency of Kamuzu Banda, declared Chewa, who, as most of my interlocutors stressed, underdeveloped the Ngoni-Tumbuka area according to his plan.

Today's presbyterian Christianity is dominating the religious life in the region, especially among Tumbuka people<sup>16</sup>. Presbyterian liturgies and prayers require electronic<sup>17</sup> instruments, like programmed keyboards as an accompaniment for gospel dancing choirs. Choirs are usually organized within particular congregations and they also use the technological equipment that belongs to the church. Due to the disposal of almost all musical equipment, churches are theoretically in control of the music education and the local scene<sup>18</sup>.

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cally dominated local groups in the mid-XIXth century, but in time assumed their language. Tumbuka people consisted on population inhabiting the area before Ngoni invasion.

<sup>15</sup> L. Vail, *The Creation of tribalism in Southern Africa*, London – Berkeley 1989.

<sup>16</sup> Although I do not dispose of the quantitative data, I have noticed that majority of Ngoni people who I met are members of Catholic church.

<sup>17</sup> Of course the electronic and the electric should not be treated by anthropologists as purely “given” material context, but as the socio-technologic phenomenon. The electric and electronic sound, as a field of study on (post)modernity, engages also philosophers. Greatly appreciated by anthropologists, Don Ihde compares the classic music and rock music sound, and coins the notion of “flow” as an essential quality of the latter. The flow, as he demonstrates, an over-embracing embodied process, is a mode of experience distinctive for modernity, defined by an extended use of electronic media (D. Ihde, *Listening and voice: phenomenologies of sound*, Albany 2007). Ihde's theory gives an remarkable example of how the social is constructed by the technologic and the technologic emerging from the social.

<sup>18</sup> The other music studios belong to independent producers connected with hip-hop and dancehall music, but they are usually located in private household

A similar pattern can be observed on the scene of presbyterian gospel of Northern Malawi outside the church performances. Presbyterian gospel has the best organized network of music recording studios and producers in the region. Producers are working within a pattern of electronic rhythms, that are highly appreciated by artists and their listeners as danceable, mixing it with western arrangements, and rhythms derived mostly from a South African and Congolese music. The process of the production is highly dominated by digital technologies and arrangements are purely electronic which excludes a studio recording of live instruments. To be the producer means to skillfully use electronic programs and hardware. The only non-automatized sounds are voices of soloists and choirs. To be Christian producer, which also implies a good deal of relatively lucrative<sup>19</sup> profession, means to be restricted only to Christian music<sup>20</sup>.

The bond of a Christian congregation, the technology and the commerce is visible also in the process of a production and a distribution of records. The paramount of expectation toward the local music carrier is to release a DVD with collection of videos to 10 or more original songs, but such an endeavor greatly exceeds

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and consist of the software, desktop computers and peripheral device. Hip-hop and dancehall remain independently distributed outside churches' structures, but religious motifs carry throughout their work relatively often.

<sup>19</sup> By stating that some economic activity was lucrative, we have to keep in mind that due to general economic situation of northern Malawi, the type of work was considered very dynamic. For example, one of best producers in Mzuzu (and a marvelous interlocutor), let's call him Don, during my research decided to open a new studio, where he could be the only owner and manager and couple of months later, move to South Africa to earn an incomparable amount of money, not on music production though.

<sup>20</sup> Generally music producers in Mzuzu are strictly limited to certain genres and parallel to cracked music software, arbitrary associated with the music style, i.e. in 2016 arrangements of gospel music were produced with Digital Audio Workstation Reason and hip-hop, dancehall style with Fruity Loops.



financial capacities of soloist or even choir. The production and the release of DVD was hence the venture of the complete congregation, not the individual artist. Elders of congregations decided about the investment in production of choir DVD, then after the costly process of recording and video shooting, when the production is finished and DVD is ready, the released title is sold in churches and other religious or semi-religious events.

For the musicians, producers and believers the technologisation of prayer, service and the evangelization (as this is the way, the music carrier of gospel musicians is defined), however limited due to crisis of Malawian economy and scarcity of technological resources, is anything but contradiction. Purely electronic rhythms, media and arrangements used during prayers indicate a relation between electricity, electronic instruments and Christianity, seen also as, literally and spiritually understood, enlightenment and development. The sound of the electronic brings the declaration of being modern, effective also in case of effectiveness of prayers. Thus, it stands as the declaration against paganism.

This, however, is not only a progressive social declaration of being modern. To grasp the deeper layer of association between the development of electricity and Christianity I must address the second case – *vimbuza* possession cult.

### **Spirits from acoustic drums**

Night soundscapes of smaller towns and villages, that are known to be centers of *vimbuza* cult, reverberate with a distant drumming sound from the darkness, a clear indication of an on-going ritual.

Nights of *vimbuza* performances are usually firmly set to particular days of week, distinguished between nearby *thempilis*. At the night of a performance patients, drummers, listeners, dancers

and most importantly the keeper of *thempili*<sup>21</sup>, known as *singanga* – which is translated as ‘African doctor’ by English speaking Tumbukas and Ngonis. The actual term *vimbuza* is the name of a disease and a medical and musical practice, that aims to communicate with spirits possessing diseased persons<sup>22</sup>. Most of categories of participation in the ritual are fluid and listeners can easily become drummers, even dancers. However, to become *vimbuza* dancer, one has to be diagnosed by the doctor as diseased. The diagnosed person starts to take part in rituals and due to individual character of disease can be cured after several dancing sessions, become a constant member of dancing team, or in most particular cases, become a *singanga*. Foregoing symptoms of sickness depend on a particular possessing spirit – they varied from a haunt in a dream by a stranger, through allergy to everyday staple food – *nsima*<sup>23</sup>, to fever, chronic tiredness and surliness in everyday contacts with neighbors. It can even drive to death, if no therapy is maintained which means that demands of spirits are ignored.

The single *vimbuza* dance – an isolated unit taken from the all night ritual – is presently performed by three drummers and individual dancer<sup>24</sup>. During the night another drummers and following dancers are involved. Three drums are playing distinguished parts, with first as a base rhythm playing regular crotchets, the second playing fast tuplets and the third one – the main – playing

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<sup>21</sup> Most *vimbuza* ceremonies I observed and being told of were performed at *thempilis* – a small temple usually located at the main dancer household, managed by him – or her together with family members.

<sup>22</sup> B. Soko, *Vimbuza: the healing dance of Northern Malawi*, Zomba 2014.

<sup>23</sup> *Nsima* is a puree from corn flour. As one of my informants said about attitude toward this staple food, “without *nsima* we haven’t eaten anything”.

<sup>24</sup> It is worth noting that *vimbuza* contains also different styles of music performances, that share the general idea of provoking the presence of spirits by the rhythmical density layered with melodic invocations. Not all performances involve the drumming orchestra.

more complicated rhythmic variations synchronized with dancers steps. Commenting after performances, drummers and dancers emphasized that it is the drummer who follows steps of the dancer and dancer's feet are actually steered by a spirit, who also directs particular songs and rhythms.

For the anthropologist the most distinctive sound is the roaring reverb of the main drum. The drums are produced from a certain local type of a tree and a goat skin. They are usually made with a hole in a lynchpin. The hole is covered by a resonating membrane made usually from a piece of a plastic bag and a cut bottle top. The massive resonator covered by the thin membrane produces the enormous pulsating sound, which really fills in the space of *thempili*. The knowledge of the technic of drumming and the drum production is often passed within families, but it is also sometimes distributed within the dancing group and, as some interlocutors highlighted, by spirits. Many drummers noticed that the process of learning is the matter of an observation of rituals and a gradually increasing participation, rather than an initiation or an isolated education.

*Vimbuza*, as commented by interlocutors, is founded on the aim of making spirits manifest in public, cooling them down by the dance and ceremonial gentility, enabling them to express their will. Only the fulfillment of spirits' fads is a condition of a healing process.

There are some other circumstances, within which spirits may be met, for example the sound of a broken twig in the bush, or a howl of the wind but these cases are always individual. Spirits are actually often compared to the wind. They cannot be seen, but one can see effect of their actions, as trees are moved by a blow. This metaphor is in fact reversible: I had observed during one of performances a female dancer, who had embroidered name on the back of her ritual dress – *anyamphepho* – which means “miss wind” (*mphepho* – wind).

The public manifestation of spirits may happen in two ways. The first way is more direct (more visible, one can say), when after the intensive rhythm and dance, spirit begins to talk through the (mouth of) the possessed person.

The second mode of manifestation is in every element of *vimbuza*. Lyrics of songs, rhythms, dance steps, attires of dancers are dictated by spirits during the performance. By this we can see that spirits actively take part in performance.

Stephen Friedson commented on *vimbuza* as construction of clinic reality within which patient is diagnosed and eventually healed<sup>25</sup>. Nevertheless, the concept of clinic reality has been criticized by anthropologists of medicine as colonial, construction of reality seems to be good start to think about *vimbuza* as a technology. The anthropologist who had researched the phenomenon of *vimbuza* around 30 years ago, proposed to understand music in *vimbuza* as a kind of technology, that constructs efficient clinical treatment of patients. I must favor this second approach, that enables to understand *vimbuza* in context of development of technologies.

*Vimbuza* like gospel music performed during church service or concert, gathers players, dancers, auditors, instruments, other spiritual and material functional paraphernalia, spirits, angels and demons. It consists of physical sound, lyrics of songs and dance movement but what is the constructive notion of music, goes far beyond the summary of elements and actors. Not defining it by the summary I rather describe it as temporary, semi-virtual collective of human and non-human actors within which a transformative work can be done by spiritual intervention enabled by technology.

Despite the fact that many *singangas* incorporated Christian symbols into the medical practice, using opening prayers to

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<sup>25</sup> S.M. Friedson, *Dancing prophets: musical experience in Tumbuka healing*, Chicago 1996.

*Yehova*, biblical quotations and sings of the cross, by puritan presbyterian Christians all sounds of drums are strongly associated with dangerous demonic spirits, a black magic and a sinful heathenism. Thereby, the sound and instruments inscribe particular rituals into wider ontologies and connect them with technical infrastructures.

Consequently, the close association of those cultural practices with certain materialities and technologies were observed. The materialities, as interviews have proven, linked to spiritual categories, identified with certain kind of immaterial beings – Holy Spirit – in case of the electric (and electronic) sound of Christian music, and spirits of animals, ancestors or of a rover provenience, clinging to the acoustic sound of local membranophones (*n'goma*). The character of sound, the instrument is associated with imaginary of the development understood as an electrification on the one hand and exclusion of malevolent spirits on the other. My presbyterian interlocutors found the idea of the electronic Christian gospel music using the dynamic and highly danceable local *vimbuza* rhythm unreasonable. Others made an assumption that spirits ignore the electronic sound and can only be called out (and be heated according to the local ontology) by acoustic drums. As a consequence, educated puritan Christians, who listen to the gospel music, reject the local rhythms and dances, associating it with dangerous spirits and threatening cults, and highly esteem music genres from other countries – rhythms of reggae, soukouss or mbaqanga from South Africa, that are neutral within the context of local cult economies<sup>26</sup>. This attitude may be also an answer to the lack of studio recordings of *vimbuza* rhythms.

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<sup>26</sup> I also heard that in certain circumstances the same members of Christian congregations take part in *vimbuza* ceremonies, however personal declarations of such a membership are hidden not only from European anthropologists but also from fellow Malawians.

I know only two professional recordings made by Malawian producers, and they are associated with understanding the *vimbuz*a as part of cultural heritage. One was the electronic version of *vimbuz*a made for local dance and music group named Kukaya, who defines its role as a preservation and promotion of Malawian north tradition, the other – produced by the local branch of the national television as a documentation of dances performed for president of the republic<sup>27</sup>.

The development concerns not only a technical infrastructure or a purely material realm. It is also perceived in a spiritual way, as an alliance of Christianity and modern technologies, that dominates, but not erases non-modernized material and spiritual actors. These actors – like *vimbuz*a spirits – are still present and powerful, but the development of modern technologies aims to give new powers to overcome them, isolate them and keep them hidden from the technologically increased presence of Jesus Christ, manifested by sensually experienced electronic sounds or electric light. Hence, the struggles of development of the country are seen in categories of not only an economic and political reconciliation but also the Manichean conflict of good and evil. It is worth noting though that the definition of evil – like witchcraft, spirits in this case – indicates an ambiguous relation with own pre-colonial past, for example native religions which are understood as dangerous relics.

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<sup>27</sup> The second example reflects the modern history of Malawi, and relates to country's first president, who was supposed to gather an "army" of African healers (also from Northern Region), aiming to strengthen his health and charisma with all kinds of nationally available magic, including musically transmitted powers. It presumably helped, at least in opinion of Malawians, as he held his office until he was in his nineties. Moreover, Kamuzu Banda often expressed his attachment to "traditional African values" and the involvement in the magic and dance within the state's representations made this declaration consistent, according to words of my interlocutors.

## Divine speed

These assumptions based on research in Malawi have some parallels in religious practices in neighboring Tanzania. Despite the proximity and many similarities, including ethnic groups like Ngoni, Tumbuka and Nyakyusa, the countries' histories are somehow detached<sup>28</sup>.

Not to dig deeper in the colonial and postcolonial times, for this paper it is well enough to notice that the infrastructure and accessibility to modern goods is far more secured in Tanzania. Considering that, I was curious how the notions of the technical development are perceived in religious context by members of Christian congregations in Iringa (and some Iringa and Mbeya born Dar Es Salaam residents). During a few weeks (preceded by studies on the literature) spent in Tanzania dedicated to comparative research, I observed spaces of religious practices, religious materiality and discussed the ritual phenomena in Iringa and Dar Es Salaam, obviously I also analyzed music and its technology used during prayers.

Number of researches of non-western healing practices and religions of Tanzania concern interactions with spirits<sup>29</sup> or categorization of non-material beings. The general category is called in Kiswahili *mashaitani*. Pat Caplan wrote about distinction into *mizimu* and *majini* made by Swahili people from Mafia Island. *Majini* are often referred to as spirits of water and also resemble

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<sup>28</sup> Only in this volume the historical context of Tanzania is addressed by Maximilian Chahula and Maciej Ząbek. Enough said that differences of political silhouettes of both countries' first presidents – Hastings Kamuzu Banda and Julius Nyerere clearly show the multitude of contrasting, political projects emerging in newly established African states.

<sup>29</sup> S.A. Langwick, *Bodies, politics, and African healing: the matter of maladies in Tanzania*, Bloomington 2011.

men from different ethnic groups. Cults connected with *majini*, called *mkobero* and *tari*, have many common features with above mentioned *vimbuza* cult<sup>30</sup>. It is clearly visible that despite political and economic detachment dated in colonial times, the cultural aspect reminds akin or at least gradable changing.

The distinctive part of Tanzanian religious practices is their mediatization. Comparing to Malawi one can have clear impression that Tanzanian congregation takes a full advantage of the accessibility to a technical hardware and software. The high quality gospel music videos, advertising banners, video broadcast, sms services, amplified speakers transmitting religious holy masses and prayers seem to be integrated parts of the local religious life. Not only the materiality but also the research on the discursive reveals the religious truth of the technological.

One of numerous charismatic churches from Dar Es Salaam announces its services by showing the banner with slogan “Divine speed” and illustration of an exceeded speedometer. The same church involves – as many others – live band, playing long hours of rhythmical, electrified music with guitars and electronic keyboards. The tempo of the music gradually rose, finding the culmination in the final part of the service. Similar scheme of a long and widely resounding religious performance I found in Iringa’s Seventh Day Adventist congregation.

My interlocutors from Iringa told me about services of puritan churches, comparing them to the spiritual, extreme body building in professional gym. The comparison, however, was not verbalized but expressed with gesticulation resembling a body building exercise when talking about zealous prayer sessions of congregation.

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<sup>30</sup> P. Caplan, *African voices, African lives personal narratives from a Swahili village*, London – New York 2003.



I was also introduced to the project of a church owned bank, with name related to economic progress. The aim of the bank was to invest money of parishioners for a common capital accumulation. I have been instructed that this financial project is not about the business, but about faith.

The other example refers to a transnational religious practice, welding Tanzania, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and other countries from the region. It concerns prophet Shepherd Bushiri, grown in Mzuzu, but presently living in South Africa, where he built economic and organizational empire, including a prominent channel Prophet TV. One of the most influential personages in Eastern and Southern Africa, by my Tanzanian interlocutors, he is perceived mostly by recorded and broadcasted sermons, rumors about miracles (e.g. he was supposed to sponsor football national teams with a miracle money) and multiple music videos of bands promoted by Prophet TV.

Martin Lindhardt, who observed the religious practices in Iringa Region, in a series of articles explains the categorization of modern material goods (i.e. banknotes, CDs) and ways they are attained, as deeply rooted in theological evaluations and concerns of the black magic<sup>31</sup>. Lindhardt explains these practices as part of the so-called cult economy, a complex set of views on the essence of the capitalist economy, market goods and money, which engages them in a good-evil Manichean polarity and informs about moral and sinful ways of a capital accumulation.

The acceleration, the power, the capital, the effectiveness, the amplification – these are features of religious symbolism and ma-

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<sup>31</sup> M. Lindhardt, *More Than Just Money: The Faith Gospel and Occult Economies in Contemporary Tanzania*, „Nova Religio”, 13(2009), no. 1, pp. 41–67; M. Lindhardt, “If you are saved you cannot forget your parents”: Agency, Power, and Social Repositioning in Tanzanian born-again Christianity, „Journal of Religion in Africa”, 40(2010), no. 3, pp. 240–272.

teriality, indicating a relation with the technical development. By these all, we can see that in practice, the religion and the technical development are perceived as nearly equal or at least compatible. Moreover, seeing the religious practice from the perspective of its effectiveness allows to understand the relations of Christianity and local religions<sup>32</sup> not as contradictions but as dialectic and concomitance<sup>33</sup>.

As a conclusion I would like to propose a question to an open discussion and a thesis.

The question concerns the thread from the very beginning of the lecture, when I indicated Max Weber's work "The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism"<sup>34</sup>. In the seminal volume, Weber introduces the way of understanding modern capitalist, bureaucratic, rational, lay in its essence society as the effect of religious movement of the protestantism. The capitalism and its core value – the development might be, according to Weber, deeply bonded with the religion, however the layness and the material rationalism of modern seculars states show the ambiguous relation of these two. Hence, the question is: to what extent connections between

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<sup>32</sup> In the light of studies on vimbuza or zar religion, that have shown how these cults emerged in the context of historical change, it seems to be obvious oversimplification to address them as "traditional". See R. Natvig, *Oromos, Slaves, and the Zar Spirits: A Contribution to the History of the Zar Cult*, „The International Journal of African Historical Studies”, 20(1987), no. 4, p. 669; B. Soko, *Vimbuza: the healing dance of Northern Malawi*, op. cit.; A. Young, 'Why Amhara get kurenya: sickness and possession in an Ethiopian zar cult', „American Ethnologist”, 2(1975), no. 3, pp. 567–584.

<sup>33</sup> J. Mlenga, *Dual religiosity in Northern Malawi: Ngonde Christians and African traditional religion*, Mzuzu 2016; T. Ranger, *Religious Pluralism in Zimbabwe. A Report on the Britain-Zimbabwe Society Research Day, St Antony's College, Oxford, 23 April 1994*, „Journal of Religion in Africa”, 25(1995), no. 3, p. 226.

<sup>34</sup> M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, S.I.: Merchant Books 2013 [1905].

religion and technical development in Eastern Africa are an effect of religious colonization by Protestant countries i.e. Germany and Great Britain, or the manifestation of a *longuee duree* – long-lasting structure of culture, in which the divine is not an abstract, but an effective power.

The thesis on the other way, concerns the very essence of what the technical development might be. What can be concluded from above examples is that the technical development is not (or not only) an objective of social and political change. It is a function in a network determined and defined by social relations in varieties of social contexts.

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## Chapter 11.

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ANTONIO ALLEGRETTI

# THE RELIGIOUS (AND POLITICAL) MATERIALITY OF DEVELOPMENT AMONG CHRISTIAN MAASAI IN CONTEMPORARY TANZANIA

### ABSTRACT

Affiliation to Christianity among the Maasai of Tanzania is relatively a recent phenomenon when compared to the quite long history of Christianity in the rest of the country. It is, however, a phenomenon that is rapidly spreading with new churches mushrooming in Maasai villages and transforming the social, cultural and material landscape of Maasailand in Tanzania. This chapter intends to show how religion can add a further layer to the analysis of the transformations involving the meanings and practices associated to being Maasai in contemporary Tanzania. Unlike popular (and academic) discourses that tend to consider factors of change such as religion or economic diversification as external to Maasai tradition and associate them to the waning of meaning underlying it, this chapter argues that the sphere of spirituality (i.e. Christianity) constitutes an arena in which political relations, intended as power relations between different sectors of society and community, are played out. Rather than simply representing a generational change as to the preferences for cultural references and role models among younger generations as opposed to their fathers, the arena of religion is a site of negotiations for the access to human and material assets, and to overall 'development'. The analysis in the chapter endorses the shift of perspective from religion as a cultural system or set of ethereal beliefs that pertain to the sphere of individual faith, to the material aspects (e.g. consumption, architecture, and the impor-

tance of material goods), that work as interface between these and the sphere of the discernible.

**Key words:** Maasai, materiality, religion, Christianity, development.

## Introduction

Anyone trying to define concepts such as globalization, identity, nationalism, and the like cannot but acknowledge a partial view and all the limitations attached. With religion, the question of definition becomes even more hazardous as we enter the sphere of faith, touching on the sensibility of all people in the world who consider themselves followers of any institutionalized faith. Many influential theorists and scientists in the history of human thought, from Freud, to Darwin, to Marx, have touched on religion, developing theories within their respective areas of authority<sup>1</sup>. As the fathers of social sciences began to approach the question of religion, the ‘sacred’ and the ‘supernatural’ became the objects of inquiry<sup>2</sup>. With Geertz<sup>3</sup>, the attention shifted to symbols as “extrasomatic control mechanisms for organizing experience and governing behavior”<sup>4</sup>.

Quite surprisingly, only towards the end of the 20th century social scientists, especially anthropologists, have started focusing on much more ‘mundane’ matters when looking at religion as an object of inquiry<sup>5</sup>. Beyond more ethereal and intangible aspects of

<sup>1</sup> J.D. Eller, *Introducing Anthropology of Religion*, New York – London 2007.

<sup>2</sup> R.L. Winzeler, *Anthropology and Religion. What We Know, Think, and Question*, Lanham – New York – Toronto – Plymouth 2012.

<sup>3</sup> C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays*, New York 1973.

<sup>4</sup> J.D. Eller, *Introducing Anthropology of Religion*, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup> W. Keane, *On the Materiality of Religion*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2, pp. 230–231; D. Chidester, *Engaging the Wildness of Things*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2, pp. 232–233; B. Meyer, *Media and the Senses in the Making of Religious Experience: an Introduction*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2,

religion such as those that pertain to the sphere of individual belief, it is common acknowledgment today among anthropologists that religion is an element that determines forms of social organization, hence an inherently social phenomenon<sup>6</sup> determined by the particular historical dynamics in which it surfaces and evolves<sup>7</sup>. This article focuses on a specific case of (changing) social organization in relation to religion, that is, the 'traditional' forms of social organization, mostly those age(sets) and gender-based, among the Maasai of Tanzania. It focuses on how Christianity among Maasai communities adds a further layer of analysis in understanding the current position of Maasai people as a culturally identifiable community. The chapter therefore highlights how Maasai today in Tanzania break the boundaries of 'community' itself based on tradition, culture and ethnic identity as they partake in other networks in the wider society. It is therefore, an analysis of overlapping and co-existing sets of values with religion constituting one particular sphere of morality alongside others, above all, that of tradition.

The analysis spotlights politics and materiality as arenas in which the religious registers are played out; these are two spheres that have recently attracted the attention of anthropologists of religion. No doubt, the most influential work on religion and politics in Africa by Ellis and ter Haar<sup>8</sup>, can be taken as a starting point when trying

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pp. 124–135; Idem, *Materializing Religion*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2, p. 227; D. Morgan, *The Materiality of Cultural Construction*, „Material Religion”, 4(2008), no. 2, pp. 228–229.

<sup>6</sup> B. Morris, *Religion and Anthropology. A Critical Introduction*, Cambridge 2006, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> T. Asad, *The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category*, in: *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, ed. T. Asad, Baltimore 1993, pp. 27–54.

<sup>8</sup> S. Ellis and G. ter Haar, *Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, „The Journal of Modern African Studies”, 36(1998), no. 2, pp. 175–201; Idem, *Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa*, London 2004.



to deploy meaningful connections between the sphere of religion, that of politics and the question of power, as a regulator of dynamics and structures of authority and hierarchy<sup>9</sup>. While Ellis and ter Haar's stress on the significance of religion as the "most important way in which Africans interact with the rest of the world"<sup>10</sup> may be overemphasized, the bond between the sphere of religion and politics in Africa is undeniable. Ellis and ter Haar refer mostly to religion as the ultimate source of power mainly in a situation of weak states, which characterizes the African continent. Their broad definition of power as "the ability of a person to induce others to act in the way that he or she requires"<sup>11</sup>, however, makes the analysis of the connection between religion and power itself applicable not only to national politics but also to much smaller-scale local dynamics such as for instance, the case and dynamics of social change at issue here among Maasai communities, where authority and hierarchy emerge as much as in the national political arena.

At local level, in Maasai communities, Christianity as an institution and one of the arenas in which power relations unfold, interacts with other overlapping and co-existing arenas of power, such as for instance the realm of 'tradition' grounded on Maasai ethnic identity. Tradition, culture, and identity, as political arenas where management and battle over resources are exercised, are a prevailing viewpoint of classic anthropology<sup>12</sup>, as much as more

<sup>9</sup> Iidem, *Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>10</sup> Iidem, *Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa*, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Iidem, *Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, op. cit., p. 196.

<sup>12</sup> J. Ferguson, *The „Bovine Mystique”: Power, Property and Livestock in Rural Lesotho*, „Man”, 20(1985), no. 4, pp. 647–674; Idem, *The Cultural Topography of Wealth: Commodity Paths and the Structure of Property in Rural Lesotho*, „American Anthropologist”, 94(1992), no. 1, pp. 55–73; *Being Maasai: Ethnicity & Identity in East Africa*, eds. T. Spear and R. Waller, Oxford – Dar es Salaam – Nairobi – Athens 1993.

recent scholarship that looks at the integration between pastoral and cash economy among the Maasai and other pastoral groups in Eastern Africa<sup>13</sup>. The history of Africa and colonialism displays the distinct bond between tradition, identity and battles of power on the ground. With, for instance, the establishment of Native Authorities based on ethnicity or formalization of customary law by colonial administrators for the sake of administering large territories otherwise impossible to rule, new struggles for entitlements over resources emerged<sup>14</sup>. Today, tradition continues to constitute among the Maasai an important institution that determines forms of social organization and (not without conflict) structures of power, hierarchy and authority for the management of resources, from livestock to land and cash, between different sectors of society (elders, youth and women)<sup>15</sup>. Christianity has added one more dimension to these dynamics, having brought a new set or register of values which is on many occasions, in overt conflict with the register of tradition.

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<sup>13</sup> E. Fratkin, *East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Borana, and Rendille Cases*, „African Studies Review”, 44(2001), no. 3, pp. 1–25; K. Home-wood, *Ecology of African Pastoralist Societies*, Oxford – Athens – Pretoria 2008, pp. 228–229; K. Smith, *The Farming Alternative: Changing Age and Gender Ideology among Pastoral Rendille and Ariaal*, „Nomadic Peoples”, 3(1999), no. 2, pp. 131–146; F. Zaal, *Economic Integration in Pastoral Areas: Commercialisation and Social Change among Kenya’s Maasai*, „Nomadic Peoples”, 3(1999), no. 2, pp. 97–114.

<sup>14</sup> S. Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent. The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Madison 1993; M. Chanock, *Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law Reform*, „International Journal of Law and Family”, 3(1989), pp. 72–88; D.L. Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development*, Bloomington 2001.

<sup>15</sup> A. Allegretti, *Maasai Ethnic Economy: Rethinking Maasai Ethnic Identity and the ‘Cash Economy’ across the Rural-Urban Interface, Tanzania*. PhD Thesis [unpublished]. The University of Manchester, 2015; *Being Maasai: Ethnicity & Identity in East Africa*, op. cit.

As with ethnic identity not defining the entirety of the social world in which those who refer to themselves as Maasai are enmeshed, neither religion can be taken as a “totalizing” institution<sup>16</sup>; religion should not be considered an institution that is sweeping away Maasai traditional institutions based on ethnic identity. As Green argues<sup>17</sup>, religious communities in Africa, loosely defined as groups of people sharing a particular vision of the world (inherently religious), “are not necessarily longstanding but come into being around particular ritual agendas”<sup>18</sup>. Instead, as globalizing processes abridge distances and spaces, the Maasai, as many other so-called ‘traditional’ or place-based groups<sup>19</sup> around the world, find themselves at the intersection of different communities which triggers a complex evolution of the meanings and practices associated to ethnic identity as well as the necessity to adapt the analytical categories that have so far been used to describe it. These developments come inevitably into being as inherently political contests in which the religious as a “category of analysis and practice” inevitably “has origins in the political struggles around delimiting the power of certain institutions”<sup>20</sup>, in this case Maasai ‘traditional’ institutions.

The second piece of the puzzle in the analysis, i.e. materiality, comes up as the tangible arena in which these political relations are enacted. Religion materializes through the external, material world, many anthropologists have started to point recently as they

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<sup>16</sup> M. Green, *Confronting Categorical Assumptions about the Power of Religion in Africa*, „Review of African Political Economy”, 2006, no. 110 pp. 635–650.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem, p. 642.

<sup>19</sup> Groups all around the world that for political historical reasons have maintained connections to a particularly distinct (‘traditional’) lifestyle, with strong geographical connotations and links to ‘ancestral’ land

<sup>20</sup> M. Green, *Confronting Categorical Assumptions about the Power of Religion in Africa*, op. cit., p. 637.

have partaken in the so called ‘media turn’ in religious studies<sup>21</sup>. Religion as experience that can be acquired through the senses<sup>22</sup> comes at the opposite end of religion as individual belief without denying it; it simply acknowledges that, as Keane puts it, “even where belief is crucial, it must still take material form [...] Ideas are not transmitted telepathically. They must be exteriorized in some way, for example, in words, gestures, objects, or practices in order to be transmitted from one mind to another”<sup>23</sup>. In this chapter, the material realms of the battle between traditional and religious institutions as carriers of value are food consumption which has a particularly heightened significance among the Maasai<sup>24</sup>, and the material form of the church as ‘house of God’ whose church members contribute to develop.

### Fieldsite and methods

The fieldwork on which this chapter is based was conducted during different time intervals from 2010 to 2012 in the Maasai village of Losirwa<sup>25</sup> which is for the most part pure grazing rangeland (Fig. 1). The closest peri-urban centre, Kigongoni, stretches over the main paved road that cuts across the Maasailand of Losirwa and increasingly encroaches open rangeland used by the Maasai of Losirwa for grazing (Fig. 2). A few kilometers further down

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<sup>21</sup> M. Engelke, *Religion and the Media Turn*, „American Ethnologist”, 37(2010), no. 2, p. 371–379.

<sup>22</sup> B. Meyer, *Media and the Senses in the Making of Religious Experience: an Introduction*, op. cit., pp. 124–135.

<sup>23</sup> W. Keane, *On the Materiality of Religion*, op. cit, p. 230.

<sup>24</sup> P. Spencer, *The Maasai of Matapato: A Study of Ritual Rebellion*, Manchester 1988; A. Talle, *Ways of Milk and Meat among the Maasai: Gender Identity and Food Resources in a Pastoral Economy*, in: *From Water to World Making*, ed. G. Palsson, Uppsala 1990, pp. 73–93.

<sup>25</sup> Names of locations are real.



Fig. 1 Losirwa Rangelands




Fig. 2 Paved road in Kigongoni

the paved road, on the way to the worldwide known Ngorongoro Conservation Area, one comes across the small town of Mto wa Mbu which forms a single, though patchy, (peri) urban conglomerate with Kigongoni.

I conducted ethnographic fieldwork through participant observation as well as a few formal interviews with a number of individuals, including those affiliated to the church, being hosted by the Tutunyo<sup>26</sup> Maasai family. While lodging in the Tutunyo *boma*<sup>27</sup> I commuted between the rural and urban-based locations including attending church Sunday masses and other church events in the local Lutheran church in Losirwa which is located somehow at the ‘border’ between the open rangeland of Losirwa and the peri-urban territory of Kigongoni. This chapter is grounded on

<sup>26</sup> Names of people are fictitious.

<sup>27</sup> An enclosure made of several huts, one or more livestock kraals, and surrounded by a fence made of tree branches, i.e. the traditional Maasai homestead.

a wealth of information, opinions, impressions and practices that I recorded during such events in the local church but also by talking to other informants outside the church networks. The main protagonists of this account are young *moran*<sup>28</sup> whose age ranged from 20 to 35 such as Luka, one among whom I built relationships of trust and friendship, as well as Isaya, a close friend of Lekishon (and mine), and a Maasai *moran* himself from another Maasai close-by village, who, at the time of fieldwork was the evangelist appointed by the Lutheran parish council in Mto wa Mbu to work in the local church in Losirwa. When I use the name ‘father’, I refer to Tutunyo’s boma head, a Maasai elder and Luka’s father, with whom I also established a close relationship of trust and respect.

In a way, throughout this chapter I hint at these three protagonists as embodiment(s) of the different positions or stances when it comes to the relationship between ‘tradition’ and Christian spirituality, with Isaya representing Christian values, ‘father’ the ‘traditional’ values, and Lekishon mediating between the two. As a certain degree of typification is unavoidable, I wish to stress that this account does not claim to exhaustively report the complexities of (Maasai) ‘tradition’ in its interaction with modernization forces. It is, however, a sincere attempt to ethnographically document the challenges and dilemmas that young men, like many other ‘indigenous’ or place-based peoples around the world, are confronted with when undertaking their individual life paths towards full personhood within the collectivities to which they belong.

### **Mediating between ‘communities’**

No forms of social organization is or has been in human history determined by an entirely homogenous set or register

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<sup>28</sup> Young Maasai in the warriorhood life stage (before entering ‘elderhood’).

of values; all communities and societies to some extent, especially in transitional times, and increasingly in our contemporary global world, have drawn from different ‘value baskets’ in routine life and ideology. Nowhere more than in contemporary Africa this holds true<sup>29</sup>, considering the combination of factors such as urbanization, market liberalization, and demographic change that continue to clash with and impact on, at times violently, more ‘traditional’ forms of social organization mostly originated in rural life<sup>30</sup>. The case of the Maasai in Tanzania and the spread of Christianity is only one among many in the African continent.

That eastern Africa pastoralism in transitional times is by now an acknowledged fact<sup>31</sup>; market liberalization, livelihood diversification and urbanization starting in the 1980’s have had major effects on these groups. The general understanding among researchers is that these factors of change have impacted on the Maasai by triggering cultural homogenization and loss of tradition. Elsewhere, I have challenged this kind of narrative and argued that tradition and culture underlying Maasai ethnic identity are being transformed and reinvented rather than swept away<sup>32</sup>. Even in the case of market integration, which is commonly acknowledged as a factor leading to ‘disappearing’ tradition and ethnic identity, I have argued, tradition and ethnic identity can be ‘capitalized’ on and become market institutions for market gains by Maasai

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<sup>29</sup> J. Guyer, *Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa*, Chicago – London 2004.

<sup>30</sup> D.F. Bryceson, *Rural Livelihoods and Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa: Processes and Policies*, in: *Rural Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction Policies*, eds. F. Ellis and H.A. Freeman London – New York 2005, pp. 43–74.

<sup>31</sup> E. Fratkin, *East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Borana, and Rendille Cases*, op. cit., pp. 1–25.

<sup>32</sup> A. Alegretti, *Maasai Ethnic Economy...*, op. cit.

themselves<sup>33</sup>. This has led to a plurality of value registers rather than replacement of an old (i.e. tradition/culture) with a new one.

Maasai church goes in Losirwa village (and throughout Maasailand presumably), embody this plurality of value registers in that they partake in different social networks and social worlds parallel to those networks based on ethnicity that have been described so well in classic ethnographical accounts<sup>34</sup>. Their identity is an assemblage that hinges on their membership in a multiplicity of communities that come from religion<sup>35</sup> and formal education<sup>36</sup>, and their social lives are shifting and diverse. Younger generations of *moran* are those most involved in parallel spheres of relationships. Both these spheres of relationships are somehow recognized in Losirwa and overall in the country as carriers of ‘modern’ values and for their empowering role within Maasai society. Several of these young warriors assiduously attend the local church, supporting and sometimes leading the activities of spreading the religious message, often through organizing events such as collective prayers, religious film showings, and helping followers and non-followers with counseling and other kinds of moral support. Among these young churchgoers, many were at the same time enrolled in primary or secondary school, and those who were attending boarding schools away from Losirwa would not miss church events or simply the Sunday Mass on their return home for holidays.

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<sup>33</sup> Idem, „*Being Maasai*” in *Markets and Trade: the Role of Ethnicity-Based Institutions in the Livestock Market of Northern Tanzania*, „Nomadic Peoples”, 21(2017), no. 1, pp. 63–86.

<sup>34</sup> P. Rigby, *Persistent Pastoralists. Nomadic Societies in Transition*, London 1985; P. Spencer, *The Maasai of Matapato: A Study of Ritual Rebellion*, op. cit.; H. Schneider, *Livestock and Equality in East Africa*, Bloomington 1979.

<sup>35</sup> D.L. Hodgson, *The Church of Women. Gendered Encounters Between Maasai and Missionaries*, Bloomington 2005.

<sup>36</sup> E. Bishop, *Schooling and the Encouragement of Farming amongst Pastoralists in Tanzania*, „Nomadic Peoples”, 11(2007), no. 2, pp. 9–29.



What struck me was how these young Maasai shifted in their practices as well as the way they verbalized this plurality of forms and sets of values. One thing that struck me in particular was how they never complied with, or better said, intentionally broke, the traditional Maasai rules of food consumption (see next section) during church events. They would share meals with women (a taboo in most cases within the Maasai village) in heterogeneous groups and paying very little attention to the sharing rules within age sets (see next section). At times, they would express contempt for traditional rules in force in the village; at other times, with little awareness of proposing contradicting ideas, they would underline the positive values of Maasai 'tradition' and their pride in showing group affiliation through food sharing.

Overall, religious affiliation affected these young men's views about some specific and important aspects of their daily life as well as their visions of future. These aspects had to do with ideas connected to individuality, practically expressed by the rejection of complying outside of 'traditional' networks with the sharing rules, and triggering a stronger sense of the self as opposed to group and ethnic collective awareness. The way they verbally envisioned their future also was an expression of contradictions such as their views about what constitutes wealth. They criticized elders' attachment to livestock at the expenses of other forms of wealth such as a 'modern' house, while wishing to retain and reproduce their families' wealth in livestock as a form of reproducing family values and ethnic identity. Polygamy as opposed to monogamy was another domain that blatantly expressed these contradictions considering that many individuals who voluntarily and convincingly had made themselves carriers of religious church values (including monogamy), were in fact polygamous, having married more than one woman, and continuing to marry other women as they continued with their moral engagement with the

church. Notwithstanding their participation in co-existing communities and networks, they continued to claim their identity as Maasai and as pastoralists, including those enrolled in school where usually values connected to agriculture-based livelihoods are highlighted as opposed to pastoralism which is considered a backward lifestyle<sup>37</sup>.

Evidently, the ideas that put the Maasai as an ethnic group, their customary and traditional institutions and practices, in opposition and mutually exclusive with instances of monetization, commoditization, 'modern' technologies (i.e. mobile phones), and in general many other aspects of everyday life of youths in Tanzania (e.g. religion affiliation and formal education) are mistaken, perhaps having survived as historical legacies of economic policies or development interventions<sup>38</sup>.

### **Political religion**

The plurality of communities in which younger generations of Maasai males are embedded is a very complex set of overlapping registers of values, as seen above, and this heterogeneous mix impacts on how resources, economic assets and wealth are managed, and the entitlements over and distribution of them.

The wedding of Luka, a 25-year-old Maasai warrior in the Tutunyo family and one of my closest friends in the field, was the occasion during fieldwork in which I realized the 'politics' involved in the relationships between spiritual affiliation to the local Lutheran church (or absence of it) and the politics of distribution and entitlements to resources and assets. It was striking to witness Luka's struggle in positioning himself between his father's efforts

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<sup>37</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>38</sup> D.L. Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors...*, op. cit.

in encouraging him to celebrate a ‘traditional’ Maasai wedding with related redistribution of entitlements and ownership of cattle (see below), and Isaya’s (the evangelist in the Losirwa church and Luka’s close friend) equally strong resolution to have a Christian celebration for him.

The first sign that the wedding celebration for Lekishon was to become a battleground for different views was father advising Lekishon to avoid having, during the celebration, people dressed in ‘Swahili’ clothes<sup>39</sup>. Isaya interpreted father’s suggestion (or admonition) as an effort to persuade Lekishon to have a fully traditional wedding without ‘external’ invitees that could disrupt the ceremonial traditional ritual. In one of his manifestations of disapproval, Isaya argued: “What kind of feast is it going to be?! Just drinking milk?!”

Milk (and its consumption) as determinant of traditional social organization and medium of life turns in individuals’ life cycles<sup>40</sup> sees its importance amplified during Maasai traditional celebrations through the ritual practice. On wedding celebrations, for instance, drinking milk according to a specific ‘protocol’ that requires groom and bride to drink milk in front of a delegation of *wazee* (elders), serves to establish the everlasting wedlock. On the occasion of the rite of passage from childhood to adulthood for males (through circumcision) too, milk is used by the one performing the operation to wash his hands as a stronger cleanser than water. Isaya’s ridiculing of the importance of milk on the wedding ceremony meant to express his disapproval and standpoint against tradition that, in the specific regard of marriage, rejected any alternative medium for the establishment of the wedlock such as those accounted for by the religious register.

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<sup>39</sup> Ordinary clothes such as trousers, shirts and the like.

<sup>40</sup> A. Talle, *Ways of Milk and Meat among the Maasai...*, op. cit., pp. 73–93.

As time went by, a decision had to be taken as to the type of wedding to arrange. Not without inner struggle, Lekishon decided eventually to organize a 'traditional' wedding only after overcoming and resisting the impetus or impulse, as he confided to me, to call the marriage off. The wedding was eventually celebrated and the traditional conventions including the customary consumption of milk were adhered to. Participants, strictly dressed in Maasai clothes, attended the whole ceremony from early afternoon to evening consuming cow meat and different types of spirit along with other drinks from bottled beers to sodas.

Other dynamics of entitlements and redistribution of property rights over livestock were particularly important to observe, especially the choice for the animals to be sold to fund the ceremony. Father 'borrowed' five cows from his other sons and sold them to finance Luka's ceremony as per 'customary' habit which had previously enabled Luka's older brothers to fund their own respective wedding ceremonies. Weddings are only one occasion in which one can realize the complex web of exchange and redistribution of property rights within an extended Maasai family<sup>41</sup>. I also described elsewhere<sup>42</sup> how younger warriors, elders, and women form a triangle of power relations expressed through property rights and entitlements over livestock in interaction with other forms of wealth, from cash to land, and houses. Such complex web is certainly one specific instance in which affiliation to Christianity on the one hand, and partaking in 'traditional' networks on the other creates conflicting relationships between the two communities. Isaya made extremely clear to me what he thought of the web of exchange within the 'traditional' Maasai family when

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<sup>41</sup> P. Spencer, *The Maasai of Matapato: A Study of Ritual Rebellion*, op. cit.; Idem, *The Pastoral Continuum. The Marginalization of Tradition in East Africa*, Oxford 1998.

<sup>42</sup> A. Allegretti, *Maasai Ethnic Economy...*, op. cit.

he referred to Luka's *boma* as a "dictatorship", with Luka's father being the dictator "eating his sons' wealth", referring to father's entitlements to dispose of his respective sons' cows without them having a say on it.

Religious affiliation has come with values that refer to individual success as opposed to shared property rights within the extended family. Similar criticism with respect to 'sharing' was however expressed by some elders, including the Tutunyo *boma* head (i.e. Luka's father), about the networks of distribution among church followers. On one of our many interesting conversation, father referred critically to the offers donated by church followers on a weekly basis that go to fund projects such as the renovation/construction of (religious) buildings and the purchases of supplies for the sake of religious activities. He argued: "Everyday they ask you to contribute money for their things; how can you contribute everyday?! And you don't see any benefit from it".

Such kind of criticism about circulation of wealth within church networks does not only come from those who are evidently outside such networks, but also from some insiders, and even church leaders themselves. Another interesting field informant I often spent time with in Losirwa and Kigongoni was Matayo, a Maasai middle-aged man originally from the neighboring village of Munghere who, after going through inner struggle of the kind Lekishon went through on occasion of his wedding, had taken the difficult decision to hang up his cassocks and marry a second younger wife. He lived at the 'border' between the Losirwa Maasailand and the peri-urban tissue of Kigongoni, having built a new house after leaving the church. His story is particularly significant when analyzing how the sphere of religiosity and spirituality in the local community of Losirwa/Kigongoni is heavily entrenched in networks and dynamics of resource sharing and management, local 'politics', and individual life paths in achieving (economic) independency and success.

The way he talked about his previous involvement with the Lutheran church showed the political dynamics that occur between church leaders and church followers. He said that the offering of money to the church had become an obligation fulfilled with great difficulty by many. People who could not prove their ‘attachment’ to the church by offering money would be looked upon and be embarrassed whereas the more ‘generous’, charitable, and benevolent would acquire positions of respect alongside church leaders and even gain decision-making power in the church affairs. Such stratification, he argued, is morally questionable when in a church and religious context where the values of equality ought to underlie social relationships among members.

These dynamics affected his own involvement with the church. As a priest, his position of leadership entailed not only his physical presence in the church but also to lavish and donate even larger sums of money for church projects and to the church members themselves as ‘offers’ to support their livelihoods. Such situation became unbearable to him and his family:

You see, those people and elders in the church always tell you, you have to go to the church every single day otherwise they would ‘accuse’ you of not being a good Christian. Plus, you have to be the first to contribute to set the example to other people... but that way you will end up poor! So many priests who retired from their services ended up becoming alcoholics ‘cos they could not save anything in their whole lives!

Leaving the priesthood was not an easy choice for him, but it turned out to be the right one as he explained: putting all his efforts in his farm earned him important assets and wealth to the point that he is now envied, he said, within the village. He argued that he followed “God’s way” in leaving the church and succeeded in his other life endeavors.

It emerges that the sphere of spirituality is far from being simply confined to an individual’s faith in a spiritual being. Quite the op-

posite, it is an arena that much resembles that of 'tradition', where social and political relationships are established, nurtured, and at times severed. These dynamics become even more complex when one partakes at the same time in both the church community and other networks based on Maasai 'tradition' as observed in the case of Luka. Luka's words in reference to this problematic link, and referring to his own situation as opposed to that of Isaya, showed how strong the dilemma was for him:

Isaya wants me to abandon all the Maasai tradition at once; but he is wrong 'cos when you are born in a certain tribe it is difficult to abandon everything.

Then, he continued:

He has already achieved his individual position within the church, so people in the church help him out when he needs to be helped; no one is going to help *me* but my family in the village.

That individuals can and do mediate between the two spheres of Christianity and (Maasai) tradition as a way of gaining recognition of personhood (also by achieving economic success) was confirmed on many occasion by Isaya who would not miss a chance to tell me how becoming a priest had enabled him to feel satisfied and fulfilled. In his own case, and unlike many others like Luka, the mediation between the two spheres materialized through the outright abandonment of Maasai tradition but without renouncing his own Maasai identity. On many occasions he referred to not only property rights arrangements but also Maasai traditional consumption arrangements which I will discuss in the next section as 'slavery' while at the same time reaffirming his own ethnic identity as a Maasai and his role as one who is supposed to strive to 'educate' his own Maasai people (those partaking in the church). As once he told me while discussing the question of Maasai tradition:

You *wazungu* [whites] want the Maasai to stay the way they are because you want to come here and see the traditional life, but they really need to change and get developed, and they can only do that if they abandon their traditions!

The question of development, as will be seen in the next section, is in fact particularly meaningful when considering the material embodiment of the community (political) dynamics just described.

### Material religion

Meyer's well-known historical account<sup>43</sup> of colonial Christian mission churches and conversions in Ghana is perhaps one of the most accurate, compelling, and still current accounts of 'material religion', that is, the material aspects that embody spirituality making it discernible in the outside world. Meyer shows quite emphatically how "worldly matters"<sup>44</sup> played a fundamental role in, or better still, constituted the tangible socio-political arena for the conversions of Ghanaians to Christianity during colonialism. Against the mission rhetoric which promoted the use and consumption of consumer goods (e.g. imported clothes) as simply an outward sign of an inner (Christian) spirituality, Ghanaians absorbed and transformed consumption practices by assigning them meanings that pertained to individual (economic) success in a competitive rivalry between each other, hence, as a result, dismissing the vision of the Christian mission of the sober and humble Christian<sup>45</sup>.

It is undeniable that there is an overt link in contemporary Africa between the sphere of spirituality and that of 'worldly matters'. The connection becomes even stronger as religion as

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<sup>43</sup> B. Meyer, *Christian Mind and Worldly Matter*, „Journal of Material Culture”, 2(1997), no. 3, pp. 311–337.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 313.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 311–337.



a network overlaps with other associational networks and spheres of practice from local economic activities providing networks of trust for vendors-customers relationships<sup>46</sup> to other networks of social capital that are widespread in Africa and can depend on the so-called ‘big man’ logic<sup>47</sup>. Among the Maasai, the sphere of consumption, especially of food, is normally loaded with an exceptionally complex set of meanings that rarely find equals in other communities around the world. Food consumption, in terms of different practices as well as types of foods, determines complex gender and age-based social dynamics and relations, including those of a ‘political’ nature between sectors of community, as well as the life cycle of single individuals (both men and women)<sup>48</sup>. Unsurprisingly, food consumption has acquired new meanings as a result of factors of change from urbanization to migration and economic development<sup>49</sup>, and religion constitutes one of these factors determining changing practices.

Isaya’s emancipation from traditional networks based on Maasai ethnic identity, as an example of the divergence between the religious and ‘traditional’ spheres and networks, for instance, was embodied in the way consumption of food would occur in his private family life. While on fieldwork, I visited his original home in a neighboring village to Losirwa, Losimingori village. The arrangements of furniture and other items in the *boma*, including those used for dining, clearly marked a deliberate shift from the way things are done, and food is eaten, according to the ‘traditional’ Maasai way. By the time we approached lunch time, a table would

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<sup>46</sup> K. Meagher, *Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Africa*, Oxford 2010.

<sup>47</sup> J.F. McCauley, *Africa’s New Big Man Rule? Pentecostalism and Patronage in Ghana*, „African Affairs”, 112(2012), pp. 1–21.

<sup>48</sup> A. Talle, *Ways of Milk and Meat among the Maasai...*, op. cit., pp. 73–93.

<sup>49</sup> A. Alegretti, *Maasai Ethnic Economy...*, op. cit.

be placed in the center of the hut, and people would sit in a circle and eat each in his or her own plate with forks and spoons. The party would be a heterogeneous mix in terms of gender and age. Such arrangements markedly differed from food consumption arrangements I had previously been acquainted with in other *boma* including Tutunyo family. Groups sharing food according to the 'traditional' arrangements are gender and age-based exclusive; men and women prior to marriage (and for some time after the marriage) would never share food together, neither would elders with younger people (although the restrictions are looser in such case). In Isaya's *boma*, a *moran* would also have food on his own, thus breaking one of the strongest taboos in Maasai culture, which forbids *moran* to have food individually without sharing with their comrades.

On the occasion of church events in Losirwa, I could easily recognize the same intentional breaking of traditional rules of food consumption that I witnessed in Isaya's *boma*. Men and women would eat either indoor in the church or outside, but not forming the small age and gender-based homogeneous clusters that are formed for instance during 'traditional' parties (e.g. circumcision feasts, wedding parties etc.). On such occasions, for instance, especially *moran* isolate themselves from the rest of the invitees as part of the social dynamics and conventions that designate the *moran* as the group that covers key functions within Maasai society (i.e. providers of security for both people and cattle).

Isaya always referred to the aforementioned taboos in food consumption practices as 'slavery', that is, for *moran* who are not allowed to eat when hungry unless sharing with another *moran* within the same age set, but also for married couples who are not allowed to share a meal, a normal activity any other non-Maasai couple is able to enjoy without restrictions, until they reach the adulthood stage of life (i.e. when men/husbands leave behind

the *moranhood* stage of life as the next batch of younger men are circumcised). On one occasion, Isaya revealed to me that many *moran* had confided him to concur with the church message but that breaking the food taboos, such as for instance the restriction on eating meat with women, would result in social stigma too strong to endure for them. Isaya himself was aware of the power of such taboos and added another untold truth which had to do with *moran's* anxiety to lose their appeal (hence sexual affairs) in the eyes of women in the village who were not affiliated to the church.

Once again, Lekishon was the most eloquent about the controversial relationship that *moran* establish with the two spheres ('tradition' and religion) while partaking in both:

I follow the tradition on food consumption when I am in traditional feasts, and I do not follow it when I am in a church feast. If I ate meat with women during the circumcision of *olayoni* [children], *wazee* [elders] and other *moran* would think I have gone crazy! [laughter].

Partaking in different communities, therefore, has created overlapping systems and sets of values which are not necessarily mutual exclusive, but that do entail discreet and subtle maneuvers within the realm and boundaries set by the values underlying each single community.

### **Religion and the materiality of development**

As consumption brings out the complex link between Christian spirituality and tradition within individual life paths for one to gain his or her personhood, other arenas of materiality, that is, the material expression of the church, embody people's efforts in striving to achieve development. The material and architectural expression of the church in Losirwa is imbued with meanings that pertain specifically to (the achievement of) development as an

essential and universal life project to better one's own life. This has to be looked at both within local social dynamics and in the broader national context where 'modern' houses (made of bricks and cement and corrugated iron roof) are indisputable signs of development and individual's economic success<sup>50</sup>. In the case of Maasai communities, as I have described elsewhere<sup>51</sup>, a 'modern' house is imbued with additional meanings when put in opposition (actual and symbolic) with the 'traditional' Maasai hut with the customary division of space according to age and gender<sup>52</sup>.

The relation between the materiality of 'the house' and instances of social organization has a long history in anthropology<sup>53</sup>. Not only the house itself, also furniture and other material arrangements that are part and parcel of the 'house' as a tangible expression of socio-cultural system(s) have been under the lens of anthropologists<sup>54</sup>. Elsewhere<sup>55</sup> I have touched more extensively on how the tangible expression of the house and domestic space in contemporary Maasai communities have taken new meanings that have clashed with customary domestic arrangements<sup>56</sup>, becoming an arena of the social transformations triggered by the shortening of distances between rural and urban areas. These changing dynamics bear

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<sup>50</sup> M. Green, *Participatory Development and the Appropriation of Agency in Southern Tanzania*, „Critique of Anthropology”, 20(2000), no. 1, pp. 67–89

<sup>51</sup> A. Allegretti, *Maasai Ethnic Economy...*, op. cit.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>53</sup> G. Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space. The Classic Look at How We Experience Intimate Places*, Boston 1994 [1958]; *About the House. Levi-Strauss and Beyond*, eds. J. Carsten and S. Hugh-Jones, Cambridge 1995.

<sup>54</sup> D.L. Lawrence and S.M. Low, *The Built Environment and Spatial Form*, „Annual Review of Anthropology”, 19(1990), pp. 453–505.

<sup>55</sup> A. Allegretti, *Maasai Ethnic Economy...*, op. cit.

<sup>56</sup> D.L. Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors...*, op. cit.; A. Talle, *Women as Heads of Houses: the Organization of Production and the Role of Women among the Pastoral Maasai in Kenya*, „Ethnos”, 52(1987), no. 1–2, pp. 50–80.

manifest resemblance with, for instance, the case of the pastoral group of the pastoral Endo in Kenya illustrated by Moore<sup>57</sup> where the process and (externally imposed) project of ‘modernization’ materialized as an opposition of values and meanings attached to ‘traditional’ houses (located on the escarpment) vis-a-vis ‘modern’ houses made of bricks geographically located on the valley floor. In Losirwa, repeated references during Sunday sermons are made to the church as the ‘house of God’ and how offers are needed to nurture ‘the house’ by purchasing new items, improving walls, constructing ‘modern’ toilets etc. The church as ‘house of God’ is metaphorically referred to as ‘moral’ shelter against the predicaments of modern society such as HIV, poverty, and general moral decay; hence, the church as architecture embodies the metaphor of the ‘house of God’. Not only in Losirwa; on other occasions such as for instance the inauguration of a church in the neighboring village of Esilalei I attended, the speech given by the Maasai village chairman concentrated on the new church as a timely resort for the Esilalei villagers against an unidentified looming plight hitting the community. The palpable euphoria I beheld on the inauguration day was also due to the participatory nature of the project which the nearly totality of the invitees had contributed to, and that had created a sense of collectivity and community sheltered metaphorically and materially under the roof of the newly constructed ‘house of God’.

Not until the early 2000’s, the connection between religion and development, especially in developing nations, has been obfuscated by the secular approach that prevailed in developed nations<sup>58</sup>. Eventually, towards the early 2000’s, academics have

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<sup>57</sup> H. Moore, *Space, Text and Gender: an Anthropological Study of the Marakwet of Kenya*, New York 1986.

<sup>58</sup> S. Deneulin and C. Rakodi, *Revisiting Religion: Development Studies Thirty Years On*, „World Development”, 39(2011), no. 1, pp. 45–54.

led the way towards the recognition of religion as an actor of and in development, drawing connections for instance with efforts made within the Millenium Development Goals framework in Africa<sup>59</sup> and preparing the terrain for Faith Based Organizations to be recognized by such important donors as the DFID as ‘agents of transformation’ (and be granted money for their operations)<sup>60</sup>. As the ‘traditional’ secular vision of development proved impractical, the academic world was confronted with new horizons of research and action. As Deneulin argues: “the unavoidable presence and importance of religion in the lives of people in developing countries – and in most developed countries too – invite development studies and its constituent disciplines to reconsider one of the assumptions upon which they are often based: that secularization is a universal, desirable, and irreversible trend”<sup>61</sup>.

The history of development and religion as an institutional and economic course cannot be detached from the political relations, and connections that contribute to determine it – connections and relations not only between countries or whole blocks (e.g. the so-called ‘Political Islam’), but also the kind of political relations that occur at small-scale levels. If development studies, as Deneulin has argued<sup>62</sup>, have had a rude awakening from the secular approach to development, other social sciences like anthropology, especially Africanists such as Meyer and others as highlighted above, have recognized the political implications at local level within the religion-development connection.

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<sup>59</sup> A.J. Njoh and F.A. Akiwumi, *The Impact of Religion on Women Empowerment*, „Social Indicators Research”, 107(2012), pp. 1–18.

<sup>60</sup> G. Clarke, *Agents of Transformations? Donors, Faith Based Organizations, and International Development*, „Third World Quarterly”, 28(2007), no. 1, pp. 77–96.

<sup>61</sup> S. Deneulin and C. Rakodi, *Revisiting Religion...*, op. cit., pp. 45–54.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibidem*.

For instance, in Losirwa, the investment in the church as a material construction and a collective project of development occurs also as a reaction that stems from the criticism by church people towards 'tradition', hence, an undertaking that feeds back into the 'political' relations between religion and 'tradition' I have referred to above. Benevolence towards church projects such as investing in furniture, renovations of the house and the like, are 'generous' acts that respond to the dialectal relationship between partaking in a community which requires altruistic gestures and individual motives aimed at the achievement of personal development<sup>63</sup>. Christian values of generosity are put in opposition to discourses of selfishness attached to 'tradition' and the stubborn attachment to cows as a form of individual wealth. But generosity, to the affiliated to the church, gets in not only for collective projects of church renovation; it is also an attribute that features other acts such as investing in the building of a private house, which are inherently to be considered private investments.

As such, the material expression of the church represents an alternative and parallel (to that of 'tradition') arena for accessing development that is strongly rooted into the local and national vision as to what constitutes progress, and development (i.e. a 'modern' house). The material expression of the church embodies values of modernity, and people's efforts in expanding it with new furniture and renovation stand for people's attempts to achieve such values. Where many individuals are not in the economic position that would allow them to build their own 'modern' house, investing in a collective venture enables them to embrace at the same time the values of generosity underlying the vision promoted by the church, and the values of individual development and modern national citizenship.

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<sup>63</sup> S. Gudeman, *The Anthropology of Economy: Community, market, and Culture*, Hoboken 2001.

## Conclusion

This chapter has tried to propose an alternative analytical framework for the understanding of the socio-economic context of the Maasai in contemporary Tanzania. ‘The Maasai’ today cannot be regarded as a discrete social unit with a specific ‘tradition’ or culture as distinctive traits of ethnic identity spatially bounded as it was during the pre-independence years when specific boundaries confined people to the Maasai Reserve first, then Maasai District<sup>64</sup>. On the contrary, even though the rural economy persists in specific spaces that could be even identified on a map, ‘the Maasai’ in contemporary Tanzania may rather be regarded as an assemblage of individuals each with their own life experiences within rural life and, importantly, outside of it. An ongoing process of negotiation between the ‘traditional’ rural economy and lifestyle, and a multiplicity of outside social and economic arenas, such as for instance religion, I believe, provides an appropriate analytical tool to make sense of the changes that commoditization and the market produce. It helps explain how and why average young Maasai men are not the only ones to live across multiple economies and communities. Even highly educated Maasai, of whom I have met a number, who live in cities and work for important NGOs, continue to have their own *boma* in their respective villages, and pursue parallel economic careers in their villages as livestock owners and occasional upscale traders.

As religion and church affiliation continue to spread among Maasai communities along with commoditization, urbanization, and the ‘market’, practices and meanings associated to Maasai ‘tradition’, culture, and ethnic identity will acquire further and more complex significance rather than disappear. My own pre-

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<sup>64</sup> D.L. Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors...*, op. cit.



diction on the ‘future of the Maasai’, a widespread concern among anthropologists that often has produced looming ominous prophecies, is that the Maasai will increasingly partake in a multiplicity of social, political, cultural and economic arenas also as a response to increasing pressure over the rural economy that comes from increasingly scarce natural resources. Rural life-style, social organization and culture will undertake some steady readjustments rather than major transformations to adapt to changing conditions.

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PART IV  
**VARIA**

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KLAUDIA WILK MHAGAMA

**EFFICIENCY AND UTILITY OF POLISH AID  
PROJECTS IN TANZANIA:  
Socio-cultural aspects of cooperation  
between local partners and external donors  
and its impact on development**

**ABSTRACT**

Although the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have been brought forward as one solution to more sustainable development in Tanzania, Church organisations and Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) still depend on resources ultimately originating from an organization's environment and/or international partners. Many organisations in Tanzania consider the partnership with the external donors as important for the long-term security in running the particular institutions. However, still there is a lack of regulations which could help such organisations to extend the long-term goals and sustain their success in cooperation with external donors. This is caused by several aspects. First of all, the permanent cooperation occurs in physical and material contribution involving financial sources and external staff. This causes some sort of dependency between these organizations and external donors. Donors and local partners have different power and resources, though often shared relief and development goals. Local partners may need funding to operate, donors need others to implement<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, such actors (e.g. Missionary societies, international donors) aim to decrease

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<sup>1</sup> *Local partnership: A guide for partnering with civil society, business and government groups*, Portland 2011, p. 20.



dependence<sup>2</sup>. Another aspect concerns the limited funding and short time of implementation of a particular project. This leads the relationship between local partners and external donors to a noncommitted relations rather than a long-term partnership. The last but not least important aspect mostly occurs in cultural and social context. Lack of special attention to this aspect may bring results nonefective to the local community. Donors often do not have access to communities due to security restrictions or limited personnel<sup>3</sup>. This aspect indicates the need of working with a local partner who accurately diagnates needs and then oversees the effective implementation of the project. Following these factors as a background for the heading of this paper, it is necessary to answer the following questions: 1) what is the partnership and what kind of role play local partners in cooperation with the Polish Aid; 2) what is the impact of a socio-cultural factor on formation of long-term effects? The above questions aim at identifying the most important factors influencing the long-term effects of project implementation in Tanzania leading to sustainable development.

## What is partnership?

According to the Guide of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)<sup>4</sup> „...a partnership is an agreement to do something together that will benefit all involved, bringing results that could not be achieved by a single partner operating alone, and reducing duplication of efforts. [...] To achieve sustained success it is essential that basic local parameters be created and agreed upon; equally essential are political will, resourcing, and the appropria-

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<sup>2</sup> J. Pfeffer & G.R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*, Redwood City 2003.

<sup>3</sup> *Local partnership...*, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> This document has been prepared collectively by members of the OECD LEED Forum for Partnerships and Local Governance and staff members of the Forum Office in Vienna, under the coordination of the Chair, Michael Förschner. The opinions expressed and arguments employed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD or of the governments of its member countries.

tion of funds”<sup>5</sup>. What is more, The Guide enumerates number of characteristics of efficient partnership<sup>6</sup>. There is no clear suggestion pointing to social and cultural aspects of partnership. However, there are several points indicating such characteristics like: social acceptance, representation by experienced persons who have influence within their organisation, good communication between actors and “learning culture”. The Guide emphasizes also the characteristics needed to implement long-term strategy. One of the first and most important is „an assessment of local needs and a consultation process with local actors,„as well as „the various measures and projects are planned and correspond to the strategy and to local and regional needs”<sup>7</sup>. According to Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff „...In the international development arena, the partnership is both a core element in programs to improve the delivery of key goods and services in poor and transitioning countries, and often applied descriptor of the relationship between the external funders of the programs and the organizations or groups in the Countries involved in carrying them out”<sup>8</sup>. In practice, partnership means maximizing the potential of a partner from a supportive country to implement project activities<sup>9</sup>. The Guide identifies partners highlighting the partnership’s objectives as important to bring in the different relevant parts of the public sector as well as the business, commu-

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<sup>5</sup> OECD, *Successful partnership. A Guide, OECD LEED Forum for Partnerships and Local Governance*, 2006, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem, pp. 7–8.

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> D.W. Brinkerhoff and J.M. Brinkerhoff, *Partnerships between international donors and non-governmental development organizations: opportunities and constraints*, „International Review of Administrative Sciences”, 70(2004), no. 2, p. 254.

<sup>9</sup> *Ewaluacja polskiej współpracy rozwojowej udzielanej za pośrednictwem MSZ RP w latach 2012–2015 w wybranych krajach Afryki Wschodniej i Bliskiego Wschodu, Raport końcowy z badania ewaluacyjnego KOMPONENT I – Afryka Wschodnia*, Warszawa 2016, p. 63.

nity and voluntary sectors<sup>10</sup>. Across this diversity, there are three broad groupings, though relationships may fit into more than one category at the same or different times and can evolve: 1. Project partnerships for a specific project with mutually agreed aims and objectives. 2. Strategic partnerships, working together over time with sufficient alignment of goals and objectives towards achieving a lasting impact on poverty. 3. Alliances with single organizations/groups or networks/coalitions of groups working together towards a specific goal, even though organizational/institutional mandates and long-term purpose may be quite different<sup>11</sup>.

### **Polish Aid as an external donor in Tanzania**

Polish Aid Programme (PAP) can be classified as a programme, coordinated by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>12</sup>. It is the main tool used for cooperation in the European Union and the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Poland, as one of the members, is involved in development cooperation for the benefit of developing countries. Polish development cooperation constitutes a part of Polish foreign policy and fits into the European and global development policies, including support for achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>13</sup>. In accordance with the law, the Polish

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<sup>10</sup> OECD, *Successful partnership. A Guide*, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> *Local partnership...*, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs coordinates development cooperation acting through the National Coordinator of Development Cooperation who holds the rank of secretary or undersecretary of state. The Coordinator is assisted by the Development Cooperation Policy Council, a consultative and advisory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>13</sup> Poland took an active part in the international community's efforts to elaborate a new set of development goals: the Sustainable Development Goals, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals; a new model of development cooperation funding, which culminated in the 3rd International Conference

development cooperation is based on the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme, developed for a minimum period of four years. The document sets the objectives and geographical and thematic priorities of development aid. The first multiannual programme covered the period from 2012 to 2015. Poland's Second Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme, covering the period from 2016 to 2020 and containing a strategy of action for developing countries, was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 6 October 2015<sup>14</sup>. Polish development cooperation is implemented through programmes and projects, addressed to specific groups of beneficiaries (bilateral assistance), as well as member fees and voluntary contributions to international institutions, funds and organisations (multilateral assistance). A substantial part of the funds is directed at priority countries of the Polish development aid programme in cooperation with Polish nongovernmental organisations, public financial sector units, Polish Academy of Sciences and universities. Polish aid projects are also carried out in cooperation with Polish representations and diplomatic missions<sup>15</sup>. Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 6 October 2015, the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme for 2016–2020 sets strategic objectives and directions of Polish development cooperation in the middle term. In line with the principle of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of development cooperation, the Programme outlines the areas targeted by Poland's development cooperation, providing for a more concentrated approach in terms of geography.

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on Financing for Development (13–16 July 2015, Addis Ababa); and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was formally adopted at the United Nations Summit on 25–27 September 2015.

<sup>14</sup> See: <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/About,Polish,aid,202.html> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> July 2017].

<sup>15</sup> See: <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Mission,statement,204.html> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> July 2017].

Tanzania as one of the priority countries has become a beneficiary of Polish Aid Programme<sup>16</sup>. Within frames of “Polish Development Assistance” Programme, between 2011 and 2017, Tanzania has become beneficiary of Polish Aid 22 times, including Foundation „Kiabakari”<sup>17</sup> that has become beneficiary 6 times (in 2013<sup>18</sup>, 2016<sup>19</sup> and 2017<sup>20</sup>).

<sup>16</sup> Priority partner countries now include current beneficiaries from Sub-Saharan Africa: Senegal, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. However, Polish Aid programme has also implemented several projects in other countries, e.g. Zambia, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia or Namibia. See: <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Sub-Saharan,Africa,449.html>, [access: 28<sup>th</sup> July 2017].

<sup>17</sup> Kiabakari is a village in northwestern Tanzania, between Lake Victoria and the Serengeti National Park. There is a Catholic parish run by a missionary. On the mission area there is a health center where about 15,000 people are being treated annually (mainly women and children). The mission also includes a kindergarten and primary school where 240 children are educated. In addition, there are over 40 people working on the mission. For more than 25 years Kiabakari has been run by a Polish priest who is also the founder of the Kiabakari Foundation, which works to improve the quality of life, health and education, and promotes the development of the local population.

<sup>18</sup> „Mbingu na Dunia – Mavuno ya Mvua” (Heaven and Earth – Water Harvest) – *complex system for harvesting, treatment and retention of rain and ground water for educational and medical institutions in Kiabakari* (PPR 122/2013); 2) “Mbegu Njema” (Good Seed) – *A modern preschool in Kiabakari: a chance for the proper development and education of the children in the rural areas of Mara Region. Transformation and refurbishment of the existing infrastructure for the needs of the preschool.* (PPR 124/2013); 3) „Upendo Unaojali” (Tender Love) – *broadening of the modern pre- and post-natal mother and child healthcare with the expansion of the hospitalization base in health center in Kiabakari.* (PPR 125/2013).

<sup>19</sup> “Tazama na Tabasamu” (Look and Smile) – *Eye and dental clinic in Kiabakari – an effective rescue measure in the desert of the medical services of this nature for the society of north-western Tanzania.* (PPR 46/2016); 2) “Shule Bora” (Perfect School) – *the completion of the construction and refurbishment of the primary school in Kiabakari – a chance of the access to the high quality education for the rural communities of Mara Region.* (PPR 47/2016).

<sup>20</sup> Salama Zaidi Lamadi (Safer in Lamadi) – *The betterment of housing conditions and safety of children and the youth with albinism through the construction of the dormitory and fencing the caring center in Lamadi.* (PPR 18/2017).

Since 2009 until 2016 within the “Polish Aid Volunteering Programme 2009”<sup>21</sup> Tanzania has become beneficiary 25 times, including three times for Foundation „Kiabakari” (in 2011<sup>22</sup>, 2012<sup>23</sup> and 2015<sup>24</sup>)<sup>25</sup>. Within the frames of „Small Grants” Tanzania has become beneficiary country two times including Kiabakari mission in 2012<sup>26</sup> and St. Walburg’s hospital in Nyangao<sup>27</sup> in 2015<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Since 2008, the MFA has been implementing the *Polish Aid Volunteering Programme*, aimed at supporting the direct involvement of Polish citizens to help citizens of developing countries, as well as disseminating information among Polish society on the problems facing these countries. *The Polish Aid Volunteering Programme* involves the following: Volunteers, Polish organizations managing volunteer work in the framework of projects, Partner organizations in countries covered by projects, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which finances the programme; See: <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Volunteering,Programme,810.html>, [access: 28<sup>th</sup> July2017].

<sup>22</sup> „Afya Bora” (Perfect Health). *Voluntary support of Kiabakari Mission, aimed at malaria and other diseases profilaxis, including introduction of health promotion and health education programs*. (WPP1283/2011).

<sup>23</sup> „Huduma ya Kwanza”. *Volunteer First Aid and Health Education for the citizens of Kiabakari and Kukirango community*. (WPP 931/2012).

<sup>24</sup> „Ili Wawe Na Afya” (That they may have health). *The growth of the level of the medicare of the inhabitants of Kiabakari and of the Butiama district in Tanzania* (WPP 783/2015).

<sup>25</sup> See: <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Polish,Aid,Volunteering,Programme,2015,-,Results,2292.html>, [access: 28<sup>th</sup> July2017].

<sup>26</sup> „Providing modern delivery unit to the Health Centre in Kiabakari (Tanzania)”.

<sup>27</sup> St. John’s Hospital Walburg’s is one of the largest hospitals in the region of Lindi and Mtwara. It is owned by a Catholic diocese. It is missionary hospital founded 56 years ago by the Benedictine nuns from Tutzing, southern Germany. The hospital has 220 beds and 4 basic departments: surgery, internship, obstetric gynecology and pediatrics. Previously there was also a tuberculosis treatment unit. The total staff number is 240 employees, of which 140 are medical staff. In the year 2015 the hospital received 34,440,000 outpatients who come to the hospital even from neighboring countries (eg Mozambique).

<sup>28</sup> Quality improvement of surgical treatment in St. Walburg’s Hospital in Nyangao and other hospitals in Lindi and Mtwara region (Tanzania).

## **The local partners and the key individuals in Tanzania**

Project implementation requires knowledge about the problems of local community as well as their development needs. Regardless of the sector, partnership should be governed by at least two main principles. The first one is *participation* of a member of a local community that gives a chance, directly or through representation by local partners, to participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of programs. Local partners play an essential role in encouraging participation and ensuring different experiences, needs and capabilities of various groups in a local community<sup>29</sup>. Hence, a close cooperation with the local partners at the stage of designing and project implementation is a prerequisite for accurate diagnosis. Very often, local organizations and their cooperative working with a PAP are based on key individual which may be a major person to complete the project successfully. The St. Walburg's hospital project, for example, was carried out in cooperation with a Polish doctor who has worked in the hospital for many years and is the only specialist surgeon working there. He is a key person in the field of cooperation for many years with a Polish diplomatic mission. As a partner and key individual, he provided many relevant information that led not only to the correct course of project activities but also to the continuation of the project. As a physician, he pointed first to the real problem of the local community, such as motorbike accidents, so that the problem was correctly diagnosed and invested in the hospital's surgical equipment. In the case of the parish in Kiabakari, there was a presence of a Polish missionary who had over 25 years of experience in missionary work in Tanzania. So far, he has coordinated many development and volunteer projects

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<sup>29</sup> *Local partnership...*, op. cit., p. 5.

in Tanzania. As a partner and key individual, he oversaw the implementation of the project, both in terms of quality and budget implementation. He also provided financial contributions for some tasks. In both cases, the local partners had the task of ensuring the timeliness of the project and the reliability of the work performed. They were directly supervising the implementation of the tasks and while carrying out the tasks of the project, they were responsible for realizing the new goals in accordance with the adopted concept. Such individuals supporting the organizations are concerned about the problems they face trying to maintain stable relationship. Due to Pfeffer & Salancik<sup>30</sup>, stable relationship is achieved through friendship, informational exchanges and understanding. This leads to the second principle of partnership which is *accountability*. According to the MerriCorps Local Partnerships Guide, accountability is defined as a two-way responsibility: among partners, between the program and donors, and the program and community. Partners are accountable to each other when they honor their commitment to communicate plans and are responsible for what they actually do. Accountability requires transparency<sup>31</sup>. That is why, the need to have a reliable partner who will be able to meet the project requirements is one of priorities leading to the sustainable development of local organisations<sup>32</sup>.

The partnership emerges itself not only in relations between the external donors and the local partners represented very often by key individuals, but also involves the local experts, leaders and representatives of the public. This is a form of *empowerment* that allows local actors to participate in project decision-making and take responsibility for their actions. At the same time, the partner

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<sup>30</sup> J. Pfeffer & G. R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations...*, op. cit.

<sup>31</sup> *Local partnership...*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> *Ewaluacja...*, op. cit., p. 37.



organization assumes that it supports the local community in the process of assuming responsibility for the implementation or continuation of the project, as long as the community needs it. It functions here as a facilitator, who gradually withdraws from the project activities. At a time when the local community is ready to take full responsibility for the effects of the project, all decision-making power goes into its hands<sup>33</sup>. In the case of St. Walburg's hospital, knowledge that was acquired during training is not only used by trained doctors, but also gives the physician the opportunity to transfer knowledge to other staff working in the same hospital or in nearby hospitals. This phenomenon is also referred to as the so-called self-sustaining model, which means that the support received for the project generates revenue that can be reused to sustain and/or develop positive effects of the program. In this case, the partner organizations themselves take care to ensure the continuity of the funding. Such model is particularly desirable in job creation projects<sup>34</sup>. One of the difficulties is certainly that the continuation of the project activities (training) is paid from the hospital's financial resources, which slightly damages the hospital budget. Nevertheless, according to the beneficiaries, the effects of the activities are so much added that the hospital's training has not stopped. This is of course a model example of the empowerment principle. In practice, a local partner has a constant control of project activities even after the project has been officially discontinued.

### **Socio-cultural context**

Another key aspect of successful implementation of projects in Tanzania is the skillful adaptation to the localized socio-cultural

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 65.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 51.

context. There are of course some obvious points concerning adaptation to the needs of the local community such as knowing the local language or overthrowing local superstitions (for example, putting a phone to the heart helps an unconscious person; the albino problem). However, it is worth noting the inapparent ones like the issue of expenditure that should bring long-term effects. This is extremely difficult with still modest resources of Polish Aid Project. It is therefore essential to focus resources and invest in projects that can bring significant improvements in a relatively short limit of time. In this area, the role of a local partner is very important. He can identify projects that address the needs of the local community. However, there is also a need to create the project based on expected effects as well as the cost of implementation. The projects evaluation indicates soft projects as those that have a high degree of efficiency. Special projects are devoted to the development of competences or professional skills, assuming the introduction of beneficiaries into the labor market or creation of new jobs<sup>35</sup>. In the case of actions targeted at the local community, the best sustainability of soft projects is noted, particularly where they are well suited to the current needs of the local community and the participants are deliberately selected from the local community (eg. local leaders). In this case, local community representatives not only use the knowledge they have acquired for their needs, but also become multipliers – they transfer knowledge further. The project – *Kiabakari first aid*, for instance, resulted in the emergence of knowledge multipliers using the knowledge acquired during the project but also continuing the activities of project on their own. Participants of this project (teachers, students, medical staff and the local community) continue their activities on their own, using the knowledge gained during the day-to-day training by

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<sup>35</sup> Ibidem, p. 32.

introducing first aid topics into seminar and into the classroom. Primary school teachers were teaching school pupils and others by showing in practice how to help, in the course of everyday situations (fainting, breaks, car accidents). However, the inclusion of a local community into the process of implementation, is also an important factor in the sustainability of projects<sup>36</sup>. This was the case with the first aid training in Kiabakari, where volunteers had to adapt the training to local problems (eg. snake bites, insect bites or motorcycle accidents) and to face local prejudices (eg. drinking Urine for poisoning). In the case of a maternity ward project, it was important to assure mothers-to-be of the possibility of having a baby without any obstacles. Previously, women often needed to be transported to a hospital 15 kilometers away, which was not always possible due to an ambulance or a private car, for which the owner required a high fee (which the family was unable to pay). Today, the equipped delivery room allows future mothers to have a peaceful and safe delivery on the spot.

According to the report, the biggest risk of failure to achieve and maintain the expected effects, is in the projects implemented in the field of health. There are the legal, procedural and institutional constraints that make the development of health institutions with the help of external donors very difficult. An excellent example is the St. Walburg's hospital in Nyangao, which operates in partnership with the government (Private Public Partnership – PPP). In case of this type of contract, the government requires free care for the vulnerable group (mothers, children and the elderly). In return, the government offers subsidies to the hospital in the form of basket funds or staff compensation, as well as the provision of adequate medical staff. The question of staff is, however, one of the biggest problems. The government is not able to provide enough doctors.

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<sup>36</sup> Ibidem, p. 54.

Single workers are delegated, but their work is temporary. Also, medical staff, when given the opportunity to work in a government hospital, resign from private / mission hospitals (in this case, the so-called church based hospitals) in connection with the possibility of receiving more government revenue. A similar situation occurs on the mission in Kiabakari. The health center is not supported financially and personally by the government. In addition, the resort can not perform many treatments because it does not have the official status of the health center. Another problem of the Kiabakari resort is the fact of having 25 medical staff. Meanwhile, the center employs 15 people and pays them from its own sources. For this reason, many operations can not be performed. In the case of volunteering projects that are being developed in both cases, there is a risk that the functioning of the health service is conditioned by the continuous flow of additional support in the form of material resources and volunteers, and there is no chance of self-realization<sup>37</sup>. Projects addressed to institutionalized beneficiaries, i.e. teachers or physicians, typically result in the departure of trained staff to better paid jobs, which causes them to cease working on project sustainability. The problem here can be to use the acquired knowledge for their own private needs, e.g. for self-development, change of work, etc., rather than for the purposes of the project. However, it should be noted that soft projects aimed at enhancing knowledge, the acquisition of competencies or skills, are sustainable in the narrow sense of the term, as the sustainability of once achieved effects of design activities. Once acquired knowledge and competences are provided to the beneficiaries, even if they are no longer linked to the achievement of the project objectives.

In a social and cultural context one should not exclude implementation of hard projects. However, combining hard and soft projects

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<sup>37</sup> Ibidem, p. 33.

(either in a single project or in the case of successive projects) is also frequently used and improves the effectiveness of the project, assuming the project is well suited to local needs. At St. Walburg's hospital that combination is implemented. Hard projects are visible through the support of the infrastructure: renovating not only the three hospital departments and the purchase of a variety of surgical equipment but also the renovation of the sanitary facilities. In the case of soft projects, trainings for physicians were conducted. The doctors involved in the project not only gained the knowledge they needed for their work, but also had the opportunity to make more surgical procedures, using already purchased tools. This indicates the ideal implementation of soft and hard projects in a single one.

## **Conclusions**

Trying to answer one of the questions concerning the role of local partners in the partnership with the Polish Aid, attention should be paid to definition of partnership that emphasizes such aspects as: a presentation by experienced persons as well as friendship, informational exchanges and understanding; good communication; and consultation process with local actors. For most projects implemented by PAP, the diagnosis of needs is based on analyses carried out by partner organizations. PAP assumes a great commitment of partners to the project and includes local experts, leaders and representatives of the public. Cooperation with the local partners gives PAP a good understanding of local issues, engagement, and partnership relations with local contractors. The implementation of PAP projects aims to build the capacity of partner organizations to manage their projects, finally leading to their professionalisation. In the case of Polish entities difficulties in carrying out the diagnosis is the construction of competitions, which do not assume the financing of preparatory work on the project, including onsite visits and diagnosis of needs

in cooperation with the partner organization<sup>38</sup>. Thus, presence of key individuals within the local partner organisation, that know the needs of local communities, is very often a critical success factor for project implementation. Key individual may be first pointing to the real problem of the local community and corresponds to the strategy and to local and regional needs. Key actors that represent local organisations may provide many relevant information that led not only to the social acceptance but also effective completion of a project and its continuation. Such activity supports the organization and maintains a stable relationship by friendship, informational exchanges and understanding.

The functioning in the socio-cultural context indicates the need not only of the already mentioned close cooperation with the local partner, but also the trust of the key individuals. However, to emphasize the type of implemented projects and the appropriation of funds are equally important. It seems that soft projects as those that have a high degree of efficiency. The most effective projects are the ones, that are devoted to the development of competences or professional skills. In that case, community representatives that are selected from the local community appear to be multipliers that transfer knowledge further. However, there is a need of inclusion of a local community that becomes direct beneficiary of the project. Although the soft projects are the ones assuring long-term effects, there is also a big need of combining hard and soft projects that reinforce synergistic effects<sup>39</sup>. However, the main barrier to the long-term effects is the low level of funding and the time limit (one year) of the projects. Thus, increasing expenditure on PAP is a prerequisite for more effective implementation of projects<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibidem, p. 67.

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem, p. 41.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem, p. 36.

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